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Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by
HENRY T. ROWELL

JAMES H. OLIVER
JAMES W. POULTNEY, JOHN H. YOUNG
EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editors
KEMP MALONE
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ON PLATO'S *TIMAEUS*, 49D4-E7.*

More than a decade has elapsed since Harold Cherniss' minute study of these lines appeared in this Journal.¹ Little further comment on this difficult passage has been published since. Norman Gulley gave us a broadside attack on Cherniss' whole interpretation,² and Friedrich Solmsen has dissented from some details of Cherniss' view, though agreeing with it on the whole.³ In the present paper, I advance a somewhat novel reading of the text. I follow the main lines of Cherniss' analysis, but I depart from him on numerous details, and, even when I agree with his reading, I sometimes do so for reasons other than those he has stated. The controversy over our passage, like the passage itself, is complex and often confusing. To make my argument as clear as possible, I divide this paper into three

* A shorter version of Parts I and II was read before the Johns Hopkins Philological Association in December of 1964. An earlier, fuller treatment of the issues appears in my unpublished dissertation, "The Concept of the 'Image' in Plato's *Metaphysics*" (Princeton University, June 1964).

¹ H. Cherniss, "A Much Misread Passage of the *Timaeus* (*Timaeus* 49C7-50B5)," *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 113-30. Hereafter, I shall refer to this work, as to the next two references, merely by the author's name.

² N. Gulley, "The Interpretation of Plato, *Timaeus* 49 D-E," *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), pp. 53-64. (I find no change nor further explanation of Gulley's views in his subsequent book, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* [London, 1962], pp. 130 ff. and p. 197, n. 54.)

³ F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (= *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, XXXIII) (Ithaca, 1960), at p. 41, n. 83, and p. 43, n. 91.

main parts. First (I), I set forth my own reading of the passage. Then (II) I criticize alternative versions of details in Cherniss and in Gulley. To conclude (III), I defend my reading through some related passages in Plato and in Aristotle which explain the philosophical point of the passage as I have construed it.

I

Many problems in our passage can be settled by careful attention to its place in the wider context of 48E ff. Plato introduces the "Receptacle" at 48E2-49A6, but he delays his explanation of its nature to discuss a preliminary question about the elements: *προαπορηθῆναι περὶ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ πυρὸς ἀναγκαῖον τούτου χάριν* (B1-2). Remarkably enough, that preliminary question is posed in *semantic* terms.⁴ Plato asks which elements genuinely deserve to be called, e.g., water any more than fire, or to be called any given thing whatever any more than all (together) as well as each (severally) (B2-4). It is difficult, Plato remarks, to tell which elements can be spoken of thus so that our account is reliable and stable: *ὥστε τινὲ πιστῶ καὶ βεβαίῳ χρῆσασθαι λόγῳ* (B5). This introductory question is then treated in two main steps: first Plato explains the difficulty about that question (B7-D3)⁵; then, in our problematic passage 49D3-E7, he recommends his own solution to it.

The difficulty is that our present, ordinary way of speaking cannot measure up to Plato's requirements of strictness and reliability. That stuff which we now speak of as water suffers radical changes: we can see it (as we think) becoming com-

⁴ The commentators have not been sufficiently impressed by this semantic orientation of all 49B-E. Its importance for the sense of 49D4-E7 will be developed in section III below.—Here, and often in this paper, I shall use the convenient term "elements," but Plato of course avoids that terminology throughout our passage, and does so quite deliberately, as 48B6-C2 shows.

⁵ Lines 49B6-7 specifically introduce this explanation of the difficulty. There Plato asks: "Now how and in what sense (*πῶς . . . καὶ πῇ*), and after raising what reasonable difficulties about them (*καὶ τί περὶ αὐτῶν* [sc. fire and the others] *εἰκότως διαπορηθέντες*) can we make this very statement (*τοῦτ' αὐτὸ . . . ἂν λέγοιμεν*—where the *τοῦτ' αὐτό* refers specifically to the statement of the difficulty just made in 49B2-5 [*τούτων γὰρ εἰπεῖν . . . χαλεπόν*])."

pressed and turning into ice and earth, or evaporating and becoming air: δ δὲ νῦν ὕδωρ ὀνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον . . . γῆν γιγνόμενον ὀρώμεν κτλ. The other elemental stuffs all appear similarly unstable (49B7-C7). Since none of them is free from change, no λόγος about any of them can be strictly secure. As Plato asks rhetorically: "which of them could one firmly assert to *be* any one (of these elements)—that one and no other—without feeling ashamed of himself?"⁶ None can qualify, so it remains for Plato to advance his own prescription for a "most secure" λόγος concerning the elements fire, earth, air, and water. This he does in 49D3 ff., but before discussing the internal complexities of these lines, we should notice their connection with the lines preceding. Plato's own phrases emphasize the connection as 49D4-5 δ καθορώμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον recalls 49B7-C1 δ δὲ νῦν ὕδωρ ὀνομάκαμεν . . . γιγνόμενον ὀρώμεν κτλ. In 49D4-5, he is still referring to that subject which has been before us all through 49B7-D3, and he does so specifically to drive home the moral of those lines describing the apparent cycle of elemental change: in order to speak "most securely" of the elements, we must not (as we now do) refer the term "fire" (or whatever) to phenomenal stuff.⁷ Instead, that term should be referred to something else, to something that does not change, to which Plato here refers as τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε (etc.).⁸

I turn now to the main concern of this paper, the problems internal to lines 49D4-E7. All agree that Plato begins these

⁶ For defense of this version of C7-D2 see section II *infra*. For the connection between 49B3 *ὅπως* and *δυσχύνεσθαι* here at 49D2, cf. *Soph.*, 231C, and *Rep.*, VII, 533A3-5. Notice, too, that the entire line of argument in *Soph.*, 221C-231C parallels that here in *Tim.*, 49B7-D3. So many aspects of the sophist are propounded there that διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι (231B9-C1), Theaetetus is at a loss (B9 ἀπορώ and C3 ἐκόντως ἀπορῶν) as to what *δυσχυνιζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὅπως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν* (C1-2).

⁷ We might thus compress the point of 49B7-D5 as follows: δ δὲ νῦν ὕδωρ ὀνομάκαμεν . . . μὴ τοῦτο προσαγορεύειν ὕδωρ. We must renounce our ordinary way of speaking (and of thinking) about the world.

⁸ For present purposes, it must suffice to take these words as a single referring phrase, parallel (as Cherniss argues in his note 3) with the other three τὸ . . . τοιοῦτον phrases in D6-7, E5, and E6-7. We shall return to elucidate the *meaning* of the phrase in section III below.

lines with three examples: first he deals with the case of fire (D4-6), then that of water (D6-7), and then he generalizes over any other cases (D7 ff.). Equally obviously, he gives his first two examples in the three-part form, *μη* X ἀλλὰ Y προσ-*αγορεύειν* Z.⁹ The key idea behind the present reading is that the third example also follows this three-part schema: that the ἀλλὰ in 49E4 parallels those in D5 and D6, introducing the third ("Y") factor which only then completes the schema begun in D7.¹⁰ The third example is of course much more complex than the others, and its sense is further obscured by the parenthesis in lines E2-4 (*φύγει . . . φάσις*), but a grasp of this basic three-part structure will help to clear away its difficulties.¹¹ Two major difficulties in it afford a test of any reading, and I shall try to show that this analysis resolves them both: the first is the problem of explaining Plato's rapid alternations between the singular and plural in lines 49D7-E4¹²; the second is the problem of interpreting E4 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν.¹³ In the analytic translation and the comments

⁹ Literally: 'not X but Y to call Z.' But the main source of the controversy over our passage is that this schema is ambiguous as between "do not call Z (by the name) 'X,' but call it 'Y'" (Gulley, Cornford, *et al.*), and "do not call X (by the name) 'Z,' but call Y (by that name)." (So Cherniss, and the present reading.)

¹⁰ The δέ in 49E5 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον does not, in my view, provide the parallel to ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον in D5 and D6. As explained in comments (iv) and (v) below, I take 49E5 δέ as occasioned by the subordinate, recapitulating phrase in E4 (ταῦτα μὲν . . . λέγειν). The whole of 49E4-6 is thus tantamount to μὴ ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . οὕτω καλεῖν (see below).

¹¹ As obvious and simple as this assumption of a consistent parallel structure might appear, I should warn the reader that I have nowhere seen it explicitly defended. Cherniss, in particular, reads E4 ἕκαστα in a way that clearly excludes this consistent schematic reading of the third example, and his comments in defense of his view do not show he found the present reading open for consideration.

¹² Cherniss was the first to emphasize this point (his notes 5 and 7), and rightly argued that many versions fail by disregarding it. Gulley quite unjustifiably dismisses the problem (p. 53, n. 3). (In his book, [p. 132] he gets rid of it entirely by rendering *αὐτά* as "it"!.) However, I agree with Gulley (p. 62) that Cherniss' own solution (given in his note 7, *sub fin.*) is implausible.

¹³ See Cherniss' note 8 for various views. But again, I believe Cherniss' own view is implausible, as does Solmsen (p. 43, n. 91).

that follow, I present and defend my own account of these matters. (The letters to the left of the translation indicate the elements of Plato's three-part schema, $\mu\eta$ X ἀλλὰ Y προσαγορεύειν Z. To avoid the ambiguity indicated in note 9 above, I render it "do not refer the term 'Z' to X, but to Y.")

- 1X As for that which we always see coming to be in different ways at different times [i. e. perpetually changing] —take, for example, fire—we must not refer to *that*,
 1Y but instead to what is of such-and-such-a-nature on every occasion,
 1Z as "fire";
 2Z neither <should we refer the term> "water"
 2X to *that*,
 2Y but instead to what is always of such-and-such-a-nature;
 3X neither <should we ever refer to that>—as though it had any permanence—
 3Z by any other <of the terms> which we believe to have some definite meaning, as we point, and make use of the terms 'this' and 'that'—
 for it *slips away* [*sc.* that which we point at does] and does not remain to be denoted as "this" or "that" or any other of the terms which would indict these things of being stable—
 (=3X) but, instead of calling *them*.
 (=3Z) each of these things,
 3Y that such-and-suchness constantly recurring alike in each case and in all together
 (=3Z) ought to be so called;
 4Y, Z for instance, that which is at all times of-such-and-such-a-character <should be called> "fire," and so with everything that comes into being.

I shall comment separately on each of the difficulties in the third example.

(i) D7-E2 ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθα τι: Since the clause is dependent upon ἄλλο μὴδέν, its position in the three-part schema parallels that of the preceding πῦρ and ἕδωρ. The ὅσα clause thus refers to the "Z" term of our schema, the general range of predicates which Plato's third injunction is to cover. (I shall offer a more

detailed defense of this interpretation of the clause—as referring to terms or predicates, not things—immediately after these comments, but I defer that now in order to proceed with problems in the structure of D7-E7 as a whole.) The *ὅσα* clause denotes an indefinite plurality of terms, but Plato refers to them here by alluding to their common use in conjunction with the gesture of pointing and saying, “this is (an) X.” This of course suggests pointing out just *one* thing at any time, and that suggestion is strongly reinforced by the singular demonstratives *τοῦτο* and *τόδε* prominent in 49E1.

(ii) 49E2 *φεύγει γάρ . . .* erupts at this point as an objection to that all-too-familiar and intuitively satisfying notion of pointing out some present physical object or stuff, and simply talking about *it*. I submit (*contra* Cherniss, n. 5) that no specific grammatical antecedent for *φεύγει* is present. The singular subject of *φεύγει . . . ὑπομένον* should rather be supplied from the immediately preceding *ὅσα* clause: the subject said to be so “fugitive” is simply one of those individual things which we so often point at and talk about. With the 49E2-3 phrase, *οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο κτλ.* Plato very pointedly echoes the words *τόδε* and *τοῦτο* from 49E1, and clearly marks a quite specific tie to that clause. For the same reason, the abrupt, emphatically singular verb *φεύγει* is purposefully and powerfully placed as a specific counterweight to the ordinary habits of speech described in that immediately preceding clause. Plato here interrupts himself to comment parenthetically on the kind of physically denoted subject that he has just mentioned, and thus to drive home his objection to our ordinary way of talking. I recognize that this same *kind* of subject was referred to by D4-5 *ἀεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν . . . γιγνόμενον*, and it is true as well that the *τοῦτο* understood in D7 referred back to that clause. None the less, we need not take that *τοῦτο* as the subject of *φεύγει*. What occasions Plato’s vigorous assertion of the point at just this juncture in the text is its specific relevance to his account of ordinary speech within the *ὅσα* clause. To tie *φεύγει* to any more remote grammatical antecedent in the preceding text is to mistake its specific function in the context.

(iii) At 49E3 *πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα* Plato’s explanatory aside widens in scope to encompass the variety of terms that we

take to signify phenomena. (We shall see in a moment why it has to do so.) At E4 *αὐτά* the pointed, censorious singulars of E2 drop away as he refers to all those many sorts of things we think that we can point to and describe securely (fire, water, man, ox . . .). Plato has to return thus to the plural number and the wider scope, for his third, generalizing example (begun at D7 *μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδέν*) is not yet finished: he has not yet given us the third ("Y") element that specifies the subjects to which the terms in question *should* be referred. If—as seems obvious on the face of it—Plato began this third example as a generalization of his point in the previous two, and therefore as parallel in structure to their own tripartite framework, then he has been moving, throughout 49D7-E4, toward that third general element which completes the schema. Therefore, as he completes this brief digression on the second element (the rejected or "X"-term), he has to generalize his characterization of it so as to regain the general scope of his third example. The variations in number in D7-E4 are quite understandable on this view. So too is E4 *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν*.

(iv) After the digression ends at *φάσις*, Plato resumes the grammatical construction of his prescription, with the infinitive *λέγειν* now replacing *προσαγορεύειν*. The *ἀλλὰ* here in E4 corresponds to those in D5 and D6 and serves, like them, to introduce the third ("Y") element which completes Plato's injunction. This time, however, it is not immediately followed by that third element. Instead, since the digression has somewhat disrupted the exact line of thought,¹⁴ the *ἀλλὰ* is followed by a compact repetition of the other two elements of the schema, preparing the way for that third:

(a) E4 *ταῦτα* replaces the *τοῦτο* understood in D7 as the X-term of the schema. The initial X-term (at D4-5) was a singular generic reference to what we see in change, a reference whose sweeping, generic force was supported by the whole of its immediately preceding context, the account of the elements' cyclical flux in B7-D3. But the force of that context has

¹⁴ This is shown by the very fact that *λέγειν* appears here to recover the force of *προσαγορεύειν*. That verb had been "understood" in D6 and D7, but the line of thought has been weakened so that an explicit verb is needed. See also comment (vi) below on the example in 49E6-7.

receded now, and the generalizing references in 49D7-E4 to the *many* sorts of things we think we can securely speak of, that we point to and observe in change, have attracted Plato's referring terms into the plural. We have already seen this in E4 *αὐτά*, and under that same influence *ταῦτα* replaces *τοῦτο* in 49E4.

(b) E4 *ἕκαστα*, like its earlier counterpart, the *ἄλλο μηδὲν (τούτων)* *ὅσα* . . . clause, represents the Z-factor of Plato's three-part schema, that indefinitely general range of terms which we are not to refer to these subjects. (For parallels to this perfectly straightforward use of *ἕκαστα*, cf. *Parm.*, 133D2 *ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπωνομαζόμεθα* and *Rep.*, VI, 507B2-3 *πολλὰ καλὰ . . . καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμεν.*)

(v) 49E5-6 *τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον . . . συμπάντων*: with two parts of the schema now accounted for, the Y-factor introduced by *ἀλλὰ* finally emerges, completing the parallel with the other two examples. I agree with Cherniss (n. 9) that this whole phrase forms a single unit. In addition to his arguments (some of which turn on his mistaken view of *ἕκαστα*) we can appreciate from our previous discussion that the closing words *ἐκάστων πέρι καὶ συμπάντων* are necessary. They are required with *τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . ὅμοιον* to generalize that phrase and so to make this third element of the example harmonious in scope with the generality of the previous two. Without them, the phrase *τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον* would merely be a more complex equivalent of the earlier *τὸ τοιοῦτον* phrases, phrases which were limited in force to their specific cases of fire and water, and so it could not provide the needed generality for the third example.

(vi) 49E6 *οὕτω καλεῖν*. With Cherniss (n. 9 at p. 122), I take *οὕτω* to refer to E4 *ἕκαστα*, but, unlike him, I do not think *ἕκαστα* is itself the word whose use is in question. My view is that *οὕτω* (i.e. *ἕκαστα*) *καλεῖν* means: to call *τὸ τοιοῦτον* etc. each of those things (like fire, earth, and air) excluded earlier under D7 *ἄλλο μηδὲν*. On this view, E6-7 gives a perfectly straightforward illustration of Plato's point: "for instance, <call> that which is always such-and-such 'fire'." But on Cherniss' own view, the example should surely be: "call it 'ἐκαστον'," not "call it 'fire'." For Cherniss holds "the meaning [*sc.* of *οὕτω καλεῖν*] necessarily to be that 'severally distinct,' *ἐκαστον*, is properly predicated . . . of the characteristic

that is identical in each and all of its recurrences."¹⁵ And the clear implication of this comment is, as Solmsen thought, that Plato is here all at once "concerned with the right use of the word *ἐκαστον*"¹⁶—that word itself. Plato's own example in E6-7 thus counts against Cherniss' construction of E4 *ἐκαστα*.

Furthermore, the fact that Plato offers this example at all would appear to support the present reading. It shows that he feels his point may have been somewhat obscured in the now extended presentation of the third example; for the terms in question (the Z-element of our schema) have not been directly mentioned since D7-E2, and they can use some recalling here. (On Cherniss' view that E6 *οὕτω* just refers specifically to E4 *ἐκαστα*, no such examples should be needed; worse yet, as I have argued, on his reading any such examples ought to be different from what Plato actually wrote.) We should not neglect to notice that Plato has already used (in D4-6) the instance of fire which he offers here.¹⁷ The fact that he repeats himself thus perhaps indicates a certain easiness or spontaneity about his composition of these lines, one that fits well with the syntactic fluctuations which we find in them, and especially well with his vivid interjection at E2-4. (I maintain this view in full awareness of the artful variation Plato has effected in his four *τὸ . . . τοιοῦτον . . .* phrases. *That* item—as we shall see in section III below—is clearly defined and prominent in his thinking here.)

We must return now to details of the dispute about D7-E2 *ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθα τι* which we postponed earlier. Because of a demonstrably mistaken consensus on the meaning of *δηλοῦν τι*, the clause has seemed more problematic than it need be. Let us briefly review the main positions:

- (1) Archer-Hind translated the clause, "such predicates as we express [*δεικνύντες*!]" by the use of the terms *this* and *that* and suppose that we signify something [*δηλοῦν τι*] thereby."
- (2) A. E. Taylor rightly objected that *δεικνύναι* means "to point

¹⁵ Cherniss, p. 122, lines 8-5 from the bottom of the page. I have omitted only the word "rather."

¹⁶ Solmsen, p. 43, n. 91.

¹⁷ For some implications of this fact, see the remarks on Gulley's treatment of this 49E6-7 example in section II below.

to," not "to express." He added that *δηλοῦν τι* must again mean "to point something out," since "to signify something" or "make a significant statement" must rather be *σημαίνειν τι*. Taking *ὅσα* as the direct object of *δεικνύντες*, he concluded it must refer to "the things we point out . . . not 'predicates which we express'."¹⁸ Thus he translated the clause: "any of the things we fancy we are indicating when we point them out by the use of the words *this* and *that*." (3) Cherniss now steers between these views. He endorses Taylor's criticisms of Archer-Hind on both *δεικνύντες* and *δηλοῦν*,¹⁹ but does not take *ὅσα* as the object of *δεικνύντες*, and preserves the reference of the clause to predicates, not things.²⁰ I find both his view and his translation often difficult to construe (particularly his translation of *δηλοῦν τι* as "to designate as something"), but instead of dwelling on them now I turn to my own interpretation.

Archer-Hind was surely wrong about *δεικνύντες*, but, despite his critics' unanimity, his view of *δηλοῦν τι* (= *σημαίνειν τι*) is defensible. The *locus classicus* for the technical semantic employment of *σημαίνειν τι* ("have some definite meaning," "be significant") is Aristotle's defense of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in *Metaphysics*, Γ, 4.²¹ Anyone who tries to deny the principle can be refuted if he will so much as make a meaningful statement:

σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὐτ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλον (1006a21-24).

To secure such λόγος, our words must have a determinate sense (*σημαῖνόν τι τὸ ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον ἐν* 1006b12-13):

τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαίνοντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι (1006b7-8).

But in Book Kappa, the doublet version of this familiar argument employs *δηλοῦν τι* for *σημαίνειν τι*:

¹⁸ All references are to p. 317 of Taylor's *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928).

¹⁹ Cherniss, p. 117, lines 19-20. (Hereafter: "117, 19-20.")

²⁰ *Ibid.*, see especially p. 118, 1-9 with 117, 22-24.

²¹ Though this appeal to the technical semantic context of *Metaphysics* Γ may at first appear remote, we shall see in section III below that it is very much in order for 49B-E.

τοὺς δὴ μέλλοντας ἀλλήλοις λόγου κοινωνήσκειν δεῖ τι συνιέναι αὐτῶν . . . δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δηλοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δὲ ἓν (1062a11-15).

Timaeus, 49D7-E2 handily parallels this case. Plato has here been saying all along that we believe the names of the elements signify the mutable stuff we see (49B7 ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν . . . γιγνόμενον ὀρώμεν κτλ.). The names we use for them are thus (to generalize), "terms we suppose to have some definite meaning as, physically pointing, we make use of the terms 'this' or 'that.'" (Or, to express the point schematically: they are the predicates [Φ] that can occur in contexts of the form, "This [item at which I am pointing] is Φ.")

Alternatively (but with much the same result) δηλοῦν τι may perhaps be taken more closely with ἡγούμεθα; that is, we, rather than the terms we use, are believed to δηλοῦν τι. Most interpreters have held this view, but it is a mistake to think the clause must then be taken as referring to phenomena, not predicates. At *Republic*, IX, 580D ff., Plato discusses the problem of how to designate the lowest part of the soul, since διὰ πολυειδίαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ (D11-E1). He suggests that we sum up its nature by dubbing it the "gain-loving" part:

εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπεριδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὁπότε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν (581A4-6).

(The upshot of the ὥστε clause is of course "so as to understand each other" [Shorey], but it is difficult to capture our phrase in translation. Cf. Jowett and Campbell: "so as to convey a clear meaning to ourselves"; Robin: "nous représenter à nous-mêmes quelque chose de clair"; and especially Schleiermacher's "so dass wir uns selbst . . . etwas bestimmtes dächten.") Following this example, we might render *Tim.*, 49D7-E2 as "the terms we use along with pointing and saying 'this' or 'that,' supposing that we are (thereby) expressing some clear sense (making our meaning clear, saying something definite)."

This alternative reading is of course very close to the first, since what *we* mean to say, and what we think the words we use mean, come to the same thing. (Compare the case of *Sophist*, 243D4-5: τί ποθ' οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ [sc. "τὸ ὅν"] δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται; "What [do] those who use the term intend it to signify?"

[Taylor] or "think it stands for" [Cornford]. But we might also render: "what do *they* mean [or mean to signify] by that term?" Cf. *Sophist*, 257B6-7: *ὅταν εἰπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;*) In either case, the clause in 49D7-E2 construes perfectly naturally as a generalization of the predicated term (the Z-element) in Plato's three-part schema, parallel to the earlier *πῦρ* and *ὑδωρ* as we have interpreted those here. I have not argued, let me emphasize, that this is the only possible interpretation of our clause; nor that Taylor, Cornford, Gulley, *et al.* have assigned it a sense it simply could not bear. I think their reading is a possible one—if our clause is considered in isolation. But I also believe that our analysis of the context has shown the clause must refer to predicates, not things, and thus that our interpretation, which we have now shown to be a perfectly possible one, must be the right one as well. To defend this reading of D4-E7 further, we must now discuss in more detail the ways that it conflicts with views expressed by Cherniss, and by Gulley.

II

Cherniss has settled many issues in the controversy over our passage, but I diverge from him on several details. The most important is the role of 49E4 *ἐκαστα* (and the whole phrase, *ταῦτα . . . ἐκαστα μὴ λέγειν*).²² The recapitulating role assigned that phrase in (iv) above is the key to my case for the full parallel between Plato's third example and the other two. Cherniss draws attention to the parallel construction in our passage,²³ but on his own view that parallel finally fails, and Plato never does complete the third example. I agree with Solmsen as to the unlikelihood of Cherniss' "idea . . . that Plato should here all at once be concerned with the right use of the word *ἐκαστον*,"²⁴ and one reason for its implausibility is the violence it does to the underlying parallel structure of the pas-

²² I am confining these remarks to 49D4-E7, but it should be noticed that rejecting Cherniss' view of E4 *ἐκαστα* may also bring into question the interpretations of some subsequent details which he bases on that view; these include 49E8 *ἐκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάξεται* (Cherniss, notes 9 [*sub fin.*], 13, and 17 [*sub fin.*]; but see Solmsen, p. 41, n. 83), and even the "gold-example" in 50A-B (see also note 71 *infra*).

²³ Cherniss, p. 117, 11-13.

²⁴ Solmsen, p. 43, n. 91.

sage. (Another, more direct argument against Cherniss' version of E4 is the resulting incongruity of Plato's actual example in E6-7; see comment [vi] above.)

Once the role of E4 ἀλλὰ and the ταῦτα . . . ἕκαστα μὲν λέγειν phrase are clear, the interjectory character of E2-4 φεύγει . . . φάσις reveals itself. Many versions of E2-4 fail demonstrably for the reasons Cherniss argues in his notes 5 and 7, but to my mind his own view fails, like the others, because it does not recognize the character of E2-4 as an aside, only briefly interrupting the consecutive parallel structure of the passage. Lacking this key to the function of φεύγει, and the reasons for the fluctuations in number, one is driven to devise strained explanations for the text.²⁵ I would of course admit I cannot *prove* these explanations wrong, but I believe that as soon as the structure of the context and the role of φεύγει . . . φάσις are revealed, the hypotheses are shown to be *ad hoc* expedients.

I have also rejected Cherniss' view on two other details: 49D1-2 (ποῖον . . . δυσχρηζόμενος), and 49D5 ἄλλη. (a) Cherniss argues that the parallel between D1-2 and 49B2-5 shows that "τοῦτο is the subject of ὅν and ὁτιοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο the predicate."²⁶ I agree with his use of this parallel, but in fact it only proves that ὁτιοῦν is predicative here, and that τοῦτο is not itself the predicated term. That does *not* prove τοῦτο is the subject, for there is an alternative: τοῦτο is in the predicate, referring for emphasis to the predicated term, though it is not itself the predicate. Translate: "which of them could one firmly assert to be only one (*sc.* of these phenomenal elements)—that one and no other?" (Cf. Fraccaroli's version: "quale è tra di esse quella che . . . uno potrebbe sostenere che è una qualche cosa e proprio quella e non altra?") Throughout his paper, Cherniss seems to me unduly apprehensive that, unless τοῦτο be taken as the subject in D2, one's entire interpretation of D4-E7 must founder.²⁷ These issues are in fact quite indepen-

²⁵ Cf. Cherniss, pp. 118-119: "Apparently Plato, just because he has said that 'it,' the phenomenon, does not abide, immediately and without further explanation refers not to 'it' as a single thing but to 'them,' the multiple and transient phases of the phenomenal flux."

²⁶ His note 1, lines 6 ff.

²⁷ See the last sentence of his note 1, p. 116, 8-10; p. 122 (lines 13-11 from bottom); and p. 126, 1-4.

dent, as our present reading adequately shows, and since Cherniss' version of D1-2 seems rather awkward to me (though it is no doubt possible), I submit the present version in its place.

(b) Most translators render 49D5 *ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ* more or less as I have—as perpetually changing, always coming to be in different ways at different times. But Cherniss translates (without comment), “at different times in different *places*.” That is of course a possible sense of *ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ*, but I believe it cannot be the right one here. Plato has not made any earlier allusion to things’ “places,” and if he were all at once to refer to his subject by that phrase, he would disrupt the continuity and clarity of his exposition. It seems to me the proper sense of D5 can be decided in the light of the resumptive role of the words: the fact that the entire clause, *ἀεὶ δὲ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γιγνόμενον*, refers to the same subject earlier discussed throughout B7-C7. Here *ἄλλοτε* recalls the temporal succession of states recounted in B7-C7, and, just so, D5 *ἄλλῃ* alludes to the various changes in state (condensation, dissolution, etc.) which produce the varying appearances we see. The clause itself thus refers to mutable appearances: “what we always see coming to be in various ways at various times.” Cherniss’ spatial rendering of *ἄλλῃ* affords no satisfactory sense in the context, and should therefore be rejected.²⁸

²⁸ Notice also (a) that one and the same individual can appear “at different times in different places” without any change but locomotion. (Cf. the description of Alexander turning up everywhere in a battle, *Arr., An.*, I, 8, 7 and VI, 6, 5: *ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ ἐπιφαινόμενος*.) Plato has prepared no such reservations in lines 49B7-D3, with their emphasis on radical changes of nature. (b) Cherniss’ reading weakens and even loses the basic contrast between our clause and *τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε*—the contrast between what is variable, and what is invariant in nature (cf. the similar contrast at *Crat.*, 439D3-6, where beauty itself *τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ ἐστὶν οἶόν ἐστιν*, and see section III below on *Arist., Met.*, Γ, 5, 1010b19 ff.). (c) Support may also be drawn from Simplicius (who read 49D-E in Cherniss’ sense): while paraphrasing 49B-E just prior to quoting E6 ff., he writes, *εἰπὼν* [*sc. δὲ Πλάτων*] *δὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς* [in 49B7-C7] *καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀεὶ γινόμενον, οἶον τότε τὸ πῦρ καὶ τότε τὸ ὕδωρ, οὐκ ἄξιον ὠρισμένῳ ὀνόματι καλεῖν ὥς ἀεὶ μεταπίπτον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον* [cf. 49D4-7], *ἐπάγει* “*καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ.* [49E6 ff.] (*In de Caelo*, p. 637, 3-5 [Heiberg]). The underlined phrases may be influ-

To summarize: I have agreed with the main lines of Cherniss' reading, but I depart from him on these details: (1) 49D1-2 (τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο), (2) D5 ἀλλή, (3) D7-E4 ὅσα . . . φάσις (several items here: the exact sense of δηλοῦν τι, the subject of φεύγει, and the rationale for Plato's variation from singular to plural), and (4) E4 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα . . . ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν (with the later reference to this in E6 οὕτω καλεῖν).

One difficulty in discussing Gulley's paper—and this is one main objection to it—is his lack of any clear defense and explanation for his own view. He is content to argue against Cherniss' reading, but that is not adequate, since his critique of Cherniss fails and leaves all the problems in his own view unexplained. I shall deal first with the weaknesses in his attack on Cherniss,²⁹ then with some weaknesses within his own interpretation.

Gulley says nothing about the connection between 49D-E and the preceding context (from 49B). Instead, he rests his case against Cherniss on the internal consistency within 49D-E (also using 50A1-4). He argues as follows:

- (1) At 49E2-4 (φεύγει . . . φάσις, the "digression" in our view) Plato says it is a mistake to call things "this" or "that." (50A1-2 implies the same.)
- (2) In the D7-E2 clause (ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθα τι) Plato says that we do now speak thus, but *implies* that this is a mistake.³⁰

THEREFORE:

- (3) The entire sentence (49D4-E2) *says* that it is a mistake to call things "this." (That is, we should translate it

enced by 49E2-4 and even 50A5-B4 (quoted just a few lines before), but the wording here is quite close to 49D4-7 taken as a unit, and suggests that Simplicius took δὲ . . . ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γινόμενον in our sense. (Simplicius' paraphrase of the passage *In Phys.*, 224, 2-5 [Diels] is too loose to bear on this issue, but again supports Cherniss' basic reading of the passage.)

²⁹ I must add that I sympathize with *some* of Gulley's criticisms, and have rejected some of the details of Cherniss' view that he attacks. Here my concern is just to show the fallacy in Gulley's "proof" that Cherniss' whole line of approach to 49D-E is mistaken in principle. For *that* attack—if successful—would also count against my own variation on Cherniss' reading.

³⁰ On this "seemingly obvious implication" see Gulley, p. 58, lines 4, 20, 21; p. 59, 10; p. 62, 18.

"do not call fire 'this'" and so forth, rejecting Cherniss' approach to the ambiguous three-part schema.) But how is this conclusion supposed to *follow*? How could the fact that Plato *says* Q (in 49E2-4) after he *implied* it (in D7-E2) prove that he had also *said* it *before* he implied it (i. e., said it in the earlier part of the sentence, D4-7)?³¹ To fill in his argument, Gulley simply spells out the "seemingly obvious implication" of the $\delta\sigma\alpha \dots \tau\iota$ clause, and then adds:

If this is Plato's point here [*sc.* in D7-E2 $\delta\sigma\alpha \dots \tau\iota$], *consistency seemingly demands* that his point in the examples in the previous part of the sentence [*sc.* D4-7] is [the same, to wit,] that it is wrong to apply the terms 'this' or 'that' to what is not a definite 'something,' to fire or to water.³²

Now, his protasis here is already an equivocation: so far he has only said what he takes Plato to imply, and goes beyond that in assuming "this is Plato's point." But even if he had established that about D7-E2 $\delta\sigma\alpha \dots \tau\iota$, why would "consistency demand" his conclusion? All that could follow is that Plato's "point" in the $\delta\sigma\alpha \dots \tau\iota$ clause should consistently be applicable to the earlier examples. But it can of course apply to them and still not be what had been said explicitly of them in D4-7: all consistency requires is *consistency*, not repetition! Only a careful and direct account of the form and content of our passage, the sequence of Plato's thought within the context, could support the kind of inference Gulley ventures. But he gives us no such analysis, and when one is given—as we have shown in Part I above—it fits quite consistently into Cherniss' reading of the schema.³³

³¹ Throughout, this jump from final clause to total sentence is the crux of Gulley's argument: at pp. 59-60, he appeals to 50A1-2 to prove a point about the clause alone (see 59, 30-60, 25), but extends his conclusion over "the sentence 49D4-E2" (60, 26; cf. 59, 28-30); at pp. 60-62, he appeals to 49E2-4 to decide the sense of "what precedes it" (61, 13-14; 62, 20), but again conflates the clause (61, 10; 62, 18-19; and *all* of his working references) and the entire sentence (61, 2-3, 7-8; 62, 16; 63, 1, 4-5).

³² Gulley, p. 58, 8-11. Italics added.

³³ In his other main line of argument (at 61, 15-62, 19, and cf. 58, 19 ff. with note 8), Gulley tries to show an incoherency in Cherniss' use of an "innocent" and "guilty" $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$. This very confused argument misrepresents Cherniss' view, as I show in full in my dissertation cited above, pp. A13-A17 of the Appendix.

There are also several weaknesses in Gulley's own view of the passage. One is his failure to explain—or grasp—the role of 49D-E within the total context beginning at 49B. At one point, he protests against Cherniss that

Plato has previously [that is, in C7-D1] made it clear that the 'elements' fire, water, air, and earth *are* constantly changing phenomena, and this in itself makes it implausible to read into what follows [that is, into 49D-E] an injunction not to apply these terms (fire, water, etc.) to constantly changing phenomena.³⁴

As polemic, this is misdirected, because Cherniss' view (and mine) is not at all that 49D-E enjoins just what we should *not* do, but, far more importantly—what is the real point of the passage—that it also gives Plato's positive advice about what should be done. Worse yet, Gulley's protest shows that he is blind to Plato's basic line of reasoning in the context: he has not seen that the positive injunction in 49D-E is given on the very ground so *pointedly* repeated from C7-D1 (or B7-D1), that perceptible stuffs are constantly changing. Far from being "implausible" or redundant, this repetition is deliberate and fundamental to the sequence of thought in the passage. But Gulley ignores all that, and takes our passage as a closed and isolated unit to be deciphered only on the basis of internal consistencies.

Another difficulty is the self-refuting character of Gulley's interpretation. On his reading of the basic schema, Plato is saying that phenomena can and should be referred to as "such-like" or "of such-and-such a kind." But how can this possibly square with what Plato himself says in the "digression" at 49E2-4? Phenomena are "fugitive." They slip away from any designation that would convict them of being stable: οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ πᾶσαν ὄση μόνιμα ὥς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις. But if they are as fugitive as all that, how can they offer any foothold even to the designation τοιοῦτον? And even if that term could somehow get some grip on the phenomenon, how could it possibly satisfy Plato's demand here (cf. 49B2-5) for a πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος? How could it accord with his own description of his recommended mode of speaking

³⁴ Gulley, p. 59, 18-23. Italics his.

as "the most sure and certain by far" (*ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῶς*)? Gulley rightly compares 49E2-4 with *Tht.*, 157B,³⁵ but he likes to think that 49D-E (as he construes it) disavows the radical flux doctrines of the *Theaetetus*, on which it would be "as illegitimate to apply the term 'of such and such a kind' to any part of [perceptible flux] as it is to apply the terms 'this' or 'that'".³⁶ Unhappily, he never explains how Plato's still very extreme language at *Tim.*, 49E2-4 (and cf. D7 *βεβαιότητά τινά*) leaves any room for "legitimately" using *τοιούτων* of phenomena. On his own reading, therefore, Plato's advice is internally incoherent and self-cancelling. At best, the exception allowed for *τοιούτων* is an utterly gratuitous assumption and an astonishingly "lame plea," as Owen³⁷ regarded it.

Besides these fairly general difficulties, there are several of detail. As Gulley emphasizes against Cherniss, "a very special emphasis is given [in D7-E4] to the terms 'this' or 'that'".³⁸ We must remember that Plato does not have quotation mark conventions at his disposal. When he wants to make it clear that he is talking about a word ("mentioning" it, rather than "using" it, as logicians say) he cannot set the word off in quotes, and rather uses it with an explicit verb of "saying," or prefaces it with an explicit verbal marker (*τὸ ὄνομα*, *τὸ τοῦτο* or the like). Now, on Gulley's interpretation Plato has been talking about the word *τοῦτο* from the very start. But then why is it that he casually "mentions" *τοῦτο* twice (in D5 and D6), and yet still feels the need to specify—by writing *τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τοῦτο . . . προσχρώμενοι* in E1—that he is talking about the use of that word? On Gulley's reading that should already be crystal clear. It has to be so clear that the reader can "supply" the word in 49D7,³⁹ but by the same token it must be so clear that Plato's special verbal emphasis in line E1 upon the fact that he is there concerned with the use of the word *τοῦτο*—would be painfully redundant. Gulley's ubiquitous use of quotation

³⁵ Gulley, p. 61.

³⁶ Gulley, p. 54; see also 53-56 and 64, and his book, pp. 120 ff. and *passim*.

³⁷ *C. Q.*, n. s., III (1953), at p. 85, n. 6.

³⁸ Gulley, p. 58, 2-3; cf. pp. 59-60 on 50A1-2.

³⁹ Gulley supplies it in quotation marks in line 9 of his translation.

marks masks the incongruity which his view forces upon Plato, but the fact is that Plato's special emphasis in 49E1 rather counts against Gulley's reading. It shows that when Plato is concerned with the application of the word *τοῦτο*, he takes pains to be explicit about it (cf. 50A1-2). He did not use the emphatic, clarifying device any earlier because he was *not* there talking about the word *τοῦτο*; the change in his idiom at 49E1 marks the appearance of his *new* concern with that word.

Finally, at two important places in the text Gulley departs without comment from almost all previous versions. He renders 49D1-2: "of which of them can one confidently assert . . . that it is any definite 'this' and not any other thing?" It is not clear what this could mean. Contrast with it Cornford's version: "which of them can we stedfastly affirm to be *this*—whatever it may be⁴⁰—and not something else." This is somewhat vague, but he apparently took *ὁτιοῦν τοῦτο* as an indefinite indicator for any identifying terms—a place-holder for predicates. At any rate, the word "this" was clearly not itself the word he thought to be applied.⁴¹ But Gulley's quotation marks around "this" (he has them for every occurrence of the word in our lines) must mean that he takes *τοῦτο* itself—as in D4-E7—to be the term applied. *Why* it should be so—why Plato would say that here, or what it could mean here in the context of 49B ff.—Gulley never explains.

Equally casual and undefended is Gulley's novel view of 49E6-7 (*καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . τοιοῦτον*). He translates (consistent with his reading of 49D4-E6): "thus we should call fire 'what is always such and such'." But almost every other translator—even those who rendered the earlier lines as Gulley now does—translates this line in just the opposite sense! (Thus Cornford: "give the name 'fire' to that which is at all times of such and such a quality."⁴²) Hackforth⁴³ appears to have been the first

⁴⁰ Thus rendering the indefinite *ὁτιοῦν*. Gulley's "any definite 'this'" is quite gratuitous.

⁴¹ Perhaps compare Aristotle, *De An.*, I, 3, 428b18-22: the senses rarely err concerning their "proper objects": *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκόν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται* (b21-22). See Ross and Hicks *ad loc.*

⁴² The same "about face" is found in Taylor, Archer-Hind, Bury, Jowett, Apelt, and Rivaud.

⁴³ *C. Q.*, XXXVIII (1944), at pp. 35-7.

one seriously troubled by this incongruity, and his view is most revealing: he agreed that if *καλεῖν* were supplied from E6 with E6-7 (the standard view), the clause would have to be interpreted in the usual, incongruous manner. For that very reason, he "understood" an *εἶναι* in E6 instead.⁴⁴ It seems that it never occurred to him to adopt the way out that Gulley has now taken: to supply *καλεῖν* and just translate without the incongruity.—It is understandable that Gulley should have wished to eliminate the incongruity: the *καὶ δὲ καὶ* collocation regularly introduces a particular example of some generalization stated just before,⁴⁵ and so E6-7 ought to agree with E4-6 and with the whole of D1-E6; further, since the case of fire was specifically dealt with earlier in D4-5, the example in E6-7 certainly ought to parallel that passage—though on most translations it does not. But the force of the Greek was here so clear to Hackforth and to so many other Hellenists of stature that they accepted the incongruous reading—a fact hardly comfortable for Gulley's casual dissolution of the problem.

To summarize: I have argued (1) that Gulley's attack upon Cherniss' reading fails, (2) that his own account of the passage fails to make sense of its rôle in the wider context of 49B ff., or to make coherent sense of its content, and (3) that his views on several details appear untenable.

III

We saw in Part I above that Plato differentiates in 49B-E between *τὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον* and *τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεὶ*; and he prescribes there that, in order to achieve a *πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος* of the elements, we should not refer their *ὀνόματα* to the former (as we customarily do, B7-C7), but to the latter. A comparison with Aristotle's semantic argument in *Metaphysics* Γ earlier helped support our reading of *δηλοῦν τι* in 49E2, and some further comparisons with *Metaphysics* Γ will now help clarify this reading of 49B-E as a whole; for Plato's distinction, and the language with which he makes it, find close parallels there.

⁴⁴ See Cherniss' criticisms of Hackforth in his notes 9 and 10.

⁴⁵ See Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, pp. 255-6 (2), Cherniss, p. 123, note 10, and Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 319 (*ad* 49E6-7).

In Γ, 5, Aristotle discusses sources of the Presocratic view that contraries must belong simultaneously to sensible things so that no given statement could be any more true of them than any other.⁴⁶ Among his several counter-arguments, Aristotle notes that the senses each report upon their proper objects, and never do thus find contrary attributes in one thing at one time (1010b14-19). Neither, he adds, do they contradict themselves as time goes on (ἐν ἐτέρῳ χρόνῳ b19-20), at least not as regards an attribute or character itself (τὸ πάθος), as distinct from a subject to which the property belongs (τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος b20-21). For such a subject may admit opposing predicates—the same wine seems at one time sweet and at another not (b21-23)—but not so the attribute sweetness itself:

ἀλλ' οὐ τό γε γλυκύ, οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾗ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν,
ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀληθεύει περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον
γλυκὺ τοιοῦτον (1010b23-26).

Here the parallel with Plato's distinction is close. (a) Plato's reference to the sort of thing ὃ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον (49D4-5) covers any mutable "subjects" such as the wine. (With D4 ἄλλοτε see Aristotle's ἐν ἐτέρῳ χρόνῳ [b19-20] and ὅτ' ἐ μὲν . . . ὅτ' ἐ δέ [b21-23].) Conflicting statements can be made about these (1010b19-21 ἡμφισβήτησεν), so that (as Plato puts it) one can not speak really firmly here—asserting that they *are* οἷον—τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο—without feeling shame at his temerity (cf. 49D2-3: παγίως δυσχυριζόμενος . . . αἰσχυνείται τις ἑαυτόν). But by contrast (b) characters or properties do not admit conflicting predicates: like sweetness, each is "always" (b24 αἰεὶ) and "necessarily" (b25 ἐξ ἀνάγκης) just as it is—τοιοῦτον οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾗ (b24-26). It is this stable aspect of appearances that Plato refers to by the general phrases τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε, τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεὶ (cf. *Phd.*, 103E5: αἰεὶ, ὅτανπερ ᾗ), τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον.⁴⁷ Since such characters are

⁴⁶ See especially P. DeLacy, "οὐ μᾶλλον and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism," *Phronesis*, III (1958), pp. 59-71. *Tim.*, 49B is cited at pp. 61 and 68, and *Met.* Γ and Κ at pp. 61-3 (and *passim*), but DeLacy does not pursue their similarities.

⁴⁷ Ross comments (*Aristotle's Metaphysics*, I, p. 278, ad 1010b19-30) that Aristotle distinguishes here "between the combination of subject and attribute and the bare attribute [which] . . . remains always self-

not subject to change, each can "most securely" be said to be just what it is, and not anything else.

Although the *status* of the entities or aspects differentiated here is problematic, it seems fairly clear how Plato's drawing of the distinction would serve to satisfy his starting demand for a *πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος* of the elements. A stable *λόγος* needs a stable, reliable subject.⁴⁸ Even if phenomenal subjects appear just as they are while actually perceived, they are mutable, and what becomes of them at other times cannot be relied on.⁴⁹ A *πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος* requires an immutable subject, so that one can be certain that, whenever one "comes back" to it, it will still be the same.⁵⁰ Hence Plato's injunction: to achieve a *πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος* of the elements, *μὴ τὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν "πῦρ,"* and so forth.

However, I believe we can probe deeper, and that Plato's reasoning in 49B-E can be explained more fully still by a comparison with other parts of *Metaphysics* Γ. The comparison is somewhat cumbersome, but if successful it illuminates several details of Plato's thought and language in 49D-E.

Aristotle's main line of defense for the Principle of Non-Contradiction may be said to come down to the irreducibility of a distinction between two kinds of *λόγος*. As Maier remarks, the major arguments in Γ, 4 (up to 1007b18) "beruhen auf der Unterscheidung von definitiven und accidentellen Prädikaten, von Sätzen, welche von ihrem Subjekt dessen Begriff aussagen, und solchen, in denen das Prädikat ein beliebiges Accidens des

identical and never becomes its opposite." Compare Cherniss' characterization of Plato's *τὸ τοιοῦτον* (etc.) as "the perpetually self-identical characteristic" (p. 129). Cf. *Crat.*, 439D3-6.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Tim.*, 29B-C. But Cherniss (pp. 128-9) is of course right that the recurring "suchnesses" of 49D-E are not themselves Platonic Forms.

⁴⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Met. Z*, 15, 1039b27-1040a5, explaining why there cannot be a definitory *λόγος* of any concrete particular (*σύνολον*). Cf. *Z*, 10, 1036a2-7, and *Top.*, E, 3, 131b21-30.

⁵⁰ Compare Plotinus' point about *dei ὄντα* in III, 7, 5, 5-7, best rendered by Hans Jonas in *Festgabe . . . E. Voegelin* (1962), p. 302: one grasps their nature to be such "dass ich versichert sein kann [*πίστιν ἔχειν*], dass es so bleibt und nicht irgendwann anders sein wird—dass also, wenn ich mich wieder darauf richte, ich es noch als das Selbe finden werde [*εὐρεῖν τοιοῦτον*!]."

Subjekts ist."⁵¹ We may (roughly) distinguish these as follows: (a) one form of λόγος asserts that a predicate happens to belong to some subject; such predicates may or may not apply, and may apply at one time, but at another time not. In this sense, there may be indefinitely many things that any subject "is." (b) The other form of λόγος asserts that a subject is essentially of some specific nature—is so "necessarily" and "always."⁵² And in this sense there must be just one thing that the subject "is"; for this defining form of λόγος tells precisely "what the subject is" (τί ἐστι) and formulates its determinate essence (οὐσία):

τὸ δ' οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ
(1007a26-27).⁵³

Against this background, Plato's point may be expressed as follows: any λόγος dealing with phenomenal subjects (τὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γυγνόμενον) must be of the first variety. These subjects lack fixity of nature (D7 βεβαιότητά τινα); there is no one thing that they can be said to *be*, to the fixed exclusion of all else. But since to signify the essence of something entails (as Aristotle puts it) ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ, this is to say there can be no essential characterization, no defining λόγος, of such subjects.⁵⁴

⁵¹ H. Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*, I (Tübingen, 1896), p. 52. The argument from determinacy of sense which we cited in Part I above of course fits readily here: to have any genuine significance at all (δηλοῦν τι, σημαίνειν τι), a word must have some one determinate significance (τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν 1006b7). Thus there must be a defining λόγος stating just what that one determinate significance essentially is; see Maier, p. 48, n. 1, and Ross, *op. cit.*, I, p. 287 (*ad* 1012a22). See also note 59 *infra*.

⁵² For these standard antitheses to κατὰ συμβεβηκός predication, cf. *Met.*, A, 30, E, 2; and cf. 1010b23-30.

⁵³ Cf. a25-26. I take it that this strictly limited, determinate character of the defining λόγος is Aristotle's point here. (As Ross notes, a30 τοιοῦτος λόγος means a definition of essence, and Bonitz [*Ind. Ar.*, 545b21] rightly enters this passage under 'οὐσία i. q. ὁρισμός.' Cf. 1024b29-36.) Though Aristotle's example ("man") is of course in the category of substance, it seems *this* point would hold for formulations of τί ἐστι in any category (cf. *Top.*, A, 9, especially 103b35-39). More limited is the point about καθ' αὐτό existence in *An. Post.*, A, 4, 73b5-10 and A, 22, 83a9-14, 30-32, b22-23; and, of course, the refinements of *Met.*, Z, 4-6.

⁵⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Met.*, Z, 15, and note 49 *supra*.

They lack what Plato elsewhere calls *βεβαιότης τῆς οὐσίας*.⁵⁵ By the same token, they cannot provide the single, determinate and stable significance required for the elements' names to *δηλοῦν τι*.⁵⁶ For a *λόγος* of the second sort, then, we require another sort of subject, and the recurring "suchnesses" that Plato introduces here (*τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι*) provide the required stable determinacy of nature and necessary self-identity.⁵⁷ In this case, it will be possible to have a *λόγος* telling just "what the subject is"—that it is *really* that,⁵⁸ and is just that and not something else (*οἷον τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο*).⁵⁹ Only in reference to this sort of subject can the names of the elements have the stable, determinate sense required if they are genuinely to *δηλοῦν τι*.

With this analysis, we can now also trace some relations between our passage and its wider context in the *Timaeus*. Plato had earlier complained that people think they know well enough "what the elements are" (48B5-7 *νῦν . . . ὥς εἰδόντι πῦρ ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν, κτλ.*). The view he means, no doubt, was that these elements are just the material stuffs that we perceive—or are, at least, such that they *could* be thus perceived if one

⁵⁵ *Crat.*, 386A4, cf. 386E1. Note the anti-Protagorean context here, as in *Thet.* and much of *Met.*, I, 4-5.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Met.*, K, 5, 1062a13-15 with I, 4, 1006a34-b11.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Met.*, 1010b26-28, and K, 6, 1063a27-28 with I, 5, 1010a22-25. Note also K, 6, 1063a33-34: *διαμενούσης παγίως* [see note 59 *infra*] . . . *φύσεως ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς*, and for sweetness as a *ὑρισμένη φύσις*, cf. Theophrastus, *de Sens.*, 70 (*Dox. Gr.*, 519, 26-520, 1).

⁵⁸ See *Tim.*, 49B3 *ὅντως*, and see note 6, *supra*, for its connection with 49D2, and with *Soph.*, 231C (where, again, the context is pursuit of a definition, 217B, 218C, 221C).

⁵⁹ *Tim.*, 49D2. Cf. *Met.*, I, 4, 1007a26-27, and notes 53 and 58 *supra*. With *παγίως* in D2 see also *Thet.*, 157A4 *ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι . . . παγίως* (cf. *Rep.*, V, 479C4).—All the "semantic" points in this section can be considered as elaborating Plato's remark in *Parm.*, 135B5-C2. It states the core of Aristotle's two basic arguments against those who would reject the Principle of Non-Contradiction: (i) that they do away with essence (*οὐσία*) (1007a20-33, 1010b26-30), and (ii) that they "destroy all *logos*" (1006a26, b8-11, and cf. 1062a11-16, b10-11, and 1063b11, with Plato, *Parm.*, 135C2, and *Thet.*, 181B-183C). As in Plato, the two arguments are inseparable, for *οὐσία* is that in reference to which *λόγος* has significance: determinate being grounds determinate sense.

could only isolate a large enough pure sample.⁶⁰ On that view, anyone who seeks a λόγος of the elements—by asking, for instance, τί ποτ' ἔστι, τὸ πῦρ;—might (in principle, at least) be answered by presenting him with an actual sample of fire, pointing to it, and saying, τοῦτο πῦρ ἐστι.⁶¹ In 49B-E, Plato repudiates this view on the semantic ground that no proper λόγος can be had in reference to phenomenal subjects.⁶² Another sort of subject is required for a λόγος that will really tell "what fire is," and so articulate that one, determinate recurring character in reference to which the name "fire" has significance. Plato does not actually give that λόγος in 49D-E, but he does distinguish here that determinate nature (τὸ τοιοῦτον αἶν) for which such a λόγος can be had; his λόγος of the elements is given afterwards, in 53C ff.

The above comparisons with *Metaphysics* Γ have only been intended to bring out the semantic "overtones" in *Tim.*, 49B-E, not to imply that Plato's views here are exactly the same as Aristotle's, nor that Aristotle drew his arguments from Plato.⁶³ Although these "overtones" are fairly muted, I believe that

⁶⁰ Plato's charge that the Presocratics tended toward such materialism is more explicit in the *Phaedo* and *Laws* X, but can also be discerned here in *Tim.*, 48-52. (See Cornford and Taylor on allusions to the Presocratics in 49B-C, and, for a defense of Plato's opinion, see Vlastos' remarks, *C. P.*, XLII [1947], at pp. 176-8.) The "semantic criticism" of Presocratic cosmologies implicit in *Tim.*, 49B-E is another link between our passage and *Met.*, Γ, 5. In the *Timaeus*, however, this criticism is subsumed within a general vision of the "all-too-human" failings expressed in the first-person plural statements at 48B5-8, 49B7-8 and D7-E2, and 52B3-C2 (though not 51B8, C4).

⁶¹ In short, they hold that there can be "ostensive definition" of the elements' names. (Contrast Plato's view in *Polit.*, 285D-286A and 277C, and *Soph.*, 218C.)

⁶² Indeed, for *him*, the only ἀσφαλὴς λόγος of the form τοῦτο X ἐστι (pointing as we speak) must apply to the "Receptacle" (49E7 ff.; see especially 50A5 ff.)!

⁶³ Interestingly enough, Lewis Campbell especially remarked (*The Theaetetus of Plato*² [1883], p. 271) that two of Aristotle's arguments in *Met.* Γ were of a different kind from any in the *Thet.* These were the argument from the presuppositions of σημαίνειν τι, and the 1010b19 ff. distinction between thing and character; and these are the very two which we have found in *Tim.*, 49B-E. (To the best of my knowledge, this similarity has not been suggested before.)

several details of the text attest that Plato's thought there has deep-reaching connections with the semantic context of *Met.*, I, 4-5, and can only properly be understood against that background.

I shall conclude with these brief supplementary remarks: As analyzed here, Plato's point in *Tim.*, 49D4-E7 is essentially a logical-semantic contrast "between the combination of subject and attribute and the bare attribute."⁶⁴ That fact has two important consequences. First, the distinction is perfectly general. Though Plato posed his initial question with specific reference to the elements (49B), nothing in his answer really limits it to them, and his subsequent remarks show that a general, even universal point was intended.⁶⁵ Second, the distinction is in itself quite neutral with respect to any metaphysical questions. Plato soon goes on to speak of phenomena as "images" of the separate Forms (50C5, etc.) but his case for the Forms' existence here will rest on the epistemological distinction between *voûs* and true belief (51D-E). His semantic reasoning at 49B-E gives no direct support for the theory of Forms. (Thus here, as often, Aristotle will agree with Plato's basic distinctions and semantic conceptions, while rejecting the metaphysics Plato superimposes upon them.⁶⁶)

However, 49B-E is clearly meant to offer some support to the metaphysics of *becoming* in our passage. This entire semantic inquiry about the elements began (at 49B1-2) as a "necessary" preliminary to the account of the "Receptacle," and Plato's exposition turns in fact to that dark theme at 49E7. The connection seems to be the following: By drawing the essentially

⁶⁴ Ross, *op. cit.*, I, p. 278 (*ad* 1010b19-30). This seems to be essentially the same as Cherniss' distinction (p. 129) between the "phase of the phenomenal flux" (i.e., "the apparent affections of the receptacle") and "the perpetually self-identical characteristic that is the determining factor of the indeterminable affection."

⁶⁵ 49E3-4 *πάσαν . . . φάσις*, E7 *καὶ ἅπαν ὁσοντερ ἂν ἔχη γένεσιν*. Cf. 50A2-4, and note that the question raised about Forms of the elements at 51B-C is also quickly extended, and answered in fully general terms. The three-part summary in 52A-B is also stated in completely general terms, with no reference at all to the example of the elements.

⁶⁶ With 1010b19-26, see in particular *Phys.*, A, 3, 186a28-31. See also *Met.*, M, 2, 1077a36-b11, and the ubiquitous *τὰ πάντα ἀχωριστά*.

semantic distinctions with which we have been concerned, Plato is also inviting us to replace our ordinary way of speaking—and of thinking—about nature with another, more “secure” variety. We are urged to view nature, not as a realm of subsisting, alterable *things*, but as a moving pattern of *recurring forms* (each invariant in nature).⁶⁷ Ordinarily, we view the world as a realm of temporally enduring stuffs and objects, things sometimes stable in nature, sometimes changing. When something which is first of one sort later becomes another, we would say, “it” has changed. Should it later change back again, we would say, “it has gone back to that condition,” or, “it has returned to its original form.”⁶⁸ But instead, Plato urges, we should say (and think), “the form comes around again.” All the phenomenal world is to be seen as made up of the occurrences of recurrent, stable, and determinate characters; as the “appearing and vanishing” (49E7-50A1) of recurring forms. But if all perceptible phenomena are viewed thus as occurrences of characters, not as enduring substances or things,⁶⁹ there must be some (non-phenomenal) subject to which the “characters” can belong. Thus Plato’s (semantic) reduction of the elements from things to properties or characters in 49B-E necessitates the role played by the “Receptacle.”⁷⁰ Thus, for

⁶⁷ For the notion of recurrence (explicit in 49E5 *περιφερόμενον*) see especially Cherniss, p. 121, and his references to *Rep.*, 402A-C and *Polit.*, 277E-278D. With *Polit.*, 278B-C on mastering *στοιχεῖα* so as to have *ἀληθῆς δόξα* concerning them “every time” we encounter them, n. b. *Tim.*, 37A5-B8 (especially B8: *δόξαι καὶ πίστεις . . . βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς*), and *Met.*, I, 5, 1010b24-25 *ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει*. With *Polit.*, 278B1-2 *τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν*, see references in note 57 *supra*.

⁶⁸ Cf. 49C3 *ἐκ τῶν ἀπὸν αὐθις*. Compare Aristotle’s account of our ways of talking about change in *Phys.*, A, 7, and, with Plato’s remark about *τοῦτο* and *τόδε* at 49E2-4, see especially A, 7, 190a21-23.

⁶⁹ Despite many disagreements on details, there is widespread agreement among commentators on this general import of the passage; see Cherniss, pp. 128-30, Cornford, 180-1, Fraccaroli, 248, n. 1, Taylor, *ad loc.*, and Gulley, 54 (pp. 132-3 of his book).

⁷⁰ There is another, important textual proof of the essential connection between Plato’s discussion of the elements in 49B-E and his account of the Receptacle: when summing up the nature of the Receptacle at 51B2-6, Plato does not confine himself to 50D4-51B1, but concentrates instead upon the nature of the elements as appearances *in* the Receptacle. That is, he treats the whole of 49A6-51B2 as the unit summarized in 51B2-6.

all its internal complexity, 49B-E is only a preliminary part of Plato's exposition, and leaves us still some distance from a full-fledged metaphysical theory of phenomenal becoming. Much remains to be said about the exact course of Plato's thought as he moves towards that goal in *Timaeus*, 48E-52D.^{71,72}

EDWARD N. LEE.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

⁷¹ I have in mind especially the question of the referent of 50A5 *αὐτοῦ περὶ*, and the precise import of the "gold-example." Cherniss (p. 125, 1-2) takes *αὐτοῦ περὶ* as referring back upon the whole of 49C7-50A4, and interprets the 50A5-B5 gold-example accordingly. But we have seen that 49B2-E7 forms a unified treatment of the preliminary problem about the elements; that problem is done with at 49E7, and the way is thus prepared for treating the Receptacle. That is the new topic Plato embarks upon in 49E7-50A4, and it is most probable, I feel, that A5 *αὐτοῦ περὶ* refers *only* to that. To prove this view, however, would require a full critique of Cherniss' reading of the gold-example, and that cannot be undertaken here. (See pp. A99-A135 of my dissertation, referred to earlier.)

⁷² I am greatly indebted to Prof. Harold Cherniss for his very helpful criticisms.

COLLECTORS OF ATHENIAN TRIBUTE.

A new fragment of the Athenian decree of 426/5 B. C. regulating the collection of tribute was found in 1964 on the south slope of the Acropolis and placed temporarily in the Byzantine annex of the Stoa of the Asklepiaion. Dr. Nikolaos Platon published a photograph and a majuscule text.¹ The inscription was recognized at once by Eugene Vanderpool as part of the Athenian decree published as D8 by Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor in *The Athenian Tribute Lists*,² where it preserves the ends of lines 22-34. The stone has now been taken to the Epigraphical Museum and given the inventory number 13355. It joins below fragment 5 and to the right of fragment 6. A close examination shows traces of letters along its top edge that were not visible in the first photograph, and which must be taken into account in the restoration of line 22. A tentative text follows:

Part of D8 (*A.T.L.*, II, pp. 52-3)

- a. 426/5 a. (Second Prytany) ΣΤΟΙΧ. 36
- 21 [h]εκάστοτε πρόσθε[ν τῶν ἡερόον· εἴ]στο δὲ καὶ Σα
μίους καὶ Θεραῖοι[ς ἁμοῖον φ]σ[τέ]φ[ι]σμ[α] περ[ι τ]
ὄν χρεμάτων ὄν τε χ[ρὲ ποῖν πλ]έν τῆς αἰρέσεως
[τ]ῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ εἴ τ[ις ἄλλ]ε πόλις ἐτάχσατο χρ
25 [έ]ματα ἀπάγειν Ἀθην[αζε· τ]ὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τὸδε ἐσ
[τέ]λει ἡε Κεκροπ[ι]ς πρυτ[ανεί]α θέτο ἐμ πόλει· Π
[...]κριτος εἶπε· τ[ὰ μὲν ἄλ]λα καθάπερ Κλεόνυμ
[ος· ἡ] ὅπως δὲ ἄρι[στα καὶ ῥᾶ]ιστα οἴσονται ἈθENA
[ιοι τ]ὸν πόλεμ[ον γνόμει] ἐς τὸν δέμον ἐχφέρεν
30 [ἐκκλε]σίαν [ποιέσαντας ἡε]οθινέν· ἔδοχσεν τῷ
[βολῇ καὶ τῷ δέμοι· Κεκρ]οπίς ἐπρυτάνευε, Πo
[λέμαρχος ἐγραμμάτευε, ἡ]νυγαῖνον ἐπεστάτε,
[Κλεόνυμος εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλ]λα κατὰ τὸ πρότερο[ν]
34 [φσέφισμα ¹⁴.....]ματα ἐς τὸν [...⁵...]
lacuna

¹ *Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον*, XIX (1964), *Χρονικά*, p. 22 and Plate 11β. See the photographs published here in Plates I and II.

² Vol. II (1949), pp. 52-3; cf. also Vol. IV (1953), pp. ix-x. For large-scale photographs of the other fragments of this stele see *A.T.L.*, I (1939), pp. 123-6, and II (1949), Plate V; Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (1937), pp. 4-12.

The readings in line 22 have been most difficult. The last iota in $\Theta\epsilon\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\iota[\varsigma]$ is no longer on the stone, but was seen by Rangabé.³ Of the second phi in $[\phi]\sigma[\acute{\epsilon}]\phi[\iota]\sigma\mu[a]$ only the lower tip of the upright is preserved. Following this the next preserved stroke is the lower stroke of sigma. Then the photograph shows a tip of the left stroke of mu. In the preposition $\pi\epsilon\rho[\acute{\iota}]$ only the lower tips of the uprights in pi and rho are preserved. The letter between them looks like omikron on the photograph, but Vanderpool, after examining the stone in Athens with especial reference to this letter, writes: "It seemed to me that in the fourth space from the end $\omicron$ was excluded, but ϵ was a possibility. I am not sure that what one sees is really a stroke rather than a break, but it suits the lower bar of an ϵ ."⁴ It is my belief that the words $[\phi]\sigma[\acute{\epsilon}]\phi[\iota]\sigma\mu[a]\ \pi\epsilon\rho[\acute{\iota}\ \tau]\delta\nu\ \chi\rho\epsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu$ may be taken as almost assured in lines 22-23.

But the interpretation presents difficulties even where the reading is sure. A lacuna of seven letters must be filled in line 22, for which I now suggest the word $\hbar\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\nu$. In fact, this decree does not apply to Samos and Thera, but Kleonymos had in mind the necessity for another decree of similar nature (with one notable exception: $[\pi\lambda]\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\ [\tau]\delta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$) which would apply to them. The present decree was concerned mainly (lines 5-8, 59-60) with the provision that all cities paying tribute to Athens should have collectors ($\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$). But there were also cities that made contributions of money other than tribute ($\phi\acute{\omicron}\rho\omicron\varsigma$) in the narrow sense of that term. Notable among these were Samos and Thera.⁵ They were to have no collectors for these other moneys, but the new decree would be concerned with them and with any other obligations they might have: "about their money and what they have to do." I doubt that the relative $\delta\nu\ \tau\epsilon$ in line 23 can refer to $\chi\rho\epsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu$. The relative with $\tau\epsilon$ is epic,⁶ and $\delta\nu$ here must depend directly on the preposition $\pi\epsilon\rho[\acute{\iota}]$; $\delta\nu\ \tau\epsilon$ means "and what," and is the

³ *Antiquités Helléniques*, I (1842), No. 269.

⁴ Eugene Vanderpool and Markellos Mitsos have been unsparing of time and effort in their study of the new fragment. Their help has been invaluable, and they have now incorporated the stone in the stele as a whole.

⁵ See Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (1937), pp. 35-8.

⁶ See Alfred Bloch, *Museum Helveticum*, XII (1955), pp. 145-53.

approximate equivalent of καὶ πάντων ᾧ, in which ᾧ is the object of χ[ρὲ ποῖν].

The "men" of line 24 must be the collectors, and the verb ἐτάχσατο, restored by the editors of *A.T.L.* but now preserved on the stone, is the same as that used of the Samian indemnity in Thucydides, I, 117, 3. Samos never paid tribute, but Thera paid both tribute and indemnity.⁷

The business of the collectors and provision for getting the money to Athens from the tribute-paying cities had been in some degree taken care of in the text down to line 21. Provision was then made for a similar decree to be brought in later about Samos and Thera, and the first decree of Kleonymos closes with the usual injunction about inscribing the decree on stone and setting it up on the Acropolis.

The amendment of lines 26-30 was moved by Polykritos or Pythokritos. Either name can be restored. In line 28 I owe the restoration [ῥοᾶ]ιστα to Hugh Lloyd-Jones and to David Lewis.⁸ In line 30 [ἡε]οθινέν was a brilliant suggestion of A. M. Woodward.⁹ The subject of ἐχφέρειν must be τοὺς πρυτάνεις understood. The προβούλευμα or γνώμη doubtless refers directly and specifically to the recommendation already adopted that a new decree would be proposed for Samos and Thera. We do not have this decree, but it too may have been proposed by Kleonymos. He had already proposed the so-called second Methone decree in the first prytany of 426/5,¹⁰ in which (lines 51-56) provision was made for the business taken up in D8.¹¹ It was anticipated even then that this might take more than one day¹² and the amendment to the first decree of D8 carries on the note of urgency by providing for an early meeting of the assembly on the morrow. Hygiainon (line 32) must have been the presiding officer on the day following Onasos (line 4), and it is most probable that Kleonymos was again the orator. Had a

⁷ Cf. *A.T.L.*, III (1951), p. 336.

⁸ My correspondence with Lewis about this new fragment has been stimulating and profitable, but any errors of interpretation are still my own.

⁹ *J.H.S.*, LVIII (1938), p. 109 (cf. *S.E.G.*, X, 72).

¹⁰ Published as D5 in *A.T.L.*, II (1949), p. 49.

¹¹ Cf. *A.T.L.*, I (1939), p. 213.

¹² D4, lines 54-55: συν[ε]χῶς δὲ ποῖν τ[ὰς ἐκε]ῖ ἐ[δρα]ς ἕως ἂν δι[απρ]αχθεῖ.

different orator been named in line 33 the author of the earlier decree ($\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron$ [ν $\phi\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\phi\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$]) in lines 33-34 should normally have been specified; but there is no room for the restoration of a formula with the name Kleonymos in line 34, whereas the name can well occupy the nine available spaces at the beginning of line 33.

This second decree (lines 30-58) concluded the business about the cities that paid $\phi\acute{o}\rho\omicron\varsigma$; the vote to finish this before taking up other business was being observed. That it was in fact finished is assured by the later introduction of other business, again by Kleonymos, while Hygiainon was still the presiding officer.¹³ At some time on the same day Samos and Thera had also to be considered.

Since the amendment (lines 26-30) refers to the original motion of Kleonymos, it is clear that the text of lines 10-26 was not itself an amendment, and the restoration of lines 10-11 must be changed to read

[-----]
[... τοῖς δὲ ἐλλεγοταμίαις ἐκκλησίαν ποῖν] ἐπ


The reading of lines 13-14 should be [$\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}$] $\Delta\iota\omicron\nu\acute{o}\sigma[ια]$ rather than [$\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$] $\Delta\iota\omicron\nu\acute{o}\sigma[ια]$, and this can be effected by restoring [$\epsilon\dot{\iota}\kappa\omicron\sigma\iota$ $\epsilon\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}$] $\Delta\iota\omicron\nu\acute{o}\sigma[ια]$.¹⁴

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.


¹³ A proxy decree, honoring some unknown benefactor: *I. G.*, II², 71 = *S. E. G.*, X, 73.

¹⁴ For the date "after the Dionysia" see now *A. T. L.*, II (1949), p. 50, D7, line 19.



Courtesy of Markellos Mitsos

PLATE I: New Fragment of D8 (EM 13355)



Courtesy of Markellos Mitsos

PLATE II: The Rebuilt Stele of D8 (Frg. 11 not shown)

VERGIL AND THE HOMERIC SCHOLIA.

A Comparative Study of *Aeneid*, XII, 216-467 and *Iliad*, IV, 86-222 *

It has long been axiomatic that Vergil wrote under the influence of Alexandrian poetry and the literary tastes and theories which produced it. These tastes and theories would not only be indirectly apparent from the Hellenistic poetry which Vergil is thought to have imitated, but they would also be directly expressed in the literary commentaries and criticisms of the Alexandrian scholars.

Scholarly investigation in this area has thus far been confined largely to studies of Vergil's appropriations of Hellenistic themes, plots, psychology, and imagery.¹ In the case of influence upon the *Aeneid*, it would seem to be equally important to study the possible effect on Vergil of the Alexandrian scholia on the Homeric poems. Though this type of investigation has not hitherto been made, there has been some recognition of the need for it, for the eminent Vergilian scholar, Richard Heinze, did in fact intimate that Vergil might have considered the scholia.² More recently, Michael Coffee in an address to the Vergil Society of London stated:

The scholia frequently comment on the lowliness of the subject matter of some of the similes of the *Iliad*. It is possible that theories of decorum affected Apollonius' practice, and so in turn, that of Vergil.³

* I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Professor Carl R. Trahman of the University of Cincinnati both for the suggestion of this topic and for his continued kindness and patience in helping me with every aspect of my dissertation, from which this article is largely drawn.

¹ Cf. E. S. Duckett, "Hellenistic Influence on the *Aeneid*," *Smith College Classical Studies*, I (1920); M. Hügi, *Vergils Aeneis und die hellenistische Dichtung* (Bern, 1952), etc., and more recently, B. Otis, *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963).

² *Virgils epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915). Cf. his index, "Homerscholien," and especially p. 164, n. 1.

³ "Vergil and the Tradition of the Ancient Epic Simile," delivered on January 16, 1960.

One wonders if these theories of decorum, as well as others, might not have affected Vergil directly!

The purpose of this investigation, then, is to examine an aspect of Vergil's technique of imitation in the *Aeneid*, and to attempt to demonstrate a probable indebtedness to Alexandrian literary criticism on an episode which he appropriated from the Homeric poems. This essay is necessarily limited, yet it is hoped that the few passages of this brief but important episode, which I shall compare and analyze in the light of the Homeric scholia, will afford new insight into some of the many subtle and virtually imperceptible changes which Vergil so often made on his prototypes. It is hoped, too, that this study will help further an understanding of Vergil's assimilative powers, and above all, of his originality, for it is indeed in his imitation, as Heinze and Pöschl have demonstrated, that Vergil's originality can best be appreciated.⁴

It might legitimately be asked whether so accomplished a poet as Vergil would have had recourse to so vast and rambling a collection of comments as those which comprise the scholia as we know them today, especially in view of the fact that the critical and exegetical work of the Alexandrians has often been brushed aside as so much "misapplied logic." The vast bulk of the scholia, the most abundant corpus of literary commentary in antiquity, does, however, contain items of aesthetic criticism.⁵ "Misapplied logic" there may frequently be, especially from our point of view, and so it may often have seemed to Vergil, who did not hesitate to appropriate passages athetized by the Alexandrians. And yet, many of these same passages appear in the *Aeneid* with significant changes, some of which may have been suggested, if not by the particular arguments of the scholiasts, then at least by their critical temper.

It must also be remembered that the entire corpus of Alexandrian scholia derives from excerpts of commentaries compiled by scholars of the early Roman Empire. These scholars in turn had incorporated into their own work the textual and exegetical criticisms of the Alexandrian commentators.⁶ Fortunately, how-

⁴ V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Vienna, 1950), pp. 43 f.

⁵ Cf. Dionysus Thrax, *Ars Gram.*, I; W. Bachmann, *Die ästhetischen Anschauungen Aristarchs*, 2 vols. (Nürnberg, 1902).

⁶ Cf. T. W. Allen, "The Homeric Scholia," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVII

ever, several manuscripts frequently preserve the ultimate sources of these scholia so that we may attribute them, despite their fragmentary nature, to such scholars as Zenodotus, Aristarchus, and their contemporaries, even Crates.⁷

These Alexandrian scholars were highly esteemed in antiquity and known to Roman *litterati* from the time of Livius Andronicus. The name, Aristarchus, who was perhaps the greatest of these scholars, was used by Cicero as a synonym for any astute literary critic.⁸ Horace, likewise, used the name in similar fashion in his *Ars Poetica* (445-50).⁹

Exactly how well known the textual recensions, monographs, and commentaries of such a scholar as Aristarchus were to the Romans is, of course, impossible to say.¹⁰ It seems, however, from a brief study by H. Fränkel, that Livius Andronicus actually translated the glosses still extant in the scholia on archaic and/or obscure words and inserted them, rather than a translation of the original Homeric word, into his Latin version of the *Odyssey*.¹¹ It is certainly not difficult to imagine that Vergil might have done the same.¹² Still more interesting—and important—is the fact that the Servian commentary on the *Aeneid* also shows a dependence on the Homeric scholia—to quote E. Fraenkel—“. . . not only for a great deal of their subject matter but also for the method and argumentation.”¹³

(1931), pp. 179-207. For a brief study and discussion of Homeric criticism in antiquity, cf. Christ, Schmid, Stählin, *Geschichte d. griech. Lit.*, I, pp. 78-87 and II, 1, pp. 259 ff.

⁷ Cf. W. Leaf, *The Iliad* (2nd ed., London, 1902), II, pp. xiv ff. For the importance of Crates, who was a member of the rival school at Pergamum, cf. Suetonius, *Gram.*, 2.

⁸ *Ad Att.*, I, 14, 5; *Ad Fam.*, III, 11, 5; IX, 10, 1.

⁹ For the possibility that Horace used a reading of Zenodotus, cf. J. Tolkiehn, *Homer und die römische Poesie* (Leipzig, 1900), p. 47, n. 1.

¹⁰ For the difference in nature and quality of these works, cf. Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.*, II, 1, p. 267.

¹¹ "Griechische Bildung in altrömische Epen," *Hermes*, LXVII (1932), pp. 303-11.

¹² Cf. for example, schol. D on *Il.*, V, 613 and *Aen.*, VII, 535-9.

¹³ Cf. his review of the "Harvard Servius," *J. R. S.*, XXXIX (1949), pp. 145-54. Cf. also D. van Berchem, "Poètes et grammairiens: Recherche sur la tradition scolaire d'explication des auteurs," *Mus. Helv.*, IX (1952), pp. 79-87. For other possibilities, cf. below, pp. 38 f. and 42.

Vergil was said in antiquity to have been a meticulous scholar and conscientious craftsman, and it is clear from the allusions in his poetry, alone, that he was a learned man; we do not need the testimony of the ancient *vita* or of Quintilian and Macrobius to substantiate this.¹⁴ There can likewise be no doubt that Vergil not only imitated Homer, but at the same time sought, as various modern scholars have felt, to rival his predecessor.¹⁵ It follows, therefore, that Vergil might well have known and studied the most famous and outstanding critical works on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*—criticism which now survives virtually alone in the scholia.¹⁶

It is, of course, impossible to render incontrovertible conclusions on so complex and unfathomable a subject as poetic genius. Vergil's own responsiveness to the Homeric poems and his critical and artistic sensitivities must not be overlooked in any study of his variations on Homeric themes, yet his reputation as a poet and scholar and the very nature of his poetry make it seem most likely that he did consult the well known and highly respected commentaries of the Alexandrian scholars in the course of his study and use of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This is certainly not to say that Vergil would have felt himself constrained to abide by the *dicta* of the Alexandrians, but it is not unlikely that in certain cases he found their critical and exegetical remarks not only perceptive, but even suggestive and useful in creating an epic worthy to rank with those of Homer. Let us now examine a brief episode of the *Aeneid* which is clearly based upon one in the *Iliad*, the "Breaking of the Truce."

¹⁴ *Vita Verg.*, 23-46; Quintilian, X, 3, 8; Macrobius, *Sat.*, V, 18, 1.

¹⁵ For Vergil as a rival of Homer, cf. Conington-Nettleship, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (3rd ed., London, 1883), II, pp. xxiv, xxxi, xxxviii; K. Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro: der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 246, line 41; A.-M. Guillemin, *L'originalité de Virgile* (Paris, 1932), pp. 125-33 (on the *agôn* and *retractatio*); G. N. Knauer, "Vergil's *Aeneid* and Homer," *G. R. B. S.*, V (1964), p. 64. Cf. also Macrobius, *Sat.*, VI, 1, 6.

¹⁶ For the possibility that the Sosii may have been publishers of commentaries on the Homeric poems, cf. J. A. Davison, "The Study of Homer in Greco-Roman Egypt," *Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der Oesterreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, n. s., V (1956), p. 54 and n. 2.

I

The shot of Tolumnius (*Aen.*, XII, 266 ff.), which broke the truce between the Trojans and Rutulians, is based upon the shot of Pandarus (*Il.*, IV, 86 ff.), and has long been regarded as one of the most suitable passages for a study of Vergil's imitative art.¹⁷ For the purpose of this study, moreover, the scholia on this episode are among the most significant of the entire corpus.

After Aphrodite has rescued Paris from Menelaus' onslaught, Agamemnon declared that his brother was victor and demanded that the terms of the pact be fulfilled. Following a lengthy scene on Olympus, Athena, in the guise of Laodocus, suggests to Pandarus that he shoot Menelaus and thereby win the praise and gratitude of Paris and the Trojans. Of Athena's appearance to Pandarus, Homer says only this (*Il.*, IV, 86-8):

ἡ δ' ἄνδρ' ἐκέλη Τρώων καταδύσειθ' ὄμιλον,
 Λαοδόκῳ Ἀντηνορίδῃ, κρατερῷ αἰχμητῇ,
 Πάνδαρον ἀντίθεον διζήμενῃ, . . .

The scholiasts discuss this disguise at some length and their remarks allow us to follow the critical methods of the Alexandrians when commenting upon Homer's *poiesis*.¹⁸ Briefly, they point out (a) that Homer did well to have Athena disguise herself as Laodocus, for not only is he, himself (as Homer says), a mighty warrior, he is also the son of Antenor, the *πρόξενος* (cf. schol. BT on *Il.*, III, 206) of the Achaeans.¹⁹ Building upon this, they make explicit what is only implicit in the *Iliad*: the influence of such a noble warrior as Laodocus

¹⁷ Cf. R. Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-32, for a detailed and sensitive appreciation of this scene.

¹⁸ The problem of dating the scholia is most difficult. It will be noted, however, that some of the scholia cited in this essay bear no indications of their ultimate origin, but from those which can be assigned here, and throughout the entire corpus, it will be seen that these anonymous comments are quite in keeping with the spirit of Alexandrian criticism, and in most cases are directly associated with them.

¹⁹ BT on Δ, 87: Ἀντηνορίδῃ] καλῶς δὲ τούτῳ εἰκάσθη. Ἀντήνορος γὰρ ὦν παῖς, καὶ παραβὰς νόμον προξενίας, καὶ τοῦτον θέλει παραβῆναι νόμον σπονδῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος ἦν ὁ συμβουλευών, ἔφη ἂν ὁ Πάνδαρος, διὰ τί μὴ σὺ παραβῇ τοὺς ὅρκους; . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ κρατερὸς αἰχμητής, ἥτοι εἰς τὸ αἰχμᾶζειν ἰσχυρός (B).

lends authority to the treacherous suggestion that Pandarus break the truce.²⁰ It is also pointed out in some detail (b), that treachery is in the very blood of Pandarus.²¹ Aristotle, himself, is cited to explain (c) why one of the allies rather than a Trojan was chosen to commit the treacherous act: Paris is hated by his countrymen.²² In short, then, the scholiasts attempt to explain the reasons for Homer's choice of characters in their effort to explicate the motivation of the action.

Let us now examine Vergil's handling of this scene in the *Aeneid*. After the exchange of oaths between Aeneas and Latinus, Vergil describes the thoughts of the Rutulians as they assemble to witness the ceremony and subsequent duel: we are told of their varying emotions and how they begin to pity their prince when they see how unequal the combatants are. Turnus, unlike Paris, is esteemed by nearly all his followers throughout the *Aeneid*, and it is upon this fact that Vergil has begun to lay the grounds for the psychological motivation for his version of the breaking of the truce.²³

As soon as she was aware of the disposition of the Rutulians, Juturna assumed the form of Camers and set out to rouse them to break the truce in her effort to save her brother (*Aen.*, XII, 224-6):

in medias acies formam adsimulata Camerti
(cui genus a proavis ingens clarumque paternae
nomen erat virtutis, et ipse acerrimus armis).

Vergil, likewise, has chosen for Juturna a figure who is a renowned warrior of a famed and noble family, but following the exposition of the scholia, leaves no doubt as to Camers' distinction, and accordingly, Juturna's reason for her choice. Servius comments as follows on line 225:

²⁰ AT on Δ, 95: πιστός δὲ ὁ λόγος παρ' ἀνδρὸς λεγόμενος ἐπιφανούς.

²¹ Cf. T on Δ, 89 where his genealogy is given to substantiate this.

²² Cf. B on 88. For the form of the scholium, and others, expressed as questions and answers, cf. Photius, *Bibliotheka*, p. 147, 190; schol. A on *Il.*, I, 50; and Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1460 b 6 ff. Many of these problems, real or supposed, are preserved in the extracts of the scholia from Porphyry's *Homeric Problems*. This is the case here.

²³ Cf. R. Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-2. Drances' harangue (*Aen.*, XI, 336 ff.) is the one major exception.

cui genus a proavis ingens) cuius auctoritatem commendabat et origo maiorum et paterna virtus et propria fortitudo.

This comment, remarkably reminiscent of the scholia (especially BT on 95), would seem to indicate that Servius, too, was aware of the ancient commentaries on this scene of the *Iliad* and that he elucidated Juturna's disguise in light of them.

Vergil has thus seen fit to add to his description what the scholiasts had felt was implied (though not stated) by Homer concerning Athena's choice of disguise. The addition, moreover, of the portrayal of the Rutulians' uneasy emotions makes them more susceptible to Juturna's proposal and so provides a psychological motivation for the action. This, the lack of such motivation, is what Aristotle and the scholiasts had seen as deficient, here and in the entire episode, and had attempted, consequently, to read first into Homer's choice of characters for the breaking of the truce.

II

In the *Iliad*, Menelaus is Pandarus' target. Scholium BT on Δ, 100 questions this choice.²⁴ His *lysis* need not detain us, here, but the question, itself, is not without merit, especially since the aim of Athena's stratagem was to break the truce (cf. *Il.*, IV, 64-7). This could, as a result, have been brought about more plausibly by shooting Agamemnon, or any of the Achaean nobles, who, presumably while watching the duel, would have been less fully armed than Menelaus: so, at least, it seemed to the scholiast.²⁵

After her inflammatory speech in the guise of Camers, Juturna causes an omen to appear to further ignite the Rutulians' smouldering resentment over the duel. The omen is conveniently interpreted by an augur, Tolumnius, as a heaven-sent sign for them to rescue their prince. He then hurls his spear at the Trojan throng, while those about him prepare for battle. The

²⁴ Δ, 100: ἀλλ' ἄγ' ὁίστευσον Μενελάου] πῶς μὴ μάλλον Ἀγαμέμνονα τοξεύει ἀκαθόπλιστον ὄντα, ἢ τινὰ τῶν ἀρίστων ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐντεθωρακισμένον Μενέλαον;

²⁵ Cf. *Il.*, III, 86 ff., 326 ff. Before the duel begins, the Trojans and Achaeans lay their armor aside.

spear, aimed at no one in particular, strikes one of the nine brothers standing together, and they, grief-stricken and enraged, rush blindly toward the Rutulians (*Aen.*, XII, 238-79).²⁶ The motivation for the renewal of hostilities is complete!

Rather than Aeneas, who like Menelaus, is harnessed in full battle array, Vergil has chosen one of the spectators of the duel as the victim of the shot which breaks the truce. The development of the action in this scene is considerably different from that of the *Iliad*, and is a tribute to Vergil's poetic skill, but, it will be noted, the point of departure from Homer's scene here, as in the first instance, coincides with the passage criticized by the scholiasts, and again, their suggestion has been incorporated into the *Aeneid*, this time, however, to serve as a cardinal point upon which the action turns.

III

Continuing with the sequence of the action in the *Iliad*: Menelaus is struck by Pandarus' arrow and, while he is being taken care of, the Trojans suddenly attack the Greeks (*Il.*, IV, 220 ff.). The scholiasts, pointing out the obvious want of motivation for the attack, raised the following questions: Why is it that the Trojans, who had long been desiring peace, immediately rush to arms rather than attempt to seek out the one who had fired the shot? Why, in particular, does Hector not do this?²⁷ Again, the particular *lysis* is of no consequence.

Aeneas, quite in contrast to Hector (or Agamemnon, for that matter), tries desperately, though in vain, to restrain his men from engaging in combat and thereby breaking the truce, until he himself is treacherously brought down by an arrow (*Aen.*, XII, 311 ff.). Like Hector, as it were, it is Turnus who, disregarding the terms of the truce, makes no effort to stem the

²⁶ The youth, though armed (cf. 275) is less fully armed than Aeneas in his *caelestibus armis* (167). Cf. *Aen.*, XII, 119 ff. where in a circumstance similar to *Il.*, III, 326 ff. (noted above) all the warriors lay aside their shields and spears, at least. For the *prooeconomia* of this detail, cf. also Servius *ad Aen.*, XII, 124.

²⁷ Δ, 221: διὰ τί οἱ Τρῶες, εἴπερ πάλοι καταθέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον ἐβούλοντο (cf. *Il.*, III, 111 ff.), οὐ ζητοῦσι τὸν βαλόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὁρμῶσιν ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα; . . . διὰ τί δὲ πάλιν Ἑκτωρ οὐκ ἐξήγησε τὸν βαλόντα; (BT).

outbreak of hostilities, but, rather, immediately leaps to his horse, his hopes revived, and rides "like unto Mars," dealing death and destruction to his hapless foe (324 ff.). The contrast of character revealed by the actions of both Turnus and the "pius Aeneas" (311) is surely intentional, and is fundamental to an understanding of the *Aeneid*.

As if in answer to both questions of the scholiasts, then, Vergil has thus presented the reader with a carefully contrived and detailed picture of the Rutulians turning step by step from the originally welcomed truce (cf. *Aen.*, XII, 1-4) and of their growing eagerness to renew the conflict. When one of the on-lookers has been slain by the act of treachery, Aeneas makes every effort to uphold the terms of the peace. In both these instances Vergil has departed from Homer's narrative precisely where the ancient commentators had criticized the lack of motivation for the action. More important is the fact that in both these cases Vergil has developed his departures exactly along the lines implied, and indeed suggested, in the scholia on this episode of the *Iliad*.

In all three variations from *Iliad* IV thus far discussed, we can clearly see how Vergil has assimilated the comments in the scholia and turned them to advantage in the finer psychological motivation and greater credibility which he achieved. The means by which Vergil accomplished this is a remarkable tribute to his own originality and poetic artistry, both of which are set off in high relief, as it were, when compared to the stark and linear conception of *Iliad* IV.

IV

The healing of Menelaus is described at considerable length, though Homer has already told us that he was only grazed by Pandarus' arrow (*Il.*, IV, 139). After a long address by Agamemnon, who believes that his brother has been mortally wounded (148-82), Menelaus finally reassures him that this is not the case (184 ff.). The scholiasts comment to the effect that Menelaus is acting like a "sick child" attempting to reassure his worried parents, and add that it is unfitting for Menelaus to act so "softly," or "effeminately."²⁸

²⁸ B on *Il.*, IV, 184: τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὡς εἰ νοσῶν υἱὸς παραμυθαῖτο γονεῖς. ἄτοπος δὲ ἦν μαλθακεύμενος Μενέλαος, ἐκείνων τὸ πάθος οἰκειουμένων.

The portrayal of Aeneas is exactly the opposite. After he has been wounded and is being helped back from the heat of battle, Aeneas struggles furiously to tear the arrow from his wound, and even suggests that it be cut out, if necessary, so that he can immediately return to combat (*Aen.*, XII, 387 ff.). There can be no accusation that Aeneas is "soft" or, indeed, "effeminate"!

It goes without saying that Vergil would have realized that Menelaus' conduct was unbecoming to a king and champion of his people without the need for a scholiast to tell him so. This observation was surely common knowledge, but it is herein that its very importance lies: Vergil wished to contrast his handling of this scene with that of Homer and, in so doing, the character of Aeneas with that of Menelaus. Vergil expected and assumed a thorough knowledge of Homer in his readers, and without such a knowledge much of the artistry and significance of the *Aeneid* is lost.²⁹

In this respect, the Servian commentary provides us with an interesting observation on this scene, specifically where Aeneas strives desperately to tear the arrow from his wound:

Aen., XII, 387: saevit) scilicet, quia non potest in bella procedere: vel quod abstractus a bellis sit. et bene viro forti servat dignitatem, qui nihil molliter facit in tam aspero vulnere: nam ideo "infracta luctatur harundine."

Surely the words ". . . nihil molliter facit" answer the scholiasts' "μαλθακενόμενος," used to describe Menelaus, and allude to the contrast of character Vergil surely intended between the Spartan king and Aeneas. Otherwise, Servius' comment would have no point.

V

After he has been reassured by his brother, Agamemnon turns to Talthybius, his herald, and orders him to summon Machaon, the physician (*Il.*, IV, 193-7):

"Ταλθύβι' ὅττι τάχιστα Μαχάονα δεῦρο κάλεσσον,
φῶτ' Ἀσκληπιοῦ νιόν, ἀμόμονος ἱγῆρος,
ὄφρα ἴδῃ Μενέλαον ἀρῆιον Ἀτρέος νιόν, (195)

²⁹ Cf. K. Büchner, *loc. cit.*, ". . . der Vergleich mit Homer ist von Vergil herausgefordert."

ὅν τις ὀσπεύσας ἔβαλεν, τόξων ἐν εἰδώς,
 Τρώων ἢ Λυκίων, τῷ μὲν κλέος, ἄμμι δὲ πένθος.”

Aristarchus commented that line 195 was unnecessary, since the herald himself can see the need for a physician. For this reason, accordingly, he athetized the rest of the address.³⁰ In such an emergency, in other words, details are unnecessary, and serve only to delay, or weaken, the continuity of the action.³¹

While Aeneas is being helped back to the camp by his attendants, he struggles to extricate the arrow, as we have seen, in his effort to return at once to the battle now raging about him. Vergil continues his narrative (391):

iamque aderat Phoebo ante alios dilectus Iapyx.

Iamque aderat is most emphatic: Iapyx is immediately present, and of his own accord!³² Even as Aristarchus could see no need for details in a command given in such an emergency, so, too, Vergil could see no need for an awkward relay of summons: it is the physician himself who sees the need for aid! Here, too, in the course of an interlude in the action, while the wound is being tended to, is the place to give the physician's medical "qualifications."

This is a very minor deviation from Homer's narrative, to be sure, but here again we are invited, as it were, to compare Vergil's skill in the *agôn* with Homer. The awkward relay of summons for Machaon and Iapyx' ready awareness of the need, Menelaus' calm reassurance in his delayed reply to Agamemnon's solicitude and Aeneas' fiery spirit and determination are both strongly contrasted in Vergil's wonderfully expressed tableau. In both instances, once more, the scholiasts' criticisms

³⁰ Δ, 195: ὁ ὀσπερίσκος καὶ ὁ ὀβελός, ὅτι νῦν παρέλκει· ὁρᾷ γὰρ ὁ κῆρυξ τὴν χρεῖαν τοῦ Μαχάονος . . . (Δ). These lines, of course, are allowed to stand when Talithybius repeats them to Machaon (205-7).

³¹ In this respect it is interesting to note that someone, perhaps Aristarchus, also criticized line 194 on the same grounds, as the scholium implies: οὐ περιττὸς ὁ στίχος, ἀλλ' ἐλπίδα διδοὺς τῆς σωτηρίας Μενελάῳ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ ἰατροῦ τυγχάνειν μέλλοντι (BT). The reason for retaining the line, on the other hand, is quite valid.

³² For the effect of the elision, cf. B. Otis, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 f.

and comments mark the points of departure for Vergil's *retractatio* of this scene in the *Iliad*.

Conclusion

In each of the five cases of imitation discussed, Vergil has developed the action of the *Aeneid* very carefully to avoid precisely the grounds of the scholiasts' criticisms. Granted that Vergil would obviously have been more than competent enough to see these flaws for himself, yet in this brief episode (*Aen.*, XII, 216-467), so closely based upon Homer, we note that in all five variations from *Iliad*, IV, 86-222, not only does the way towards Vergil's final development of the episode seem to have been pointed out by the scholiasts' criticisms, but Vergil, in his endeavor both to compete with Homer and to further his own artistic ends, has, in fact, himself incorporated their suggestions directly into his departures from *Iliad*, IV.

The Alexandrian criticism of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, in short, would have been as well known to Roman students of Homer as the leading modern commentaries of a standard author are to scholars today, and the ancient text and commentary would have been regarded as a unit, as integral parts of a single tradition. Any admirer of Homer would have known and considered them.

A knowledge of these commentaries and of how the Alexandrian scholars regarded and interpreted the Homeric poems will, I believe, open a way to a richer understanding of Vergil's methods of imitation and to a deeper appreciation of his originality. For it is one thing to compare the Homeric poems and the *Aeneid*, but quite another to study them in the light of the intervening centuries of exegesis and criticism which Vergil surely took into consideration.³³

ROBIN R. SCHLUNK.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

³³ The entire *Aeneid* is, of course, a veritable mosaic of Homeric passages and the importance of the Alexandrian criticism can be seen throughout. It is my hope to be able to publish a fuller report of this investigation at a later date.

THE MODAL PARTICLES $\check{\alpha}\nu$, $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, $\kappa\alpha$.

The distribution of the modal particles, accented $\check{\alpha}\nu$ and unaccented $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, $\kappa\alpha$, is irregular. $\check{\alpha}\nu$ is Attic-Ionic and Arcadian; Cypriot does not, as one would expect it to do, follow Arcadian, but uses $\kappa\epsilon$ (which is found before consonants); $\kappa\epsilon$ is also found in Thessalian (before vowels). Lesbian also predominantly uses $\kappa\epsilon$ (in poetry κ' , and occasionally $\kappa\epsilon\nu$, before vowels, with isolated cases of $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ before consonants). See Schwyzer, *Gr. Gr.*, II, p. 568. Homer uses in roughly equal numbers $\kappa\epsilon$, κ' and $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ before vowels and consonants. Schwyzer writes further "Es scheint daher äol. (bzw. auch altion.) $\kappa\epsilon$ in ionischen Epos (ionisches) ν ἐφελκυστικόν bekommen zu haben (vgl. I 405 u.) was andere Dichter nachahmten." [But, while in I, pp. 405, 406 he writes "bei den Ortsadverbien auf $-\theta\epsilon(\nu)$ und der Modalpartikel $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ gilt die Doppelformigkeit nur für die (epische) Dichtung (die Prosa hat fast durchaus $-\theta\epsilon\nu$, dor. äol. ist $-\theta\alpha$; fest sind (ϵ) $\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\nu$, $\epsilon\nu\theta\epsilon\nu$, $\delta\eta\theta\epsilon\nu$)," at p. 406 (middle) he writes "In $-\theta\epsilon\nu$ und $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ scheint ν etymologisch," which means, I take it, that $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ is the original form, and $\kappa\epsilon$ secondary; a statement which seems to clash with that in II, p. 568]. West Greek and Boeotian show $\kappa\alpha$, which can elide to κ' , and neither $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ nor $\kappa\alpha\nu$ ¹ is found. There are two special features in Arcadian (which, as already said, uses $\check{\alpha}\nu$) namely:

(1) while inscriptions, our only source, show $\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\nu$ (= $\epsilon\iota\delta'$ $\check{\alpha}\nu$), yet, when there is no $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, we find $\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha\nu$ in eight instances, viz.

Sch.² 654, 16 $\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha\nu$ διελαυνόμενα τύχῃ

654, 23	"	παραμαξεύῃ
654, 32	"	ἰόντα [...
656, 2	"	τι γένηται
656, 10	"	δέαται (contrast 656, 46 $\epsilon\iota\delta'$ $\check{\alpha}\nu$. . . δέαται)
656, 15	"	κελεύωνσι
656, 25	"	τις πλέον . . . ἔχῃ, κατ' εἰ δέ τινα τρόπον . . .
657, 34	"	τι αὐτοῖς ἦι

¹ But note *I. G.*, 3045, 7 (see later).

² Schwyzer, *Dial. Graec. Exempla Epigraphica Potiora* (1960). Buck, *Greek Dialects* (1927).

(2) Schwyzer, 654, 21 has the hapax $\epsilon\iota\kappa$ in the phrase $\epsilon\iota\kappa \epsilon\pi\iota \delta\tilde{\omicron}\mu\alpha \pi\tilde{\upsilon}\rho \epsilon\pi\acute{o}\iota\sigma\epsilon$ (from Tegea, dated *ca.* 390 [Schwyzer] or *ca.* 400 [Buck]). It must be noted that these inscriptions otherwise regularly use $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, e.g. $\tilde{\omicron}\tau\iota \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (654), $\tilde{\alpha}\nu\tau\ \tau\tilde{\alpha}\iota \tilde{\alpha}\nu \tau\tilde{o} \tilde{\alpha}\delta\tilde{\iota}\kappa\eta\mu\alpha \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\eta}\tau\omicron\iota$, $\tilde{\omicron}\tau\iota\nu\iota \tilde{\alpha}\mu \mu\eta . . .$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\tau' \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (656), in addition to regular $\epsilon\iota \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu$.

[I may here observe in passing that, so far as I can see, in dialects generally the normal use of $\epsilon\iota$ or $\alpha\iota$ with $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ or $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ is with the subjunctive mood, and the particle is normally absent with the optative (though the opposite is sometimes true), e.g. Buck, *G. D.*, 117, III, 16, $\alpha\iota \tilde{\alpha}\nu\tilde{\epsilon}\rho \tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\tilde{\alpha}\nu\omicron\iota$, $\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha \lambda\tilde{\epsilon}\iota \tilde{\alpha} \gamma\upsilon\nu\tilde{\alpha}$ (Gortyn) as against the frequent formula $\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa' \tilde{\alpha}\nu\theta\tilde{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota$ (Laconian, V cent., Tegea, Buck, 70, 2): notice also Gortyn II, 3 $\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha . . . \kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\epsilon\iota \tilde{\omicron}\pi\tilde{\epsilon}\iota$ contrasted with $\alpha\iota \kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\epsilon\iota \delta\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\iota\tau\omicron$ but followed by $\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha$ (no verb expressed; ? subj. or ? opt. to be understood). Even down to III and II cent. in Crete (Buck, 117, 118) $\alpha\tilde{\iota}$, $\kappa\alpha$ with subj., and without $\kappa\alpha$ with optative, is noticeable.]

Schwyzzer's view of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (*Gr. Gr.*, II, p. 568 with I, pp. 405-6) is that it is cognate with Lat. *an* and Goth. *an*. He writes further (II, p. 558, 2) "Die Unzuversichtlichkeit des Redenden ist in lat. *an* got. *an*, in denen $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ wiederkehrt, auf die Frage geschränkt; von dieser Verwendung hängt wieder die Anfangsstellung ab. Während darin wohl eine Neuerung des Lateinischen und Gotischen liegt, ist die Verwendung von lat. got. *an* auch bei Ind. (ausser bei Konj. bzw. Opt.) alt, umgekehrt die zunächst bestehende griechische Beschränkung auf Konj. und Opt. sekundär." He adds in a footnote that *Dubito an veniat* could be *Dubito an; veniat?* There is nothing *prima facie* improbable, either semantically or etymologically, in this view connecting the Greek particle with the homophonous Lat. and Goth. particles; and Frisk (*Gr. etym. Wb.*, s. v. $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$) follows this view (1959) in an article which virtually repeats the view quoted from Schwyzer-Debrunner (1950).

As regards $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)/\kappa\alpha$ Schwyzer prints $\kappa\tilde{\alpha}$, referring the makron to "the poets," citing Ar., *Ach.*, 799 and Theocr., I, 4, while also noting that it also elides and saying that this fact points to $\kappa\alpha$ being by nature a short syllable. (See also Page, *Alcman, the Partheneion*, pp. 152 f.)

$\kappa\tilde{\alpha}$, with a makron, seems quite out of pattern. We have

μᾶν/μήν with Ionic *μέν*,³ Thess. *μα* 'but' (like Hittite), and Homeric *μᾶ* (A, 86, 234; Ψ, 43; υ, 339) equivalent apparently with *μᾶν/μήν*; we have *γᾶ/γε* and *-θα/-θε*; but there is no **μᾶ*, **γᾶ*, or **-θα* in any dialect to correspond to Doric (mostly Sicilian) *κᾶ*. If *κᾶ* were original, one would expect *krasis* rather than elision in, for example, *εἰ δέ κ' ἐλεύθερος* (Crete); or does this in fact represent *krasis* *κ' ἐλεύθερος*, as in Schwyzler, 362, 23, *τὰ ἐν > τ' ἐν* and *ibid.*, 17, *ἐ ἐχέπαμῶν > ἐχέπαμῶν* and *καὶ ἐν > κ' ἐν* for Thessalian (Thumb-Scherer, II, §245.8, p. 58)? But would not *krasis* be expected to yield *κ' ἐλεύθερος* not *κ' ἐλ'*? Elision of a long alpha seems highly anomalous. The view that *κα* is naturally short seems to be justified. Possibly the *makron* arose in Doric in order to distinguish the modal particle from the *-κᾶ* of temporal adverbs (= *τε* of Myc., Att. Ion., Arc., Cypr.; *τα* of Lesbian) which is short.

Schwyzler considers that the Arcadian *εικαν* and *εικ επι* quoted above should be divided *εἰκ ἄν/ἐπὶ* not *εἰ κ' ἄν/ἐπὶ*, though he does not explain the usage, where *εἰκ ἄν* differs alike from Att. Ion., Aeolic, and West Greek, and *εἰκ* from Att. Ion. He apparently agrees with Schulze and considers the *κ* a mere hiatus-breaker; see *Gr. Gr.*, p. 404, where he says *εἰκ:εἰ::οὐκ:οὐ*. So too in II, p. 568, "In Ark. ist wohl *εἰκ ἐπὶ*, *εἰκ ἄν* zu umschreiben (vgl. *οὐκ*)."

(But if, II, p. 569, *οὐκ* is < *οὐκί* and if *οὐκί* contains *kwid, there seem to be different kappas.)

Scherer⁴ (II, §266.5c, p. 140) considers that "eine Spur des alten *κε enthält *εἰκ ἄν*" in the eight instances quoted above. Buck (§134.2) considers that the two forms, *εικαν* and *εἰκ*, show that Arcadian once had *κε* (thus agreeing with Scherer) and goes on to say that *κε* had been replaced by *ἄν* in Arcadian "probably through prehistoric Ionian influence" (and he takes *εἰκ* . . . *ἐπολόε* as a subj. without *ἄν*. Clearly this is so; the question is, however, whether *εἰκ* is [a] the equivalent of *εἰ ἄν*, or [b] alternative for *εἰ*).

³ Manu Leumann in *Mus. Helv.*, VI (1949), pp. 85 f. has discussed *μέν* and *μήν* (*μάν*). His finding is that *μέν* is probably a shortened form of *μήν*, explainable by *μήντροι > μέντροι: μνηντ- > μνηντ-*.

⁴ Thumb, *Handbuch der Gr. Dialekte* (Vol. I, Kieckers, 1932; II, Scherer, 1959).

Recently other views have been put forward by K. Forbes (*Glotta*, XXXVII [1958], pp. 179 f.) and by L. R. Palmer (Wace and Stubbings, *Companion to Homer*, pp. 90 f.). Both reject the view that there is any connexion between *äv* and Lat./Goth. *an*: (1) Forbes, because of the "semantic difficulty that *äv* is used mainly with the subj. and opt. moods, but also with the indicative of past conditions, and sometimes with the future, while in Latin and Gothic *an* only introduces questions," and (2) Palmer, because he finds it hard to believe that *äv* should be "preserved solely by Att. Ion. and Arcadian (but not Cypriot!) . . . to differentiate the prospective subjunctive and potential optative, whereas other groups of Greeks, though making essentially the same differentiation . . . used another word. Such procedure violates the first law of etymology, which has been phrased 'Look for Latin etymologies first on the Tiber'"; (3) Forbes, because "Latin and Gothic *an* take the first position in the clause, but Greek *äv* as an enclitic takes the second."

On the views recorded above I would comment as follows:

(a) (Thumb) that *εικαν* shows a trace of original Arc. **κε*. There is no suggestion, however, here as to how, why, or when Arc. replaced **κε* by *äv*, while retaining the trace only in *εικ* and *εικαν*. I would observe that Arc. and Att. Ion. also share *ει*, as against the *ai* of other dialects.

(b) (Buck) that *äv* replaced **κε* in Arc. through "prehistoric Ionian influence." But, again, it is not explained how or why *äv* should have ousted *κε*—nor how Ionic got its *äv*, the greater problem. If Ionic had such influence early (say before 1000?), is this the reason for the use by Arc. of *ει* also (Thumb, I, p. 53, no. 3) and for the infinitive in *-εσαι*, which is common to Arc. and Ionic (*ibid.*, no. 10, and II, §§258, 265.23b, 275.20), and also for the common treatment of **ρυ* and **θυ* (Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque*, pp. 87, 88)? If Ionians and Arcadians formed one block (Hdt., I, 146, first sentence), why should Arc. *äv* be an innovation rather than a joint possession?

(c) I cannot agree with Forbes that there is any semantic difficulty in equating Greek with Lat. and Goth *an*, or with Palmer that this is an "etymological phantasy." They all three have Schwyzer's "Unzuversichtlichkeit."

(d) Palmer's objection, of two particles existing in the same use in different dialects, is not strong, though the fact that allied, though geographically distant, Arc. and Cypriot use different particles is of importance. If Palmer finds it hard to conceive of Att. Ion. and Arc. alone *preserving* $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, it is still harder to imagine Att. Ion. alone *inventing* $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ and then foisting it on Arcadian alone.

(e) As to Forbes' difficulty regarding the position in the phrase of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ and Lat./Goth. *an*, we may compare $\tilde{\nu}\nu$ and $\nu\nu$, Hittite initial *nu* and Celtic verbal particle *no* (initial or not initial; Thurneysen, *O.I.Gr.*, p. 348), as well as Russian *nu*. And all these differ greatly semantically, as well as positionally.

Next, (i) Forbes connects "proto-Greek *ken/ $\kappa\eta$ " with Sk. *kam*—a connexion which she finds likely in view of the "striking equation *nu kam*— $\nu\nu$ $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ (Homer), with which Hittite *nukan* is identical." (See also Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr.*, II, p. 568 *ad fin.*)

(ii) She goes on to shew that Arc. $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\nu$ retains the original * $\kappa\alpha\nu$, and makes $\epsilon\kappa$ "a convenient variant in prevocalic position $\epsilon\kappa$ $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}$." "Though $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ gradually [how does she know it was gradually?] became predominant in Arcadian as well as in Attic Ionic, $\kappa\alpha\nu$ was preserved in the isolated $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\nu$ " [why?]. She rejects the view that $\omicron\tilde{\nu}/\omicron\tilde{\nu}\kappa$ "could have influenced the form of the conditional conjunction" to the extent of adding a κ to $\epsilon\iota$ (the view held in Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr.*, I, p. 404). (iii) But she goes on to quote Seiler to the effect that $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ "is of recent date, not even proto-Greek, since the Aeolic and Doric equivalents are respectively *ke* and *ka*." (iv) She then derives $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ from the "false division of the common collocation $\omicron\tilde{\nu}$ $\kappa\alpha\nu$ " as $\omicron\tilde{\nu}\kappa$ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, and states that " $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ in Homer is found most frequently⁵ in the phrase $\omicron\tilde{\nu}\kappa$ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, commonly thought to be an Ionicism from Aeolic $\omicron\tilde{\nu}$ $\kappa\epsilon\nu$."

Palmer's view is somewhat different. True to his principles, he does not go to the Indus to relate $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)/\kappa\alpha$ with Vedic *kam*, but finds their origin in the demonstrative * $\kappa\epsilon$ with locative⁶ $-\nu$; the particle means therefore 'in this case.' This could then, he argues, have a reduced form * $\kappa\eta$ (cf. *Thess. μέν: μάλ*, the

⁵ There are in fact 60 or 61 instances of $\omicron\tilde{\nu}\kappa$ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$; see later.

⁶ 'Vocative' in the text is of course a printing error.

latter from * $\mu\eta$ "),⁷ which reduced form would appear as $\kappa\alpha/\kappa\alpha\nu$ before consonant/vowel: Aeolic levelled $\kappa\epsilon\nu:\kappa\alpha$ to $\kappa\epsilon\nu:\kappa\epsilon$ (while Doric and Boeotian, we must presume, though Palmer does not say so, used $\kappa\alpha$ only and dropped $\kappa\epsilon\nu$ or $\kappa\alpha\nu$ completely. Why?). But in a footnote Palmer also makes Doric $\kappa\bar{\alpha}$ parallel to $\tau\alpha\nu\bar{\alpha}$, which he says is found in West Greek, again = 'in this case.' (Thumb, p. 89, §94.5, gives $\tau\alpha\nu\bar{\alpha}$ $\hbar\alpha\tau\epsilon$ 'auf die Weise wie' for Laconian, and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu\bar{\alpha}$ 'ebenso,' cf. Hom. $\eta\chi\iota$, for Locrian, §211.10. But if so, why is $\kappa\bar{\alpha}$ accentless?⁸) Palmer goes on to make $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ the result of false division of $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$, like Forbes, but adds the ingenious explanation that the accent on $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is due to the frequency of $\tau\iota\varsigma$ following $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \acute{\alpha}\nu$ and throwing its accent back—so that * $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ acquired an accent; and then this accent became a permanency. (But an original * $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$ would have been * $\omicron\upsilon\acute{\alpha} \kappa\alpha\nu$, and so the accent which was $\acute{\alpha}\nu$'s gain was $\omicron\upsilon$'s loss!)

In setting out the slightly differing explanations of Forbes and Palmer I have interposed a few criticisms. Let me now state my main objections.

1. If Forbes rejects cognation with Lat./Goth. *an* on semantic and positional grounds, how much more ought she to do so in the case of her putative * $\kappa\alpha\nu$ with Vedic $k\bar{a}m/kam$, about which she has no qualms. She strains at a gnat and swallows a camel; since $k\bar{a}m/kam$ is used, 1 = 'well,' 2 = 'for the benefit of' with dative, 3 unaccented only after $n\acute{u}, s\acute{u}, h\acute{i}$ = 'willingly, gladly, indeed,' but practically meaningless, with verbs in various moods and tenses, or no verb (Macdonell, *Vedic Gram.* [1916], p. 225). As regards Hittite *nukan* she is on slightly safer ground in the matter of position in the clause; but there is no semantic connexion whatever between $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)/\kappa\alpha$ and the, in my view,⁹ meaning-

⁷ But if Leumann is right (note 3 above) that $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is a purely Ionic form derived from $\mu\acute{\eta}\nu$, this would imply that $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ in Thess. and other dialects are all later Atticisms; Thess. $\mu\acute{\alpha}$ would not be connected with this $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu < \mu\acute{\eta}\nu$, since $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is not = $\mu\eta$ but secondary to $\mu\acute{\eta}\nu$; and Thess. $\mu\acute{\alpha}$ is still used = $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ in Thess. inscriptions, Schwyzler, 590 (B.C. 214), line 22, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\mu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \iota\acute{\alpha}\nu . . . \tau\acute{\alpha}\mu \mu\acute{\alpha} \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\nu . . .$; contrast and compare lines 44, 45, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \iota\acute{\alpha}\nu . . . \tau\acute{\alpha}\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\nu$.

⁸ If Palmer compares $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu:\mu\acute{\alpha}::\kappa\epsilon\nu:\kappa\alpha$, he implies reduced grade $\mu\eta/\iota$, strong grade man/kan , lengthened grade $m\bar{a}n/k\bar{a}n$. But Doric has $\mu\bar{\alpha}\nu = (\mu\acute{\eta}\nu)$. Why should $k\bar{a}n$ go to $k\bar{\alpha}$?

⁹ See my article in *Archiv Orientalní*, XXXIV (1966), pp. 1-26 on the particle *-kan*.

less Hittite particle *-kan*, and still less with it if it has the wealth of effect attributed to it by Goetze (*Archiv Orientalni*, V, pp. 16 f.; Friedrich, *Heth. Elementarbuch* [1960], §§294 f.). It may be noted that Frisk (*Gr. etym. Wb.*, s. v. $\kappa\epsilon$) who briefly reproduces the sense of Schwyzler-Debrunner, *Gr. Gr.*, p. 568, rejects as 'nicht glaubhaft' any genetic connexion with Vedic *kām*, with Slavic *kъ*, and with Hittite *-kan* in spite of the assonant *nukan*: $\nu\nu$ $\kappa\epsilon\nu$.

2. $\epsilon\iota\kappa$ can hardly be considered a "convenient variant" of $\epsilon\iota$, since the verb $\epsilon\pi\omicron\iota\sigma\epsilon$ is in the subjunctive, and it cannot be doubted that, had the phrase come in such a way as to allow of a $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, there would have been $\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha\nu$. Here therefore $\epsilon\iota\kappa$ is a variant of $\epsilon\iota$ $\alpha\nu$, not of simple $\epsilon\iota$.

3. Seiler's statement, which Forbes quotes, to the effect that the existence of Aeolic and Doric $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)/\kappa\alpha$ prove that Att. Ion. and Arc. $\alpha\nu$ are of more recent date is a bald statement based on no argument other than his previous equally unsupported statement "As to *an*, all the evidence in early Greek points to a state of affairs in which the modal distinctions were not marked by the particle, but by the verb alone." But whether the latter statement is true or not, the fact that Aeolic and Doric (and Cypriot) have $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)/\kappa\alpha$ does not *eo ipso facto* prove that Att. Ion. (and Arc.) have in $\alpha\nu$ some recent growth.

4. The alleged commonness of the collocation $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\alpha\nu$ in Homer. Forbes denies the, usually accepted, likelihood that $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\alpha\nu$ represents—at least in some cases—an Ionicisation of an earlier and more original $\omicron\nu$ $\kappa\epsilon\nu$. As well as I can count from Ebeling (*Lex. Hom.*) *svv.* $\alpha\nu$ and $\omicron\nu$, there are sixty instances of what we read as $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\alpha\nu$, though Chantraine (*Gr. hom.*, II, §503) gives a figure of sixty-one. (This must not be confused with the "nearly ninety" cases where $\alpha\nu$ is found with, but not immediately following, $\omicron\nu\kappa$, $\omicron\nu\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, etc., *ibid.*, n. 1.) Forbes' statement (p. 182) that " $\alpha\nu$ is found in Homer most frequently in the phrase $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\alpha\nu$ " is not correct; Chantraine gives a figure of about 350 $\alpha\nu$ (against nearly 1200 $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$) and even allowing for the 350 being reduced by such re-reading of N, 127 and σ , 318 as noted by him, 60 or 61 cases of $\omicron\nu\kappa$ $\alpha\nu$ out of 350 or so uses of $\alpha\nu$ cannot justify Forbes' statement. (The same would be true if 90 out of 350 were taken.) I may note here that we both,

implicitly, assume that the proportion of $\omicron\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ in Homer is the same as that in contemporary speech—an assumption possibly as unreal as that of ‘contemporary speech’ being reflected by ‘Homer.’ I must enter a second *caveat* against Forbes’ loose statement (p. 180) “. . . the combined use of $\kappa\epsilon$ and $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, as is sometimes found in Homer.” What is found in Homer is $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon$; there are no cases of $\kappa\epsilon$. . . $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (the six reverse cases are Λ , 187 = 202, N , 127, Ω , 437, ξ , 259, ϵ , 361, ι , 334).¹⁰

The reading of $\omicron\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ would represent, I take it, in Forbes’ view the *retention* of original $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$. If so, this would mean that in these 60 or 61 cases alone $\kappa\alpha\nu$ was retained; in the 350 minus 60 the novelty $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ appeared, and in the 1200 or so other cases the weakened form of $\kappa\alpha\nu$, viz. $\kappa\epsilon\nu$, $\kappa\epsilon$, κ' appeared. I cannot conceive of the same speaker, or singer, being able to continue to say $\omicron\nu \kappa\alpha\nu$ and at the same time say $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu\theta\alpha\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota} \nu\upsilon\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, etc. If he continued to say $\kappa\alpha\nu$ in the one case, why not in the other? That is to say, it is hard to imagine retention of $\kappa\alpha\nu$ only in the cluster $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\alpha\nu$ (see point 6 below).

5. Both Forbes and Palmer seem not to realize, or, if they realize, to glose over the difficulty of a coexisting $\kappa\alpha\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$. Forbes gets her $\kappa\alpha\nu$ from a (?) bye-form of her “proto-Greek *ken/kn̥”; Palmer gets his $\kappa\alpha\nu$ from an obsolete * $\kappa\epsilon-\nu$, reduced (stage 1) to *kn̥, appearing (stage 2) as $\kappa\epsilon\nu/\kappa\alpha$, levelled (stage 3) by Aeolic to $\kappa\epsilon\nu/\kappa\epsilon$, and then somehow or other getting to $\kappa\alpha\nu$ so as to allow of its forming (a) Att. Ion. $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, by misdivision of $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$ and (b) Doric $\kappa\tilde{\alpha}$. Forbes speaks of “ $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ gradually becoming predominant in Arcadian as well as Attic Ionic” but gives no evidence (indeed there is none) for this gradual change (nor why it should not have affected other dialects).

And as to Pamer’s theory of how his * $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ got its accent, I may point out that out of the 60 $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ which I count in Homer

¹⁰ Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, II, p. 729, col. 1, “Saepius $\tilde{\alpha}\nu \kappa\epsilon$, nusquam $\kappa\epsilon\nu \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ legitur apud Homerum. Non separantur (exc. Ω 437) nisi interposito vocabulo μέν (quater).” He goes on to mention the variant readings $\tilde{\eta}\nu \kappa\epsilon$ and $\tilde{\epsilon}\pi\tilde{\eta}\nu \kappa\epsilon$ in various lines. Notice the alternatives Δ , 353 and I , 359, $\tilde{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\alpha\iota \tilde{\eta}\nu \tilde{\epsilon}\theta\tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha$ against $\tilde{\upsilon}\psi\epsilon\alpha\iota \alpha\acute{\iota} \kappa' \tilde{\epsilon}\theta\tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha$. σ , 318 could of course have been * $\tilde{\epsilon}\acute{\iota} \pi\epsilon\rho \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \kappa' \tilde{\epsilon}\theta\tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha$ instead of what we read, $\tilde{\eta}\nu \pi\epsilon\rho \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \kappa' \tilde{\epsilon}\theta\tilde{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\iota\sigma\theta\alpha$, which could be an Ionicisation. But equally well in these three instances $\tilde{\eta}\nu \kappa'$, $\tilde{\eta}\nu$. . . κ' could be an early usage with the κ' a meaningless appositive, though in the σ instance it has metrical value.

I only find eight followed by *τις/τι*—and again there is the assumption of this reflecting ‘contemporary speech’—*viz.* A, 301, Γ, 66, Z, 521, δ, 78, ρ, 268, 387, 497, and τ, 107. (On the other hand Oxford Text reads οὐ κέν *τις* in M, 465, ψ, 187. Why? And see Chantraine, II, p. 345 last paragraph.) There are four cases of οὐκ ἄν δὴ *τις* and six other οὐκ ἄν δὴ without *τις*; there are twenty cases of οὐκ ἄν ἐγώ/ἐγώγε/ἐμοίγε¹¹ and 28 cases of οὐκ ἄν with other words following. That is to say, the instances of οὐκ ἄν *τις/τι* are comparatively few (8 out of 60, or 12%), certainly not enough to give the already allegedly unreal ἄν the further unreality of an accent (which is not extended *ex gratia*, *vel ex analogia*, by Ionic singers to *κεν*).

(In addition to the few example of *κεν* where ἄν *could* be read given by Chantraine, I might mention M, 58, οὐ κεν ῥέα, β, 249, οὐ κέν φοι, δ, 223, οὐ κεν ἐφημέριος.)

Sixty (or 61) occurrences of οὐκ ἄν (against several οὐ κεν)—even supposing they are not οὐ κεν Ionicised—are not enough to justify the conclusion reached; and eight instances of οὐκ ἄν *τις/τι* are an even weaker foundation for the accent-theory.

6. But furthermore we must consider all the influences which would have tended to preserve an original **καν*, had it existed. When there is a δέ in the phrase, the order is always, e.g. οὐδ(ε) ἄν/κε(ν). Could **ουδεκαν* *not* have survived in Att. Ion./Arc., even supposing that οὐκαν gave place to οὐκ ἄν? Could the false notion that οὐκαν was οὐκ ἄν have led to the removal of the kappa from **ουδεκαν*, **ενθακαν*, **εικαν*, **ειδεκαν*, **ος καν*, **οσοι καν* (cf. *οσοι* ἄν [dative], Schwyzer, 661, 14), etc. (had they existed) in Att. Ion. and Arc. and in them alone? The forces tending to the retention of the kappa of **καν* in **ος καν*, **οσοι καν*, etc. would surely have been greater and more numerous than the solitary force of οὐκαν for its elimination, and for the consequent formation of a novel and basically unreal ἄν, which, somehow or other, acquired an accent.

7. Nor does the problem end here. Even supposing Arc. *εικαν* represents *ει καν*, the question still remains as to how Att. Ion. got from **ει δέ καν* to **ει καν δε* to ἐ(ι)άν δέ, while Arc. retained

¹¹ I do not know why Allen's Oxford Text consistently prints ἐγώγε for the *Iliad* but ἐγώ γε for the *Odyssey*.

the order $\epsilon\iota \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu$, not fusing $\epsilon\iota$ and $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ but dropping the κ of $*\epsilon\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\alpha\nu$.¹²

8. Forbes writes "It is hardly to be wondered at that $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\epsilon\nu$ was not interpreted as $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \acute{\epsilon}\nu$, where $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ would be homonymous with the preposition." Yes: but the reinterpretation supposed is not of $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\epsilon\nu$ (if I understand her argument aright) but of $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$, the only form which could have given $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (and then somehow $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$). But perhaps I am misunderstanding her view; perhaps she means that $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\nu$ led to $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ (accented), and that there was no *further* change, after $\kappa\alpha\nu$ had weakened to $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, of $\omicron\upsilon \kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ to $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ (accented or unaccented?). The citing of Thess. $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu: \mu\acute{\alpha}$ is irrelevant as an illustration of a change of $\kappa\alpha\nu$ to $\kappa\epsilon\nu$. Forbes' real problem is how her proto-Greek $*\kappa\epsilon\nu/\kappa\eta$, which could have yielded $\kappa\epsilon\nu/\kappa\tilde{\alpha}$, could have given $*\kappa\alpha\nu$ (from which her $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ came). This question is burked.

Close consideration therefore demands the rejection of the Forbes-Palmer theory of the genesis of an originally unreal $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ as a bye-form of $*\kappa\alpha\nu$. Consequently it seems better to go back to the cognation of $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ with Lat./Goth. *an* as the explanation of the particle, and to acknowledge it as genuine and inherited. The fact that Greek, Latin, and Gothic had a particle *an* seems to show that these languages had a particle of, to use Schwyzler's word, *Unzuversichtlichkeit*, used in various contexts of doubtfulness, potentiality, conditionality, or whatever (cf. Palmer's "making essentially the same differentiation," but here in the matter of differentiating fact and not-quite-fact). Not only

¹² This basic difference between Att. Ionic and Arcadian, that the one had $\acute{\epsilon}(\iota)\tilde{\alpha}\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon}$ and the other $\epsilon\iota \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu$ is surely of importance. Were the alleged changes from $*\kappa\alpha\nu$ to $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ separately occurring phenomena in two different dialects? Or, if Arc. $\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ is borrowed from Attic (Buck's view), why was not the change completed to $\epsilon\iota \tilde{\alpha}\nu \delta\acute{\epsilon}$? Buck's view requires that the alleged borrowing must have taken place at a time when Attic said $*\epsilon\iota \delta' \tilde{\alpha}\nu$; but there is no evidence for such an Attic locution.

Page, *History and the Hom. Iliad*, p. 220, writes that the peculiar features which differentiate Ionic from other dialects as *Ionic* are all (or most) of relatively late development; in the Mycenaean period *one* dialect was predominant in Southern Greece; Arc. features in the Epic will be heirlooms from the past of the Ionian peoples themselves. Similarly he holds that specifically Aeolic forms in the epic are relics of a time when Aeolic was spoken in the North, Arcadian in the South, and poetry was composed in both dialects.

these languages: we may perhaps see the same particle incorporated in the Hittite particle *ma-an*, which is used not only = 'if,' but also in potential sentences such as *ma-an-ta(k)-kan ku-en-ni-er* = $\xi\kappa\tau\alpha\nu\acute{o}\nu$ $\sigma\epsilon$ $\tilde{a}v$.¹³ It would seem that there was a common psychological disposition in IE people to use a particle of *Unzuversichtlichkeit*. And since there are parallels in Latin, Gothic, and also probably Hittite, it seems safer to accept $\tilde{a}v$ as the older, and more genuine particle, rather than as a false form arising from a putative $*\kappa av$, and to look, on the contrary, on $\kappa e(v)$ as the cuckoo in the nest.

The $\epsilon\kappa av$ and $\epsilon\kappa$ of V cent. Tegea must therefore be explained as the result of continuous Laconian-Doric influence, a fusion of $\epsilon\iota/\alpha\iota$ κa with $\tilde{a}v$ and plain $\epsilon\iota$ κ' respectively. So too I would explain Cypr. κe as due to Aeolic influence. Though Arcadians and Laconians, living as neighbours, continued to speak each his mother tongue, the Arcadian had every reason of proximity to adopt a Doricism. And so we see the supersession of Arc. $\sigma\iota s$ and $\kappa a s$ in the IV century by $\tau\iota s$ and $\kappa a\iota$. Forbes admits the possibility of external influence 'the prevalence of $\tilde{a}v$ ' introducing $\tilde{a}v$ into Arcadian. But it is surely easier to suppose Arc., with original $\tilde{a}v$, being influenced by near-by Doric to adopt the mixture $\epsilon\iota$ κ' $\tilde{a}v$ and $\epsilon\iota\kappa$ than to suppose far-off Attic in IV or earlier century influencing Arc. to replace κav by $\tilde{a}v$ only to the extent of dropping the kappa of $\epsilon\iota$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ κav to make $\epsilon\iota$ δ' $\tilde{a}v$ but not to go the whole way with Attic to make $\epsilon\iota$ $\tilde{a}v$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$. Buck's 'prehistoric Ionian influence' and Forbes' (much later) 'pre-

¹³ I would go further and suggest that this I. E. $*an$ is incorporated in the particle $\sigma\tilde{a}v/\tilde{a}v$. Schwyzler (*Gr. Gr.*, pp. 586-7) says that the meaning recommends a derivation from the present participle $\delta\nu$ ($\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota$) 'wahr (ist es),' a parenthesis like Sanskrit *satyám*, Lat. *verum*. I would suggest the possibility, even the likelihood, of its being $< *o\tilde{a} \tilde{a}v$; 'n'est-ce pas?', again a parenthesis, again equivalent to *satyam*, *verum* (and something like a parenthetical *nonne* or *n'est-ce pas*). True, the $o\tilde{a}$ lacks the final κ , but the sandhi, at least as regard $\sigma\tilde{a}v$, though less so as regards $\tilde{a}v$ without the v , is satisfactory; while the meaning is as satisfactory as, if not more satisfactory than, Schwyzler's 'wahr, satyam, verum.' It could have arisen at a time before $o\tilde{a}$ had acquired an obligatory κ before a vowel; and the origin I propose is more acceptable than one which requires either a lengthening of $\delta\nu$ to produce $\tilde{a}v$ or a contraction of $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\nu$ to produce $\sigma\tilde{a}v$; while semantically and psychologically it is in full agreement with its stronger offspring $\mu\tilde{a}v$.

DEMIURGE AND WORLD SOUL IN PLATO'S *POLITICUS*.

The *Politicus*, like the *Timaeus*, is a dialogue difficult to date. For reasons on which I hope to expatiate elsewhere I take it as coming some time after the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* (in that order), though its most recent English editor thinks it was written either antecedently to, or concomitantly with the *Timaeus*.¹ Certainly the cosmology and cosmogony of both *Politicus* and *Timaeus* appear at first sight to be strikingly similar. The cosmos, for example, is seen as a living creature endowed with intelligence (*φρόνησις*),² and so presumably qualifies for the title of "ensouled," in much the same way as the world is said to possess a soul in the *Timaeus*.³ As a living creature it owes its origin to a *δημιουργὸς καὶ πατήρ*,⁴ and, while enjoying immortality of a sort, possesses it only in a contingent manner, having received it as a gift from the Demiurge.⁵ The Demiurge, however, is not omnipotent; he is himself subject,

¹ J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 237 and *passim*. On the relative dating of the *Timaeus* see G. E. L. Owen, "The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues," *O. Q.*, N. S. III (1953), pp. 79-95. For extensive criticism of his views one should consult H. Cherniss, "The Relationship of the *Timaeus* to Plato's Later Dialogues," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 225-66, and J. Rist, "The Order of the Later Dialogues of Plato," *Phoenix*, XIV (1960), pp. 207-21, as well as the postscript in J. B. Skemp's translation of the *Politicus*. In spite of these criticisms, I believe that the essence of Owen's case stands unimpaired, and has indeed been corroborated by recent computer-research into the linguistic traits of Platonic dialogues. On this see D. R. Cox and L. Brandwood, "On a Discriminatory Problem Connected with the Works of Plato," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Soc.*, Series B, XXI (1959), pp. 195-200.

² 269D1; cf. 269D9, τοῦ γεννήσαντος.

³ J. Bidez, *Eos, ou Platon et l'Orient* (Bruxelles, 1945), p. 71, claims that there is no idea of World Soul in the *Politicus*. The sentence 269C4-D2 (especially D1-2) would seem to be enough to disprove this, however. For fuller notes on World Soul in the *Politicus* see J. B. Skemp, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-6.

⁴ 273B1-2; cf. *Tim.*, 34B3 ff.

⁵ 270A4-5; cf. *Tim.*, 41A8-B6.

like the Olympians of Homer, to ἀνάγκη and θέμις and εἰμαρμένη.⁶ He is divine, but probably only in a referred sense, in much the same way as the gods in the *Phaedrus* are said to receive their divinity from the Ideas.⁷ All the world's good derives from him⁸; all its evil is to be attributed to the presence of the bodily element in it,⁹ and to its forgetfulness of his instructions.¹⁰ For all its self-induced ills and sicknesses he is the Great Healer.

As in the *Timaeus*, he is or represents good, intelligent and purposive activity, though now it is explicitly stated that he has a κίνησις of his own, described as αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ στρέφειν ἀεί, or "everlasting self-sustained rotation in a single sense."¹¹ Whether such talk of rotation has any meaning at all will depend on one's view of the Demiurge as real or as a symbol¹²; and if he is to

⁶ 269D3 (ἀνάγκη), 269E7 (θέμις), 272E6 (εἰμαρμένη). So, too, in the *Timaeus* he is not omnipotent, in the sense that the scope of his demiurgic activities is limited by the nature of his models, the *Ideas*.

⁷ *Phaedr.*, 249C6. I take it, with J. Van Camp and P. Canart, *Le sens du mot θεῖος chez Platon* (Louvain, 1956), p. 219, n. 3, that the phrase τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις (269D6) is a veiled reference to *Ideas*. It can hardly mean Intelligences, or Souls, or divinities, since such beings are said to possess motion of one type or another (see 269E1-6, 270A5-8), while the θεϊότατα and they only (μόνοις, 269D6) are described as enjoying τὰ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι (269D5-6). The phrase is identical with that of a description of the static Ideas in the *Phaedo* (80B2-3), and it is hard to see how it can apply to anything subject to motion, however minimal. Even in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge still looks to the Ideas for his model (32C ff.). For another apparent reference to the Ideas in the *Politicus* see 285D10-286A7.

⁸ 273B6-7.

⁹ 273B4, τὸ σωματωειδές.

¹⁰ 273C6.

¹¹ Tr. Skemp. I understand ἡγουμένῳ at 269E6 to refer to the Demiurge. (For Campbell it is "Pure Soul in general, of which the Deity, who sustains the universe, is a particular example." Commentary, *ad loc.*) This is to say that it is νοῦς and ψυχὴ at their purest, since the Demiurge is presumably their most perfect embodiment.

¹² I follow Taylor in seeing him as a personal deity, rather than simply a symbol of intelligent causation, or as a doublet of World Soul or a doublet of the rational element within World Soul. For the first view see H. Cherniss, review of A.-J. Festugière's *Le dieu cosmique, Gnomon*, XXII (1950), pp. 204-16; for the second, W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zürich-Leipzig, 1925), p. 72. A.-J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique* (Paris,

be taken as real there could be further dispute as to whether his "rotation" is local or otherwise.¹³ If one accepts the view that here and in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge is merely a symbol or personification of the logical abstraction "intelligent causation" in general, a symbol of the class of causes *ὅσαι μετὰ νοῦ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δημιουργοὶ (εἰσὶν)*,¹⁴ one is still left facing the question why no self-movement of the Demiurge (nor self-movement of *any ψυχή*, for that matter) is mentioned in the *Timaeus* when it is in the *Politicus*. An extreme answer is to say that the notion of *κίνησις* in soul or intelligence is not introduced in the *Timaeus* because it seems to run counter to the particular type of myth in which Plato there chooses to express his thoughts: i. e. to talk of soul as eternally self-moving "would have deprived the creation myth of all literary plausibility."¹⁵ If this is true, Plato has only himself to blame if he is misunderstood; soul as self-moving is necessarily eternal and *non*-contingent, as the *Phaedrus*¹⁶ makes clear, whereas the

1949), p. 104; P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon* (Paris, 1930), p. 206; G. S. Claghorn, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's 'Timaeus'* (The Hague, 1954), p. 119; for the third, F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 361. While it is true that both World Soul and the Demiurge are spoken of as rational and divine, their differences are more significant. World Soul, for example, is spoken of as fashioned by the Demiurge, while he himself is eternal and uncreated (*Tim.*, 34B3 ff.). In language popularized by the Schoolmen, the Demiurge is *non*-contingent, while World Soul, no less than the world's body, is contingent. That alone is enough to indicate a radical difference in kind between the two. The *eternal* existence of the Demiurge as distinct from the everlasting (*temporal*) existence of World Soul is another aspect of the same truth.

¹³ J. B. Skemp, *op. cit.*, p. 105 takes it that the motion of the Demiurge is not *ἐν τόπῳ*, but "psychic" only, and interprets 269D5-6 as a reference to God. This involves taking the phrase as meaning not absolute rest but to "revolve ever in the same sense" (*ibid.*). For my own view see note 7 above.

¹⁴ *Tim.*, 46E4, cf. H. Cherniss, *Gnomon*, XXII (1950), p. 207, n. 1.

¹⁵ H. Cherniss, "The Sources of Evil According to Plato," *Proc. Amer. Philos. Soc.*, XCVIII (1954), pp. 23-30, n. 4; cf. *idem*, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I (Baltimore, 1944), pp. 428-31, and *idem*, *Gnomon*, XXII (1950), p. 207, n. 1.

¹⁶ *Phaedr.*, 245C5 ff. Soul-as-such has as its *φύσις* motion which is *ἐρδοθεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ* (245E5-6). It never came into being (245D7-8), nor will it ever be destroyed (*ibid.*). This is not to argue, of course, that the notion of soul's autokinesis (which necessarily involves *non*-contin-

burden of the *Timaeus* is that all soul (except, presumably, that of the Demiurge), enjoys merely a temporal everlastingness, rather than eternity, and does so inasmuch as it is *dependent* upon a reality itself independent.¹⁷ How Plato could have written so misleading an account if his views on the autokinetic nature of soul were already developed is not immediately clear.

It seems to me much more plausible to argue that the *Phaedrus* is to be dated a little after the *Timaeus*, which in turn follows close on the *Republic*.¹⁸ The *Politicus* will then be seen to incorporate into a single *Weltanschauung* the cosmology of the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus* doctrine of soul as an ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. In the *Phaedrus* a single and over-simplified principle was announced; now it is seen that it will not account for all of the facts. To posit soul as the source of all activity in the universe is in itself no guarantee that the universe is under intelligent and beneficent direction; one must still assume a supremely intelligent and provident ψυχή, the Demiurge, who takes as his model the perfection of the Ideas and guarantees the basic victory of νοῦς over ἄνοια.¹⁹ He will now, of course, have the

gency, as it seems to me) appears like a bolt from the blue in the *Phaedrus*. It was there by implication in both *Phaedo* and *Republic* when soul was seen as a life-principle, or bound up with the "idea of life" (*Rep.*, 353D9 ff., *Phaedo*, 105D3 ff.); unfortunately this notion was allowed to stand on equal terms with others barely compatible with it—such as that of soul as like the static Ideas (*Phaedo*, 80B1 ff.)—and one is led to conclude that Plato was not then fully aware of the implications of what he was asserting. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, I, pp. 435-8, seems to me to go beyond the evidence when, in seeing a connection between the final proof of immortality in the *Phaedo* and that in the *Phaedrus*, he identifies the "idea of life" with the "idea of motion." Compare his comments elsewhere (*Gnomon*, XXII [1950], p. 208) where he makes the point that the notion of self-motion is to be found as early as *Charmides* 168E. To have a notion, however, is not necessarily to see its implications. If, at the time when he wrote the *Phaedo*, Plato really did see all the implications of the notion of the "idea of life," it is hard to believe that he would have painted the very static portrait of ψυχή that he did.

¹⁷ See n. 12.

¹⁸ See L. Robin, *La théorie Platonicienne de l'amour* (Paris, 1908), pp. 116-17, and G. E. L. Owen, *op. cit.*, *C. Q.*, N. S. III (1953), pp. 79-95.

¹⁹ See J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (Cambridge, 1942), p. 112.

characteristic attributed to *all* ψυχαί in the *Phaedrus*, namely autokinesis. World Soul, too, will have autokinesis, though its ultimate dependence upon the Demiurge, and its association with the bodily, will ensure that such autokinesis will be of a very restricted nature. This does seem to be an advance upon the views of the *Timaeus*, where World Soul was portrayed as a κινούμενόν τι, rather than an ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.²⁰ As far as the Demiurge is concerned, however, it only makes explicit what in the *Timaeus* was implicit. For even in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge was by implication a soul who was both a κινούμενόν τι and an ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.²¹

If, as I believe, the Demiurge of the *Politicus*, like his counterpart in the *Timaeus*,²² is meant to be a person, we are presented with what looks like a hierarchy of existents. Foremost stand the static and exemplary Ideas,²³ followed by the Demiurge, whose particular quality is that eternal self-motion which is rotation in the same sense, local or otherwise.²⁴ Being a person, he is intelligence and ψυχή, rather than represents them, and he is non-contingent. Below him comes the world's ψυχή. This receives its eternity from him and so is contingent,²⁵ while its basic characteristic is apparently that self-motion which is rotation in the same sense, like his own. This, at any rate, is true in theory, since he has endowed it with life and φρόνησις like his own.²⁶ But in practice World Soul is

²⁰ Plato makes it clear that the agents involved in the formulation of the cosmos are the Demiurge and lesser deities; these (at this stage of Plato's cosmological thinking, at any rate) seem to be seen as the genuine ἀρχαὶ κινήσεως, rather than World Soul. It is true, of course, that any statement that soul is a life-principle is an embryonic and implicit statement that it is a source of motion. But my argument is that Plato probably did not realize this truth (and certainly did not exploit it) before writing the *Phaedrus*.

²¹ His eternity and his activities of creation and formation seem sufficient evidence of this.

²² See note 12 above.

²³ 269D6, 285D10-A7; cf. note 4 above.

²⁴ 269E5-6.

²⁵ 270A4-5.

²⁶ 269D1. Most scholars assume that the phrase ζῶον δὲ καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχός at 269D1 is causal, but this need not be so. If ζῶον δὲ is seen as a phrase in apposition to τὸ δέ ("the desire to run in the opposite

inseparable from the world's body, and this bodily element, inducing forgetfulness, prevents it from performing its task correctly.²⁷ It is reduced to a second-best activity, that of rotation in reverse (*ἀνακύκλησις*).²⁸ Perfection lies in the static

direction is a characteristic of refractory *ζῷα*"), *καὶ φρόνησιν* could then be treated as concessive. That which possesses *φρόνησις* ought to work in *harmony* with the wishes of the Demiurge; why in fact the world does not is later explained in terms of the "bodily element" (273B4) in it and the "forgetfulness" (273C6) of the Father's instructions which this induces. The world in the *Timaeus* is a *ζῷον ἐμψυχον ἐννοον τε* and a god, and in itself (without reference to *ἀνάγκη*) affords no trouble to the Demiurge; in the *Politicus* this is hardly the case, since any *φρόνησις* possessed by the world eventually turns to forgetfulness, making it more refractory than amenable. For a similar view see Skemp, *Statesman*, p. 106, and J. Gould, *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 207, and n. 4. The former sees World Soul as a battle-ground between *φρόνησις* and *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία*, with *ἐπιθυμία* largely prevailing. With reservations he follows Plutarch, 1014d in seeing similarities between *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* and the *ἀνάγκη* of the *Timaeus* (p. 89). But the opposition, if any, is more likely to be between *φρόνησις* and *τὸ σωματοειδές*, that bodily and irrational element in the universe whose presence and influence condition the *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* into being the type of drive that it is. See A.-J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique*, p. 123; A. Diès, *Le Politique de Platon* (Éditions Budé, Paris), p. xxxii, and my own comments later in this article.

²⁷ 273C6, 273B4.

²⁸ 269E3. The phrase *τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν εἴληχεν* (269E3-4) is strange, suggesting as it does that the *ἀνακύκλησις* has been received from the Demiurge, rather than as the result of its own *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία*. But the difficulty is perhaps only apparent. Both World Soul and its *ἐπιθυμία* are of the Demiurge's fashioning and so ultimately beneath his control; the alien force with which he must reckon is *τὸ σωματοειδές*. So in giving the world an *ἀνακύκλησις* he could be said to be catering for the element of *σωματοειδές* in the universe and its inevitable influence upon World Soul. When this is said, however, one must face the further difficulty that it is not *θέμις* (269E7), apparently, for the Demiurge to initiate two contrary motions. Light may be thrown on the problem if we examine the implications of the phrase *δι' ἑαυτοῦ* at 270A5. This phrase is particularly ambiguous, capable as it is of a mechanistic or non-mechanistic interpretation. I take it as non-mechanistic (accepting at its face-value Plato's view of the cosmos as a *ζῷον τι*), and indicating proximate causality, by contrast with the remote and more fundamental causality exercised by the Demiurge on the one hand (*εἰληχός*, 269D1) and by *τὸ σωματοειδές* on the other. If the distinction is a legitimate one it could be argued that the troublesome reference at 269E7 is to direct and proximate causality only.

Ideas; the world, being other than these, is necessarily subject to change, and so undergoes *κίνησις*. So, too, does the Demiurge, since he also is other than and less than the Ideas. But he, being *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* at their purest, possesses the noblest form of change, that autokinesis which Plato sees as self-sustained rotation in one sense; lesser *ψυχαί* approximate to this as best they can, and in doing so come as near as their station permits them to the perfection of the Ideas.

Has there been any change in his views on the created world and necessity? In the *Timaeus* Necessity or the Wandering Cause stood over and against the Demiurge; it was a *datum* with which he had to grapple; he did not create it. In the *Politicus* we read of a *σύνφυτος ἐπιθυμία* or "inborn urge" of the world, which causes it to rotate in a direction counter to that imparted by the Demiurge.²⁹ More remotely, it is said to be "the bodily" which accounts for the evil in the world, and this, if anything, has some affinities with the Necessity of the *Timaeus*.³⁰ This is not to say that the body or the bodily as such is positively evil; it can mean simply that, in any complex involving body or the bodily, results tend to be less perfect than in a complex which does not.³¹ In the same way a virus could be said to be neutral as such; it becomes harmful when allowed to contact a particular living organism. Again, the motion of the *σύνφυτος ἐπιθυμία* is rotatory, whereas the movements of Necessity in the *Timaeus* are rectilinear.³² The movements of "the bodily" in the *Politicus* are no doubt equally rectilinear, and this will be another reason for seeing it as the equivalent of Necessity rather than the *σύνφυτος ἐπιθυμία*. If this is the case, however, the status of the world's "inborn urge" becomes very ambiguous, and the evidence of the text seems to point to Plato's discomfort about the whole matter. A view of the world as a living creature leads him to talk of its activities as one would those of a person, and the picture which emerges is that of a refractory infant.³³ Laying stress on this, Skemp

²⁹ 272E6.

³⁰ 273B4, *Tim.*, 47E4-5.

³¹ See S. Pétremont, *Le dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens* (Paris, 1947), pp. 78 f.

³² For references and comments see Skemp, *Statesman*, pp. 26-7.

³³ 272E6, 273C6-7, etc.

sees the *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* as the equivalent of that (psychic) Necessity which he finds in the *Timaeus*, a Necessity in opposition to the Demiurge, but amenable to his persuasion.³⁴ But even if this were true, one would still be in doubt about its genuine status. Is it supposed to be an irrational urge within World Soul, or an irrational force over and against World Soul? Hardly the latter, for in this very same dialogue Plato explicitly rejects the notion of two deities in opposition in the universe.³⁵ But if it is supposed to be within World Soul it will also be within the Demiurge's general control, since the world and its soul are of his fashioning. Its refractory nature will then be accounted for by the presence of *τὸ σωματοειδές*. In this case the more genuine opposition-force to the Demiurge will be the same *σωματοειδές*, and to that degree it will be a more exact equivalent of Necessity.

On the other hand, the imagery of the spindle which Plato employs to illustrate the world's periodic inverse rotation could lead one to imagine that any such rotation is of a purely mechanical, rather than psychic nature, and the simple result of relaxed tension, as in the case of any spring or spindle tightly wound and then allowed to uncoil under the impetus of its own stored momentum. If one lays stress on this image, as does P.-M. Schuhl, the *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* can be explained away as a colorful expression for what is a purely mechanical, non-psychic phenomenon.³⁶ This would be extremely convenient, but it does little justice to the earlier imagery in which the world is a *ζῷον τι*, and liable to act like a refractory child. If we take this at its face-value, Plato seems to be carrying to their logical

³⁴ See note 26 above.

³⁵ 270A1-2.

³⁶ Presuming, like Bidez (see note 3 above), that there is no case for World Soul in the *Politicus*, he takes it that *σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία* is a colorful expression for a physical impetus of a purely mechanical nature, P.-M. Schuhl, "Sur le mythe du Politique," *Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XXXIX (1932), p. 47. In his edition of the dialogue Skemp concedes (p. 103) that Plato's explanation in terms of "unwinding" does seem mechanical, but feels that "the real motive power of the world is its own Soul and that the Framer and Maker works upon it essentially by persuasion" (p. 102). For a similar criticism of Schuhl see Diès, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi, and H. Herter, "Gott und die Welt bei Platon," *Bonner Jahrb.*, CLVIII (1958), p. 109, n. 13.

conclusion on a *cosmic* scale views expressed about the *human* soul in earlier dialogues. When discussing the newly incarnate infant soul in the *Timaeus*, for example, he showed how the purely rational circles of its soul could be bent awry by the incursions of τὸ σωματοειδές and its demands³⁷; however rational ψυχή may be in theory, contact with the bodily is liable to influence it. This is seen to be true as early as the *Phaedo*, where even the noetic soul can end by δοξάζουσιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ.³⁸ In similar strain is a comment at 83D7-8: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται . . . ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι. If my analysis is correct, Plato is implicitly criticizing his earlier concept of World Soul (as seen in the *Timaeus*) by reference to truths outlined in his individual psychology. But he expresses himself so obscurely on the point that confident assertion is hazardous. As so often, he seems content to let two barely compatible views stand side by side, an abiding monument to his caution or confusion according to one's prejudices.

Another point of interest is that in the *Politicus* the activity of ψυχή is the originating force, not simply of κίνησις, but of a very particular type—rotation. In its perfect state ψυχή can initiate rotation in one sense only, it seems; rotation in the opposite sense is of a less elevated nature, and is the result of the soul's association with the bodily.³⁹ Why the Demiurge cannot initiate rotation now in one sense now in another is left obscure; Plato himself is satisfied to say οὐ θέμις.⁴⁰ It is more than likely, however, that this idea comes from a conflation of ideas expressed in the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*. For in the *Timaeus* the κίνησις initiated by the Demiurge is of a circular kind only (rectilinear motion being due to ἀνάγκη⁴¹),

³⁷ 43A ff.

³⁸ 83D6-8.

³⁹ 269E4, τῆς αὐτοῦ κινήσεως; cf. notes 27 and 28 above, on λήθη and ἀνακύκλις.

⁴⁰ 269E7. This sounds very like the ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη which govern the action of the Olympian gods, even Zeus himself, in the Homeric poems. In the activities of Xenophanes' god the controlling factor is "seemliness," or "what is fitting for a god" (Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*,¹⁰ Xenophanes, B26).

⁴¹ *Tim.*, 34A4-5, 43B1-5. See Skemp, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

while in the *Phaedrus* no limitation seems to be set upon the kinds of motion which $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ can originate.⁴² By the time of the *Politicus*, however, the global claims of the *Phaedrus* have been somewhat modified, it seems, so that while $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is still described as a $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$, the motions initiated by it are once again said to be of a *circular* kind only⁴³; deviations from this norm can be attributed to $\tau\omicron$ $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\varsigma$.⁴⁴ But if $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is a $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$, and if what it moves is moved in a circle, the logical corollary is that its own motion is rotatory. For this reason the Demiurge, the most perfect $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, is given rotatory movement,⁴⁵ and so is World Soul.⁴⁶ These types of rotation are different, as we have seen,⁴⁷ and Plato's $\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\iota\varsigma$, offered in explanation, is hardly enlightening. One might, perhaps, hazard the guess that rotation in a single sense—i. e. that exercised by the Demiurge—epitomizes the eternal, underived and *undisturbed* nature of his autokinesis (cf. the *Phaedrus*, where a $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$ never "breaks contact" with itself⁴⁸), while the backward-and-forward rotation of World Soul epitomizes its "eternity" as ultimately *derivative* from the Demiurge and subject to the disturbing exigencies of $\tau\omicron$ $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\varsigma$. Another possible reason would be that offered in the *Timaeus*: the heavenly gods have uniform motion in the same place "because their thoughts and the object of their thoughts never vary"⁴⁹; their manner of cognition is an indication of their perfection.

T. M. ROBINSON.

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, CANADA.

⁴² *Phaedr.*, 245C8-9.

⁴³ 269E5-6.

⁴⁴ 273B4.

⁴⁵ 269E5-6.

⁴⁶ 269E3-4.

⁴⁷ See notes 27, 28 above.

⁴⁸ 245C8.

⁴⁹ 40AB.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURE ANALYSIS IN LATIN PHONOLOGY.

Classical linguists find no difficulty in applying to Latin (and Greek, too, although this paper deals only with Latin) the results of modern studies in phonology. No one can deny that the notion of the phoneme has played a key role in this research. In approaching a new language, most linguists consider it their first task to make what they call a phonemic analysis; i. e., they will classify certain noncontrasting phonetic entities as allophones of the same phoneme. Thus for English one customarily assigns to the phoneme /t/ such phonetically diverse elements as the initial aspirated *t* in *top*, the unaspirated *t* in *stop*, the so-called flap after an accented vowel in *water*, the labialized *t* before *r* in *tree*, and several other sounds—all presumably conditioned by the phonetic environment but similar enough to one another that they can be classified as belonging to one phoneme. Underlying this procedure are three well-known principles: complementary distribution, phonetic similarity, and structural symmetry.¹ Given the words, *top*, *stop*, *water*, and *tree*, the investigator observes that the *t*-like segments occur in different and exclusive positions: one in initial position before vowels, another after *s*, and so on. This is the situation described by saying that the sounds are in complementary distribution. In itself, however, it does not justify assigning two sounds to the same phoneme; English [h] and [ɣ], after all, are in complementary distribution with [h] found at the beginning of syllables and [ɣ] at the end. The principle of phonetic similarity excludes any attempt to group them as allophones of a single phoneme; presumably, though, this principle will be interpreted broadly enough to permit the inclusion of the flap of *water* in the *t*-phoneme.

Symmetry within the phonemic system is most clearly manifested in traditional presentations by arranging the phonemes or sub-sets of them in diagrams structured by means of articulatory or acoustic features. In Latin the relationships among the stops and nasals permit the following matrix:

¹ See C. Hockett, *A Course in Modern Linguistics* (New York, 1958), pp. 107-9.

	Labial	Dental	Velar
Voiceless	p	t	k
Voiced	b	d	g
Nasal	m	n	ŋ ²

In interpreting this diagram, we see that /b, d, g/ are related to /p, t, k/ by the presence vs. absence of the acoustic feature voice. Since the columns indicate the place of articulation, the nasals /m, n, ŋ/ are evidently homorganic with the corresponding stops. The remaining consonants in the Latin inventory do not pattern quite so conveniently; nevertheless certain relationships can be indicated by correct grouping.

	Labial	Alveolar
Fricatives	f	s
	Lateral	Trill
Liquids	l	r
	Front	Back
Semivowels	y	w

When we come to the Latin vowels, we have once again a well-ordered sub-system, defined in this case by three articulatory coordinates: tongue height, degree of retraction, and length.

	Front	Central	Back
High	i ī		u ū
Mid	e ē		o ō
Low		a ā	

It has seemed to many linguists in the past (and to many in the present, we hasten to add) that the ideal spelling system for a language will be phonemic, in the sense that there will exist a one-to-one correspondence between letters and sounds. Even a person not knowing the syntax of the language would be able to read correctly any text written in such a phonemic notation, provided only that he be given the various allophonic realizations of each phoneme. Halle describes this viewpoint by means of a

² It is certainly possible to debate the status of the velar nasal. A. A. Hill recognized three nasals in his brief sketch of Latin grammar given as an appendix in the *Introduction to Linguistic Structures* (New York, 1958), p. 441.

condition that can be imposed upon phonological theory: "A phonological description must include instructions for inferring (deriving) the proper phonological representation of any speech event, without recourse to information not contained in the physical signal."³ Latin orthography comes close to being phonemic, certainly much closer than English; its most notable deviation from strictly phonemic spelling is, of course, the failure to differentiate between long and short vowels. The syntax, if we know it, tells us whether to say, for example, *rosa* or *rosā*; but it is precisely such reliance upon higher levels of grammar that a phonemic transcription is designed to obviate. From the standpoint of recent developments in phonological theory, however, perhaps a more interesting case of nonphonemic writing is found in words like *urbs* and *plēbs*, phonemically /urps/ and /plēps/. In order to arrive at the correct pronunciations, one must know not only the representations *urbs* and *plēbs* but also a rule which devoices voiced stops before *s*. Traditionally in linguistics, spellings like *urbs* and *plēbs* have been called morphophonemic. The rationale behind this orthography is evident; from the other case forms we know that the stems end in the voiced /b/. Nevertheless we still face the problem: which spelling is preferable in the nominative singular, the phonemic or the morphophonemic. The group of linguists led by Chomsky and Halle (and therefore frequently called the M.I.T. school) opts in favor of the morphophoneme, asserting rather vehemently that the strictly phonemic level has no true linguistic relevance and is therefore superfluous. They derive the final phonetic expression from a morphophonemic representation and a series of phonological rules.⁴

The basic contrasting units of phonology, either phonemes, if we continue to insist on the usefulness of this level of analysis, or morphonemes (*sic*; from morphophonemes), are to be considered as complexes or bundles of so-called distinctive features

³ M. Halle, *The Sound Pattern of Russian* (The Hague, 1959), p. 21. Halle proceeds to reject this condition as unnecessary to linguistic theory, thereby eliminating the phonemic level of analysis.

⁴ Perhaps the best treatment of this position is found in N. Chomsky, "The Logical Basis of Linguistic Theory" in *Proc. Ninth Internat. Congress of Linguists*, ed. by H. Lunt (The Hague, 1964), pp. 951 f.

which are defined primarily in terms of acoustic phonetics but also, if necessary, in the older terminology of articulatory phonetics. Within such a theoretical framework a Latin /p/, for instance, can be defined by the features: nonvocalic, consonantal, noncompact, grave, nonstrident, nonnasal, and voiceless.⁵ The morphoneme /b/ shares all these features with /p/ except the last since /b/ is voiced. Thus /b/ is seen to be more closely related to /p/ than to any other morphoneme in the system. Such a statement, of course, startles no one and has evidently been recognized from antiquity. Less obvious relationships, however, will appear once the distinctive feature matrices of all the Latin morphonemes have been constructed; we are thinking here of links between certain consonants and vowels: for instance, both /p, b, m, f/ and /o, u/ contain the feature of gravity or low tonality among their distinctive features.

A distinctive feature analysis of the Latin phonological system does not abandon any of the advantages of the traditional diagrammatic presentation sketched above. More positively, the new approach will integrate the disjointed sections into a more comprehensive theory in which the relationships among all the members of the system can be seen at a glance. Chomsky and Halle go even further and claim that "only feature notation has linguistic significance, and that segments [the symbols we are now calling morphonemes] are simply to be regarded as conventional abbreviations, utilized to cope with the exigencies of printing but having no linguistic significance in themselves."⁶


The phonetic features which figure so prominently in this discussion are binary, i. e., the morphoneme being defined either possesses them or does not; there is no middle ground. Included among the defining features of the morphoneme /g/, for

⁵ The distinctive features will be defined below; these definitions depend upon the basic study of R. Jakobson, C. Fant, and M. Halle, *Preliminaries to Speech Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) and upon the essay of Jakobson and Halle, "Phonology in Relation to Phonetics" in L. Kaiser, *Manual of Phonetics* (Amsterdam, 1957), pp. 215-51.

⁶ N. Chomsky and M. Halle, "Some Controversial Questions in Phonological Theory," *Journal of Linguistics*, I (1965), pp. 97-138. This article is a reply to an attempt by F. W. Householder, Jr. to defend the importance of the phonemic level. See his "On Some Recent Claims in Phonological Theory," *Journal of Linguistics*, I (1965), pp. 13-34.

example, will be the presence of voicing; at the same time its voiceless counterpart /k/ is characterized by a negative answer to the question, "is this entity voiced." The number of binary features necessary for the complete specification of the morphonemic inventory of a language depends upon the complexity of the language in question. For Latin, ten features will be necessary and sufficient. No single morphoneme requires all ten features; in fact none will have more than seven. A branching tree diagram, of the sort used by Halle in his study of Russian phonology, illustrates simply and clearly the binary nature of the distinctive features at the same time as it represents graphically to the reader the pertinent relationships among the morphonemes of the system. Each time a feature is introduced into the tree-representation, we ask which morphonemes possess it and which do not; the tree then branches either to the right, defining thereby those morphonemes characterized by the presence of the feature, or to the left in order to specify those which lack this particular feature.

We begin with the feature vocalic/nonvocalic. This feature immediately splits the total inventory into two classes:




Vocalicness is defined in acoustic terminology as the "presence . . . of a sharply defined formant structure."⁷ We are led to a genetic or articulatory definition when we ask what causes this kind of formant structure to appear on spectrograms; it is due, again following Jakobson and Halle, to an "excitation at the glottis together with a free passage through the vocal tract."⁸

Remaining on the right side of the diagram above, i. e., with the vocalic morphonemes, we introduce a second feature, viz., consonantal/nonconsonantal. Consonantal sounds are those which have low energy in their spectrum or, from the standpoint of production, some obstruction in the vocal passage. The so-


⁷ Kaiser, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁸ *Ibid.*

called liquids are consonantal; the vowels, obviously, nonconsonantal. The branching tree schematic represents this neatly:



Latinists generally agree that the /r/ was trilled.⁹ This allows us to complete the specification of the two liquids by means of a feature called interrupted/continuant. In view of its articulation, an interrupted liquid is effected by one or more taps of the tip of the tongue against the alveolar ridge, thus cutting off momentarily the supply of air. In the production of the continuant /l/, of course, the air escapes through a lateral opening. Hence, in the branching tree we have:




Three features only, then, enter into the definitions of the liquids: /r/ is vocalic, consonantal, and interrupted; /l/ vocalic, consonantal, and continuant. Obviously this approach preserves the traditional insight that /l/ and /r/ are more closely related to each other than to any other morphonemes; it further makes quite clear their ambivalence with respect to the vowels and consonants, inasmuch as they share with the vowels the feature vocalic and with the consonants, as we shall see below, the feature consonantal.


Returning to the vowels, i.e., the vocalic and nonconsonantal morphonemes, we next introduce the feature diffuse/nondiffuse, defining it from the articulatory point of view as high vs. non-high. This is something of an oversimplification; more technically stated, diffuse speech sounds are those for which the volume of the resonating chamber behind the point of narrowest

⁹ See M. Leumann and J. Hofmann, *Lateinische Grammatik* (Munich, 1928), p. 117.

stricture is greater than the volume in front of this point. There are four diffuse (high) vowels in Latin.



In order to separate the two low vowels /a, ā/ from the other nondiffuse vowels, we make use of the feature compact/noncompact. As applied to the specification of vowels, then, compact means low; in contrast to the feature diffuse, the resonating chamber in front of the most narrow stricture has a greater volume than the chamber to the rear.




The introduction of the next feature, grave/acute, entails a differentiation between the front and back vowels; it is therefore relevant both to the high *i* and *u* and to the mid *e* and *o*. Continuing to limit our description of the features to their articulatory parameters, we note that the grave (back) vowels have a "larger and less comparted (*sic*; compartmentalized) mouth cavity, while acuteness originates in a smaller and more divided cavity. Hence gravity characterizes . . . back vowels articulated with a retraction of the tongue vs. front vowels with advanced tongue."¹⁰

One final feature, long/short, will complete the specification of the Latin vowels. Obviously, this feature is to be defined by measurements of time; lacking, however, access to native speakers and consequently the possibility of statistical studies of the actual times that were involved, we must be content with the knowledge that there did exist a phonological opposition between long and short vowels in the language.


It is now possible to construct a tree diagram for all the vowels.

¹⁰ Jakobson, Fant, and Halle, *Preliminaries*, p. 30.




In this framework, the vowel /e/, for instance, is described as a bundle or matrix of the features: vocalic, nonconsonantal, nondiffuse, noncompact, acute, and short. Six binary decisions had to be made before arriving at complete specification of this particular morphoneme; in contrast, only five features were needed to define /ā/, since the question of gravity or acuteness is irrelevant; /ā/ is vocalic, nonconsonantal, nondiffuse, compact, and long.

In order to define the nonvocalic morphonemes, i. e., the semi-vowels and consonants, we must return to the feature vocalic/nonvocalic, but this time by answering *no* to the question "is it vocalic," we proceed along the left branch of the tree.




The semivowels break off from the consonants as soon as we affirm that, like the vowels, they are nonconsonantal. With the introduction of the feature grave/acute, their specification is complete; /w/ like the back vowel /u/ is grave and /y/ like /i/ is acute.




Going to the right at the node consonantal/nonconsonantal, we come to the feature compact/noncompact. Compact vowels

are low, as we have seen above; thus for Latin compactness is needed in the definition of /a/. For consonants, on the other hand, the feature specifies those articulated against the hard or soft palate, i.e., palatals and velars, in contrast to those generated in the front of the mouth (labials and dentals). The volume of the mouth cavity in front of the place of articulation for velars (Latin has no palatals) is greater than the volume behind—this in accordance with the definition of compactness.




Two more features will be necessary to complete the specifications of the three velar morphonemes, viz., nasal/oral and voiced/voiceless. Nasalized sounds, as is well known, are formed when, as a result of the lowering of the soft palate, a part of the air stream instead of going through the mouth is allowed to pass through the nasal passages. The distinction between voiced and voiceless morphonemes is due to the presence or absence of vocal cord vibration.




The answer given to the question grave or acute will divide the Latin labials and dentals. The feature of gravity, when applied to vowels, enabled us to distinguish between back and front vowels; as applied to consonants, however, the "concentration of energy in the lower frequencies of the spectrum,"¹¹ as required by the acoustic definition of gravity, is caused by peripheral articulation. That is to say, consonants formed at the extremes of the vocal tract, e.g., labials, will be grave; those articulated in the middle, in this case, dentals, will be acute.


¹¹ Kaiser, *op. cit.*, p. 235.



One last feature, strident/mellow, is required to complete the characterization of the Latin fricatives, *f* and *s*. Stridency, as applied to fricatives, means that the turbulence created at their place of articulation gives them a higher intensity noise than that associated with mellow consonants, such as the stops or nasals.




As with the velars, the features of nasality and voice enable us to define the mellow consonants.



We unite now the separate parts into one large branching tree diagram; for reasons of space the distinctive features are coded numerically. This schematization brings out clearly the relationships that exist between certain classes of consonants and vowels; thus gravity is a feature both of labials and back vowels; the front vowels and the dentals are acute; lastly /a/ and the velars share compactness.

1. vocalic/nonvocalic.
2. consonantal/nonconsonantal.
3. diffuse/nondiffuse.
4. compact/noncompact.
5. grave/acute.

6. strident/mellow.
7. nasal/oral.
8. voiced/voiceless.
9. long/short.
10. interrupted/continuant.



While the pertinence of a distinctive feature analysis, such as we have sketched, to phonological studies of Latin verse will not be momentous, we believe that it will be worth considering in a future study. The poet's words possess an acoustic quality and conversely effect an auditory impression in the listener. In saying this, of course, we belabor the obvious since the statement means hardly more than that we make speech sounds when we talk. Still prose and poetry do differ in the use they make of the phonological resources of the language; poets focus the audience's attention upon the sound of the verse as much as upon its meaning. This foregrounding or deautomatization, to use the terminology of the Czech formalists, is achieved by such well-known devices as meter, rhyme, assonance, and alliteration. Distinctive feature analyses alert the critic to the interrelatedness of the various morphonemes; perhaps this broadening of perspective will give us new insight into the poet's artistic, even if subconscious, manipulation of sounds in the construction of the tightly organized speech that is the poem.

BRO. DAVID H. KELLY.

LA SALLE COLLEGE, ELKINS PARK.

THE POETIC UNITY OF HORACE'S *SERM.*, I, 4.

In a recent discussion of Horace's satiric technique W. S. Anderson offers several imaginative insights into the thematic unity of *Serm.*, I, 4.¹ This poem, he points out, explores both the literary and moral applications of the term *libertas*. Noting that "ideally, the basis of freedom is a sense of responsibility, self-discipline, which prevents one from interfering with the liberty of others," Anderson suggests that Horace offers his own life and work as illustrations of true *libertas*, while criticizing Lucilius' lack of self-control in both his social intercourse and his writing (Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 9). Since the scope of Anderson's essay precluded a detailed analysis of this poem, I offer some observations in support of his thesis.

The imagery and details in *Serm.*, I, 4 develop two analogies, first, between the undisciplined poet and the man controlled by his passions, and, secondly, between their virtuous counterparts, the disciplined poet and the man whose social behavior is guided by moderation and good taste. In the opening section of the satire, for example, Lucilius, who prided himself on turning out two hundred verses an hour, and Crispinus, who challenges Horace to a contest of quantity, both represent the undisciplined poet. The words *fluere* (11), *garrulus* (12), and *molliat* (20), and the comparison of the inferior poet to a puffing bellows (19-21) all suggest a lack of well-defined limits. In contrast Horace uses *describi* (3), meaning "to limit or define," and *notabant* (5), connoting a sharp incisive mark of censure, to characterize the satire of Old Comedy, and he refers to himself as *raro et perpauca loquentis* (18).

Turning to men in general, Horace emphasizes their similar lack of self-control in the words *insanit* (27), *capit, stupet* (28), *praeceps* (30), *fertur* (31), and in the comparison of the merchant to *pulvis collectus turbine* (31). Furthermore, just as Crispinus worries about the size of his poetic output (16) and struggles to compose (*laborantis*, 20), so the avaricious man

¹ W. S. Anderson, "The Roman Socrates: Horace and his Satires," *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Satire*, ed. J. P. Sullivan (London, 1963), pp. 1-37.

struggles over money or advancement (*laborat*, 26) and frets over the size of his income (32).

This theme of discipline *vs.* a lack of moderation unifies the rest of the satire. In lines 38-62, for example, Horace ostensibly discusses the qualities of true poetry but in fact focuses upon only one of these qualities, poetic unity. His choice becomes significant when we remember that to his readers a man's speech closely mirrored his personality, *talīs hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita*;² hence a unified poem reflects the self-discipline of its author. Lines 38-62 thus implicitly contrast the true poet with his undisciplined counterparts, Lucilius and Crispinus. It is also worth noting that the comic scene between a father and his son, which Horace inserts at this point, reiterates his main theme. The father is unable to manage his son because he himself is controlled by his passions (*ardens*, 48, *saevit*, 49), while the boy, inheriting this lack of moderation (*insanus*, 49, cf. 27, *ebrius*, 51), does not even wait until evening to parade before his mistress' door with torches. This failure of parental authority contrasts vividly with Horace's later description of the ideal relationship between himself and his father.

When Horace considers whether satire may justly be condemned for giving offense, he further develops the analogy between artistic and moral discipline. The poetaster, ignorant of the limits of good taste, seeks public recognition by reciting in the forum or the baths (75). His lack of propriety parallels that of the gossip who spreads rumors among the women returning from the tanks and public ovens (37), of Caprius and Sulcius who walk about shouting slander (*ambulat*, 66), and of the drunken youth who parades his bad manners in public (*ambulet*, 51). The undisciplined poet is even more closely related to the party wit whose social behavior manifests his lack of self-control. He drinks freely (*potus*, 88, cf. 51), scatters jibes indiscriminately (*aspergere cunctos*, 87), and makes public trusted secrets (84)—all in order to win the loose laughter of men (*solutos risus*, 82-3), an adjective which hints at his audience's equal lack of control.

So far, aside from an implicit picture of the well-disciplined

² Seneca, *Ep. Mor.*, CXIV, 1, translating a Greek proverb. Cf. Plato, *Rep.*, 400 D; Cicero, *Tusc.*, V, 16, 47.

poet in lines 38-62, Horace has focused on the failure of this ideal. Now in the final section of the satire he presents himself as an example of the self-controlled man and writer, and through verbal repetition clearly contrasts his own behavior with that of the failures he has been describing. Ullman and, more recently, Rudd have pointed out that the vices which Horace's father shows his son in lines 109-14 correspond to those enumerated earlier (25-32) and in each instance the same method of selecting someone from the crowd as an example is used.³ There is an additional contrast, however, between the obedience which Horace gives to his father and the defiance shown by the son to his father in the earlier comic scene. Two verbal echoes reinforce this contrast: Horace calls himself *sanus* (129), whereas the errant youth was *insanus* (49), and Horace is warned away *a turpi meretricis amore* (111) while the other youth is under the control of a *meretrice amica* (49).

Additional verbal repetitions set Horace apart from other reprehensible figures in the satire. Unlike Petillus Capitolinus who, although guilty, escaped conviction (*fugerit*, 100) and remains safe in the city (*incolumis*, 98), Horace, through his father's discipline, learns to avoid vice altogether (*fugerem*, 106) and preserves an unstained reputation (*incolumem famam*, 118-19). And unlike the adversary who has a bad habit (*mos*, 95) of defending his friends in public, while slandering them at the same time, Horace's father wished to preserve for him the old Roman standard of decorous behavior (*morem*, 117). Similarly, Horace's father served as a moral guardian (*custodis*, 118) for his son, whereas Crispinus trusts in literary referees (*custodes*, 16) to insure honesty. Finally, the reference to Horace's good reputation (*famam*, 118) recalls the earlier pejorative uses of this term (*famosus*, 5, *famam*, 83, 114).

Horace also uses iteration to suggest lesser parallels and contrasts in this satire. He establishes Old Comedy as his model by the repetition of *dignus* (3), *dignos* (25) and *notabant* (5), *notando* (106), the latter pair occupying the same final position in the line. And whereas the slanderer betrays his friends

³ B. L. Ullman, "Horace on the Nature of Satire," *T. A. P. A.*, XLVIII (1917), p. 126; N. Rudd, "Had Horace Been Criticized? A Study of *Serm.*, I, 4," *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 171-2.

(*amico*, 35, *amicum*, 81, *amico*, 96), Horace recites only to close acquaintances (73) and hopes a *liber amicus* will correct his faults (132). In addition, a series of verbal repetitions associate discipline with cleanliness and laxity with dirt. Lucilius' style is muddy (*lutulentus*, 11), the gossip smears his page with scandal (*illeverit*, 36), and the public paws over published works with sweaty hands (*insudet*, 72); on a moral level illicit love is *turpi* (111) and slander black (*nigris*, 91, *sucus lolliginis*, 100), while the morally upright man lives *puris manibus* (68). These are but a few of the very effective repetitions in this satire.⁴

The foregoing analysis suggests that we should hardly take seriously Horace's claim that he is not a true poet (40). Not only does he refer earlier to the satirists as poets (33), but in the final lines of the poem he threatens to call on his fellow writers for support (*poetarum manus*, 141) for, he says, *multo plures sumus* (142). Nor should we believe Horace's argument that verse satire does not have strict poetic unity (56-62). The careful organization of this satire around the theme of artistic and moral discipline belies its external informality, and it is certainly this careful poetic craftsmanship which Van Rooy has in mind when he argues that Horace "was conscious that in regard to artistic form he had established a new standard in the genre."⁵

CYNTHIA DESSEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN,
MADISON.

⁴ Horace, for example, contrasts his own spirit, hardened and moulded (*finæverunt*, 18, *duraverit*, 119, *formabat*, 121), with the *teneros animos* of other men (128). Cf. also the repetition *conclusas* (19) *concludere* (40), the echoing of *satis est* in literary and moral contexts (41, 54, 116), and the play on *liber* (5, 89, 90, 132).

⁵ C. A. Van Rooy, *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Theory* (Leiden, 1965), p. 68.

SOPHOCLES, FRAGMENT 608 PEARSON.

The source of the fragment is Harpocration's gloss *μελίνη*, the relevant portion of which I print according to Dindorf's text: *Μελίνη—Δημοσθένης Φιλίππικοῖς* (8.45). *ὁσπρίου ἐστὶ σπέρμα καὶ ἀρσενικῶς λέγουσι. θηλυκῶς δὲ Σοφοκλῆς Τριπτολέμῳ* (de Maussac, -έμου codd.) "*κνήμη μελίνης*" καὶ Ἡρόδοτος κτλ. The phrase *κνήμη μελίνης* does not give sense, in spite of Campbell's¹ suggestions (approved by Pearson) that *κνήμη* could refer to the space between two knots in the stalk of a plant (cf. Theophr., *H.P.*, IX, 13, 5) or to the long rounded ear of the millet-plant. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to reach for such extreme interpretations.

The reading of Dindorf's (and Bekker's) text is based on MS A,² which is also found in R and V: all three MSS derive from the same exemplar. But other MSS provide different readings: *κνήμου*,³ PMK, with which should be classed *κνίμου* of Q, and *μνήμου*, XBG. Of these variants, it seems clear that the reading found in PMK and implied by Q is to be preferred, both on general grounds, since they are better MSS in the text-tradition of Harpocration, and because it is easy to see how both erroneous readings arose from an original *κνήμου*. That is, the scribe of the exemplar of RAV, by a simple aberration, referred *θηλυκῶς* to *κνήμου* instead of *μελίνη* and this resulted in *κνήμη*. The other three MSS, XBG, themselves derive from a single exemplar, X perhaps directly, BG through at least one intermediary. The scribe of this MS made the not infrequent confusion of the minuscule forms of *κ* and *μ* (and *β*).⁴

¹ L. Campbell, *Sophocles*, II (Oxford, 1881), p. 535 (fr. 547).

² For the *sigla*, see the edition by G. Dindorf, I (Oxford, 1853), pp. iii-x, to which should be added R = Riccard. Gr. 12, V = Lond. 16C, and X = Vat. Gr. 2226.

³ In the MSS of Harpocration, the (implied) nominative is *properis-pomenon*. Elsewhere, it is reported to be oxytone: cf. LSJ, *s. v.* and Stephanus' *Thesaurus*, *s. v.*

⁴ It is the possibility of this confusion which lies behind Nauck's (fr. 551) conjecture, *κνήκου*. Coincidentally, the same error, involving different letters, is found in some of the MSS of Theophr., *H.P.*, IX, 13, 5, in which *κνίκας* has replaced *κνήμας*. For similar confusion in the

Although the exact meaning of the word is disputed,⁵ it was taken in antiquity to mean the slope immediately above the foot of a mountain.⁶ Thus, the fragment refers to a mountain-flank on which millet grows, and is similar in expression to fr. 603, *σιλφίου λειμών*, of the same play.⁷ Presumably the fragment refers to a specific geographical location but seems neither to support nor weaken Pearson's view⁸ that frs. 606-610 refer to the diet of peoples whom Triptolemus was to visit.

JOHN J. KEANEY.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

MSS of Harpocration, cf. *s. v.* "Αλογοι ἐρανισταί, ἐμφερομένων PQMXBGK, ἐκφ- RAV, and *s. v.* 'Αμάδοκος, Κερσοβλέπτην Epit. AVBG, -οβλέπτην X, -οκλέπτην PQMRK.

⁵ See the discussion in H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1960), pp. 883-4.

⁶ Cf. Eust., 265, 39-40; 1291, 49-50.

⁷ Eust., 265, 40, also says that *κνημός* is the Argive word for *ὀρίγανον*. But, even if it were possible to understand the word in that sense here, the resulting two genitives, each independent of the other, would be inconsistent with Harpocration's method in citing fragments of poetry. That is, in all his brief citations of this type, one word is always syntactically subordinate to another, e.g. (the closest parallel) *οἶον τ' εἰαμενῆς ὑποκυδέος* (Euphorion, fr. 138 Powell = *s. v.* "Υποκυδεῖς γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ τόποι).

⁸ A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, II (Cambridge, 1917), p. 240, n. 4.

M. AURELIUS ATHO MARCELLUS.

P. Dura, 81 is a puzzling fragment which mentions an Alexandria in line 2 followed by *cum nauib*[u]s, and in line 3 the [o]ff(icium) praef(ectorum) praet(orio). Line 4 as published runs].athon. Marcello [...]. prœ[; line 6 has either [con]s]ulares or [sing]ulares; and line 7 [i]n his ord. The date, on palaeographical grounds, is *ca.* A.D. 250.

On line 4 Gilliam notes, "Following -athon it appears that *o* was first written and then corrected to *i*. Possibly these letters are part of a name, perhaps the nomen of Marcellus. *Mathoni* would be possible, though surprising." Study of the plate in the volume of *Dura papyri*, however, now convinces me that one should read]i Athoni Marcello [...]. pra[and recognize here M. Aurelius Atho Marcellus. He is known, to be sure, only from two inscriptions of Mauretania Caesariensis; but the name 'Atho' is so unusual that the combination with 'Marcellus' and the nearness of the dates of the papyrus and inscriptions make the identification appear all but certain. In one inscription (*C.I.L.*, VIII, 8809; Dessau, 5785) he is vir egregius, procurator of the two Philippi Augusti and Otacilia Severa, praeses, and patronus municipii Lemellefensis. In the other (*Ann. Ep.*, 1908, no. 30) he is vir egregius, procurator Augusti nostri, and praeses Mauretaniae Caesariensis. The two inscriptions seem to be close together in time, since he is praeses in both; so the single Augustus of the second is probably the elder Philip, though he might be Decius or Gordian III. The date of the former inscription must be A.D. 247-249; that of the latter may fall anywhere between 238 and 251. The papyrus may not be of exactly the same time as the inscriptions; but a date before A.D. 240 is palaeographically unlikely. The traces of letters following *marcello* may or may not be remains of Atho's titles. The first is a mere fleck; the one before *p* is *b*, *d*, or *h*. A possibility, but no more than that, is *u(iro)* [e(gregio) c]o[*h* pra[. The last could be either pra[posito or pra[fecto; and s]ubpraefecto might be possible; but p[ra]ef[torio seems an impossible reading. We are consequently left in the dark as to the reasons why a man otherwise known

only from Mauretania is mentioned in a papyrus from the military archives of Dura.

*P. I. R.*² (s. v. "Aurelius," no. 1460) gives the name of Atho's wife as *Mani[l]i[a] Septimia [C]rispina* from the inscription in *Ann. Ep.*, 1908.

ROBERT O. FINK.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY.

REVIEWS.

Euripides, *Hippolytos*. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by W. S. BARRETT. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xvi + 453. \$8.00.

This book has developed from lectures given to Oxford undergraduates. Throughout the many years while it grew Barrett kept the needs and interests of undergraduates in mind. The explanations of the Commentary will doubtless be a boon to them, especially as he has skilfully kept the more esoteric and polemical disquisitions apart from the basic interpretation. Still, the principal gainers will be the category referred to by Barrett as "experienced scholars" and I am sure that no scholar can be so experienced as not to derive an immense profit from this work. Materially and methodically alike its interest extends far beyond the specialists on Euripides or even on Greek drama as a whole.

The "Introduction" alone offers more than a review of normal length can summarize, let alone assess. The two subjects here treated are the Hippolytus legend—before and in Tragedy, but mainly of course what Sophocles and Euripides made of it—and the textual history in the fullest yet at the same time broadest sense that this term will bear. For throughout the centuries of antiquity this history as presented by Barrett covers much more than the *Hippolytus*, in fact more than Euripides, throwing light on the other tragedians, on Aristophanes, and quite often beyond drama on other forms of poetry. Only when it comes to the manuscripts does the account narrow down to provide from the perspective of one play information on their ancestry, their mutual relations (including extensive contamination), agreements in error as well as in truth, corrections by later hands and much else that is interesting in itself and has a bearing on the evaluation of their readings.

Knowing that Barrett has made new collations of all MSS, we follow his presentation with unqualified confidence. Astonishingly many false readings—by Barrett's evaluation no fewer than one in every ten lines—can be traced back to an early (i. e. ancient) origin. The numerous instances in which both the true and the false reading demonstrably go back to antiquity tell against one uncial ancestor of the Byzantine MSS (p. 58); on the other hand colometric errors (a subject investigated by Barrett with special care) common to both families of MSS tell in favor of one uncial ancestor (pp. 60 f., 84 ff.). This complex state of things asks for a complex explanation, and Barrett's hypothesis, whether correct to the last detail or only *τρίτερον*, is certainly adequate to the complexity. He suggests one trans-literation from one uncial MS, yet a liberal addition afterwards of readings from one or several other uncial MSS (pp. 59 f.). Other evidence for the text—anthologies, excerpts, quotations (according to Barrett least useful), and of course the scholia with their own and independent interrelations—are studied with the same accuracy as the MSS. The apparatus, embodying the result of so much

conscientious labor, is exemplary in many respects, not least because while nothing that may in any way be relevant is omitted from it, the intelligent organization of the material allows quick and easy orientation. How thorough it is may be gathered if I mention that instead of a blanket symbol Σ for the scholia there is invariably a far more specific symbol indicating not only in which MS or MSS the scholion is found but also whether the reading in question occurs in the lemma or in the body of the scholion, whether it is attested or may be inferred, whether it is given as *varia lectio*, etc.

As we pass on to the Text and Commentary, the conviction grows that we are dealing with one of the outstanding philological achievements of our generation. Textual criticism, metrical analysis, grammatical and syntactic explanation, linguistic comments, discussion of idioms are, all of them, of the highest order. Many notes of the Commentary lead us to question something that we have so far taken for granted; others teach us to take a broader view of familiar facts. Very often the bearing of the learned and acute comments extends far beyond the passage under scrutiny (what a surprise to become in the note to vv. 1234 ff. acquainted with a meaning of *δεσμός* in the light of which we for the first time really understand two passages of the *Republic*, 378D and 390C). Wherever in future a Hellenist, struggling with a problem, finds himself referred to a passage of the *Hippolytus* he will experience a feeling of relief, knowing that from that point onward his path is smoothed and the most competent guide at hand.

Where so much is offered there is bound to be occasionally disagreement. A few instances in which the text and the supporting arguments in the commentary invite further discussion will be taken up later in this review. In the meantime, since Barrett professes to explain not only text, metre, and language but all other aspects of the play as well, it may be permissible to concentrate on a subject in which his judgment shows itself less sure. What I have in mind is matters of meaning and thought (not just the philosophical speculations but *διάνοια* as understood in the *Poetics*, chs. 6 and 19). For on the intention of speeches or arguments, a few times even on the significance of entire episodes, Barrett presents opinions that should not go unchallenged.

In Phaedra's great *ῥῆσις* (vv. 373-430) the distinction between voluntary and involuntary wrong-doing is not at all the issue. Nothing in her analysis of human failing takes up the nurse's after all rather incidental remark (v. 358) that *σώφρονες* (like Phaedra) do wrong *οὐχ ἐκόντες*. Surely Euripides feels entitled whenever it suits his book to understand love as a divine power or as a *νόσος*; on either view it can be considered stronger than man and as something for which he is not responsible (Barrett might have referred us to the debate in the *Troades*, 940 ff., especially 946-50, 983-92, and to the full statement of all possible views in Gorgias, 76B 11, 19). But to find Phaedra concerned with *ἀκούσια ἁμαρτήματα* and to read her speech as implying that her "erring *ἄκουσα* is no excuse" (Barrett, p. 228) is utterly unwarranted. She states quite clearly what subject she wishes to discuss and what thesis she upholds: even

if we know what we ought to do we fail for a variety of reasons to live up to it (vv. 377 ff., especially 380 ff.). If she polemizes, the polemic cannot be directed "against the" (comparatively simple) "view that wrongdoing is ordinarily due to natural vice"; for how could this view be expressed by *κατὰ γνώμης φύσιν* (v. 377)? In denying a polemical reference to Socrates' paradox Barrett may be right (Snell has in *Scenes from Greek Drama* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964], pp. 54 ff. repeated his well-known theory in more pointed but hardly more persuasive form). Whether, or how far, the causes of moral failure set forth vv. 381-9 apply specifically to her own situation is not easy to say. *οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δ'* (vv. 381 f.) do not favor such a supposition, and there is much in Barrett's explanation that does not satisfy, most particularly his understanding of the bad *αἰδώς* (v. 386) as describing Phaedra's "indecisiveness, . . . her besetting sin," which, I fear, betrays a serious misreading of her character. Euripides does not show the power of *ἔρος* by presenting a weak-willed woman succumbing to him but by showing a strongminded woman of firm determination struggling in vain to overcome him. Barrett could have found a better opinion on *αἰδώς* in Wilamowitz's commentary and in Dodds (*Cl. R.*, XXXIX [1925], pp. 102 f.) or von Erffa (*Aidos, Philologus*, Suppl. XXX, 2 [1937], pp. 166 f.), none of whom he here mentions. Passing over some other problematic suggestions I note that while Barrett has some valuable comments on *γνώμη* *ad* v. 377, he fails on v. 391 where Phaedra begins to set forth *τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης ὁδόν* to point out what other interpreters have missed even more completely, sometimes with disastrous results: this *γνώμη* of Phaedra, far from being just a thought in her mind, is that which has directed and determined her actions; in listening to the account of her *γνώμη* we learn why she has refused to take food (vv. 135 ff., 275, 277) and why in the preceding episodes we have seen her unwilling to speak about her condition.

On the debate between Theseus and Hippolytus (vv. 932-1077) I shall be briefer. That "with Hippolytus already convicted and sentenced *in absentia*" this episode "must take the form not of prosecution and defense but of condemnation and appeal from sentence" (p. 334) is correct but matters less than Barrett thinks. In truth both parties keep close to the proceedings customary in a criminal case. As in the contemporary speeches of Antiphon, the evidence to be weighed in the balance (Greek: *πίστεις*, see vv. 1054-60) consists of *μάρτυρες*, *ὄρκοι* (vv. 960 f., 1025 ff., 1036 f., 1055), and *λόγοι* in the sense of arguments. For Theseus the dead body of Phaedra is *μάρτυς σαφέστατος* (v. 972; cf. 960 f.), a deliberately unorthodox use of the term; in a normal lawsuit her letter would have been more likely to figure (as it actually does, v. 1057). At v. 1022 Hippolytus regrets not to have a witness to his character (*οἶός ἐμι' ἐγώ*, well explained by Barrett); he surely could have found more than one among his companions but this would have been inconvenient for Euripides. The arguments of *κατηγορία* and *ἀπολογία* were just developing into more eloquent and literary forms. Besides the *οὐκ ἐμὶ δεινὸς λέγειν* motif (varied vv. 986-9), which is a "commonplace"

of the proimion—"of the law courts" is not precise enough by Barrett's standards—the most typical procedure, here to be recognized both in Theseus' accusation (vv. 962-70) and in Hippolytus' defense (vv. 1008-20), is to take up the conceivable motives for the action one by one, disproving each of them. Euripides has a sovereign way with this (presumably) new "form." He leaves the first motive unrefuted—even Hippolytus has enough tact not to question Phaedra's beauty—, reacts to the second in so offhand a manner that Barrett feels very dissatisfied, and argues seriously only against the third. A commentator should try to separate the conventional topics from those peculiar to Euripides.

An individual thought for which it is difficult to acquiesce in Barrett's explanation is that of vv. 1102 ff.: ἡ μέγα μοι τὰ θεῶν μελεδήμαθ', ὅταν φρένας ἔλθῃ / λύπας παραιρεί· ξύνεσιν δέ τιν' ἐλπίδι κεύθων / λείπομαι ἐν τε τύχαις θνατῶν καὶ ἐν ἔργοισι λεύσσω. Barrett translates the first sentence: "Greatly does the gods' care when it comes to mind relieve my trouble." So far so good; but ξύνεσιν . . . κεύθων cannot mean: "though deep within me I have hopes of understanding." This is refuted by Barrett's own comments on κεύθειν: "contain in such a way that it is invisible"; for if this is correct, ἐλπίδι κεύθειν can hardly be a periphrastic equivalent for ἐλπίζειν. Moreover, what is ξύνεσις? Really the "discovery of a rational order"? I find no evidence for this. It seems a pity that Barrett has not studied the concept with his usual thoroughness or availed himself of Wilamowitz's and Snell's investigations about it. For while he polemizes, not without reason, against Wilamowitz's treatment of the passage in the notes appended to the *Hippolytos* (1891), he never mentions the rather different and, it would seem, better explanation of the passage two years earlier in *Euripides Herakles* (Berlin, 1889, *ad* v. 655). Using the paraphrase there given of *Hipp.* 1104 f. yet avoiding Wilamowitz's rather too glaring equation of ξύνεσις and ἐλπίς with "Vernunft" and "Glaube" we may understand thus: The chorus has some kind (τιν', not to be changed) of grasp *scil.* of what really goes on in the world (for ξύνεσις is realistic) but relying on the divine care tries to hide, or cover up, such understanding by a religious "hope" or confidence. In the end, however, it is left behind, dumbfounded or disappointed when, looking at the facts, it compares a man's deeds and his fate. I see no need for a genitive (like ἐλπίδος) after λείπομαι since the context makes sufficiently clear what does not work out or of what the chorus "falls short."

From διάνοια we may for a moment turn to τέχνη. On Euripides' dramatic art and his "psychology" Barrett's comments are often helpful and at times illuminating. Still one is bound to regret the almost complete lack of contact with other scholars' work on Euripides' drama. It would be pointless to compile a bibliography of studies never mentioned by Barrett (the contrast with the ample bibliographical references on grammatical subjects is striking). Whatever the reason for Barrett's restraint, I believe that the Commentary could have gained in breadth and depth; for if one ponders the upshot of his literary comments important omissions come to mind. Too little is done to bring out the similarities in structure

and motivation between *Hippolytus* and other tragedies of the same period (notably *Medea* and *Hecabe*). Festugière's opinions ought on no account to have been ignored; had Barrett paid attention to the beautiful first chapter of *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954) he might, even if perhaps not quite convinced by the comparison of Hippolytus with the blushing Charmides of Plato, have been prompted to do some more thinking about two fundamental topics, the treatment of the gods, and Hippolytus' personality. On the former Barrett offers too little, never facing some of the issues; on the latter he says more but sees only the negative aspects. Is there really nothing good to be said about Hippolytus? I have seen his weaknesses overemphasized elsewhere but have always assumed that some virtuous qualities were taken for granted. *σωφροσύνη*, the virtue to which he himself lays claim (as Phaedra too in her way), is indeed a concept of many facets. Here and there (*ad* vv. 728 ff., 1013) Barrett touches on the antinomies latent in the word. He might have clarified them with more success if he had availed himself of Helen F. North's article on *σωφροσύνη* in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 1 ff., especially 4 ff.

Numerous perceptive observations go far to outbalance such shortcomings. Above all, the text, improved in many ways, furnishes us with a new basis, and the Commentary, replete with information about connotations of words and fine shades of meaning, should be of great help toward an understanding also of Euripides' artistic and intellectual achievement. It is a decided gain for the poetic conception that vv. 912 f. no longer disfigure the text: *ἡ γὰρ ποθοῦσα πάντα καρδία κλύειν / κὰν τοῖς κακοῖσι λίχνος οὖς' ἀλίσκεται*. The lines are utterly inappropriate when Hippolytus insists on being told the cause of Phaedra's death. Altogether nine passages have been removed from the text and appear in smaller print above the apparatus. In none of these cases do I see a reason for questioning Barrett's decision. I do not know why v. 72 (two words at the end of the chorus of hunters) is to be found in the apparatus, not like the other interpolations in the limbo above it, yet what matters is after all that the text is not the right place; for here too one may, after some hesitation, have to accept Barrett's diagnosis. But in three cases where Barrett himself hesitates and while voicing strong suspicion leaves the passages in the text (191 ff., 664 ff., 1012 ff.) I must say that I consider his doubts unfounded. What the nurse says (vv. 191-7) about death as *φίλτερον* than life and our ignorance about "another life" connects excellently with v. 190 (or is it not clear that death might be a *πόνων ἀνάπανσις*?). The nurse philosophizes also vv. 252-66; whether we like it or not, we have to accept this as part of her character.—To remove not only v. 663 but also vv. 664-8 borders on the arbitrary. It is not for us to say how brusque Hippolytus should be; on another occasion too (after v. 105) he does not stop where editors would like to have him stop. Moreover the main objection to vv. 664 ff., viz. that they add nothing new, has been met in advance by their author. Can Barrett ask for more?

With vv. 1012-15 I have dealt briefly above. Here Barrett's arguments are somewhat stronger. Still *ἦν* as form of the first person,

while "unwonted," is on Barrett's own showing not impossible. The difficulty about *σώφροσιν* (v. 1013) lies not in its meaning, which in rigid logic "must" differ from the use of the word six lines earlier, but in the return to the topic of *σωφροσύνη* after it seemed to be dropped (v. 1007). For v. 1014 Barrett himself offers a very attractive emendation as alternative to excision (the *εἰ μὴ* of the MSS is troublesome, even if we have to reckon with a colloquialism, as Wilamowitz supposed, whereas Barrett takes little interest in colloquialisms; see P. T. Stevens, *C. Q.*, XXXI [1937], pp. 182 ff.). Altogether it is very unlikely for *τυραννίς*, a favorite subject of Euripides' discussions ever since his first play (*Peliades*, fr. 605 Nauck), to come up incidentally instead of being, as elsewhere (*Ion*, 621 ff., *Phoen.*, 504 ff., 549 ff.), properly introduced.

Of new readings proposed by Barrett I accept (besides smaller corrections, e. g. in v. 924) the change "*exempli gratia*" of *προ(σ)τρέπουσ'* to *πρὸς τούτοις* in v. 715 as well as the two particularly brilliant emendations: *φονίοισι νυμφείοις* v. 552 for *φονίοις ὑμεναίοις* and *Μινωίδος τ'* v. 758 for the impossible *ῆ* (or *ῆ*) *Κρησίας*. The former has on metrical grounds the edge over Wilamowitz's *φονίοισι θ' ὑμεναίοις*, although the repetition of *ὑμεναίος* two lines later in the clausula (554) would be, *pace* Barrett, an "advantage." In the latter passage the sentence as a whole (vv. 758-63) remains most irregular and troublesome. I am less attracted by *ἐφ' ᾧ στήσας ἔχεις* (*scil.* *κραυγὴν*) v. 903. Here the MSS have *ἐφ' ᾧ(ι)τινι στένεις*, and while *ᾧτινι* is unidiomatic, *στένεις* ought not to be touched. There is no good reason why Hippolytus who has heard his father's *ὠδὸς* may not describe this exclamation as a *στόνος*.

Many other decisions concerning the text are excellent. I welcome Barrett's attribution of vv. 58-60 to Hippolytus alone and of vv. 61-71 to the chorus of hunters and Hippolytus (*ἄμ' αὐτῷ* v. 54 does confirm this, and if *λέλακεν* and *τιμῶν* in v. 55 did not "include" Hippolytus, Artemis' words that the gates of Hades stand open for him would have less point). Barrett was probably wise in using the obelos in v. 791 and certainly in limiting it to two words in v. 840. But if Barrett is so strict about *γάρ* in v. 792, not allowing a line between it and the sentence with which it connects, I wonder how he can elsewhere follow Wilamowitz in establishing the sequence vv. 180, 172, 181, although this deprives *γάρ* in 181 of its obvious antecedent, leaving it so vague that no appeal to either Denniston or an "underlying idea" can help. To put v. 172 after 181 would be equally hard on the *δέ* of v. 182. Since the verse cannot remain where the MSS have it, we may, however reluctantly, have to join Murray in eliminating it. Having begun to disagree, as one surely can even with the best edition, I may add three points on which I feel exceptionally confident. In v. 491 *δυστέον* is impossible; as the nurse wishes to act *ὡς τάχος*, there is no time either to "distinguish" or to "analyze"; the variant *διοιστέον* being no better, we must emend to *δὲ πειστέον* (Hadley) or *δὲ δραστέον*. In v. 378 it is futile to impose on 5th century Greek a differentiation between *κακὰ πράττειν* (to do wrong) and *κακῶς πράττειν* (to fare ill). Platō

and Wilamowitz knew better. We may criticize the Greeks for not making the distinction, yet there may have been wisdom in their failure. Finally the more I think about the *locus conclamatus* vv. 32 f.: Ἰππολύτῳ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὠνόμαζεν (subject: Phaedra) ἰδρῦσθαι θεάν (i. e. Aphrodite), the more mistaken does the clamor seem to me. "It is cardinal to the play that Phaedra's love is still a dead secret" (Barrett *ad loc.*). For whom? Not for the audience, surely. As for the οἰκέται, does it not suffice that Aphrodite says this (v. 40)? Are the episodes in which chorus, nurse, Hippolytus, and Theseus are ignorant of Phaedra's νόσος not arresting enough to preclude any irrelevant question as to whether they do not remember her having built a temple Ἰππολύτῳ ἐπὶ? Barrett's wise remark (*ad* v. 1241) about a point "which would occur only to an editor digesting the play at leisure" applies here too—and altogether more often than he thinks. It might be worth collecting all inconsistencies noted by him, for apart from supporting one another they might illustrate inevitable(?) differences between a playwright's and an editor's concerns.

In the foregoing remarks I have tapped the riches of the commentary only in a few spots. To go farther is hardly possible in this review. There is no aspect of a word, and no sentence construction, that does not receive penetrating scrutiny. Barrett handles time-honored methods in masterly fashion, yet the methods never stifle the spontaneous use of his ever active, ever resourceful intelligence. Dissent, if arising here or there (e. g. regarding all too subtle semasiological distinctions), is soon felt to be insignificant by comparison to the overwhelmingly large amount of observations and suggestions that we readily accept, remaining for ever in Barrett's debt.

An equally summary expression of gratitude must suffice for Barrett's substantial contributions in the "Introduction" to the subject of the text history and to the reconstruction of Sophocles' *Phaedra* and Euripides' First *Hippolytus*. After presenting the fragments and testimonies for these plays, he takes us through the most circumspect examination of each item and its conceivable uses toward recovering the plots. So much is seen to be uncertain that we are left disillusioned and in no mood for risky hypotheses. I do not know whether acquaintance with Merkelbach's note (*Rh. Mus.*, C [1957], p. 99) would have induced him to modify his scepticism concerning Seneca's *Phaedra* as reflecting the First *Hippolytus*. Seneca's capacity of composing tragic scenes *suo Marte* should indeed not be underrated; arguments suggesting his originality in the *Phaedra* have recently also been advanced by P. Grimal (*Rev. Ét. Lat.*, XLI [1964], pp. 297 ff.). Still, giving due weight to specific arguments as well as to more general considerations, I cannot convince myself that the position of those who use the *Phaedra* with more confidence for the First *Hippolytus* is quite as precarious as Barrett (and perhaps also Grimal) would have us believe. The evidence collected by C. Zintzen (*Analytisches Hypomnema zu Seneca's Phaedra* [Meisenheim, 1960]) is often of dubious quality and Bruno Snell (*loc. cit.*, pp. 23 ff.) rests too much of an otherwise good case on the ἀμυχανία motif of fr. 430. But W. H. Friedrich's

Euripides und Diphilos (*Zetemata*, V [1953], ch. 5) still carries a good measure of conviction. Moreover, even granted that some of our questions regarding the First *Hippolytus* cannot be answered, we may yet be positive about the direction in which the Second departed from the First. Phaedra's determination to overcome her *ἔπος* and the ensuing struggle between *σωφροσύνη* and passion, central conceptions of the later play, must be presumed to have been absent in the earlier. On this important point Barrett (pp. 14, 30, 37) seems to be at one with the more "daring" reconstructions.

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

BEN EDWIN PERRY. *Secundus the Silent Philosopher*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv + 256; 7 pls. (*Philological Monographs* published by the American Philological Association, No. XXII.) \$3.00.

The story of Secundus, a Greek philosopher who had taken a vow of silence and won the admiration of Hadrian by refusing to break it, is preserved in Syriac, Armenian, Arabic, and Aethiopic versions as well as in the original Greek and a medieval Latin translation. A papyrus in Leningrad containing a fragment of the Greek text (*Pap. russ. georg.*, 1, 105-14) has been dated as not later than the third century, and Perry is inclined to believe that the anonymous author belongs to the late second century. A story of a man prepared to die rather than abandon his pledge, whom the emperor spares when he finds him unshaken by the threat of execution, followed by a set of semi-philosophical questions by the emperor, which Secundus answers in writing—this kind of literary production is quite appropriate to the second century, and Hadrian is represented by his biographers as fond of interrogating philosophers. No philosopher by the name of Secundus is known from any other source, though Philostratus knows a rhetorician by this name, and the story is not mentioned by any Greek or Latin writer until much later. Perry nevertheless believes that there was a real philosopher (not a rhetorician) called Secundus, however fictitious the details of his story may be.

This book represents the first collected edition of all the versions in the original languages, with English translations added. It is thus a notable achievement of critical scholarship, towards which orientalists (whose assistance Perry acknowledges generously) have made their contribution. Only a few readers of this Journal (the present reviewer unfortunately not included) will be capable of appreciating properly the full range of scholarship shown here, but all must re-echo the author's gratitude for the skill and care shown by his editor and printers (William Clowes and Sons) in producing such an ambitious volume.

Perry's principal concern is to establish the history of the Greek text. He is able to show without difficulty that the eleventh century text in R (Vaticanus Reginensis Graecus 10) is the source of four

copies made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (V copied directly from R, the others from V). These texts contain the Life of Secundus as well as the twenty Questions. Eight other manuscripts of various dates (from the eleventh to the seventeenth century) contain only the Questions or a selection from them. Earlier editors apparently never discovered the text of R—four folios in a codex otherwise devoted to books of the Old Testament and Apocrypha—and even doubted whether the Life and the Questions were originally combined in a single work. Since there are oriental versions containing both parts, some of them based on manuscripts earlier than any surviving Greek text except the papyrus fragment, there was never any very strong reason for such an opinion, and Perry's rediscovery of R (in the Vatican Library, not the Medicean to which Schier had wrongly directed earlier searchers) refutes it finally. He is also able to show that the twelfth century Latin translation of Willelmus Medicus of St. Denis must have been made from this text, that it was evidently one of the Greek manuscripts brought from Constantinople by Willelmus in 1167 and (like the Latin Codices Reginenses) must have remained in the abbey of St. Denis until it passed into the hands of Alexander Pettavius, from whom the Vatican acquired it. The Latin translator's errors and difficulties and occasional lapses into sheer nonsense can easily be explained by the difficult or corrupt passages in R.

Of the manuscripts which contain only the Questions all except two appear to derive from a different tradition from R. This tradition Perry calls β , and the tradition to which R belongs π . He maintains that this division into two traditions is as early as the fifth century, and that the Arabic version depends ultimately on a text of the β tradition, the Syriac and Armenian on a π manuscript. He reports that the Syriac and Armenian versions in answer to the question "What is death?" include the definition "the desire of poor men," corresponding to $\pi\epsilon\eta\gamma\tau\omega\nu \epsilon\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in R (Question 20), whereas the Arabic version—"the strength and joy of poor men"—translates $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ of β . Other reasons for this conclusion are also given; for example, in the Arabic version, as well as in the Old French *Image du Monde*, which appears to incorporate features of the Arabic version, there is an account of the impression made by the suicide of Secundus' mother on the city and on himself, at a point in the narrative where R is rather brief and a lacuna is marked in the manuscript. Perry is of course fully aware that transcribers of popular Greek texts, and to a far greater extent writers of oriental versions, are likely to expand or otherwise "improve upon" the original which they are following. It is thus highly likely that there were considerable differences between the two traditions in later antiquity, but so long as we have no Greek text of the β tradition for the Life, there is no evidence of its character unless we accept Perry's thesis that the Arabic version depends upon it.

When an editor is faced with a double text tradition of this kind, and when corruption is common in the texts of both families, it is not easy to make a good case for preferring one to the other.

Indeed, in dealing with the Alexander Romance of Pseudo-Callisthenes Kroll decided to make separate editions of the A and B recensions. Perry decided to base his text on R, and thus he can claim to be following the same tradition for both the Life and the Questions. Seven plates at the end of the book reproduce the text of R. It might perhaps have been worthwhile to add photographs or a transcription of the text of the Questions as it appears in one or more of the β manuscripts, so that the full extent of the differences between the two traditions could be seen more clearly than by reference to the apparatus criticus.

The Greek text offers many puzzles, some of which can be solved by reference to the papyrus fragment or the Latin or oriental versions. Thus, in the Greek and Latin texts, when Secundus refuses to speak, Hadrian hands him over to someone apparently called Tyrpon, but in the Syriac version it is a tribune, and Perry therefore emends the Greek text to *τριβούνῳ*. He does not remind us that Greek writers always refer to a military tribune as *χιλίαρχος*, and the word *τριβουνος* does not occur at all in LSJ. But this is not a serious objection. It is hard to believe that anyone in even a Greek-speaking Roman province was unfamiliar with words like *tribunus* and *centurio*, even though formal speech demanded their translation into Greek equivalents.

In fact, one of the features of this work is that it provides a number of interesting additions to our Greek vocabulary. It could perhaps be suggested—but not by way of criticism or complaint, since Perry offers so many good things in this book—that a detailed examination of this vocabulary might be worthwhile and might throw some light on the writer's literary background. This is always an interesting question where a writer of popular Greek literature is concerned. Many of the definitions in the answers to the Questions, though unfamiliar in surviving Greek literature, as reference to LSJ will show, have a distinctly tragic ring and are easily adaptable metrically so as to form part of iambic trimeters. This is a familiar phenomenon in the Greek romances, where one often imagines that a phrase or expression must be borrowed from a tragic or comic poet. One scarcely supposes that a writer of this calibre invented all these fine-sounding definitions, but their literary source is not so easily identified.

This critical text of Secundus, even to someone who cannot read the oriental versions, is of immense value to students of later Greek literature.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

EMIN TENGSTRÖM. Donatisten und Katholiken. Soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Aspekte einer nordafrikanischen Kirchenspaltung. Göteborg, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1964. Pp. 202. (*Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia*, XVIII.)

The vigorous persistence of the Donatist heresy in North Africa during the fourth and early decades of the fifth centuries has been

the focus of considerable attention since the appearance of W. Thümmel's *Zur Beurteilung des Donatismus* in 1893. Aware that the conflict between Donatists and Catholics was more than a theological one, students of the later Empire, including Martroye, Frend, Warmington, and Brisson, have emphasized the role played in the heresy by anti-government sentiments—nationalism can be a misleading term here—and/or the spirit of social revolution. In the light of these studies it is salutary to find Professor Tengström's book which is particularly admirable for recognizing the limits of our knowledge.

Tengström has not attempted a new history of Donatism. As its subtitle indicates, *Donatisten und Katholiken* is a re-examination of certain social, economic, and political aspects of the heresy, "einzelne grundlegende Probleme" which the author feels must be thoroughly understood before a comprehensive history of Donatism can be written. With an obvious command of the primary and secondary sources Tengström considers five principal topics: the nature of the Circumcellions, the Donatists' relations with Firmus and Gildo, the effect of the imperial edicts on the growth of Donatism and Catholicism, the relative superiority of the two churches in the cities and the countryside, and finally, the decline of Donatism during the years 411-420 A.D. Following a brief concluding chapter there is a comprehensive bibliography of ancient and modern sources as well as a topical index.

Central to Tengström's study is the role played by the Circumcellions in the Donatist controversy. In part he follows Saumagne and others in arguing that the Circumcellions were not fugitive slaves, discontented *coloni*, or barbarian tribes but an *ordo* of free men who worked on the large country estates, possessed property, and were subject to fines. This description derived principally from the Edict of 412 A.D. (*Cod. Theod.*, XVI, 5, 52) clearly does not fit St. Augustine's characterization of them as a "genus hominum . . . ab utilibus operibus otiosum . . . ab agris vacans et victus sui causa cellas circumiens rusticanas . . ." (*Contra Gaud.*, I, 28, 32). Given the polemical character of St. Augustine's writings, Tengström feels that we must reject his description in favor of the knowledge obtained from the official edict. From St. Augustine's own words (*Sermo*, 46, 39) it seems clear that the Bishop of Hippo was totally ignorant of the extensive olive groves centered in the highland area of Numidia and was unaware of the vast labor force that was demanded there at harvest time. It was this force of olive workers supplementary to the *coloni* and *servi* which Tengström believes the Circumcellions comprised. As such they were a relatively stable social group not to be classified as migrant laborers. Though the Circumcellions formed religious bands that terrorized fellow Donatists and Catholics alike, it is not demonstrable that the two groups are completely identical. The use of the same nomenclature for the olive workers and the religious fanatics may be due to the fact that the members of one group were "ganz oder fast ganz identisch" with those of the other. In the light of our present sources, however, we can only say that the olive workers were in a very good position during the off season to wander to other parts

of Africa for religious motives. In this way they came to be known by St. Augustine.

Following the general purpose outlined in his introduction Tengström avoids a lengthy discussion of the religious motivation of the Circumcellions which is intimately connected with their nomadic character. But perhaps too readily he has dismissed Augustine's description as a kind of polemical "Volksetymologie." While rightly emphasizing the fact that the Circumcellions constituted an *ordo* of society, we must take account of the fact that St. Augustine knew his words would be scrutinized for any misrepresentation, and we must attempt to reconcile what he says with the information gleaned from the official sources. If we accept Diesner's theory that there were two groups, the laborers on the estates and a militant religious faction composed of fugitive slaves and destitute *coloni*, we can, it seems, preserve the integrity of the two sources and, in addition, retain Frend's explanation of the term "Circumcellions" which appears to this reviewer a most plausible one.

In each of the principal texts which have been used to show that the Circumcellions represented a social revolutionary movement (St. Augustine, *Ep.*, 108, 6, 18; 185, 4, 15; Optatus Milevitanus, *Contra Parm.*, 3, 4) Tengström sees the possibility of religious rather than social discontent. The violent lawlessness of the Circumcellions may well have been an attempt to protect their fellow Donatists (*coloni* and *servi*) against the efforts of *creditores* and *possessores* to force conversion to Catholicism. Though Tengström recognizes that the interpretation of these texts must remain uncertain, he has at least provided us with a serious alternative to the hypothesis of a social revolution. In the same vein he argues cogently that St. Augustine's description of the Donatist bishop Optatus of Timgad is meant simply to prove that the Donatists had a criminal in their midst rather than one who was trying "to create a new social order with Circumcellion aid" as Frend concluded.

Though much has been made of the Donatists' relations with Firmus and Gildo, Tengström's scrutiny of the pertinent texts makes us aware of the limits of our knowledge. If the Donatists employed the help of Firmus and Gildo against the dissident Rogatists and Maximianists, it must be remembered that they also called upon the imperial authorities for assistance without there being any word of an "alliance" between themselves and the emperor. Although St. Augustine refers to Optatus Thamugadensis as a "satellis Gildonis," he elsewhere (*Contra Cresc.*, III, 12, 15) expresses some uncertainty about this fact and never speaks in such terms of the Donatists in general.

A short but adequate review of the decisive effect that the imperial edicts had on the expansion of Donatism and Catholicism serves as a preface to the important question of the predominance of Donatism in certain areas of North Africa. The cause for the continuance of Donatism in the countryside in general Tengström finds in the *patrocinium* exercised by the *senatores* and *conductores* of the large estates who were unwilling to risk the flight of their laborers on account of religious discontent. Moreover, since the principle of *adjectio* (*Cod. Iust.*, XI, 59, 1 and 7) made large landowners ulti-

mately responsible for taxes which the *coloni* or the *curiales* could not bear, the *possessores* and *conductores* had a strong motive for maintaining peace on the smaller farms through their *patrocinium*. A decree of 405 A.D. (*Cod. Theod.*, XVI, 6, 4) reckons with the possibility of such interference, and St. Augustine (*Ep.*, 58, 3) indicates that it was risky even to suggest the use of coercion by a *senator* against his laborers. The protection afforded by the landowners for economic reasons prevented effective enforcement of anti-Donatist laws in the countryside and explains "ganz oder zum Teil" the relative strength of the Donatists outside the cities.

In this connection the situation in the highland areas of southern Numidia is very significant. Tengström revises Frend's figures on the ratio of "unchallenged bishoprics" between the Donatists and Catholics, but most significantly the ratio in the olive growing region of Numidia was thirteen to one. It is no coincidence that the Donatists were strongest in the area where the Circumcellions worked in the olive groves. As "eine Schutzmauer gegen den staatlichen religiösen Druck" they performed the same function for the Donatists which the official persecutions did for the Catholics. Their immunity from official sanction was due to their occupation which was essential to the economic welfare of the area. No *conductor* or *senator* would alienate the very ones who made a plentiful harvest possible. Nor would they dare provoke the Donatist *coloni* to flee their lands and burden them with new taxes at the moment when laborers for the olive groves were at a premium. Economic factors, then, rather than a spirit of social revolution lay behind the strength of the Donatists and Circumcellions in Numidia.

In January of 412 A.D. new and severe laws were promulgated against the Donatists. But more significant in Tengström's view was the edict that followed shortly thereafter (*Cod. Theod.*, XI, 1, 31) which completely abrogated the long standing policy of *adjectio*. This effectively eliminated the economic motives of the *senatores* for protecting the Donatists on the smaller farms. In respect to their own Donatist laborers the *senatores* must have found it increasingly more difficult to oppose or ignore the law. Contrary to the practice of the past when the imperial persecutions were principally directed against the ecclesiastical organization of the Donatists, specific fines were now established for various classes of people, and the individual Donatist must have begun to feel the economic consequences of remaining in his faith. Coupled with this we find that the imperial policy became more consistent. No longer do we have the "plötzlichen Veränderungen" that are reflected in the edicts of toleration which followed the persecutions.

The effects of the edicts, of course, depended in great measure upon the imperial administrators. Following the idea of Warrington that "what delayed the downfall of the Donatists was the attitude of the governors, officials and landowners," Tengström reviews the prosopographical material concerning the governors of Africa during the Donatist heresy. Though the evidence is limited and open to considerable interpretation, it seems clear that the imperial policy was supported by more loyal adherents after 411 A.D. than before. The fact that three of these energetic *persecutores* were

special commissioners indicates that the emperor was cognizant of previous failures on the part of officials and wished to see no repetition of them.

As he clearly indicates in the concluding chapter, Tengström does not deny that other factors such as differences of temperament and sentiments of a social and national character influenced an individual in choosing between Donatism and Catholicism. What he insists on first, however, is a clear understanding of the "ausseren Voraussetzungen" of the strife between the two churches. Only with such a knowledge can we hope to keep the other influences in balance. He does not attempt here to evaluate these other elements, and he cautions against underestimating the religious dispute. But in analyzing the role of the Circumcellions and the significance of *patrocinium* he has argued well against the theory of a nationalistic and/or social revolution in Africa. In doing so, Tengström has helped to give us a more balanced view of the Donatist heresy. No one who studies the history of the period can afford to ignore his work.

LOUIS J. SWIFT.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO.

SERGIO DARIS. Documenti per la storia dell'esercito romano in Egitto. Milan, Società editrice Vita e Pensiero, 1964. Pp. 272. L. 5000. (*Pubblicazioni dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore: Contributi*, serie terza, *Scienze storiche*, No. 9.)

With a few exceptions, such as diplomata, the documents collected here are papyri, ostraca, and wooden tablets. For the period from Augustus to Diocletian, they include virtually everything official in origin that concerns the internal administration of the garrison and its units. What is omitted altogether in this category is inconsequential: e.g., *P. Oxy.*, 1511 and *P. Rylands*, 223. The Pselkis ostraca and *P. Hamburg*, 39 are given only in part. In addition to these military records in the more narrow sense, which as a rule are in Latin, Daris provides a substantial selection of texts dealing with requisitions and the like, with administrative and quasi-military employment of soldiers, and with the status and privileges of veterans. Another similar volume of equal size and value might well be devoted to the private affairs of soldiers and veterans, which are not covered. One may hope that Daris himself will prepare it.

The 108 texts, a few of which are merely extracts, are conveniently arranged according to their content. Each is presented with a full bibliography, a brief introduction, an apparatus, and a commentary reduced to essentials. The indices will probably be adequate for most purposes, though they are not exhaustive. A short general introduction and a good bibliography complete the volume.

Many areas are richer in other materials, but a group of texts such as this could not be provided for any other province; even the Dura papyri are more restricted in variety and number. Much of what

is found in Roman Egypt may have limited relevance for institutions and patterns of life elsewhere, but this is much less true of the army. Documents of precisely the same form as many of these were drawn up daily in bureaux and orderly rooms all over the Empire, and one may assume that the employment and activities of soldiers that they recorded were pretty much the same wherever troops were stationed. On a different but not really less important level, these texts tell us as much about the character and means of Roman rule as do the letters exchanged between Trajan and Pliny.

No comparable collection has ever been prepared. To be sure, J. Lesquier in his brilliant and still indispensable *L'armée romaine d'Égypte* made careful use of all texts available in 1918, but he printed only a few in full. (About half of those in this volume, though the less important half, were published after 1918.) R. Cavenaile's *Corpus Papyrorum Latinarum* (1958) should also be mentioned, for it includes nearly all of Daris' Latin texts, something over a third of the whole. But Daris' volume not only is more comprehensive but often, for the Latin fragments especially, gives a better text. Evidently he did not examine many of the originals or obtain photographs, but when plates existed, he was able to make use of them. He shows himself to be well-informed and discriminating in judging proposals of others and has made contributions of his own. Some of the texts, in particular those in Latin, will be more fully read and understood, and new ones will be published. But this volume should remain a convenient and valuable collection for many years, and one widely used.

Inevitably, those who work with it will need to add marginal comments. The following may be noted here. No. 3, p. 34, notes: *cohors* not *ala I Thebaeorum*. No. 5, 3: the verb here probably means "send back." It seems best to restore *Germanus* in the nominative, as Youtie did. The *curator* need not have been named. It may be noted that the name *Claudius Germanus* appears in another military document, *P. Hibeh*, 276, where it should also be read in the first line of the verso, a suggestion confirmed by the editor, E. G. Turner. No. 9, I, 5: *idus* not *iudus*; I, 32 and 35: in both a numeral, lost or imperfectly preserved, preceded *nonas*. No. 10, A, 3: restore *divo* or *divi*, not *imp.*; 5, b, 8: probably *secutor tri[b(uni)]*, substantially as Premerstein, p. 34 (not cited on this point); 6 (pp. 57-9): the loss of the right edge of the papyrus not noted from entry XI on. No. 11, I, 14: (*centuria*) not *in*; II, 11: insert (*centurio*) before *ad*; on the centurions and legion (*XXII Deiotariana?*) see *C. P.*, XLVII (1952), p. 30. In any event, the papyrus is probably to be dated not later than *Claudius*. No. 12, B verso, 9: divide the letters to read *illa die*; B verso, 26: quite possibly *alae* rather than *ala V(eterana)*; B verso, 29:] *imperatum fuerit faciemus* seems to me certain; B recto, 8: *reliq[ui]*. No. 13: not first century but Trajanic or early Hadrianic in date because of the *gentilicia Cocceius* and *Ulpianus*. No. 14: early first century, perhaps Augustan, to judge from the tribes and names; tribes in lines 1-6 more fully read in *Écriture lat.*, no. 21; line 12: read] *untius*. No. 16, 12: add *Pr[o]sop[us]* at right; date must be 193 or shortly thereafter (*Commodus* omitted in dates, lines 8, 15). No. 20, II, 12: Daris' sug-

gestion seems certain. However, J. Bingen, *Latomus*, VIII (1949), pp. 71-2 should be cited here. No. 22: move first six lines to right, over column of names; loss of left edge not indicated in lines 9-19. No. 23: lines 12 and 18 provide a date of 238-ca. 243. No. 24: cf. *Historia*, XIV (1965), p. 87, n. 47. No. 26: new edition by R. O. Fink, *A. J. A.*, LXVIII (1964), pp. 297-9. No. 27: it is worth observing that the text must come from a bureau above the unit level; apparatus, line 10: *Hierax* not *Hiera* (read first by A. S. Hunt); line 19: *dec.* here seems unintelligible except as a mistake for *ord.* No. 34, B, 11, 2: if *Ilo stip.*, restore *ka[l. Mai. not Ian.?* No. 35: for the exact date (A. D. 192) see Fink, *Synteleia Vincenzo Arancio-Ruiz* (Naples, 1964), p. 233. Is *loricitis* (a deformation of *loricatis*) to be explained by cuirassed statues of emperors standing before a strong-room in the *principia*? For the substantive, cf. the *proc. a loricata*. No. 37: new edition by Fink, *Bull. Amer. Soc. Papyr.*, I (1963-64), pp. 39-46. *Castris* should be restored before *A]ug.* in B, 6 (cf. A, 11). Thus, however the units' names are to be read, the receipts come from the great camp near Alexandria. No. 39, II, 12: delete *V*; move the names in lines 13-17 to the left. No. 44, 4: the printer omitted *ἀπὸ* (third word). No. 62: at end of line 3, prefix not preposition. No. 68, 17: restore *ἐπιτ[ρόπου,* as I find Wilcken did, *Grundz.*, p. 379, n. 1. No. 88: the discrepancy between lines 4 and 8 requires an explanation; read *Nigro* instead of *Nostro* in line 4? No. 95: the restoration of the consular date in line 21 is impossible; see *C. P.*, LV (1960), pp. 177-8. No. 97: insert *ἀ-* at end of line 13. Small misprints in the Greek in Nos. 40, 69, 80, and 108.

J. F. GILLIAM.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

CHRISTINA DEDOUSSI. *The Samia of Menander*. Introduction, Commentary, Text. Athens, 1965. Pp. xvi + 113. \$5.00. (*Greek Society for Humanistic Studies, Centre for Classical Studies*, 2nd series, no. 9, *Studies and Researches*.)

Mrs. Dedoussi gives us here in modern Greek a full and careful edition of Menander's *Samia* with an Introduction (pp. 1-18) discussing the Cairo codex; title, plot, and characters; date of the play; vocabulary of Menander and its relation to characterization. An English abstract (p. 113) informs us that this book is a revision of her doctoral thesis approved by the University of London in 1958. She delayed publication hoping that new fragments of *Samia* from the Bodmer codex would be published. Though that hope failed, she has made diligent use of *Dyskolos* and other recent publications. Her own published articles on the significance of tetrameters and some items of vocabulary are, too modestly, omitted in her bibliography, but they are referred to in the notes (24, 36, 69). Her revised text (pp. 91-105) follows the commentary and is followed by an *Index locorum* (pp. 100-12). It is inconvenient to find no other index to the notes.

Some readers may wonder why Edmonds' edition of the *Samia* (1951), though listed in the bibliography, is disregarded without explanation in the notes. This was printed again with corrections in 1961 in the final volume (III B) of Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy* (Leiden, Brill). There is one illustration (preceding page 1), a reproduction of one of the mosaics uncovered in 1961 on the island of Lesbos. It is labeled "Act 3 of Menander's *Samia*," and shows with names a puzzled dark-faced cook, an angry Demeas, and a grandly dressed Chrysis, whose look of injured innocence speaks volumes. No space is found for the mute servant and baby who appeared in this scene on the stage. With this evidence there can no longer be any doubt that we have before us the *Samia* of Menander, not some other play. For a classicist the reading of modern Greek is facilitated by the recent publication of J. T. Pring's *Oxford Dictionary of Modern Greek*. No one need be deterred by the language from this convenient storehouse and discussion of material bearing on the play.

Mrs. Dedoussi has followed the text of Koerte-Thierfelder except in a few places. She rightly removes the question mark after an indirect question (248) and points out that Demeas' appeal (235) to an imaginary public behind the scene should not have been listed as an address to the audience. She also removes the question mark in line 331 and so changes the sense,—for the worse, I think. Good are π[άν (15) and the comma for full stop and dash (44). She follows the papyrus in giving all of line 96 to Demeas. She disregards Jensen's reading of the papyrus with ὅψομ'. [Ἐξίων (210), ἐκ τοῦ τεκούσα (103), ε[ἴπα τοῦτ]ο, τᾶλλα (105) τουτον<ι> [παρ]όνθ' (65). At line 306 she proposes τ[υχόν. But Parmenon is not really in doubt. An argumentative τ[ί οὐν; would be appropriate. Edmonds has τί γάρ. At line 103 Jensen's text has the advantage of being ambiguous so as to mean one thing to Demeas, another to Parmenon. At line 105, where Koerte reads OION, Jensen EMON, and Edmonds has ὅθεν, I propose MONON: "Answer me just the one word yes." In Greek: ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι τοῦτό μοι / μόνον,] ἔστιν. "Ἐ[στι, δέσπ]οτ', ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν— Or the translation might be: "Answer me this one thing, is it so?" "It is, master, but the secret—" There is a misprint in line 208. Edmonds' σφάττε in line 265 is worth noting. At line 268 I still like my proposal δ[εῖ καταλαβεῖν, for a joke is needed: "You've got to catch up with us," i. e., with the baby at our house we are well ahead of you.

The commentary provides abundant illustration and sound reasoning on most points. I miss any appreciation of the delightfully appropriate oaths of a jealous husband "by Hephaestus" (207), of the discoverer of an intrigue "by Helios" (108), and of a would-be actor "by Dionysus" (323). For Helios compare *Odyssey*, VIII, 271. This is a light touch that is inevitably missed by serious scholars. Nor is any notice taken of the exact parallel between *Samia*, 229 and *Dyskolos*, 168 that I pointed out in *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), p. 406 (see also LXXXIV, p. 201). Even more remarkably the parallel is ignored by Handley in his generally admirable edition. The question, "Are you going to hit me?" addressed to an angry

man by one who doubts his sanity, is evidently formulaic and guaranteed against emendation by the parallel.

I find three matters about which Mrs. Dedoussi has strong views that are, I think, refuted by the evidence. She denies that Moschion strikes Parmenon (332) though he says (334) *διακέκομαι τὸ στόμα*, "My lip's split" (Post, Edmonds) or "I've a gash in my lip." Compare the man who gave himself a gash in the leg at *Georgos*, 48: *διέκοψε τὸ σκέλος*. She does not cite any support for her translation, "I am speechless." Secondly, she will not allow Chrysis to regain Athenian citizenship and marry Demeas in the end, because she must have been a hetaera, not a virgin, when he took her as his concubine. But he says (162-4) that she came to him with a single plain dress. There is almost perfect correlation between poverty and virtue in the case of single women in ancient comedy. Demeas also warns Chrysis (175-82) that she will now learn what it is like to be a hetaera. If she had been one before, she would have had nothing to learn. Chrysis should be compared with Glykera in the *Perikeiromene*, who was given as a virgin to Polemon and is depicted as an ideal character, though the hopeful Moschion thinks of her as a hetaera (113). If Menander wrote a play *Glykera*, as Koerte believes, then that Glykera was a hetaera, and the one name may be used without distinction. Neither the name Chrysis nor the angry epithets of Demeas can outweigh the evidence of the text. Demeas calls her "whore" under a misapprehension.

Thirdly, Mrs. Dedoussi denies that Chrysis suckled the babe as stated by Demeas (51). He must have been mistaken. Now a real person may be mistaken, but not a character in a play of Menander, unless Menander wants him to be. Menander dare not let him mislead the audience or the play will be blurred. Furthermore, Demeas' ears would have told him if the babe was still hungry. The argument from silence is valid in such cases. Chrysis' own baby was doomed to die as soon as born. For it to live it must be "picked up" as much as any exposed infant. The important thing, however, is that the play is much more effective if Chrysis has meekly sacrificed her own child, yet braves all indignities and dangers as she does in order to save Moschion's. He has no other resource, since he has no means to pay a wetnurse. Chrysis' character is pure gold and captivates a popular audience. Nor would Demeas have tolerated even reluctantly a baby in the house that had no claim whatever on him or his adored Chrysis. That would be too much to ask.

Mrs. Dedoussi suggests that from Demeas' use of the myth of Zeus and Danaë (245) it may be inferred that Moschion too crept into the girl's room. But Moschion is a shy, honest youth. He must have confessed his adventure to the audience in a monologue. Circumstances must have conspired to weaken him,—women celebrating a festival at night, for instance, and roaming abroad. Demeas can conceive of similar weakness on his part (124) only if he were tipsy and tempted by Chrysis. After the event he evidently confessed to the girl's mother, promised to marry the girl when his father returned, and was given custody of the newborn infant. The girl's father would certainly not have permitted it to live. It would ease

Menander's problem of showing Moschion as a lone agent, never entering the house to confer with Chrysis, if he were described as living at a distance in the country and occupied with duties assigned to him by Demeas. Demeas evidently does not think of him as having daily opportunities for intimacy with Chrysis.

The fact that led Moschion not to confess at once to his father was Demeas' proposal to arrange the marriage anyway. A shy boy might be glad to let events take their course. Naturally, it would be a harrowing experience for Chrysis and Parmenon to take part in the deception of Demeas. We must suppose that Parmenon had at least warned Demeas that he would find a baby in the house and that Moschion had authorized Chrysis to keep it. This would produce in Demeas a state of suppressed indignation that needed only a new discovery to cause the explosion that we see in Act 3.

There were probably at least two monologues by Demeas in the first two acts, one in which he explained how generously he had treated the adopted Moschion as well as Chrysis, who was given a home when she was destitute. Let us suppose that Demeas had had it in mind to acquire a mistress for Moschion in order to guard against amorous adventures, and that, when he enlisted Chrysis, Demeas to his surprise fell in love with her himself. This would add fuel to the jealousy of Act 3. The other monologue, in which Demeas must have excused and pardoned Moschion for his offense in sponsoring the baby, would prepare the way for greater exasperation later when a greater offense had to be excused. So too there may have been a successful intervention by Moschion on behalf of the baby to pave the way for the later unsuccessful intervention in Act 4 that finally compelled Moschion to confess.

Unlike Sostratus in the *Dyskolos*, who acts, Moschion keeps the plot going by refusal to act. Parmenon's only part is to persuade Moschion to do his duty. We see him working at this in Act 5, and there must have been similar scenes in earlier acts. There was no need for Chrysis to appear on stage before she was expelled from the house. Menander's good women are homebodies. But it would have been convenient to let her be heard in the house offstage agreeing with Demeas to prepare for the wedding and to keep the screaming brat out of sight. Since one actor could imitate the two offstage voices, we may imagine Moschion and Parmenon on stage, listening and identifying the offstage characters for the audience. There is such a scene in the *Asinaria* (890-906) of Plautus. Since he had no need to confine himself to three actors, his use of offstage voices probably derives from a Greek original. On the Greek stage four speakers could be presented directly in no other way.

An actor who is required to report a public meeting to characters on stage, as in *Sicyonian*, VI B, had to be even more versatile, distinguishing various speakers and cries from the crowd by voice alone. So too the words of two characters and the silence of a third are reported by Getas onstage in a soliloquy that is overheard by a second onstage character (*Misoumenos*, frag. C, lines 10-12, p. 51, Turner). We already had in the *Epitrepontes* (558-87) a more complicated technique whereby the reaction of Charisius eavesdropping on an offstage dialogue is reported to the audience by Onesimus,

who had himself been eavesdropping on Charisius. In this case, however, a part of the dialogue is reported only by Charisius when he comes on stage, so that no exceptional versatility is required of the actor. Does this indicate a later date for the production of *Misoumenos* and *Sicyonian*? It is idle to speculate.

Of *Samia* we have almost all of Act 3. The action of Acts 4 and 5 is clear enough from the fragments that we have. As Mrs. Dedoussi says, publication of the Bodmer papyrus may well fill out the gaps in them. We are greatly indebted to her for a painstaking contribution to the study of Menander.

L. A. POST.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

B. R. REES, ed. *Papyri from Hermopolis, and Other Documents of the Byzantine Period*. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1964. Pp. XII + 127; 6 pls. 4 gns. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 42.)

The eighty-five documents published in this volume were brought from Egypt about sixty years ago by Grenfell and Hunt. With the exception of No. 1, a first-century letter of introduction, they range in date from the fourth to the seventh century. There are letters, petitions, contracts, receipts, accounts, and orders for payment, but no literary texts.

Nos. 2-6 concern the same Theophanes whose archive, dating from the first quarter of the fourth century, is published in *P. RyI*, IV. Theophanes, a native of Hermopolis, was a person of some importance: we know that he was a *scholasticus* in government employment, and an advocate and legal adviser of some high official, from which we infer that he was probably on the staff of the Prefect of Egypt. It is particularly interesting, therefore, to find mentions of the worship of Hermes Trismegistus in these new letters from Theophanes' circle. No. 3 concludes (lines 20-5) with the benediction, εὐδαίμονά σε δοῖεν αὐτός τε ὁ τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμοῦς καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πάντες διὰ τέλους εἶναι. In No. 2, 11-12, the text as published reads, τῆς θρησκείας τοῦ φυλάττοντος θε[ο]ῦ Ἑρμοῦ τὸ ἀπαραίτητον [μο]ι [ῥ]ῥωρ. While the cultic reference is thus unmistakable, the textual restoration at the end seems quite unsatisfactory. This is not because, in the words of the editor's footnote, "the allusion to 'water' has proved impossible to explain or relate to the cult of Hermes Trismegistus." Rather, a study of the photograph in Plate I suggests to me that ἀπαραίτητον is in reality followed by a dative, of which I can only read [. . .] δωι (the writer regularly writes iota adscript). Also, where a god is said to have sent illness κατ' ἐπῆρειαν (line 10), this is not really "in malice" (the editor's translation), but rather "abusively," "using me ill."

The editor calls attention several times to the similar phrasing of these and contemporary Christian letters, of which examples are at hand in Nos. 7-10. No. 8, for instance, concludes with a prayer for preservation akin to that quoted above from No. 3.

No. 15, another letter, is a splendid example of vulgar Greek. Specially interesting are the words *ἐξηφώνησα* and *ἐξήφωνα* (lines 2-3 and 6). The editor prefers—with a question mark—to regard these as representing *ἐσιφώνησα* and *σιφώνια*, rejecting the more common and semantically fitting terms *ἐσυμφώνησα* and *σύμφωνα* because these latter “would involve the assumption of a much more radical error, and there is no parallel . . . for the change of *νμ* to *η*” (note to 2 f.). These objections misconstrue the problem. In the first place, these are not erroneously or incompetently written literary forms which we are called upon to correct or emend, but faithful phonetic spellings which we need but to fathom. Secondly, the interchange before us is not *η* for *νμ*, but *η* for *ν* (which is too everyday a phenomenon, including an example in line 9 of this text, to require citations here) with the nasal sign, *μ*, omitted (as *φροντίζω* is written without *ν* in 32, 19); a good parallel is *ἀβλοιόσων* (*P. S. I.*, 1103, 14; third century), which, as H. C. Youtie has shown (*Eos*, XLVIII [1956], I, pp. 387-8), is a vulgar spelling of *ἀμβλυόσων*. And for examples of the augmenting of familiar compound verbs as if they were simple verbs see, in addition to the New Testament citation in the editor's note, *P. Nessana*, 57, 4 and note.

A prize piece in this collection is No. 18, the verbatim transcript of an official proceeding in which a slave affirms that he and his mother and brother are slaves. (More than one modern reader will, I feel sure, be struck by the seeming indifference of the slave's responses to the questions: Is it simple matter-of-factness, or does it perhaps reflect the insensitivity of hopelessness?) The editor's introduction needs correction on one major point. The purpose of the hearing is not to satisfy the owner about the slave's status, but to satisfy the presiding *hypomnematographoi*, who are being asked by the new owner to record the purchase in the archives. In fact, as Professor Youtie has called to my attention in a recent letter, this document is the first actual example of the *anakrisis* of a slave—a process referred to in several previously published papyri and much written about in the past: see in particular the excellent summary by E. P. Wegener, *Journal of Juristic Papyrology*, IX-X (1955-56), pp. 104-9. It had previously been apparent that *anakrisis* took place when a slave was imported. And, as it turns out, one of the questions asked of the slave in No. 18 is, *πόθεν σε ἐκτήσατο*; The answer given is, *ἀπὸ Ῥεσκούπου*. This place name being hitherto unattested, the editor speculates on whether it is miswritten for Resculum, in Dacia. There is no room here for extended argument on the point, but I think it altogether more likely that the slave had been brought in from the Egyptian *chora* or from some other place in the nearby eastern Mediterranean. Finally, I find unsatisfactory the treatment of lines 12-13. The editor restores *προδήλου γεγ[ο]ν[ος] μέρ[ους] καλῆς (?) αἰρέσεως τοῦ ἀνδραπόδου*, which seems to me linguistically strange and an altogether inadequate basis from which to derive the sense, “now that it has become clear that the purchase of the slave was made *bonis condicionibus* (?)”. Moreover, what has been demonstrated by the preceding interrogatory is the slave's acknowledgment of his servile status; not a word has been said about

conditions of sale. For reasons of grammar and sense, therefore, a restoration needs to be sought along the lines rejected in the editor's footnote, e.g. *προδῆλου γεγ[ο]μέν[ης τῆς ἰπρο]αίρέσεως τοῦ ἀνδραπόδου*, "the slave's sentiments now being clear."

No. 19 is a petition involving a dispute over the performance of a liturgy. While much is gone beyond recall in the portion of the text that is lost, it is possible to improve upon the editor's interpretation of the situation. In particular, line 9 cannot mean that "the liturgist has defaulted"; rather, what the passage in question conveys is that a certain Theodorus accepted a salary from the liturgist to serve as his substitute, and thus released him (*ἀπέλυσεν αὐτόν*). And—the broken text goes on—since the petitioner had given the guarantee for the liturgist's appearance and satisfactory performance, attempts are now being made to compel him to pay the salary. The petitioner appears to be on secure ground in rebuffing these attempts: since the liturgist has not defaulted, the guarantor's liability does not come into play.

In No. 25 ownership of a house is ceded *ἀπὸ ἐδάφους ἕως ἀέρος*. The translation "from basement to attic" is inaccurate: *ἔδαφος* is the ground, not the *sous-sol*, and *ἀήρ* is not the top of the house but the open space above it. Is the expression perhaps an echo of the legal maxim *cuius est solum eius est usque ad caelum*? As this question does not appear to have been raised at any of the dozen or so previous occurrences of the phrase in Greek papyri, I have looked briefly into the history of the Latin maxim, with kind assistance from Professor A. A. Schiller. In the words of a recent monograph, "It is now generally conceded that the language of the maxim 'cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum' was not part of Roman written law. It is not in the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. . . . When the maxim is carefully analyzed, however, and reasonably construed, it is apparent that it must have sprung originally from principles of Roman law—though stated in a non-Roman manner" (J. C. Cooper, *Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus Est Solum" in International Air Law* [Montreal, 1952], p. 28). In fact, it is possible to cite a handful of texts from the *Corpus Iuris*—Cooper collects and comments on them, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-17—which are conceptually related, but none is expressed in language even approximating that of the maxim. The latter first occurs in the great collection of glosses compiled at Bologna under the direction of Franciscus Accursius, who died in 1260 A.D. But there still remains the question of its ultimate origin: Was this interpretation original with the glossators, or were they preserving an earlier, now lost, formulation? The phrase *ἀπὸ ἐδάφους ἕως ἀέρος*, which occurs in papyrus documents from the fifth century on, is, I suggest, evidence of a clearly formulated principle that private property extended—or could extend—a *solo ad caelum*.

A few details to conclude, some of them from notes of Professor Youtie. No. 17, 2: *τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους* are not "the incapacitated," but rather "those unable to help themselves," or something of that sort. No. 21, end of the first paragraph of the introduction: The references after Seidl are not directly relevant; they deal with

suretyship in litigation rather than in liturgy. No. 22, 10: The reading τῆς εὐσεβοῦς should be reexamined for the customary τῆς εὐτυχοῦς—25: Read (ἀρούρης) and περὶ <πρακτορίαν> Ὀφews—11 n.: The last sentence of this note confuses Oxyrhynchite Ὀφεις with Hermopolite Ὀφεις (should Ὀφews also be read in No. 61, 3?). No. 24, 4: The translation of τοῦ θεμένου as "the person who has drawn up the document" is ambiguous; read "execute" for "draw up," as in Nos. 32 and 34.

The typography and the plates have the customary excellence of the Egypt Exploration Society publications.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

A. J. GRAHAM. *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1964. Pp. xviii + 259. \$6.75.

This good study of the relationship between colony and founding city in Greece, from the eighth to the fourth century B. C., was developed by A. J. Graham from his doctoral thesis at Cambridge University. While the book retains some formal marks of a dissertation, Graham's careful discussion of the evidence and his conclusions deserve careful attention. He considers that the concern expressed by Thucydides about the breakdown of filial ties between colony and mother city under the duress of the Peloponnesian War was typical of contemporary Greek feeling; further, that Thucydides' "basic ideas (of the relationship) are the product of traditions from an older Greek world, which were no longer effective in the times that he described." Colonies were independent city-states, but their relationship to the mother city, deriving from old and basic religious concepts, was close and important from the outset. The colony was regarded by the Greeks as an extension of the mother community, although, of course, subsequent developments might weaken the original ties. Graham argues that neither the colonies of the Corinthian tyrants nor the "imperial" colonies of Athens represented basically new and different types of foundation. He protests, too, against the views of Édouard Will (*La Nouvelle Olio*, VI [1954], pp. 413-60) that early colonies were independent and that the relationship to the mother city became effective only in the sixth century and later.

Such a thesis, arguing the vitality of an institutional relationship over the course of about four hundred years, involves the dangers of regarding the Greek polis as springing virtually full grown from the Dark Age and of projecting evidence from the better known classical period back into the times of early colonization. I am not sure that Graham entirely avoids the former pitfall, but he is at pains to evaluate the documentary evidence scrupulously. Most of it is from the writers and inscriptions of the fifth and fourth centuries. Only for that period, with rare exceptions, can we trace specific dealings between colony and mother city over a period of

some time and gain an understanding of Greek feelings about the proper relationship between the two at first hand. The problems of relationship are very complex and Graham has perhaps narrowed them too much for full understanding. Almost excluded from discussion are the causes of colonization, the commercial factor in relationships, and East Greek colonization. The latter process does seem to have been of a different character and generally later in time than the movement from peninsular Greece. So the conceptions underlying and developing from it may well have been different.

A "Prolegomena" (pp. 1-22) discusses some generalizations about Greek colonization and the nature of the evidence. The "Act of Foundation" (pp. 25-68) studies the function of Delphi in sanctioning colonies, the work of the oekist, and the foundation decrees of Cyrene, Naupactus, and Brea. In a lengthy section on "Subsequent Relations" (pp. 71-217) Graham selects important cases to exemplify particular relationships: Thasos and the effect of distance (usually, the farther, the more tenuous); Miletus and the question of mutual citizenship (Miletus had isopolity with Olbia and Cyzicus, probably from the fifth century or even earlier); Corinth and its colonial empire (the colonies were "somewhere between autonomy and absorption in the state of Corinth"—admittedly a difficult status to define); Argos, Cnossus, Tylissus and religious relations (with an appendix on the Argive decree discussed by Vollgraff, *Verhand. d. k. Nederl. Akad. von Wetenschappen*, N.R. LI [1948], No. 2); Athens and late imperial colonies (they were the possession of the mother city and under close control by her).

Graham's discussion is well documented and argued, but the transformation of colonies from extensions of the mother city in socio-religious terms to possessions of the mother city in political terms seems to me to reflect a more fundamental change in conception than he admits. Is this not represented by the change in the position of the oekist? Graham considers that at first the oekist was an independent leader, all responsible and even monarchical (beyond the act of foundation?); then, in the Corinthian tyrants' colonies the oekist was closely attached to the ruler of the metropolis; finally, in the imperial colonies of the fifth century, closely controlled by the mother city, the oekist was no longer even a participant. As the polis became more consciously a political community older ties based on religion and kinship were supplanted by political considerations of a fundamentally different nature. The older ties do not seem to have been particularly compulsive in the early stages, to judge from the cases of Thera and Cyrene and of Corinth and Coreyra. Themistocles invoked the traditional ties between Athens and Asiatic Ionia in the Persian Wars, but rather incidentally and without effect. Does not his appeal reflect the growing political consciousness of the city state and the readiness of its leaders to utilize traditional, but essentially meaningless, institutions for political purposes? The tyrants in the late seventh and sixth centuries had ordered their states politically and given them something like a foreign policy. It seems significant that in the tyrants' colonies the idea of political hegemony by mother city over colony appears clearly. I am left with the feeling that the order of relationship between mother city

and colony in the early period of colonization was on a different plane from that in the classical period. The age of transition seems to have been the sixth century and the conditioning factors for the thought of Thucydides and of Greece in the classical period the political experience of the Persian War and of the Athenian Empire.

CARL ROEBUCK.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

E. R. DODDS. *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety. Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine.* Cambridge, At the University Press, 1965. Pp. xii + 144. \$5.50.

In these four lectures delivered at Belfast and Oslo, Professor Dodds addresses himself to salient features of personal religious experience that illuminate the spiritual transformation of a crucial period "when the material decline was steepest and the ferment of new religious feelings most intense." In particular, he treats of the progressive devaluation of material, bodily, and human experience; daemonic contacts through dreams and prophetic utterance; mystical states; and the issues that both united and separated paganism and Christianity. The publication is dedicated to the memory of the late A. D. Nock, who would certainly have rejoiced in the rich documentation that adorns the text. Indeed, some of Dodds' most engaging insights are buried in the footnotes.

The cross-fertilizing of classical and patristic studies is as yet all too rare, despite the pioneering work of scholars such as Reitzenstein and Norden, Nilsson and Jaeger, A. D. Nock and C. N. Cochrane. The problem is rooted in the long-standing conflict of "science and religion." Classicists rightly distrust the theological judgments of churchmen; and patrologists disdain the humanistic approach in interpreting religious phenomena and convictions. This mutual suspicion is illustrated by Dodds himself, with reference to the tension between cultivated pagan and Christian apologist in antiquity—"the difference between *logismos* and *pistis*, between reasoned conviction and blind faith."

At the very beginning, Dodds is forthrightly honest in stating his position as an agnostic who "cannot share the standpoint of those who see the triumph of Christianity as the divine event to which the whole creation moved." He has deliberately confined his attention to the inner experience of individuals, pagan and Christian, without concerning himself with the validity of philosophical theory or religious dogma, and by excluding consideration of external forms of worship. His approach is rationalistic and psychological (often with Freudian overtones)—and this will raise eyebrows among theologians and church historians, who should in no case overlook the extraordinary range of interpretation within the self-imposed limits of his perspective.

His reasons for the triumph of Christianity over paganism—already well under way in the latter half of the third century—are indisputable. Christian exclusiveness simplified the choice of men “in a bewildering mass of alternatives.” Christianity was open to all, without respect to social distinction or educational qualification. The Church outbid its pagan rivals in better promises for the future, no less than in more rewarding benefits of social security in this world. All these points have been acknowledged since the researches of Harnack. But Dodds refuses to engage himself to the theological principles that underlay these sociological differences between Christianity and paganism. It is not enough to say that “one reason for the success of Christianity was simply the weakness and weariness of the opposition.” Why did the “vitality of paganism” go into a decline?

Dodds quite rightly points out that “love of one’s neighbor” was not an exclusively Christian teaching, though he admits that “the Christians appear to have practiced it much more effectively than any other group.” But that is exactly what the apologists for Christianity emphasized. Christianity gave not only a high moral teaching, it gave men power to live it out. In one of his illuminating footnotes, Dodds cites a remark of Rostovtzeff, that in the period under consideration “‘hatred and envy reigned everywhere: the peasants hated the landowners and the officials, the city proletariat hated the city bourgeoisie, the army was hated by everybody’ . . . Christianity was the one force which could effectively bring the jarring elements together: hence its attractiveness to Constantine.” This singular reference to Constantine’s attraction to Christianity deserves more attention.

In general, Dodds sees very little difference psychologically in the religious orientation of Christian and pagan in this period. It was a time of interiorization of religious experience, of despair over material existence and indifference to the amelioration of this world. The dominant figures are Origen and Plotinus—both of them pupils of the same teacher, and formed by the same culture. (More attention to Clement of Alexandria and to Irenaeus would have given a better balance to the Christian side of this picture.) Again and again, Dodds sees the underlying anxiety, retreat, and world-renunciation as based in a desire for expiation of an unconscious guilt. He goes so far as to state that the concern for “authority of ancient texts” and the allegorizing of them display an intellectual dependence “closely related to guilt-feelings.” Yet he nowhere offers any explanation as to why these guilt-feelings should have been so predominant at this time. Such Freudian judgments need closer scrutiny.

Certain of Dodds’ interpretations are, to this reviewer at least, admirably judicious. He rejects the existence of a pre-Christian Gnostic system. He sees the rise of Christian asceticism as not necessarily due to pagan influence, but believes that its root is probably Jewish. I would suggest that the eschatological character of Christianity, combined with its experience of persecution, was a more likely source of inspiration. The analysis of Plotinus’ mystic experience is masterful, distinguished from Gnostic divinization, and mantic trance. Its approach was intellectual, not physical; and

its interpretation, a natural event, not (as in Christianity) a gift of grace. He is right, too, in denying to Origen the Plotinian mysticism; it enters Christianity first with Gregory of Nyssa. Yet once again, he intrudes psychological criteria to explain religious phenomena—this time by support from Festugière's statement that "misery and mysticism are related facts." So Dodds sums up: "From a world so impoverished intellectually, so insecure materially, so filled with fear and hatred as the world of the the third century, any path that promised escape must have attracted serious minds."

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

THE CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL
OF THE PACIFIC,
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.

Studi Annibalici: Atti del Convegno Svoltosi a Cortona-Tuoro sul Trasimeno-Perugia, Ottobre 1961. Cortona, Tipografia Commerciale, 1964. Pp. vi + 260; 49 pls. (Estratto da Accademia Etrusca-Cortona, *Annuario*, XII, n. s. V [1961-1964].)

Sir Gavin de Beer's *Alps and Elephants* is one of several recent studies attesting to the perennial interest in Hannibal's character and career in general as well as in the specific problem of where he crossed the Alps. Professor Susini gives a sizeable list of such works in the course of his own article (p. 115, n. 6) in the volume under review. This volume includes sixteen papers delivered at Cortona, Tuoro, or Perugia during the Convegno di Studi Annibalici held in October, 1961. The papers are another example, as the congress itself was, of interest in Hannibal and show a fine awareness of the significance of the Second Punic War in history. As Professor Romanelli notes in the Preface to the book, the *convegno* was "diretto a illustrare vari aspetti della storia e della cultura romana e punica nel periodo cruciale della seconda guerra fra Roma e Cartagine." The various aspects are illustrated in the present articles by a wealth of material connected with several disciplines, in particular with archeology and history or with subdivisions of these like sculpture, numismatics, and epigraphy. Perhaps a reviewer can do no more than list all the papers and cite special points, or give a kind of summary, in the case of those more or less related to his own work.

But this reviewer, who attended the congress, has a pleasant extra duty to perform. That is to declare how well it was organized and how grateful he is to everybody who had a hand in the organizing for all the hospitality provided. His appreciation and thanks go to the Accademia Etrusca di Cortona, the *promotrice* of the convention; to the Academy's secretary, Dr. C. Bruschetti; to Professor G. Susini; and to many other people and institutions. He would call attention to the list of institutions, beginning with the Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione, which Dr. Bruschetti himself gives in the note at the end of his chronicle of the congress (pp. 1-5).

In the first article (pp. 9-36) Professor G.-Ch. Picard discusses "Carthage au temps d'Hannibal." There is frequent reference to the Semitic god Melqart in the guise of Hercules. This particular instance of syncretism is of great importance and interest for anybody who holds the thesis, as this reviewer does, that on one level Silius Italicus' *Punica* is concerned with the question of whether Scipio or Hannibal should count as the successor of Hercules (the patron of the Stoics). Picard notes that the Hercules on a coin issued at Cartagena shortly after 228 B. C. is surely the Melqart of Gades and refers to Silius' description of the temple of Hercules in the latter place. A complement to this paper by Professor Picard is now to be found in "Hercule et Melqart" written by Mme. Picard and himself for the *Hommages à Jean Bayet* (Bruxelles-Berchem, 1964), pp. 569-78. The second article of the *Studi Annibali* (pp. 37-55) is by Professor V. Tusa on "La questione fenicio-punica in Sicilia." Pp. 57-69 contain Professor G. Vitucci's "Un nuovo episodio della seconda guerra Punica?" The author reaffirms his stand in regard to the inscription *Année épigraphique*, 1954, no. 216. The person commemorated on the inscription is not an unknown native of Brindisi but the Cunctator, and the VI there is not to be expanded as VIBINVM. So the question of a new episode in the Second Punic War must be answered in the negative. In the next paper (pp. 71-81), "La testimonianza di Catone sulla 'decessio de foedere' saguntina (Fr. 84 Peter²)," Professor G. Nenci explains how the Second Punic War became so important in Roman historiography. Cato's partisan approach to it and to the preceding *decessionis de foedere* in the *Origines* was influential. Its great events and dramatic situations were such as to obscure very soon the memory of the first war. For Fabius Pictor the stimulus to write came from having taken part in the second conflict, and from his time on everything antedating the Hannibalic War was considered merely introductory to it. In the next two articles Professor N. Degrossi reports on "La zona archeologica di Canne della Battaglia" (pp. 83-91) and Dr. F. Bertocchi on "Recenti scavi ai sepolcreti di Canne" (pp. 93-109). Both authors note among other things that the cemetery thought by many to contain skeletons of soldiers who fell at the Battle of Cannae is actually medieval.

The last five pages of Dr. Bertocchi's article are an appendix in which she provides data unavailable when the paper was read at the congress. Several other articles have something similar. All those responsible for accepting and editing such additions are to be congratulated on their desire to see Hannibalic scholarship presented in its latest phase.

Professor G. Susini's "L'archeologia della guerra annibalica" (pp. 111-39) contains "osservazioni e risultati generali, di carattere metodologico" that he has been led to by his studies on the Battle of Lake Trasimene which were published as *Ricerche sulla battaglia del Trasimeno* in *Annuario XI* (1960) of the Accademia Etrusca. In "Perchè Annibale non assediò Roma: Considerazioni archeologiche" (pp. 141-51) Professor L. Laurenzi, drawing analogies with the fortifications of Rhodes, emphasizes the fortress-like character of Rome in Hannibal's time (hence the latter's decision not to

attack Rome after Cannae). This has an important bearing on the theme of the walls of Rome in Silius' *Punica*, especially as this theme has now been analyzed by M. von Albrecht in his *Silius Italicus* (Amsterdam, 1964). Professor P. Romanelli writes on "Roma e i Libi durante le guerre Puniche" (pp. 153-65). Professor F. P. Rosati deals with "La monetazione Annibalica" (pp. 167-80). The only issues that can be assigned with good probability to Hannibal are those of electrum coined in the mint of Capua.

In the next article (pp. 181-9) Professor A. D. Fitton Brown discusses "La stratégie romaine, 218-216 a. C." On pp. 191-4 Professor F. Cassola writes about "Il diadema di Annibale." Pp. 195-207 present a second article by G.-Ch. Picard, "Le portrait d'Hannibal: Hypothèse nouvelle." A bronze bust discovered at Volubilis in 1944 may be of the youthful Hannibal. Professor Picard notes *inter alia* similarities between this bronze and the profile on Barcid coins of Spain which have been attributed to Hannibal by E. S. G. Robinson. On pp. 209-33 the present reviewer treats of "Hannibal at the Tutia." Pp. 235-59 contain Professor A. Di Vita's "Le stele puniche dal recinto di Zeus Meilichios a Selinunte." The last article in the volume is Professor U. Ciotti's "La Battaglia al Lago Plestino" (pp. 251-9). The author accepts the Lake of Plestia which Appian gives as the site of Centenius' defeat, though he notes errors in Appian's account of the battle. Hannibal was heading for Picenum, then, after Trasimenum rather than for Rome. Accordingly, the siege of Spoleto as narrated by Livy must be revised.

The papers are followed by 49 plates. The first one shows Professor Romanelli opening the congress at the Palazzo Casali in Cortona. The other 48 accompany various articles in the volume. Articles and plates together throw much new light on the greatest period in the struggle between Rome and Carthage.

EDWARD L. BASSETT.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

PIERRE MONTEIL. *Beau et Laid en Latin. Étude de vocabulaire.* Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1964. Pp. 373. 48 Fr. (*Études et Commentaires*, LIV.)

In a penetrating study, Dr. Monteil investigates the meanings and etymologies of the Latin words for "beautiful" and "ugly." He bases his research on those writings from the age of Ennius to that of Apuleius for which *indices verborum* are available.

He maintains that the characteristic meanings of the words for "beautiful" are as follows. *Pulcher* refers to an ideal beauty which transcends its embodiments; *formosus* to a physical beauty (p. 96). *Venustus*, "charming," has an instantaneous force which may be fleeting (p. 133). *Lepidus* refers to beauty experienced as pleasure (p. 162). The use of *concinnus* with aesthetic value is rare, except

as a rhetorical term meaning "beautiful in sound" (pp. 190-1). *Elegans* has an intellectual quality, being based on the judgment of a connoisseur (p. 219). *Bellus*, originally a diminutive of *bonus*, refers either to the beauty of a creature not fully developed or to a beauty in which something is lacking (p. 240).

In addition to adjectives with negative prefixes, such as *deformis* and *invenustus*, there are three words for "ugly." *Turpis* has reference to extreme ugliness, often connoting humiliation and segregation; *foedus* to an abnormal ugliness (p. 337); *pravus* to deformity (p. 248).

A summary of Chapter II, "*Pulcher*," will indicate the nature of the book. *Pulcher* has left no trace in Romance (p. 71). Of uncertain origin, it has occasioned etymological speculations (pp. 72-3). *Pulcher* and its derivatives have, most frequently in early Latin, meanings connected with religion. I. They refer to favorable omens, Ennius, *Ann.*, 91 (Cic., *De Div.*, I, 107) (p. 74). II. They refer to gods as favorable, Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 780 (p. 77). *Pulcher* also refers to the august powers of gods, Cic., *Phil.*, XII, 8 (p. 78). III. *Pulcher* means "divinely favored," Cic., *Cat.*, II, 19: *Deos immortales . . . pulcherrimae urbi . . . auxilium esse laturos* (p. 81). IV. *Pulcher* and *pulchre* indicate that an object or an event is the result of divine favor, Plaut., *Rud.*, 1366 (p. 82). V. They express the idea of profit or success gained by divine favor, Plaut., *Pers.*, 608 (p. 85), and also of profit or success in general, Cic., *Verr.*, V, 77 (p. 88). Further, *pulcher* means "fertile" or "productive," as applied to land, to work, or to the mind of an orator. It means "fertilizing," Verg., *Georg.*, II, 137 (pp. 86-7). *Pulcher* describes animals and plants as at the peak of their growth, Verg., *Aen.*, V, 399, and qualifies products, such as vinegar and wine, as ripe (p. 87). VI. *Pulcher* and its derivatives, applied to men and to things, express the idea of an optimal condition or development. *Classis pulcherrima*, Cic., *Verr.*, III, 186, is "a powerful and intact fleet"; *pulchritudo*, Cic., *De Fin.*, IV, 35, "a sound physical condition" (p. 90). The ethical and aesthetic meanings, for which see below, developed from the religious meanings (pp. 92, 106). Derivation cannot have proceeded in the opposite direction (p. 106). The etymology of Heinze and of Ceci, which connects *pulcher* with *polleo*, is the least improbable of those proposed. The ground meaning of *pulcher* is that which refers to a success that is "*quasi providentielle*" (p. 108).

The discussion of *pulcher* with ethical significance is disappointing. The author opposes the accepted theory, that it was derived from the aesthetic significance, arguing, all too abstractly, that the aura of sublimity which it has in certain contexts shows that it must be of religious origin (pp. 91-2). He does, to be sure, mention a connection of the ethical meaning with a specific "religious" meaning, that which refers to success (p. 94). However, this connection is much less close than the connection of the ethical with the aesthetic meaning. The accepted theory stands. Indeed it receives new support from the fact (see p. 94) that no clear example has been adduced of "ethical *pulcher*" applied to a person; for a beautiful action is a good action, but the handsomeness of people does not connote goodness.

In the section on the aesthetic significance of *pulcher*, the part that bears on the problem of origins is more concrete than in the section on the ethical significance, and far more rewarding. After pointing out the connection of "beautiful" with the meaning that refers to success (p. 99) and that which refers to divine favor (p. 100) and also with the meaning "at the high point of development" (p. 102), Monteil cites Cic., *De Off.*, III, 95: <Iphigenia> *qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius*, "who was the most perfect (*achevé*) product of that year." He comments that this passage shows that a man of Cicero's time could feel as one whole a meaning that we label "religious" and one that we call aesthetic (p. 102). The passage shows, too, though Monteil does not say so, just how, in all probability, the aesthetic meaning of *pulcher* originated. It seems that the meaning "at the high point of development (or condition)," which is much closer to the aesthetic meaning than is any other except the ethical, was the sole, or at any rate the principal source of the aesthetic significance, giving rise to it in uses similar to the one cited.

Throughout the book Monteil presents new interpretations of passages in literature. Many are illuminating. A very few are not convincing. Plaut., *Mil.*, 68: *Nimiast miseria nimis pulchrum esse hominem*. Monteil thinks that *pulchrum* means "divinely favored." The usual interpretation, "handsome," is better. Not valid against this interpretation is Monteil's argument that *formast ferox* (vs. 1390) shows that, far from regretting his good looks, Pyrgopolynices is proud of them; for *Mil.*, 68 is actually an expression of pride, negatively phrased. Likewise in *Mil.*, 968 the meaning "handsome" suits the context best; and in 959 *pulchritudinem* is best rendered by "handsomeness" (pp. 79-80).

The author thinks that in *concinna Samos* (*Epist.*, I, XI, 2) Horace improperly uses an adjective which, when it has aesthetic force, belongs to the language of rhetoric. He does not, however, object to Plaut., *Pers.*, 547, *Sat edepol concinnast facie*, and he suggests that the meaning "(naturally) beautiful" which *concinna* has here was derived from "made beautiful" (*soigné*), which, in turn, grew out of such expressions as *concinmare faciem* (pp. 188-9). Granted. However, when *concinus* had come to mean "(naturally) beautiful," it might well have been applied to nouns of a wide range of meaning. Especially when one bears in mind that only a small part of the literature of the republic has survived, Monteil's criticism seems unwarranted.

Lucr., I, 62: *Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret / In terris . . .*, "When men were dragging out a wretched existence on the land (*sur le sol*) . . ." (p. 313). The interpretation of *foede*, which is the point at issue, is good; but does not *in terris*, when not qualified, mean "on earth"?

Of Monteil's illuminating interpretations, a number have been cited in the summary of Chapter II. Four additional examples must suffice. Lesbia's pet, described as *bellus*, is not "beautiful," but is, rather, "a good little sparrow" (Catul., 3, 15, pp. 233-4). The *turpis* whom Pholoe spurns is a man "of low rank" (Hor., *Odes*, I, 33, 9, p. 286). Verg., *Ecl.*, VII, 65: *Fraxinus in silvis pulcherrima*,

pinus in hortis. "The ash is the tree that grows the best in the woods . . ." (p. 87). Plaut., *Amph.*, 1085: *At me uxor insanum facit / Suis foedis factis*, . . . "with her actions that bode no good" (p. 313).

The book is provided with a bibliography, an *index locorum*, and a detailed table of contents. Of the occasional misprints, one, in the last line of p. 83, is baffling. *Mieux*, the first word on p. 294, is puzzling as a translation of *turpius*. On p. 366, col. 2, under Horace, *Epîtres*, for I, XV, 45 read I, XVI, 45.

ALICE F. BRAUNLICH.

GOUCHER COLLEGE.

Plutarchi Vita Aristidis. Introduzione, testo, commento, traduzione ed appendice a cura di IDA CALABI LIMENTANI. Pp. lxxviii + 184. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1964. L. 2500. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori*, No. XLVIII ["Storia antica ed epigrafia"].)

For the historian this is an excellent edition. For the Plutarchist it will be found extremely useful but lacking. It furnishes the first learned commentary on Plutarch's *Aristides* since that by Bernadotte Perrin to accompany the translations (without Greek text) in his *Plutarch's Themistocles and Aristides* (New York and London, 1901), and joins the editions of the *Demetrius* (1953, by Eugenio Manni), the *Caesar* (1954, by Albino Garzetti), and the *Cicero* (1963, by Domenico Magnino) as the fourth volume in the *Biblioteca di Studi Superiori* to be devoted to a single Plutarchean biography.

A long introduction covers all appropriate historical and some literary matters. After analyzing (Part I) the formal structure of the *Aristides*, the central portion of which (5-25,3) is almost a history of Athens from 490 to 477, Dottoressa Limentani turns (Part II) to Plutarch's sources for this *Life* and deals separately with the authors cited by name in the *Aristides*, those not cited but postulated as sources, autopsy, and rhetorical elements. She avoids dogmatic conclusions—except in the case of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plato. Though seeming to approve (p. x) the synthetic interpretation of the biographer's relation to his sources, whereby it is assumed that Plutarch himself, and not some obscure secondary source, made wherever possible a synthesis of the available major and minor sources, she attempts to demonstrate that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides was used directly for the *Aristides* (pp. xiv-xvii) by employing the methodology of the one-source interpretation. According to this Plutarch followed only one source at a time and any discrepancy between him and an apparent extant source (say, Herodotus) indicates the use of an intermediary. More cogent is her assertion (p. xvii) that in 25, 9 Plutarch has contaminated *Gorgias* 519A and 526A-B and quoted from memory.

The rest of the introduction concentrates on a historical assessment of both *Aristides* and Plutarch's *Life*. A discussion of the informa-

tion about Aristides from sources other than the biography (Part III) and of the ancient traditions concerning his character and public life (Part IV) is followed by a highly critical examination (Part V) of the historical notices for which the *Aristides* is a unique or basic source: e. g., the credibility of Plutarch's account of the oligarchic plot before the battle of Platea (13) and of the removal of the boundaries between Athens and Platea (11) is impugned. In her final summary and evaluation of Aristides' political and military career (Part VI) Dottoressa Limentani rejects Plutarch's characterization of Aristides as the aristocratic rival of the popular leader Themistocles (especially 2) in favor of the Aristides of the *Athēnaion Politeia* (23-4; 28, 2; 41, 2), who is a champion of the *dēmos*.

Concise surveys of Plutarch's life and works and of the MSS, editions, and translations of the biographies are appended to the introduction.

The Greek text is that of Konrat Ziegler's third Teubner edition (I, 1 [1960]) and is, therefore, based on S of the *bipartita recensio* and UA (designated by Y) of the *tripartita*. It is accompanied by a brief critical apparatus and an extensive set of notes that are historically oriented and replete with references to ancient sources and modern scholarship. A few (such as that on 1, 1 cataloguing the discussions of wealth in the *Lives*) are literary, and occasionally textual problems are considered (e. g., the change in meaning caused at the end of 6, 3 should one accept τὸ θεῖον [Y] in place of Ziegler's θεῖον ἐστὶ). Syntax and style, however, are virtually ignored. Interspersed among the notes are special bibliographical notices on Plutarch's political ideas (p. 26), ostracism (p. 30), the Delian League (p. 97), and the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Platea (pp. 19-20, 41, and 50 respectively). Plutarch's formal comparison of Aristides and Cato the Elder has unfortunately been relegated to an Italian summary in the introduction (pp. xli-xliii).

The text and commentary are followed by a straightforward translation conveniently furnished with the standard chapter and paragraph numbering, and an appendix gives the Greek or Latin text of a selection of *testimonia*. (Among them Michael H. Jameson's revised text of the Themistocles Decree is reprinted from *Hesperia*, XXXI [1962], pp. 311-12 with one major error: his τ[ἀ]ς in line 34 is replaced with τ[ῆ]ς.) The volume concludes with a chronological table covering the period 524-454 and an index of the proper nouns occurring in the *Aristides*.

HUBERT MARTIN, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

ERNST MILOBENSKI. Der Neid in der griechischen Philosophie. Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1964. Pp. xiii + 176. (*Klass.-Philol. Studien*, 29.)

In this book the author collects what various Greek philosophers had to say about envy. In chronological order he surveys phi-

losophers and philosophic schools. With great industry he gathers together and quotes a large number of passages in which *φθόνος* is treated. Half of the book is devoted to Plato and Aristotle; the other half covers many philosophers from Thales to Plutarch.

The treatment is mostly piecemeal. Authors and passages are introduced one by one, with brief comments on the quotations. Occasionally attempts are made to interrelate some of the material, but only in the last brief chapter do we encounter systematic generalizations. Even this chapter is, however, mostly a mere summary of "what people said."

Among the Presocratics only Democritus and the Sophists are said to have treated envy extensively, and Milobenski claims that Plato is the first philosopher to have a full-blown theory of this concept.

The author interprets Plato's theory—like the theories of the other philosophers—as essentially negative. Envy is something men should be without. First, because men should be god-like and the gods are without envy. Secondly, because envy has a tyrannical effect on the soul and it hinders intellectual dialogue. The expurgation of envy is also one of the key functions of the rulers.

In the last chapter Plato's theory of *φθόνος* is characterized as primarily educational and as such it is contrasted with the treatment by Aristotle which is said to be more scientific and psychological. The views of the Hellenic philosophers are described as concerned with envy primarily as a threat to the tranquility of the individual soul.

From this brief and partial survey of Milobenski's views one can see that even when he attempts generalizations and systematic treatment the results are rather superficial and philosophically unsophisticated. One helpful move might have been to extend as a principle of organization over much of the material that threefold distinction of a) what kind of people feel envy? b) what kind of objects stimulate envy? and c) what kind of people are likely objects of envy? which the author rightly discerns in Aristotle (p. 71). As another improvement Milobenski might have explored further his suggestion (p. 106) that all Greek philosophers were against envy, and that the only significant question concerns the differences in their opposition. He suggests that whereas the opposition of Plato and Aristotle was primarily moral and social, the opposition of the Hellenic philosophers was based mainly on the painful effects which *φθόνος* has on the individual. The question arises: what good could be said for envy, and why was it not said?

There are no large conceptual questions raised in this book, though it is difficult to see how these can be avoided in an enterprise such as the one undertaken by the author. First, one wonders whether all of the collected passages in which we encounter *φθόνος* are about the same or about several concepts. Did *φθόνος* have the same meaning for everyone throughout the history of Greek philosophy? If the answer to this question is affirmative, should we not consider at least the possibility that the concept undergoes change if not development?

Secondly, not all of the "sayings" about envy are on the same conceptual level. At the most superficial level we find mere verdicts, e. g. that envy is bad, or that those who are admired are also envied. On a more sophisticated level one finds the assessment of envy integrated into larger frameworks of moral philosophy. Finally, one might find some philosophers relating the phenomenon of envy to general theories of motivation, passions, the influence of belief over emotions, etc. It would be worth while to explore the question: do the Greeks interpret envy mostly in behavioral terms, or do some of them regard it as an internal state of which types of behavior are merely symptoms?

From the point of view of the history of ethics one wants to know whether all of the Greeks think of the appraisal of envy in utilitarian terms, i. e. in view of its consequences, or do some of them think that envy is wrong in itself and thus its avoidance is a matter of duty? With regard to this question the book is useful; Milobenski suggests on the basis of his work that all of the appraisals are based on utilitarian considerations (p. 134).

In general, the main defect of this book is the rather naive view with which the author approaches his task. One should not merely assume that there is a single subject designated by *φθόνος* and that all we need to know is what various philosophers said about it. The benefits of a historical study of a concept depend mostly on the extent to which the material is approached with an interesting but not anachronistic set of questions in mind.

The greatest merit of the book is the wealth of evidence which it presents, thus facilitating future investigations of envy. It would be beneficial if evidence of this kind were collected with regard to some of the more central concepts of Greek ethics, such as justice, friendship, and duty.

J. M. E. MORAVCSIK.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

P. Ovidi Nasonis Remedia Amoris, Medicamina Faciei edidit FRIDERICUS WALTHARIUS LENZ. Aug. Taurinorum, in Aedibus Paraviae, 1965. Pp. XLVIII + 105. L. 2450. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*.)

A comparison of Professor Lenz's text with Mr. Kenney's, which I reviewed in this Journal (LXXXVI [1965], pp. 89 ff.) and discussed in detail in *H. S. C. P.*, LXIX (1965), pp. 1 ff., reveals over forty differences of reading: at *Rem.*, 133, Lenz's *uita* is correct, Kenney's *uitium* being a slip of the pen (which I omitted to notice on p. 67 of my article, when drawing attention to other misprints at *Rem.*, 304 and 678); at *Rem.*, 758 Lenz rightly ignores R's *ipsius*, and at *Medic.*, 60 reasonably prefers Heinsius' *solidi* to Kenney's obeli. But the remainder find him grating on a serannell pipe. Take, for example, *Rem.*, 396: "Elegy owes as much to Ovid as . . . does to Virgil": *opus* Lenz, *epos* Kenney. Or take *Rem.*, 497, where the sick at heart are exhorted to put on a mask of indifference: shall

we read *quod non est, simula* or *quod non es, simula*? The first means "pretend to be what does not exist" (= a unicorn), the second "pretend to be what you are not" (= indifferent). "Non video," says Lenz, "quomodo unam alteramve lectionem in poetam vindicare possis," and plumps for *est* (*es* Kenney).

I pass over a number of debased spellings like *formonsa* and *Laudamia* to discuss the reading at *Rem.*, 473, where Lenz follows Heinsius in adopting the 15th-century conjecture *Achilli* (gen.) against *Achillis* of the archetype (Kenney). The genitive of the 5th and 3rd declension heteroclitics *Achilles* and *Vlixes* varies in the Augustan poets, and the old spelling of final *-i* as *-ei* (which for simplicity's sake I shall ignore below) further complicates the problem. Servius (on *Aen.*, I, 30) tells us that Virgil eschewed *Achillis* for *Achilli* when the preceding word ended in *-s*, hence *inmitis Achilli*, but (adds Servius auctus) *nec equis adspirat Achillis* at *Aen.*, XII, 352. Horace makes choice between *-i* and *-ei*. Propertius seems to waver: *Achilli* (to rhyme with its adjective) at II, 9, 13 and IV, 11, 39, but *Vlixis* (clashing with *Admeti*) at II, 6, 23, where it is preceded by *-s*. In his elevated style Ovid appears to follow Virgil, for we learn on the express testimony of Priscian (*G. L.*, II, 277) that at *Met.*, XIV, 159 he wrote *experientis Vlixii* (*Vlixis* MSS). His elegiacs, however, relaxed in this as in other respects, exhibit *Vlixis* at *Her.*, I, 84 and *Achillis* at *Pont.*, I, 3, 74, both examples guaranteed by the metre, the latter even after a preceding *-s*. So here, and at *Am.*, II, 13, 29 and *Ars*, I, 743, the manuscripts are probably right after all.

Where his text is sound, Lenz's punctuation is a little fuller and thus a little better than Kenney's. But not much. *Rem.*, 587 f. is typical:

Nec fuge conloquium nec sit tibi ianua clausa
Nec tenebris vultus flebilis abde tuos.

The absence of commas after *conloquium* and *clausa* gives no help to a reader who reads aloud. And only by reading aloud shall we ever appreciate the phrasing of such passages as *Rem.*, 7 f.:

Saepe tepent alii iuvenes, ego semper amavi,
Et si, quid faciam nunc quoque, quaeris, amo.

Thus Lenz (and everybody else). The pentameter looks innocent enough, but conceals a particularly devilish hyperbaton: "ET, si, quid faciam, NUNC QUOQUE, quaeris, AMO": "and, if you ask what I am doing, am a-loving still." It makes no sense to ask "What are you doing still?" which *nunc quoque* must signify (cf. *Am.*, II, 9, 18; III, 13, 21; *Ars*, I, 134; 189; 626; III, 43).

This edition commands respect less for the text at the top of the page than for the painstaking collection of verbal parallels and manuscript readings at the bottom of it. Lenz has used twice as many sources as Kenney, whom he occasionally corrects. At *Rem.*, 704 (*utque facis* edd.) Kenney had reported the reading of Par. Lat. 7994 as *tuque faueas*, whence I conjectured (p. 105) *tuque fauens*: tucked away in Lenz's apparatus is a notice that this is the

manuscript reading. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether he has roamed beyond the point of diminishing returns: his apparatus is piled high with palaeographical plankton from the rag, tag, and bobtail of medieval manuscripts, with the result that, although he tells us more than Kenney did, he often obscures rather than enlightens our understanding of the tradition. References to Ovidian scholarship in the editions and learned periodicals (neglected by the Oxford Classical Texts) are plentiful—but, again, indiscriminating: he has missed Damsté's conjecture at *Rem.*, 221 (*Mnemosyne*, XXIX [1911], p. 446) and Bentley's note on Horace, *Carm.*, I, 18, 7 dealing with *Rem.*, 465, both of immediate relevance for the establishment of the text.

It appears that, about a year ago, Herr H. Boese was enjoying a quiet perusal of the Amatory Poems in a Berlin library when he suddenly became aware that the manuscript in his hands displayed a remarkably high-quality text. On being consulted, Franco Munari at once saw that Berolinensis Hamiltonianus 471 was of an antiquity and importance comparable with the oldest and best manuscript known, and closely related to it. The full implications of this discovery must wait till Munari's detailed account is published. However, the good news fortunately reached Lenz in time for him to conjure up in an appendix a stop-press collation of its text of the *Remedia*. This shows it to be a truly excellent manuscript, which will greatly increase our knowledge of the *Überlieferungsgeschichte*. That it will materially advance the textual criticism of the Amatory Poems, I take leave to doubt: it does not antedate the archetype, which we can generally reconstruct from R(P) and ω , nor has it furnished Lenz with a single new reading. Beyond pushing back the date of a few conjectures—as it has now done at *Rem.*, 683 (where *obstet* remains a conjecture, since the archetype gave *obstat*)—I am not expecting it to add anything of moment to Kenney's apparatus for the *Amores* and *Ars Amatoria*. Still, I should love to be wrong.

G. P. GOOLD.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER. *Boundaries of Dionysus. Athenian Foundations for the Theory of Tragedy.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. x + 145. \$3.50. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, XVII.)

In this most recent volume in the series of Martin Classical Lectures, Professor Schlesinger of Oberlin College undertakes to establish appropriate ground rules for determining the genre of tragedy. He is concerned to correct what he regards as unduly narrow and unduly theoretical definitions. To this end he conducts a rapid survey of certain aspects of Greek tragedy, in the course of which he designates categories of plays, rated according to the degree to which they can be classified as tragic: "high tragedy,

characterized by full seriousness of manner, tone, and effect," "exotragedy" (in which "a series of external events" is "more important . . . than the developments within the characters," *Iphigeneia among the Taurians* being an example), melodrama (*Orestes, Iphigeneia at Aulis*), and plays of partisanship (*Andromache*). The author means by this procedure to secure a basis for judging the limits within which drama can appropriately be called tragedy: what is found in those plays designated as high tragedy "will constitute the stuff of tragedy . . . what is found to be incompatible with them will constitute a boundary for tragedy." Since all extant plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles and nine plays of Euripides are classed as high tragedy, it turns out that the notion of high tragedy is much like the general notion of Greek tragedy. What Schlesinger most decidedly opposes is the theory that the essence of tragedy is suffering alone, and that its effect is purely emotional. There must, he believes, be an element of rational explanation and an imparting of rational insight.

The general outlook and critical position, so far as I can determine them, seem to me reasonable and acceptable, and so do many of the incidental observations on the plays. But the study as a whole fails to achieve effectiveness, partly because of a persistent unclarity of expression and thought, but primarily because too much ground is covered too superficially and because the method of procedure is extremely fragmentary. Plays are never really discussed; there are only lists of features or characters described very briefly if at all.

On page 28 we are told that "considerable cold harshness" is Antigone's "fatal inadequacy," and that Sophocles' Electra "undergoes spiritual catastrophe." These are sweeping judgments; made without argument, as they are in this book, they are neither convincing nor useful. On the next page, the first paragraph asserts that "the least sympathetic principal figures" of Greek tragedy are Xerxes and Pentheus. "One tends to work up a case for Pentheus, assuming virtues where he has them not; but an exact consideration serves to reveal his harshness, as well as his blindness to facts." Then the author hastens on to list, in the following paragraph of eighteen lines, nineteen additional disagreeable characters. There is no "exact consideration" of Pentheus and no consideration at all of the eighteen who follow. If we had no reason to question Schlesinger's judgments these declarations and pigeonholings would be of doubtful value. But one often wonders why a given character or aspect of a play is categorized as it is. Do the barbarian kings of *Iphigeneia among the Taurians* and *Helen* belong in a list of eminently disagreeable characters? Is Medea "essentially . . . a typical woman"? What is the "fall" of Medea referred to on page 36?

A reader is likely to wish that the author had presented in greater detail and with more clarity some of the points that he raises. He might by such a procedure have come nearer than he does to the confirmation needed for his generalizations. We may agree or not with the author's views, but we must seek their justification elsewhere.

Mycenean Studies. Proceedings of the Third International Colloquium for Mycenean Studies held at "Wingspread," 4-8 September 1961. Edited by EMMETT L. BENNETT, JR. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. Pp. x + 284. \$6.00.

The first of the series of colloquia devoted to Mycenean studies was held at Gif-sur-Yvette in April 1956, the second at Pavia in September 1958. Before the appearance of the present brief notice the Fourth International Colloquium on Mycenean Studies will have been held at Cambridge, England, in April 1965.

The resolutions familiarly known as the "Wingspread Convention," which seek to standardize the transcription of phonetic and ideographic signs in the publication of Mycenean texts, and which make up an important part of the content of the Resolutions of the Colloquium in the volume here under review, have already been published in *Nestor*, pp. 165-8, 1 January 1962.

Space will not permit even a summary, much less a discussion, of the twenty-two articles in this volume, by eighteen scholars who attended, or had been invited to attend, the colloquium. The last five articles, including Emmett L. Bennett's "Find-Spots of the Pylos Tablets," are predominantly archaeological in character. Six may be called linguistic in the strict sense, since they deal with internal features of the Mycenean dialect or with its place among the Greek dialects. Jaan Puhvel's "Eleuthēr and Oinoātis: Dionysiac Data from Mycenean Greece," while it contains some matter of considerable linguistic interest, is at the same time the only article of an essentially mythological character and is important not only because of the interest aroused when the name of Dionysus appeared on a fragment of a Mycenean tablet, but also because of its discussion of some rather unfamiliar aspects of the legend of Ariadne. The remaining articles may be described as "philological" in several of the senses in which that word is used: they deal with the reading, restoration, or interpretation of specific texts, with orthographic conventions, with the meaning of problematical words, etc.

It is needless to say that this volume, because of the nature of the articles contained in it and the distinction of the group of international scholars who participated in the colloquium, is an essential part of any private or university library of works devoted to Mycenean studies.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

KENNETH MORGAN ABBOTT, † WILLIAM ABBOTT OLDFATHER, † HOWARD VERNON CANTER. Index Verborum in Ciceronis Rhetorica Necnon Incerti Auctoris Libros Ad Herennium. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. xii + 1160. \$17.50.

This is a companion to the index of Cicero's *Epistles* published by the same compilers in 1938, long delayed by the vagaries of assistants and the infelicity of the times, but at last happily brought

to publication by the pious persistence of Professor Abbott and the assistance of Professor Heller of the University of Illinois. The index is made along the lines outlined by Oldfather in *T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII and based on what were in 1938 the best editions available, namely Wilkins' Oxford text of *De Oratore*, *Brutus*, *Orator*, *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, *Partitiones Oratoriae*, and *Topica* and the Teubner texts of the *De Inventione* by Stroebel and of the *Ad Herennium* by Marx. In each case the text indexed included quotations and the editors' *apparatus critici* in full, but not proper nouns. As in the index of the *Epistles* a bibliography of critical discussions published between the date of issue of the particular text used for each work and (in this case) 1946 is given, followed by an additamentum of readings drawn from these discussions. This runs to 292 columns. The index itself covers 1009 pages, four columns on a page. Both the organization and production of the work are admirable and the patience and fortitude of the compilers beyond praise. A brief spot check revealed no errors. In his introduction Professor Abbott encourages Classicists to look for the appearance within the saeculum of another monumental index, that to the prose works of the younger Seneca.

GEORGE KENNEDY.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Amit (M.). Athens and the Sea, A Study in Athenian Sea-Power. Bruxelles, *Latomus, Revue d'Études Latines*, 1965. Pp. 150. 225 Fr. (*Collection Latomus*, LXXIV.)

Bader (Françoise). La formation des composés nominaux du Latin. Paris, *Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1962. Pp. xxvii + 481. (*Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Besançon*, XLVI.)

Bartoněk (Antonín). Development of the Long-Vowel System in Ancient Greek Dialects. Praha, *Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství*, 1966. Pp. 199. (*Opera Universitatis Purkynianae Brunensis, Facultas Philosophica*, 106.)

Beye (Charles Rowan). The *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* and the Epic Tradition. Garden City, *Anchor Books-Doubleday & Co., Inc.*, 1966. Pp. ix + 263. \$1.25.

Borecký (Bořivoj). Survivals of Some Tribal Ideas in Classical Greek. The Use and the Meaning of *λαγχάνω*, *δατέομαι* and the Origin of *ἴσον ἔχειν*, *ἴσον νέμειν*, and Related Idioms. Prague, 1965. Pp. 110. (*Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Philosophica et Historica Monographia*, X.)

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Caldwell: *Laudatores Temporis Acti. Studies in Memory of Wallace Everett Caldwell*. Edited by Mary Francis Gyles and Eugene Wood Davis. Chapel Hill, *Univ. of North Carolina Press*, 1964. Pp. viii + 148; frontispiece; 3 figs. \$2.50. (*The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science*, 46.)

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Cèbe (Jean-Pierre). *La caricature et la parodie dans le monde romain antique des origines à Juvénal*. Paris, *Éditions E. de Boccard*, 1966. Pp. 408; 19 pls. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, 206.)

Coleman-Norton (P. R.). *Roman State and Christian Church. A Collection of Legal Documents to A.D. 535*. 3 vols. London, *Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge*, 1966. Pp. lxxvii + 1358. \$38.50.

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
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NISUS AND EURYALUS FOR *AENEID* IX-XII.¹

The night expedition of Nisus and Euryalus in *Aeneid*, IX, 176-449, is one of the great tragic stories of Vergil's epic. It has been called "a dramatic episode of friendship,"² the glorification of heroism and friendship,³ "one of the crowning instances of Vergil's power of appealing to human sensibility."⁴ It has also, and wrongly, been termed "a separate story of romantic adventure,"⁵ one of Vergil's "embellishing incidents," or "ornaments,"⁶ "a 'self-contained' story,"⁷ possibly, as Mackail sug-

¹ Since I refer frequently in the footnotes to both A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Énéide* (Paris, 1926) and B. Otis, *Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), I cite these works merely as Cartault and Otis respectively.

² A. S. Pease, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1935), p. 6.

³ Cartault, p. 667: "l'épisode de Nisus et d'Euryale n'est pas seulement la glorification de l'héroïsme, mais aussi de l'amitié."

⁴ J. Conington-H. Nettleship, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, III (3rd ed., London, 1883), p. 158.

⁵ C. W. Mendell, "Vergil's Workmanship," *C. J.*, XXXIV (1938-39), p. 16; in "The Influence of the Epyllion on the *Aeneid*," *Y. C. S.*, XII (1951), p. 216, Mendell again refers to the adventure of Nisus and Euryalus as one of "the romantic incidents in the *Aeneid*," and discusses the possibility that it was "a sort of epyllion . . . already written as an independent work."

⁶ N. W. DeWitt, "Vergil and the Tragic Drama," *C. J.*, XXVI (1930-31), p. 24. DeWitt strangely includes among such "ornaments" Aeneas' visit to the site of Rome in VIII, a passage absolutely necessary, from the standpoint of both structure and content, to the epic as a whole.

⁷ L. J. D. Richardson, "In Defence of Nisus," *Hermathena*, LI (1938), p. 140, n. 2. Richardson interprets *amor unus* (IX, 182) not as "devo-

gests, "originally composed as a substantive epyllion."⁸ But Mackail adds that "it is interwoven into the texture of the main epic with admirable skill."⁹ Büchner does not even admit this: he considers the story an exception to Vergil's usual procedure, an episode existing for its own sake and not related to the poem as a whole.¹⁰

Evaluations such as these do a great injustice to the importance of Nisus and Euryalus and fail to show how Vergil has made their story an integral part of the *Aeneid*. In an earlier article I touched upon the similarity of the actions and fate of Nisus and Euryalus to those of other characters in Books X-XII,¹¹ but a more thorough treatment seems necessary, especially since Otis in his recent and excellent book on Vergil devotes far too little attention to the two youthful heroes,¹² and, as a result of his unfortunate linking of Book IX to V-VIII,¹³ fails to consider the Nisus-Euryalus story in its true relation to X-XII. I shall, therefore, after a summary and analysis of the salient features of Vergil's night expedition, attempt to show in detail the extent to which the story is significant for the structure and content of the remainder of the epic.

I

Vergil portrays the self-sacrifice of two young men; Nisus, the older, is eager to gain glory and wants to volunteer to take a message to the absent Aeneas; the more youthful Euryalus will not let him go alone. With the approval and praises of

tion" or "mutual love" but as "community of interest," i.e., *amor venandi et pugnandi*. Since he considers the story in IX an "independent unit," he looks upon *Nisus amore pio pueri* (V, 296) as outside the scope of his paper.

⁸ J. W. Mackail, *The Aeneid* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 335 f. Cf. Mendell, above, note 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 336. Cf. P. Colmant, S. J., "L'épisode de Nisus et Euryale ou le poème de l'amitié," *L.É.C.*, XIX (1951), p. 90.

¹⁰ K. Büchner, "Vergils Aeneis," *Studi in onore di Luigi Castiglioni* (Firenze, 1960), I, p. 109.

¹¹ G. E. Duckworth, "Fate and Free Will in Vergil's *Aeneid*," *C.J.*, LI (1955-56), pp. 359-61.

¹² Otis, pp. 348-50, 388 f., plus incidental references, e.g., pp. 303, 315, 317, 393.

¹³ Otis, pp. 273 f., 343-5, 419. See below, pp. 143-6.

Ascanius and the Trojan elders they enter the camp of the sleeping enemy; after a (needless?) slaughter of the Rutulians, they leave the camp but are seen by a band of approaching cavalry (the result of the helmet which Euryalus has taken with other booty). Nisus escapes, but, neglecting his obvious duty (to bear the *mandata* to Aeneas), returns in a vain effort to save Euryalus and dies avenging the death of his friend. Both have made mistakes and as a result they meet their tragic deaths.¹⁴

Prescott comments as follows: "Nisus, forgetting his main purpose, urges Euryalus to join him in murdering the helpless foe; they deal havoc far and wide and take valuable plunder."¹⁵ This statement is inaccurate for two reasons: first, Nisus does not urge Euryalus to join him, but attempts to dissuade him (cf. 207-18), and later, when they enter the camp of the enemy, says (321-3):

". . . tu, ne qua manus se attollere nobis
a tergo possit, custodi et consule longe;
haec ego vasta dabo et lato te limite ducam."

Euryalus takes part in the slaughter of his own volition; second, and more important, the sending of a messenger to Aeneas is the desire of the Trojans (cf. 192 f., 226-8), but can hardly be called the "main purpose" of Nisus; for him it provides the excuse, the pretext, to do what he wants; his true desire, as he states in his first speech to Euryalus, is to achieve glory by going into battle and killing the enemy; cf. 186 f.:

"aut pugnam aut aliquid iamdudum invadere magnum
mens agitat mihi."¹⁶

¹⁴ So Otis, p. 315: Nisus and Euryalus "succumb to the lust of plunder"; p. 393: they "pay the penalty for their own excesses." Otis is here speaking not only of Nisus and Euryalus, but also of Mezentius, Camilla, and Turnus; see below, pp. 147-8.

¹⁵ H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Virgil's Art* (Chicago, 1927), p. 205.

¹⁶ The verb *invadere* seems significant here; it has been considered equivalent to *ingredi* (so Forbiger, Conington-Nettleship) or explained as "essay" (Sidgwick), "attempt" (Papillon-Haigh). In view of the later assault on the enemy, the word seems most appropriately to reveal Nisus' inner thoughts.

Again, in his words to Ascanius and the Trojans in the assembly, he reveals, perhaps without realizing it, why he offers to seek Aeneas and Pallanteum; cf. 240-3:

“. . . si fortuna permittitis uti,
quaesitum Aenean et moenia Pallantea,
mox hic cum spoliis ingenti caede peracta
adfore cernetis. nec nos via fallit euntis.”

Almost all editors agree that *nos* is to be supplied as the subject of *adfore*.¹⁷ Nisus promises that they will attempt to get word to Aeneas, but foremost in his thoughts are the *ingens caedes* and the *spolia*; the scene in the camp of the enemy, as a result, is devoted to *caedes* (324-56) and *spolia* (359-66). To assume that it is Aeneas who will return with spoils after a great slaughter¹⁸ completely blurs Vergil's careful delineation of the psychology of Nisus.¹⁹

Paramount in Nisus' thought, then, was the desire for fame, to be achieved by killing the enemy and acquiring booty. The *ingens caedes* committed by Nisus (324-38) concludes with the simile of a lion in a sheepfold;²⁰ Euryalus, although less experi-

¹⁷ See on 241, e.g., Heyne-Wagner, Forbiger, Conington-Nettleship. All recent translators of the *Aeneid* (Humphries, Day Lewis, Guinagh, Jackson Knight, Oakley, Dickinson, Lind, Mantinband, Copley) supply *nos* as the subject of *adfore*; Lind's version is typical: "You'll see us soon returning with our spoils / And with great slaughter done." The older translation of Delabère May, recently revised by M. Hadas, assigns the slaughter and spoils to Aeneas; see below, note 18.

¹⁸ As does Benoist, who says (on 243) that Nisus cannot announce in the assembly the later massacre. But the Trojans, interested primarily in his offer to get through to Aeneas, fail to note Nisus' indiscreet revelation of his real ambition. Page, *ad loc.*, also assigns the *caedes* and the *spolia* to Aeneas; this results from the fact that he reads *ad moenia* in 241 and takes *quaesitum* as a participle with *Aenean*. Mackail (above, note 8) objects to the reading *ad moenia*, and avoids the difficulty of *quaesitum* as a supine by placing 241 after 243: *neo nos via fallit euntis*; see Duckworth (above, note 11), p. 363, n. 23.

¹⁹ Cf. B. C. Fenik, *The Influence of Euripides on Vergil's Aeneid* (Ann Arbor, 1960 [= Princeton University dissertation, microfilmed]), pp. 66-8.

²⁰ Cf. *Il.*, X, 485 f., where Diomedes is similarly likened to a lion attacking goats or sheep; as has often been pointed out, e.g., by Cartault, p. 672, Nisus has here the role of Diomedes. On Vergil's indebtedness to the *Doloneia* and other earlier sources, see below, pp. 136-7, and note 35.

enced, disobeys Nisus' instructions (cf. 321f.) and likewise indulges in carnage (342-50) which Vergil says is equal to that of Nisus (342: *nec minor Euryali caedes*). Actually, it is Nisus who, realizing at last that there has been too much slaughter, stops Euryalus from attacking the companions of Messapus; cf. 353-6:

breviter cum talia Nisus
(sensit enim nimia caede atque cupidine ferri)
"absistamus" ait, "nam lux inimica propinquat.
poenarum exhaustum satis est, via facta per hostis."

Killing the enemy was not the purpose of the night expedition, and it was not necessary for them to cut their way *per hostis*. Nisus himself knew that the Rutulians were buried in sleep and wine (*somno vinoque soluti*, 189 and 236), and Vergil stresses the needlessness of the slaughter by his many additional allusions to their drunkenness.²¹ Cartault suggests that if Vergil had allowed Nisus and Euryalus to slip through the camp unseen, without slaying the enemy, the exploit would not have been sufficiently heroic or Homeric.²² This rather misses the point: Vergil was more interested, I believe, in showing that the two young men do the wrong thing and pay the penalty for their actions. The slaughter of the Rutulians delayed their departure from the camp, and Euryalus created an additional delay by taking booty; had they left earlier, they would have avoided the cavalry led by Volcens, and they still might have escaped unnoticed, had it not been for the fateful helmet; cf. 373 f.:

et galea Euryalum sublustri noctis in umbra
prodidit immemorem radiisque adversa refulsit.

Nisus, the faster runner (cf. V, 318-22), did get away, and it was due in part to the *onerosa praeda* (384) that Euryalus fell

²¹ Cf. 165 (*indulgent vino*), 316 f. (*somno vinoque . . . corpora fusa*), 336 f. (*multoque . . . deo victus*; as the adjective implies, the *deus* is Bacchus rather than Somnus), 346 (*magnum . . . cratera*), 349 f. (*cum sanguine mixta vina*). Cf. Cartault, p. 698, n. 3 (to p. 672): "le motif de l'ivresse, si largement développé par Virgile n'existe pas dans la Dolonie."

²² Cartault, p. 672; cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1915), p. 217, n. 2.

behind and was captured. Again Nisus could have done the right thing and carried out his mission, but his first thoughts were of Euryalus²³ and he sacrificed himself for his friend.

Vergil thus gives us in the night expedition a story of mistakes which lead to disaster. There is no divine intervention, and the story illustrates the working of free will. It is significant that Nisus raises this question at the very beginning of his first speech to Euryalus; cf. 184f.:

“dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,
Euryale, an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?”²⁴
“Do the gods instil this passion in our minds,
Euryalus, or does each person interpret his own
fierce desire as [the voice of] a god?”²⁵

Nisus' query, says Cartault, is a “question philosophique,” one which shows that Vergil has given to his characters a more modern psychology than is found in those of Homer.²⁶ In fact, there are two questions here: what is the *dira cupido* of Nisus, and is it his own *cupido*, rather than divine will, that motivates him?

The answer to the first is apparent in the verses which follow; cf. 186 f.

“aut pugnam aut aliquid iamdudum invadere magnum
mens agitat mihi, nec placida contenta quiete est.”

²³ Cf. V, 327-38; in the footrace Nisus was first, but slipped (*infelix*, 329) and fell; here too he first thought of Euryalus (334: *non tamen Euryali, non ille oblitus amorum*) and, with questionable sportsmanship, blocked the second runner in order to give the victory to Euryalus.

²⁴ *dira cupido* occurs also in *Georg.*, I, 37; *Aen.*, VI, 373, 721. The nominative of *cupido* is found in Vergil ten times and *Cupido* twice (*Aen.*, I, 658, 695); in all twelve instances, the word is at the end of the verse.

²⁵ To the parallels cited by Conington-Nettleship and Fenik (above, note 19), p. 68, n. 1, may be added the words of Hecuba to Helen in Euripides' *Troïades*, 988 f.: ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδὼν νυν τοῦς ἐποιήθη Κύπρις / τὰ μῶρα γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτῃ βροτοῖς.

²⁶ Cartault, p. 668, and cf. p. 695, n. 2 (to p. 668). See Duckworth (above, note 11), p. 360 and the references cited on p. 363, n. 25; to the latter should be added T. Fiore, “Eurialo e Niso,” *La Cultura*, XII (1933), pp. 642 f.; Fiore says (p. 643): “Le parole possono essere di Omero, di Menandro, ma l'anima è un' altra: sentiamo di respirare la grande aura della religiosità virgiliana.”

The proximity of *pugnam* to *cupido* implies that it is a *pugnae cupido* = *caedis cupido*; cf. 354:

sensit enim nimia caede et cupidine ferri,

where, as most editors assert,²⁷ we have hendiadys: *caede et cupidine* = *caedis cupidine*.²⁸ This is the *ingens caedes* of 242 which Nisus, perhaps inadvertently, mentioned in the council, and which he likewise had in mind in his first speech to Euryalus.

Vergil himself answers the second question in his presentation of the story of Nisus and Euryalus. The action is entirely on the human level; the gods and Fate play no part in the sequence of events,²⁹ and Nisus' *dira cupido* does become his god. As Otis says,³⁰ "In the end Nisus' question is answered: his *cupido* is not divine but very human." The story thus illustrates Vergil's own view that the success or failure of mortals is the result of their decisions and their actions. Nisus' query, however, is answered by the highest possible authority in X, 111 f.:

"sua cuique exorsa laborem
fortunamque ferent."

Jupiter's comment would seem to present Vergil's final conclusions about fate and free will,³¹ and this is further indicated

²⁷ E. g., Forbiger, Conington-Nettleship, Sidgwick, Page. H. W. Garrod, "A Suggestion on Virgil, *Aen.* IX.353-355," *C.R.*, XXIV (1910), pp. 119 f., with less plausibility, punctuates thus: (*sensit enim*) "*nimia caede et cupidine ferri / absistamus*," taking *ferri* as genitive; he compares XI, 307: *absistere ferro* and Lucr., I, 355: *ferri amore*; see also *Aen.*, VII, 461: *amor ferri*.

²⁸ Cf. IX, 760: *caedisque insana cupido*, referring to Turnus; see below, p. 147.

²⁹ Nisus himself in 354 realizes that it is time to stop; this is very unlike the *Doloneia* where Athena tells Diomedes to return (*Il.*, X, 507-11)—all the more surprising as Diomedes had chosen Odysseus for his understanding (242-7), and such a team of "brawn and brain" would seem to be self-sufficient. But Athena aids Diomedes throughout the night expedition; cf. 274-6, 295, 366 f., 482, 516. On Vergil and Homer, see below, pp. 136-7, and note 35.

³⁰ Otis, p. 349.

³¹ Divine intervention occurs frequently in the *Aeneid*, but it is usually preceded by psychological motivation, and what the god or

by the phrase *sua cuique* in X, 111, which echoes the *sua cuique* of IX, 185.³² Vergil deliberately couples together the two passages as question and answer. As I wrote in an earlier article,³³

In the words of Jupiter, the supreme authority, we have Vergil's definite statement that mortals can and must work out their own salvation in a world governed by Destiny. Human beings are free agents; they may make their own decisions and if the decisions are wrong, they must suffer the consequences.³⁴

There is nothing in *Iliad* X (the *Doloneia*) similar to Vergil's penetrating character analysis of Nisus and Euryalus. It is not my purpose in this paper to compare the two night expeditions, for many scholars have already written in detail on Vergil's indebtedness to the Homeric episode.³⁵ But here, as

goddess does is merely to accentuate or inflame a state of mind already eager to do what the deity wishes; cf. V, 613-17, the desire of the women to remain in Sicily, before the words of Iris (as Beroe); XII, 216-21, the anxiety of the Rutulians concerning Turnus, before the words of Juturna (as Camers); on these and other examples of such "double causation," see Duckworth (above, note 11), pp. 358 f. The one great exception is in IV, where Jupiter sends Mercury to compel Aeneas to act contrary to his wishes. The divine command is necessary, and Vergil in this way shows how deeply Aeneas was in love with Dido. His love is clearly attested also in 331 f., 393-6, and in 441-9, where the *lacrimae inanes* of 449 are the tears of Aeneas and correspond to the *frondes* of 444; see G. E. Duckworth, *Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil's Aeneid* (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 17, n. 37.

³² The only other instance of *sua cuique* in the *Aeneid* occurs in X, 467 (Jupiter's words to Hercules), where the theme is heroic achievement before death; cf. 468 f.: *famam extendere factis / hoc virtutis opus*, almost a restatement of *exvrsa . . . fortunamque ferent* (X, 111 f.).

³³ Duckworth (above, note 11), p. 361.

³⁴ Cf. Otis, p. 227: "Freedom is not an alternative to predestination but an essential component of it . . . both men and gods can accept fate with piety; both men and gods can reject fate with *furor*; and fate itself is the predestined product of their interpenetrating acceptances and rejections."

³⁵ See Heinze (above, note 22), pp. 216-19; Cartault, pp. 666-75 and notes on pp. 695-701; Prescott (above, note 15), pp. 203-6, 472 f.; more recently, Fenik (above, note 19), pp. 54-96, and G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen, 1964 [= *Hypomnemata*, Heft 7]), pp. 266-9 and 407-9 (parallel passages to Homer). Fenik's discussion is

elsewhere in the *Aeneid*, the differences are more striking and significant than the similarities. Prescott summarizes the effect of the two stories as follows:³⁶

[In Homer] there is not a single obstacle to the success of the two Greek heroes, and . . . the reader's interest is supposed to be solely in the mere exploit of their venturesome journey. . . .

[In Vergil] the action moves with dramatic rise and fall; at the climax of their achievement their fortune is suddenly reversed; and from that point it rises to the close, the revenge and death of Nisus. The poet loses no opportunity to bring out the pathos of his story and the inner impulses that determine the outer action. . . . Homer's narrative led to mere interest in the adventure and its issue; Vergil's contains universal truths.

We are therefore justified in viewing the story of Nisus and Euryalus as a psychological drama, a miniature tragedy in three acts:³⁷

most thorough and he argues effectively for Vergil's indebtedness to the *Rhesus* as well as to the *Doloneia*; cf. p. 56: "if the *Aeneid* frequently echoes the *Rhesus* more closely than it does the *Iliad*, the only reasonable conclusion is that in these particular cases Vergil drew his material from the Greek play rather than from Homer"; see also p. 84; on the differences between Vergil and the *Rhesus*, see pp. 94-6. For the similarities between the story of Nisus and Euryalus and the night expedition in *Mahābhārata* X, see G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus and Duryodhana," *T. A. P. A.*, XCII (1961), p. 112, n. 110.

³⁶ Prescott (above, note 15), pp. 204-6.

³⁷ I consider the story of Nisus and Euryalus to comprise 176-449, as do most scholars; e. g., Cartault, p. 666; K. Büchner, *P. Vergilius Maro. Der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1956), col. 385 [= *R.-E.*, Zweite Reihe, 16 Halbband, col. 1407]. Others carry the story through line 502 and include the lament of Euryalus' mother the following morning: cf. DeWitt (above, note 6), p. 25 (a "miniature drama" in "five parts"); Mendell, *Y. C. S.*, XII (1951), pp. 218 f.; Colmant (above, note 9), pp. 91 f., 100. But the apostrophe in 446-9 definitely marks the conclusion of the night expedition. The action in IX spreads over a day (1-175), a night (176-449), and a day (450-818). Similarly, most of VIII takes place during a day (94-368), a night (369-453), and a day (454-731). The day, night, and day in these two books are *not* to be synchronized, as some scholars wrongly believe, e. g., Heinze (above, note 22), pp. 386-f.; M. M. Crump, *The Growth of the Aeneid* (Oxford, 1920), p. 98; R. Mandra, *The Time Element in the Aeneid of Vergil*

- Act I. Scene 1. 176-223. The youths on watch.
 Scene 2. 224-313. At the assembly.
 Act II. 314-366. Slaughter of the Rutulians.
 Act III. 367-449. Flight, capture of Euryalus,
 return of Nisus, their deaths.

From the beginning Nisus and Euryalus each has a foreboding of possible disaster:

210 f.: "sed si quis (quae multa vides discrimine tali)
 si quis in adversum rapiat casusve deusve, . . ."

282 f.: "tantum fortuna secunda
 haud adversa cadat."

287 f.: "hanc ego nunc ignaram huius quodcumque periculi est
 inque salutatam linquo . . ."

and Vergil in his own words foreshadows the tragic outcome:³⁸

312 f.: multa patri mandata dabat portanda; sed aurae
 omnia discerpunt et nubibus inrita donant.

315 f.: castra inimica petunt, multis tamen ante futuri
 exitio.³⁹

364: haec rapit atque umeris nequiquam fortibus aptat.

Still, at the end of the second Act, all apparently is well:

366: excedunt castris et tuta capessunt.

The reversal of action comes suddenly at the beginning of Act III: we have the approach of the cavalry, the flight of Nisus and Euryalus when betrayed by the helmet,⁴⁰ the capture

(Williamsport, 1934), pp. 167 ff.; and, recently, Otis, pp. 332, 342 f.; the first day of IX is the final day of VIII, and this is clearly indicated by IX, 10 f.: *extremas Corythi penetravit ad urbes / Lydorumque manum*; see G. E. Duckworth, "The Chronology of *Aeneid* VIII-X," *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 135-44, and review of Otis in *A. J. P.*, LXXXVI (1965), p. 418; see also G. Krókowski, *Quaestiones Epicae* (Wrocław, 1951), pp. 29 f.; Büchner, *op. cit.*, col. 390 [= *R.-E.*, col. 1412]. Aeneas was no longer at Pallanteum when Nisus and Euryalus went on their ill-fated mission.

³⁸ Cf. G. E. Duckworth, *Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and Vergil* (Princeton, 1933), pp. 88-91.

³⁹ Cf. Nisus' words in 355: *lux inimica propinquat*. Vergil's one other use of *ante* in this prophetic sense occurs in a speech of Turnus to Juturna, XII, 680: *hunc, oro, sine me furere ante furorem*. See below, p. 147.

⁴⁰ Fenik (above, note 19), p. 83, compares the staccato-like questions in 376 f. to the abrupt questions of the chorus in *Rhesus*, 682. The

of Euryalus, the return of Nisus and, after his slaying of Sulmo and Tagus, his futile assertion of his comrade's innocence; cf. 427-30:

"me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum,
o Rutuli! mea fraus omnis, nihil iste nec ausus
nec potuit; caelum hoc et conscia sidera testor:
tantum infelicem nimium dilexit amicum."

The guilt was entirely that of Nisus; Euryalus' only fault was excessive devotion to his older friend. I quote the speech in its entirety, because the Oxford Text of Hirtzel is wrong here and closes the quotation with *testor* at the end of 429, thus making 430 a parenthetical comment by Vergil. With this punctuation it is Nisus who *infelicem nimium dilexit amicum*, and this destroys the point of Nisus' plea—the innocence of Euryalus and especially the fact that excessive devotion was responsible for the youth's present plight.⁴¹ Nisus speaks of Euryalus as *infelix* in 390, but is most appropriate at this point, just before his death, for Nisus to refer to himself as *infelix*.⁴²

Nisus' plea is of no avail; Euryalus' breast is pierced by Volcens' sword and he falls like a purple flower crushed by a

next phrase, *nihil illi tendere contra*, surely means "they made no reply" (cf., *ad loc.*, Conington-Nettleship, Sidgwick, Papillon-Haigh), not, as Page takes it, "they sought not to confront the foe"; Nisus and Euryalus would hardly be so foolish as to consider attacking an armed band. Fenik (p. 84) says that the silence of the two youths "recalls the mysterious silence of the Greek pair in the *Rhesus* (778): *οἱ δ' ὀδδέρ*."

⁴¹ It is worth noting that Nisus twice accuses his friend of excess; cf. *nimia* (354), *nimum* (430); see below, note 42.

⁴² The other editors consistently include 430 in Nisus' speech, e. g., Forbiger (see note *ad loc.*), Ribbeck, Conington-Nettleship, Page, Sidgwick, Papillon-Haigh, Mackail, Sabbadini, etc., as do recent translators, with the unfortunate exception of Copley. The beginning of 431 (*talia dicta dabat*) indicates clearly that the previous verse is part of Nisus' plea. Hirtzel's punctuation is likewise wrong in Nisus' earlier speech, when he has escaped and realizes that Euryalus is not with him; his questions, beginning in 390, should go through *silvae* in 392, but Hirtzel wrongly ends the question with *sequar* in 391. Here again editors and translators are in agreement that the quotation ends with *silvae*. Mackail in his translation, however (but not in his 1930 edition), follows Hirtzel, as does Copley.

plow or like poppies bent down by the rain.⁴³ Nisus rushes into the midst of the enemy, kills Volcens, and, pierced through and through, falls on the body of his lifeless friend; cf. 444 f.:

tum super exanimum sese proiecit amicum
confossus, placidaque ibi demum morte quievit.

Nisus had said in his first speech (187):

mens agitat mihi, nec placida contenta quiete est.

Vergil's words in 445 (*placidaque ibi demum morte quievit*), by providing a tragic echo of 187, bring together the beginning and the end of Nisus' story.⁴⁴ The *dira cupido* of Nisus made him dissatisfied with *quies*; he and Euryalus both made mistakes and paid the penalty for their wrong actions. At the end Nisus achieved the *quies* of death.⁴⁵

⁴³The comparison of Euryalus to a *purpureus flos* and to *papavera* in 435-7 is a composite of similes in Homer, *Il.*, VIII, 306 f., Sappho, fr. 105c (Lobel-Page), and Catullus, XI, 22 ff. (cf. LXII, 39 f.); cf. R. E. H. Westendorp Boerma, "Vergil's Debt to Catullus," *Acta Classica*, I (1958), pp. 62 f.: "Vergil combined the redness of the flower in Sappho, the dropping of the head by the heavy rain in Homer and the cutting off by the plough in Catullus; the whole comparison, however, is finer and more delicate than all its models; it is a very good specimen of Vergil's workmanship." Page, *ad loc.*, and Cartault, p. 701, n. 11 (to p. 674), omit the reference to Sappho.

⁴⁴Vergil similarly frames XII as a whole by *miserere parentis longuevi* (43 f., Latinus' appeal to Turnus not to fight) and *Dauni miserere senectae* (934, Turnus' appeal to Aeneas for mercy); the entire *Aeneid* in a sense is framed by *solvuntur frigore membra* (I, 92, first appearance of Aeneas, and XII, 951, death of Turnus), and, on the divine level, by Jupiter's words in I, 278-82 (*his ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono: imperium sine fine dedi. quin aspera Iuno, // . . . mecumque fovebit / Romanos, rerum dominos gentemque togatam*) and XII, 838-40 (*hinc genus Ausonio mixtum quod sanguine surget, / supra homines, supra ire deos pietate videbis, / nec gens ulla tuos aequae celebrabit honores*). For a similar linking of IX and XII and of I and IV, see below, p. 146, and note 67. The double sense in *quiete* (IX, 187) and *quievit* (IX, 445) is not only paralleled by that in *frigore* (I, 92, and XII, 951), but appears also in *Mahābhārata* V, lviii, 27: "If you do not conclude peace . . . , you will be killed and ever remain in peace"; see Duckworth (above, note 35), p. 96, n. 58.

⁴⁵There is a definite correlation between Vergil's use of metrical patterns and his subject matter. If we disregard the few spondaic

II

To this point I have considered the tragedy of Nisus and Euryalus primarily as "a 'self-contained' story," to use the phrase of Richardson,⁴⁶ but it is far from this; instead of being an independent episode introduced for its own sake and unrelated to the *Aeneid* as a whole, it bears a vital relation to both the structure and the significance of the last four books; in fact, it may be said to set the tone and lay the foundation for Vergil's treatment of character and event in the remainder of the epic. In order to show this in detail, we must first fix the story firmly in the structure of the poem; this is all the more imperative, as recent discussions have blurred its true relation to the surrounding books.

A. Structure

Many scholars look upon the *Aeneid* as a trilogy, divided as follows: I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII. Mackail points out⁴⁷ that each part or "act" ends with an effective cadence, I-IV with *in ventos vita recessit*, IX-XII on the deeper note of *vita fugit indignata sub umbras*;

the intermediate act (Books V-VIII), which is not only intermediate but central, qualifies its triumphant close by the strangely suggestive *rerum ignarus imagine gaudet*, words in which it is not too fanciful to recognize, beneath

verses in the *Aeneid* (twenty-four in number) and consider the last two feet as composed of a dactyl (*d*) and a spondee (*s*), there are sixteen possible combinations of dactyls and spondees in the hexameter line. The pattern appearing most frequently in the *Aeneid* is *dsss*, with a percentage of 14.39; see G. E. Duckworth, "Variety and Repetition in Vergil's Hexameters," *T. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), pp. 24-6. But in certain passages, those of a more dramatic and emotional nature, those which Otis, pp. 41-96, considers illustrative of an empathetic-sympathetic "subjective" style, I find the percentage of *dsss* to be low, three to six per cent; in the more narrative, "objective," portions of the poem, *dsss* often rises to twenty-five and even thirty per cent; see G. E. Duckworth, "Vergil's Subjective Style and its Relation to Meter," *Vergilius*, XII (1966), pp. 1-10; cf. also Duckworth, "Hexameter Patterns in Vergil," *P. V. S.*, V (1965-66), pp. 45-8. The *dsss*-variation in Act III of the tragedy of Nisus and Euryalus provides a striking confirmation of this distinction: 367-421, attempt to escape, 29.09 per cent: 422-49, deaths of the two youths, 0 per cent.

⁴⁶ See above, note 7.

⁴⁷ Mackail (above, note 8), p. 298.

the surface, one of those subtle and profound touches in which Virgil (saying as he does "much in little, and often in silence") gives not only a criticism but an interpretation of human life.

Pöschl stresses the conflict throughout the poem between light and darkness, and summarizes the three parts (I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII) as follows: "Dunkel—Licht—Dunkel: dies also ist der Rhythmus, der das Epos in seiner Gesamtheit beherrscht."⁴⁸ Büchner analyzes the three parts as follows: I-IV, Aeneas in Carthage; V-VIII, arrival in Latium and preparation for battle; IX-XII, the conflict itself.⁴⁹

I prefer to look upon V-VIII as the distinctly Roman and Augustan center of the poem,⁵⁰ framed by two tragedies: I-IV, the tragedy of Dido (with I and IV the Dido books), and IX-XII, the tragedy of Turnus (with IX and XII the Turnus books).⁵¹ In the central portion, four lengthy Homeric episodes (V, games; VI, underworld; VII, catalogue; VIII, shield) are reworked and transformed for the glorification of Rome and its history, the portrayal of ancient Italy, and the praise of Augustus and the new Golden Age. In each third of the poem, the two even-numbered books, each of a more serious and tragic nature than the odd-numbered books, are bound together

⁴⁸ V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils. Bild und Symbol in der Aeneis* (Innsbruck, 1950), p. 280; cf. the translation by G. Seligson, *The Art of Vergil. Image and Symbol in the Aeneid* (Ann Arbor, 1962), pp. 171 f. See also T. W. Stadler, *Vergils Aeneis. Eine poetische Betrachtung* (Einsiedeln, 1942), pp. 50-61.

⁴⁹ Büchner (above, note 37), col. 418; cf. col. 420 [= *R.-E.*, cols. 1440, 1442].

⁵⁰ Cf. *Georg.*, III, 16: *in medio mihi Caesar erit templumque tenebit* (also *Aen.*, VIII, 675 ff.: *in medio . . . Augustus . . . Caesar*, Augustus and the battle of Actium on the shield); Otis, pp. 38 f., rightly assumes that the *templum* in the proem to *Georgics* III refers to the present *Aeneid*, not to a historical epic about Augustus; cf. Duckworth (above, note 31), p. 14.

⁵¹ See G. E. Duckworth, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 1-10, and cf. V. Pöschl, "Der Forschungsbericht Virgil," *A.A.H.G.*, XII (1959), col. 209; cf. also Duckworth (above, note 31), pp. 11-13. For a more detailed analysis of the epic divided into thirds (I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII), see F. J. Worstbrock, *Elemente einer Poetik der Aeneis* (Münster Westf., 1963 [= *Orbis Antiquus*, Heft 21]), pp. 84-121.

by numerous similarities: II, departure from Troy and loss of Creusa, and IV, departure from Carthage and death of Dido;⁵² VI, future of Rome the state, and VIII, future of Rome the city; X, Aeneas victorious over Mezentius (*impietas*), and XII, Aeneas victorious over Turnus (*violentia*).

Vergil has three different structural patterns in the *Aeneid*: (1) an alternation between the even-numbered, more serious, books and the odd-numbered books which are lighter and relieve the tension;⁵³ (2) a sharp division into two halves, I-VI and VII-XII (cf. *maius opus*, VII, 45), with the books in each half (I and VII, II and VIII, III and IX, etc.) bound together by many parallels, both similarities and contrasts;⁵⁴ (3) the tripartite division, I-IV, V-VIII, and IX-XII, as analyzed above. Such a structure, with the two tragic sections framing the central portion, gives to the poem a unity which is lacking when we view the epic as divided into an Odyssean half and an Iliadic (or Italian) half.⁵⁵

⁵² On these two books, see especially B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *A.J.P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 1-24.

⁵³ See Duckworth, "Trilogy" (above, note 51), pp. 1 f., and bibliography cited in notes 4 and 5.

⁵⁴ See G. E. Duckworth, "The Architecture of the *Aeneid*," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15; cf. (above, note 31), pp. 2-10 (with many additional parallels); see also "Mathematical Symmetry in Vergil's *Aeneid*," *T.A.P.A.*, XCI (1960), p. 187, n. 4. Otis, pp. 217 f., 344, 391 f., 418, introduces a second parallelism between the halves: I and VII correspond, but the other books are in reverse order (II and XII, III and XI, IV and X, V and IX, VI and VIII); cf. Duckworth, review of Otis, *A.J.P.*, LXXXVI (1965), pp. 419 f. The parallelism of I and VII, II and VIII, III and IX, etc. is supported by a similar parallelism between the two halves of the *Argonautica* of Valerius Flaccus, with many similarities and contrasts in I and V, II and VI, III and VII, IV and VIII; see E. Frank, "Structure of Valerius' *Argonautica*," *C.B.*, XLIII (1966-67), pp. 38-9.

⁵⁵ See, however, V. Buchheit, *Vergil über die Sendung Roms. Untersuchungen zum Bellum Poenicum und zur Aeneis* (Heidelberg, 1963 [= *Gymnasium Beihefte*, Heft 31], p. 192. Buchheit stresses the division into two halves and especially the parallelism between I and VII; he is sceptical about viewing the *Aeneid* as a trilogy, for this destroys the unity of the poem: "Eine solche Auffassung zerreißt, was der Dichter als Einheit gesehen hat." This I am unable to accept; the tripartite structure of the poem, with the two tragedies framing the more Roman and Augustan core, certainly provides more unity than the division into two halves.

Camps speaks of "an underlying division of the poem into three main portions, the episodes of Aeneas' story which have Dido and Turnus for secondary heroes standing one on either side of a large central section wherein the wider significance of the story is expounded."⁵⁶ This sounds identical to my description of the *Aeneid* as a trilogy: V-VIII, on Roman and Augustan themes, framed by I-IV, the tragedy of Dido, and IX-XII, the tragedy of Turnus, but it is *not* the same; Camps joins IX to the central portion (V-VIII), and in so doing fails to see the importance of Nisus and Euryalus for the remainder of the poem.

Camps' arguments are the following, to which I add my reasons for rejecting his views:

1. There are many parallels between V and IX, e.g., Juno and Iris, the attempt to destroy the ships by fire, from which they are saved by a miracle, and the prominent role in both books not only of Nisus and Euryalus, but also of Ascanius and Mnesteus.⁵⁷

These similarities are striking, but they seem equally appropriate if we consider V and IX as the opening books of the second and third parts of the trilogy, V-VIII and IX-XII. The parallels and contrasts between I and VII are very numerous,⁵⁸ but it is important to note that I also contains an attempted destruction of the ships, in this case the result of Juno's appeal to Aeolus. The first book of each section of the trilogy, therefore, contains the activity of Juno, an attempt to destroy the ships (I, by storm; V and IX, by fire), and the preservation of the ships by divine action (I, Neptune; V, Jupiter; IX, Cybele).⁵⁹

2. Camps says: "We find that in Books 5-9 he [Vergil] has produced five successive counterparts to five famous Homeric show-pieces: the Games of *Il.* 23, the Nekyia of *Od.* 11, the Catalogue of *Il.* 2, the Shield of *Il.* 18, and the Doloneia of *Il.* 10. . . . In whatever other ways he has modified each Homeric

⁵⁶ W. A. Camps, "A Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *C. Q.*, IV (1954), p. 215.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁵⁸ Cf. Duckworth, above, note 54.

⁵⁹ See Worstbrock (above, note 51), p. 102; cf. pp. 116 f.

original, he has consistently in each case given his own version a specifically Roman application,"⁶⁰ and he looks upon the story of Nisus and Euryalus as "an example of Roman military *virtus*."

As an answer to this statement, I quote from my discussion of the *Aeneid* as a trilogy:⁶¹

This adaptation of long Homeric episodes for historical, patriotic, and nationalistic purposes is something unique and appears only in the central portion of the poem. One other long episode, the night expedition in IX, is based upon Homer (the *Doloneia* in *Iliad* X), but this may be considered the exception to prove the rule: the story of Nisus and Euryalus, appearing in the opening book of the third part of the poem (the tragedy of Turnus), is itself a miniature tragedy, in which two characters meet disaster and death as the result of their own actions; this sets the tone for the final section of the *Aeneid*, when Turnus at the end of XII likewise pays the penalty for his own wrong act—the insolent treatment of the body of Pallas.

I have discussed Camps' arguments at length and have explained why I disagree, for this important reason: Otis in his recent book accepts the structural theory of Camps and likewise includes Book IX in the central portion of the poem: "Books 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 clearly form *one* group related by the theme of the Latin war,"⁶² and he believes that the story of Nisus and Euryalus, like the Homeric motifs in V-VIII, receives a specific Roman application: "in the end the episode is assimilated to Roman history, to the ideology of Roman patriotism."⁶³

⁶⁰ W. A. Camps, "A Second Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *C. Q.*, IX (1959), p. 53. In a review of Worstbrock (above, note 51) in *C. R.*, XV (1965), pp. 185 f., Camps reaffirms his theory of the unity of V-IX, and adds the following argument: "it is difficult to regard the contemporaneous actions of Books VIII and IX as belonging to separate major structural phases of the poem"; this point has little validity, since many scholars reject the synchronization of VIII and IX; see above, note 37.

⁶¹ Duckworth (above, note 31), p. 12; similarly (above, note 51), p. 6.

⁶² Otis, p. 274, n. 1; cf. pp. 344 f. But how, apart from the prophetic passages in V, 730 f., and VI, 86-97, 888-92, does "the theme of the Latin war" apply to V and VI?

⁶³ Otis, p. 389; cf. p. 419.

Otis' acceptance of Camps' theory seems particularly unfortunate; as a result, the story of Nisus and Euryalus (and IX as a whole) looks backward to the central portion of the trilogy, rather than forward to the remainder of the poem. Otis states this clearly when he says: "The true meaning of 9 is in fact only brought out when we realize its relation to 5."⁶⁴

There are several reasons, I am convinced, why IX should be considered the first book of the final section of the trilogy (IX-XII):

1. The scenes on the shield at the end of VIII reach a climax with the victory of Augustus over Antony and Cleopatra and his later triumphs; this is certainly the conclusion of the central, more Roman and Augustan, portion of the poem.

2. The extensive role played by Turnus in IX proves that the book is a part of the tragedy of Turnus (IX-XII). Turnus has an important role in X (slaying of Pallas) and in XI (reply to Drances), but IX and XII are his great books, as I and IV are the Dido books. Otis realizes this when he says: "9 reveals the character of Turnus and prefigures his fate."⁶⁵

3. Vergil's psychological portrayal of character and his insistence that individuals bring disaster on themselves are especially apparent in IX-XII, and in this respect the Nisus-Euryalus story sets the tone for the final third of the trilogy. In spite of his adherence to Camps' belief that IX is part of the central, more Roman, section, Otis admits that Nisus and Euryalus "prefigure" Mezentius, Camilla, and Turnus: "they all pay the penalty for their own excesses."⁶⁶

4. Parallels (or contrasts) in thought and wording likewise prove that IX and XII belong together; cf. Turnus' words in IX, 138 f. (*nil me fatale terrent, / . . . responsa deorum*) and XII, 895 (*di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis*); similarly, IX, 21 f. (*sequor omnia tanta, / quisquis in arma vocas*) and XII, 676 (*iam iam fata, soror, superant*). Iris, sent by Juno at the beginning of IX (1-15), is balanced by the Dira, sent by Jupiter at the end of XII (853-66), and the comparison of Turnus to a lion at the end of IX (792-6) corresponds to the more prophetic comparison of Turnus to a lion at the beginning of XII (4-8,

⁶⁴ Otis, p. 344.

⁶⁵ Otis, p. 345.

⁶⁶ Otis, p. 393; cf. p. 315.

where *saucius*, *grave vulnus*, and *telum* look ahead to the *telum fatale* of Aeneas in 919 and the wounding of Turnus in 926).⁶⁷

B. Significance

This brings me to the final portion of this paper, the true meaning of Nisus and Euryalus for the concluding books of the *Aeneid*. Vergil's use in IX of the Homeric night expedition is very unlike his treatment of Homeric episodes in V-VIII; as a miniature tragedy, it emphasizes human error and the penalty that characters must pay for their mistakes, and this Vergil stresses repeatedly in IX-XII.

The close relation of the Nisus-Euryalus story to the remainder of the poem may best be presented in outline form:

- Act I. Nisus raises the problem of free will in 184 f. His question is answered both by the outcome of the story and by Jupiter's words in X, 111 f., and furthermore is illustrated by the deaths of Mezentius, Camilla, and Turnus.
- Act II. (a) Nisus and Euryalus seek the camp of the enemy, *multis tamen ante futuri / exitio* (315 f.); cf. the same prophetic use of *ante* in Turnus' words to Juturna (XII, 680): *hunc, oro, sine me furere ante furorem*.
- (b) Nisus is compared to a lion (339-41); cf. 792-6, where Turnus is compared to a lion.
- (c) Nisus in 354 realizes that they are guilty of *caedes* and *cupido* = *caedis cupido* (cf. 185 f.: *dira cupido? / et pugnam*); so Turnus in 757-61 does the wrong thing, motivated by *furor* . . . *caedisque insana cupido*.
- (d) In 359-66 Euryalus seizes booty, including a *galea*; cf. 373 f.: *galea Euryalum* . . . *prodidit*; 384:

⁶⁷ Cf. Worstbrock (above, note 51), pp. 90-8; in pp. 84-90, Worstbrock also points out similarities linking I and IV (in the first third of the trilogy), e.g., I, 13 (*Karthago, Italiam contra*), 239 (*fatis contraria fata*), and IV, 628 (*litora litoribus contraria*); Dido, *pulcherrima* (I, 496), compared to Diana (I, 498-502), and Aeneas, *pulcherrimus* (IV, 141), likened to Apollo (IV, 143-9).

onerosaque praeda. Both Camilla and Turnus meet death as a result of their love of spoils; for Camilla, cf. XI, 781 f.: *totumque incauta per agmen / femineo praedae et spoliū ardebat amore*; for Turnus, cf. X, 500: *ovat spolio gaudetque potitus*; 503-5: *Turno tempus erit . . . cum spolia ista diemque / oderit*; see XII, 940-9.⁶⁸

- Act III. (a) Nisus' attempt to save his friend looks forward to Lausus' attempt to save his father in X, 796-9, and in each case Vergil bestows praise in an apostrophe (IX, 446-9; X, 791-3).⁶⁹
- (b) Nisus does not wish to survive Euryalus and dies avenging the death of his friend; similarly Mezentius does not wish to live after Lausus is slain (cf. X, 855 f.),⁷⁰ and attempts to avenge his son's death (cf. X, 862-4).
- (c) Nisus represents the youthful heroism so characteristic of Vergil; like Nisus, both Pallas and Lausus are eager for glory, rush into danger, and meet death.⁷¹

Otis himself suggests that "the devotion of Nisus and his tragic grief is a forecast of the affection and grief of Aeneas for Pallas in Book 10."⁷² This is perhaps less convincing than the parallels listed above, but shows again that Otis, in spite

⁶⁸ The individual books of the *Aeneid* each have three main divisions and most divisions are likewise divided into three parts; see G. E. Duckworth, "Tripartite Structure in the *Aeneid*," *Vergilius*, 7 (1961), pp. 2-11; see also (above, note 31), pp. 25-33. It is perhaps worth noting that Euryalus kills the Rutulians and takes booty, including the fateful *galea*, in the central section of the second main division of IX, and Turnus likewise slays Pallas and seizes the equally fatal swordbelt in the central section of the second main division of X.

⁶⁹ These parallels seem more valid than the view that the motif of Nisus' return recalls Aeneas' attempt in II to find Creusa; on the latter, see Büchner (above, note 37), col. 386 [= *R.-E.*, col. 1408].

⁷⁰ Cf. the end of *Mahābhārata* VII, where Droṇa, believing (wrongly) that his son is dead, does not wish to survive him; see Duckworth (above, note 35), pp. 113 f.

⁷¹ Cf. Cartault, p. 666.

⁷² Otis, p. 350.

of assigning IX to the middle portion of the poem, is aware of its importance for the remainder of the epic.

In summary, the story of Nisus and Euryalus, although based (at least in part) on the night expedition of the *Doloneia*, is very unlike the adaptation of Homeric themes in V-VIII, where the emphasis is on Rome, Italy, and Augustus. Vergil presents in dramatic form a psychological study of two youths whose motives are basically noble but who do the wrong things and suffer tragic deaths as a result. The story is neither an independent unit, a digression introduced for its own sake, nor is it a part of the central portion of the epic (V-VIII); on the contrary, it prepares for Vergil's treatment of character and event in IX-XII, and is especially important in foreshadowing the tragic fate of Turnus.

Turnus, led by his *furor . . . caedisque insana cupido*,⁷³ failed to open the gate (IX, 756-61), insolently despoiled the slain Pallas of his swordbelt (X, 495-505),⁷⁴ welcomed the breaking of the truce in XII, and, as a result of his reluctance to face Aeneas,⁷⁵ was responsible for the death of Amata (XII, 595-603; cf. XII, 61-3). Wounded by Aeneas, he appealed for mercy; cf. XII, 932-6:

"miseri te si qua parentis
tangere cura potest, oro (fuit et tibi talis
Anchises genitor) Dauni miserere senectae
et me, seu corpus spoliatum lumine mavis,
redde meis."

The father-son relationship made an effective plea, and Aeneas was about to spare him when he saw the swordbelt and was reminded of Turnus' arrogant treatment of Pallas in X. Another father-son relationship entered his mind, that of Evander and

⁷³ IX, 760; cf. VII, 461 f.: *saevit amor ferri et scelerata insania belli, / ira super.*

⁷⁴ Cf. *iussa superba*, X, 445; *superbum caede nova*, X, 514 f.; Vergil also describes Turnus as *superbus* in XII, 326, when he rushes into battle after the breaking of the truce and the wounding of Aeneas. Again he is eager to do the wrong thing.

⁷⁵ Cf. the accusation of Saces in XII, 664: *tu currum deserto in gramine versas*; see G. E. Duckworth, "Turnus as a Tragic Character," *Vergilius*, 4 (1940), pp. 13 ff.

Pallas,⁷⁶ and Aeneas avenged the death of the youth with the words (947-9):

"tunc hinc spoliis indute meorum
eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit,"

at the same time carrying out the request of Anchises in VI, 853 (*parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*); *iustitia* rather than *clementia* prevailed at the end.⁷⁷

Turnus is characterized throughout by *furor*, *violentia*, and *ira*. His *dira cupido* (= *caedis insana cupido*) and his reckless desire for booty combine to destroy him as they did Nisus and Euryalus in IX, at the beginning of the Turnus books (IX-XII).

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

⁷⁶ Cf. Evander's words in XI, 177-9: *quod vitam moror invisam Palante perempto / dextera causa tua est, Turnum natoque patrique / quam debere vides*.

⁷⁷ I do not agree with the picture of Aeneas' *furor* at the end of XII presented by M. C. J. Putnam, *The Poetry of the Aeneid* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1965), pp. 151 f., 189, 192-4, nor can I accept his view (p. 193) that Aeneas, in slaying Turnus, disregards Anchises' words in VI, 853; Turnus is *superbus* (cf. above, note 74) and it is Aeneas' duty to give up the *clementia* which he has displayed in XII, 938-41.

AENEAS AND ANDROMACHE IN *AENEID* III.

As a result of R. B. Lloyd's perceptive study of *Aeneid* III,¹ scholars no longer have reason to look upon this book as a lacklustre makeshift which Vergil would have thoroughly revised in his final version of the *Aeneid*. Lloyd has convincingly revealed the exquisite care employed by Vergil in arranging the incidents of Aeneas' voyage from Troy to Carthage so as to secure symmetry and emphasis.² Moreover, Lloyd clearly establishes that Book III is carefully integrated within the larger framework of the first six books of the *Aeneid*.

¹ R. B. Lloyd, "Aeneid III: A New Approach," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 133-51. See also his "Aeneid III and the Aeneas Legend," *ibid.*, pp. 382-400. For an earlier discussion of the problems presented by Book III (with references to previous literature), see C. Saunders, "The Relation of Aeneid III to the Rest of The Poem," *C. Q.*, XIX (1925), pp. 85-91. G. Duckworth, "Recent Work on Vergil (1940-1956)," *C. W.*, LI (1957-58), pp. 89-235 *passim*, has a valuable list, p. 154, of studies made of Book III in the period which he surveys.

² Lloyd observes that there are nine episodes in Book III—Thrace, Delos, Crete, the Strophades, Actium, Buthrotum, the passage from Epirus to Italy, Scylla and Charybdis, and the Cyclops. He notes that the first three take place in the Aegean, the second three in Western Greece, and the final three in Magna Graecia; in each of these triads the last scene is related at greater length and assumes greater importance. Lloyd also shows how each episode has within it an instance of prophecy or fulfilment of prophecy, and how episodes 1-3 gradually make clear to Aeneas that he is to settle in Italy, episodes 4-6 deal with the signs and perils of the approach to Italy, and episodes 7-9 begin a partial consummation of what has been forecast.

Brooks Otis, *Vergil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford, 1963), p. 256, n. 2, finds Lloyd's analysis "useful" but his interpretation of Book III "very inadequate." For Otis' own sensitive interpretation of Book III, see pp. 251-64. Like Lloyd, he divides the book into three sections but isolates the Buthrotum episode as part two, in which Aeneas is made certain that his goal is Italy. He ignores Aeneas' landing at Actium, which scarcely merits inclusion in the "period of uncertainty," the name which he gives to the first section, vv. 1-293. "The period of desolation," the title which he applies to the last section, vv. 506-715, is perhaps too sweeping, since it alludes primarily to Aeneas' desolation following the loss of Anchises at the end of the book. At bottom, Lloyd's analysis, though perhaps more mechanical, seems to be more esthetically satisfying.

The close-knit structure of Book III in its entirety having been thus demonstrated, it seems natural to examine in more detail some of the particular sections of this book in an effort to discover whether Vergil operates *in minimis* with the same scrupulous attention to form as he does *in maximis*. Of the nine episodes into which Lloyd divides Book III, I shall here consider the one devoted to Aeneas' stay at Buthrotum.³

This Buthrotum episode occupies 211 of Book III's 718 lines and is the longest of the book. Moreover, as Lloyd notes, the scene in which occurs the elaborate and important prophecy of Helenus to Aeneas begins at the precise center of the book, line 359. As prophet of Apollo, Helenus in great detail makes clear to Aeneas the route which he must pursue until he reaches Italy. Despite its importance in the "prophecy-pattern" which marks this book, however, Helenus' long utterance does little to illuminate his own character. When Helenus first comes on the scene (345), Vergil merely says in a few lines that he recognizes the Trojans and, talking and weeping, leads them to the palace. Again, as the Trojans are about to leave following the prophecy (463 ff.), Helenus, after bringing forth gifts and equipment for the Trojans, makes but a brief speech, and that to Anchises, not to Aeneas. The reasons for this apparent unconcern on Vergil's part to characterize Helenus more fully are not far to seek. First, as the voice of Apollo in unfolding Aeneas' destiny to him at this point, Helenus takes on a certain impersonality and distance which properly would be associated with the fateful powers moving Aeneas onward to his goal. But secondly, and more importantly from an artistic viewpoint, the low-keyed lines devoted to Helenus are framed by two scenes (300-43 and 482-505) which for intense pathos can rank among the finest in the *Aeneid*; and in each scene Andromache and Aeneas are the central figures. Heinze noted that Vergil is more concerned with Andromache than with the colorless Helenus.⁴ While this

³ Otis, pp. 259-61, has treated the Buthrotum episode briefly but has not concentrated on Andromache. For the text in the following discussion, I use that of Sabbadini and Castiglioni, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Libri XII* (Torino, 1945).

⁴ R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik* (Leipzig, 1928), p. 108: "Auf sie [Andromache] viel mehr als auf den farblos gehaltenen Helenus richtet sich der Sinn des Dichters."

is true, one should remember that Vergil *made* Helenus colorless, Andromache vivid. Each character has his function—Helenus to support the epic's larger machinery, by which Aeneas is made increasingly aware of his destiny, Andromache to lend to the Buthrotum episode its emotional coloring. It is to these two Aeneas-Andromache scenes that I now turn.

The first is the longer and has been much admired. Bellessort⁵ and Paratore⁶ have some fine pages in appreciation of this scene, and Conington,⁷ Henry,⁸ and others have carefully pointed out the passages in both this episode and the later one which reveal Vergil's conscious recall of passages in Homer or in the Euripidean plays *The Trojan Women*, *Hecuba*, and, of course, *Andromache*. Indeed, much of the pathos derives from such recollections and overtones. However, it seems to me that the power of both Aeneas-Andromache scenes derives only secondarily from these literary allusions; it is upon the necessarily conflicting feelings of the two protagonists that Vergil concentrates his poetic resources. A consideration of certain lines in the text may make this clear.

At line 300, Aeneas has just put in at Buthrotum and has heard that Priam's son Helenus has taken control of Pyrrhus' realm of Epirus and at the same time has gained Andromache, formerly Pyrrhus' prize of war, as his wife. Lines 300-9 follow.

In this ten-line section Vergil makes full use of the only extended narrative in the Aeneas-Andromache encounter to convey forcibly the impression—later reinforced by the dialogue—that Andromache regards herself still as the wife of the dead Hector. Significantly, the first sight to greet Aeneas is that of Andromache offering sacrifice at Hector's cenotaph. *Sollemnis* is the key first word of the *cum* clause in which Andromache first appears; it most probably refers, not to the annual, but to the repeated, customary pilgrimage which Andromache makes

⁵ A. Bellessort, *Virgile. Son oeuvre et son temps* (Paris, 1924), pp. 283-6.

⁶ E. Paratore, *Virgilio* (Firenze, 1954), pp. 366-9.

⁷ J. Conington, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*, II (London, 1872). See especially his notes on lines 305, 328, 332, 486, and 490.

⁸ J. Henry, *Aeneidea*, II (Dublin, 1878), pp. 409-21 *passim* and 468-76 *passim*.

to Hector's cenotaph.⁹ The *tristia dona* are "gifts of her sadness," complementing and further defining at the line's end the *sollemnis dapes* at the beginning. The heavy, spondaic *ante urbem in luco falsi* hesitates briefly—and significantly—at the caesura on a note of unreality before the dactylic rippling of this new Simois' wave ends the line. The long-postponed subject, Andromache, appearing at the caesura of the next line, is surrounded by *cineri* and *manis*. Again, the name of Hector is postponed, equally effectively, to the first word of the following line, where, in adjectival form, it modifies *tumulum*, also occurring at the caesura and also effectively placed, since only here is it at last discerned that Andromache has actually constructed a cenotaph to Hector. Finally, in the twin altars, which seem to be a sign of particular emphasis in sacrifice,¹⁰ and in the explicit *causam lacrimis*, Vergil is at pains to emphasize that Andromache's grief is self-willed and her devotion excessive.

In lines 306-9, therefore, Andromache's shock at seeing Aeneas and her fainting are due not only to surprise at seeing one thought dead. Aeneas and his Trojan arms are a reality from that Trojan past which in Epirus can be simulated only by a feigned Simois or by wilful retreat into that past by way of offerings at an empty, futile tomb.¹¹ Andromache's first words

⁹ Many, following Servius, *ad loc.*: *non festas, sed legitimas, anniversarias*, have interpreted *sollemnis* to mean "annual." Though frequently in the *Aeneid* the word *sollemnis* can bear this meaning, in II, 202 and XII, 193 the meaning of "wonted," "customary" seems clearly indicated for the word. In VIII, 102, *solemnem* might bear either of the two meanings. The passage VIII, 102-25 contains many reminiscences of our present lines. There, Aeneas is approaching Evander's city for the first time, as here he is approaching Helenus' city. The following parallels are worthy of note: III, 301 *solemnis . . . forte*, and VIII, 102 *forte . . . solemnem*; III, 302 and VIII, 104 *ante urbem in luco*; III, 305 and VIII, 106 *aras*; III, 307-8 *magnis exterrita monstribus/deriguit visu in medio*, and VIII, 109 *terrentur visu subito*; III, 300 *progredior . . . iniquens*, and VIII, 125 *progressi . . . relinquant*. Are these echoes intended to focus attention on Aeneas' appearing at "memorial services" to Hector and to Hercules?

¹⁰ This is the judgment of W. Warde Fowler, "Duplicated Altars and Offerings in Virgil, *Ecl.* V. 65; *Aen.* III. 305; and *Aen.* V. 77 ff.," *C. R.*, XXXI (1917), pp. 163-7.

¹¹ *Inanem* in line 304 may mean "empty" in both its literal and figurative sense.

(310-12) corroborate this interpretation. The first questions, with their emphasis on *vera*, *verus*, *vivis*, show Andromache's near-incredulity; such a living reality as Aeneas breaks rudely upon the world of the dead past to which she is committed. And the final, strange, anguished question, *Hector ubi est?*, gains greatly in pathos if we consider that after the incredulous *vivisne?* Andromache seems immediately ready to assume the opposite—that Aeneas is indeed a real shade, representing a more vivid projection of her world than any she has thus far known—and she steps readily into that domain of death to ask Aeneas where her dead Hector is, as though Aeneas could immediately point him out. But, as appears from the immediately following lines (312-14), the sound of her own voice uttering Hector's name produces immediately an intense reaction of grief, occasioned perhaps by a renewed, overwhelming sense of her loss and at the same time by a sudden realization that this is, after all, a real person before her who can in no way bring back Hector to her. Whatever be the reason, Andromache plainly has hysterics: if the words *omnem/implevit clamore locum* would not be sufficient to convince us of this, surely *furenti* in line 313 is explicit enough.

The reaction of Aeneas to this display follows (315-19). His reply falls into two parts, in the first of which he answers Andromache's *vivisne*; in the second he turns to Andromache herself. Vergil shows by the words *raris turbatus vocibus hisco* of line 314 that Aeneas is deeply moved, but his response to this hysterical, clamoring woman is most revealing. *Vivo equidem* would be sufficient to answer Andromache's earlier question, but the following *vitamque extrema per omnia duco* shows clearly that Andromache's display has but served to arouse in Aeneas that weariness and pity for his *own* lot which is so much a part of his character in the earlier books of the *Aeneid*. His mind turns first to himself, and to his own *extrema*; he thereby reveals an attitude of world-weariness at this point commensurate with that of Andromache, though the *extrema* which he undergoes are certainly diverse from hers. Though it is a commonplace that ancient man is not to be judged by modern standards, it is hard not to see in this reply that same combination of self-consciousness and sad awareness

of his own mission which Aeneas will display in his damning speech of defense before a far different woman in Book IV. Aeneas' involvement in his own destiny blinds him to any real, penetrating understanding of the woman involved. In his present speech, after his first sentence (with the incomplete line 316 perhaps indicating an attempt to find the right words), Aeneas manages to ask the distraught woman, whom he addresses as *Hectoris Andromache*, what her fate has been; the indelicacy of first calling her Hector's wife and then bluntly asking her if she is still bound to Pyrrhus has occasioned some rather uneasy apologies, and the text has been variously punctuated,¹² but I feel that this "slip" on Vergil's part is designed: even in his attempt at expressing pity Aeneas still makes the sad mistake of coupling a mention of Andromache's concubinage to a reminder of her past glory. But equally important is the fact that Aeneas too thinks of Andromache first as Trojan Andromache, Hector's wife; Troy exerts always its hold on Aeneas, and the appearance of Andromache powerfully reinforces this hold.

Aeneas' mention of Pyrrhus has an immediate effect upon Andromache, as line 320 shows; for this name has recalled to Andromache's mind the sad reality and painful memory of her more recent past. Her passionate outbursts give way to a speech of more restrained tenor, yet of infinite sadness, which she delivers with downcast countenance and subdued voice (321-43).

The structure of this speech deserves careful scrutiny. The relation of Andromache's fate subsequent to Troy's capture, her

¹² The difficulty is as old as Servius, who found two readings, *Andromache* (vocative) and *Andromachen*. The vocative has stronger manuscript support and seems right, since it is unlikely that Aeneas, in speaking to Andromache, would use the third person immediately after the *te* of line 317. *Te* is the object of both *excipit* and *revisit*. Whether, however, the vocative is considered to end the sentence beginning in line 317 or to begin the sentence in 319 has been considerably debated. The more recent editors, including Sabbadini, punctuate with a question mark after *Andromache*; this on the whole seems best. Henry (above, note 8) makes a spirited defence of this reading. Though by this punctuation we thus gain a full stop at the caesura of this line, the bluntness of *Pyrrhin conubia servas?* immediately following Aeneas' *Hectoris Andromache* still constitutes (despite Henry) insensitivity on Aeneas' part; he could have spared Andromache this reminder of her fortune following Troy's fall.

degradation as concubine of Pyrrhus and mother of his child, her pathetic transfer to her fellow-slave Helenus upon Pyrrhus' marriage to Hermione, Pyrrhus' subsequent death at Orestes' hands, and Helenus' establishing of his new Troy are movingly told with true poetic economy; but this account is placed in lines 325-36, between the beginning and end of her speech, both of which reveal further facets of Andromache's present state of mind. Her first "happy" words in line 321 are *O felix*, but they are spoken in reference to her sister-in-law Polyxena, sacrificed by the Greeks at Troy. For Andromache, significantly, Polyxena's *felicitas* consisted in being *iussa mori* (323) before she could know the concubinage which Andromache knew; the subsequent upturn in her own fortunes has apparently not altered Andromache's conviction that death of this sort is better than life with such memories as she now has.¹³ Again, the *felix . . . mori* clause comes but shortly after Aeneas' lugubrious *vivo equidem*; Vergil is intent to show how both characters feel the weight of their present life, though, to be sure, from pronouncedly different points of view.

The latter part of Andromache's speech, beginning at line 337, adds the final dimension to the portrait Vergil is here drawing. After only a perfunctory two lines (337-8) to ask Aeneas how he has come to their shores, Andromache turns her thoughts to Ascanius: "What of the boy Ascanius? Does he survive and feed on the air? Whom for you already at Troy—." Line 340, the only grammatically incomplete line in the *Aeneid*, has been variously supplied by editors; but perhaps Sparrow's judgment is best: "The fact that the hemistich is incomplete in sense is not enough (cf. 1.135 *quos ego*—) to show that it is unfinished; Virgil may have intended Andromache's utterance to be broken off by her sudden recollection of Creusa's death."¹⁴

¹³ The significance of Andromache's outburst is perhaps enhanced if we remember that *Troiae sub moenibus altis* of line 322 echoes precisely the words of Aeneas in his first speech of the *Aeneid*, when during the storm he calls *terque quaterque beati* (I, 94) those who died "under Troy's high walls." Both the Aeneas of that scene and the Andromache of this have such a "Troy-fixation" that death at Ilium seems a boon compared to subsequent sufferings.

¹⁴ J. Sparrow, *Half-Lines and Repetitions in Virgil* (Oxford, 1931), p. 43.

This is one possibility; or perhaps, as Feldman has suggested,¹⁵ Andromache has temporarily broken down in tears. This is wholly probable; for her next words, *ecqua tamen puerost amissae cura parentis?*, show that she is once more intensely in the grip of the past, this time embodied in her recollection of her dead son Astyanax. Feldman well states the case: "Andromache has been reminded of the reversal of the roles played by Creusa and herself. She has lived, her husband and son have been killed; Creusa has died, her husband and son have lived. She wonders whether Ascanius has any love for his lost mother comparable to the love which she feels for Astyanax."¹⁶ This reversal of roles of boy and mother is intensified if we reflect that Andromache as portrayed by Vergil is as much a *parens amissa* as Creusa; for she is lost in *life* from the very ones whom she yearns to join in *death*. It is Andromache the wife and mother, too, who speaks in the final two lines of the above passage. Once more the past (*antiquam*, 342) permeates the present: Andromache would have Ascanius imbibe of that Trojan world represented by the martial valor of Hector and Aeneas at Troy. And of course it is no accident that *Hector* is the last word to fall from her lips.

This is properly the end of the first scene with Andromache. In line 345, Helenus appears with some companions and leads Aeneas and his men to the palace, past landmarks which Helenus and his followers have named after those at Troy. The cumulative effect on Aeneas of the memory-stirring encounter with Andromache and the sight of the *parva Troia* (349) shown him by Helenus is marked by Aeneas' embracing (*amplector*, 351) the new Scaean gates, symbol of fallen Troy, as though by physical embrace he could capture again the life which old Troy represents.

This, then, is "Act I" of the Buthrotum episode. It has presented Andromache, her soul obsessed with her personal tragedy as wife and mother, her thoughts turning on death and

¹⁵ L. H. Feldman, "Ascanius and Astyanax," *C. J.*, LIII (1957-58), p. 362. W. F. Witton, "Two Passages in the Third Book of the *Aeneid*," *G. & R.*, N. S. VII (1960), p. 171, offers nearly the same explanation as Feldman, though he does not allude to Creusa.

¹⁶ Feldman, *loc. cit.*

the past. Aeneas, on the other hand, with his heavy burden as leader of the Trojan remnants, is conscious first of his present tribulations but is also strongly affected by the pull towards the past represented by everything at this miniature Troy of Buthrotum, including Andromache herself.

Many days pass between this Act I and the final act at Buthrotum, but most of the lines (374-462) are devoted to Helenus' reassuring prophecy that Aeneas will reach Italy. As the last scene opens, Helenus has just finished presenting gifts and saluting Anchises, whom he addresses *multo honore* (474). Then Andromache comes forward. Lines 482-505 are devoted primarily to her words and those of Aeneas. The beauty and pathos of this scene have been universally admired, but its close relation with the earlier encounter between Aeneas and Andromache does not seem to have been adequately stressed. Once again, a careful analysis is necessary.

Beginning with line 482, Vergil portrays Andromache coming sadly forward with her *dona*. *Nec minus* means "no less than Helenus," and if this fact is kept in mind the much-debated *nec cedit honori* of line 484 will mean "nor does she yield to the *honor* Helenus has just shown Anchises in the *honor* which she bestows on young Ascanius."¹⁷ Two things deserve special notice here. First, as in the first meeting with Aeneas, Andro-

¹⁷ This interpretation is, in part, at least as old as C. Heyne's note *ad loc.* in his edition, *P. Virgilii Maronis Opera* (Leipzig, 1767). Why subsequent commentators, and especially Henry (above, note 8) in his long note on this passage, have not accepted this explanation is difficult to see. *Multo compellat honore* (474) ends the line just prior to Helenus' complimentary farewell speech to Anchises; *nec cedit honori* ends the penultimate line preceding Andromache's farewell words to Ascanius. Though Ascanius is young, Andromache does not yield to the *honor* Helenus has shown Anchises, who might, as elder, be expected to receive a greater show of respect than anyone. True, the alternative reading adopted by Sabbadini, *honore* ("in honoring" Ascanius), is easier, but the dative is sufficiently intelligible. Vergil is paralleling Helenus' farewell to Anchises (warm, but somewhat formal) with Andromache's heartfelt farewell to Ascanius, and the *honori* of 484 recalls the *honore* of 474, while the *nec* of 484 harks back to the *nec minus* of 482. Andromache *no less than* her husband bestowed a farewell, *nor* did she yield to the *honor* he had shown Anchises, for she bestowed rich gifts upon Ascanius.

make is bearing a sad offering (cf. *donis*, 485, with *tristia dona*, 301). Secondly, while the former *dona*, being offerings to the dead Hector, symbolized Andromache's devotion to the past, the present *dona*, though given to a living Ascanius, are also woven from the fabric of past history; they are a *Phrygia chlamys* that is a material embodiment of that bygone time with which she literally wishes to clothe Ascanius: Henry¹⁸ thinks that *onerat* of line 485 means not "loads his hands with presents" but "loads Ascanius' person, clothes him" with the chlamys, and this interpretation, together with his suggestion that *vestes* of 483 and *chlamydem* of 484 are actually one single rich garment (*vestes* being a "stately plural") strikes me as so poetically right that I do not hesitate to adopt it.

At line 486 begin Andromache's final words. Brief though it is, this evocative speech is a triumph of Vergilian art. It firmly resumes the last thought of Andromache at the end of Act I but this time is more intense because Ascanius himself is present. Once more Andromache is close to self-hypnotism; for as she looks at Ascanius she is seeing Astyanax. The *monumenta* which she gives Ascanius indeed testify to a *longum amorem*, a love which looks far back into the past to her own dead child and reaches forward to Ascanius, whom she would have been as mindful of her, through the symbolic chlamys, as she is mindful of her own son. The tone is parallel to that, already noted, at the end of Act I. Further, with *coniugis Hectoreae*, ending at the caesura of line 488, Andromache again ends a sentence with her dead husband's name and shows us that for her, meaningful time came to an end many a year ago at Troy. Also, it is difficult to overpraise the delicacy of the words *mihi sola mei* of line 489, where the adjective, though grammatically modifying *imago*, lends its sad coloring to the words surrounding it: Andromache is *sola* too. The final two lines, with the pathetic anaphora of the *sic* and the sudden vividness of the imperfect *ferebat* as Andromache sees momentarily her Astyanax as he was in life, followed by the *nunc* which is used only to modify the imperfect subjunctive *pubesceret* in the conclusion of an unreal condition (Andromache leaves unsaid the thought *si viveret*)—these lines contain the

¹⁸ Henry (above, note 8), pp. 475-6.

final touches of Vergil's brush as he completes his portrait of Andromache, drawn from beginning to end in tones of unrelieved gray.

Aeneas' reply ends this scene and, if I read it right, is permeated with a gentle irony that depends for its effect upon, first, our recollection of Act I, and secondly, our keeping in mind the prophecy just delivered to Aeneas by Helenus. With rising tears, Aeneas says (493-4):

Vivite felices, quibus est fortuna peracta
iam sua; nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur.

Vivite felices, coming immediately after Andromache's clear indication of her extreme sorrow and shortly after the earlier remark (480) of the supposedly childless Helenus to Anchises, *felix nati pietate*, gains greatly in irony when we recall Andromache's earlier *O FELIX una ante alias Priameia virgo . . . iussa MORI* (321-3) or the earlier sad remark of Aeneas himself, *vivo equidem* (315). Further, in each speech of Aeneas occurs the word *fortuna*. Doubtless the *digna satis fortuna* (318) which Aeneas conceives for Andromache in the earlier speech is precisely the one upon which he congratulates her and Helenus now: marriage to each other and rule over a new Troy. The extent to which Andromache regards this as *bona fortuna* has been amply illustrated, though in a sense totally different from the one intended by Aeneas it can be said of her, *est fortuna peracta iam sua*. Finally, *nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur* is practically a restatement of Aeneas' earlier *vitamque extrema per omnia duco* (315), when Aeneas was also decrying his uncertainty-filled present life, though in this later statement there is again a deeper meaning for the words than Aeneas himself intends. For he is called from one destiny—the past, Troy, defeat—to another—the future, Italy, and triumph; and it is this fact which helps create the delicate web of conflicting emotions in this last scene. The *quies* upon which Aeneas congratulates the pair in line 495 is, for Andromache at least, the *quies* of the grave; the *effigies Xanthi* of line 497, like the *Astyanactis imago* of line 489, remains for her but a substitute—dear, but no less a substitute—for the dearer realities of the irretrievable past. For Andromache, Aeneas and Ascanius em-

body *in life* the two things which she holds most dear and which she can find only by returning to the past—a heroic husband and a beloved son. As for Aeneas, who is preoccupied by his burden of leadership to such an extent that he fails adequately to comprehend the deeper forces motivating another, he can conceive of no greater *felicitas* than the founding of his *moenia* (501) and the seal which this act will set on his present uncertainty and suffering. As he looks at this new Troy he sees in miniature all that he hopes one day to attain and is so engulfed by feelings of envy for those who have gained this *quies* that he fails to realize that he has in Ascanius something more precious to an Andromache than a thousand new cities. The divergence in viewpoints is essentially irreconcilable, for it springs from the burdens which fate has imposed on each. But if Aeneas cannot appreciate Andromache's feelings, he can, with that weary resignation to his own lot which characterizes him, turn away from the dead past which is Andromache's world and to which he himself has been powerfully drawn, and utter in his final sentence the hope, stirred by Helenus' prophecy still ringing in his ears, that their two peoples can one day build one single Troy united in spirit—this time a vital new Troy, untainted by the defeat of the past. The contrast between the attitude of Andromache and that of Aeneas Vergil poignantly reveals in their last words. Andromache, looking back to her sole dead son and what he might have been: *et nunc aequali tecum pubesceret aevo* (491); Aeneas, doubtfully struggling onward into the future and voicing a hope for all the coming Ascanii and Astyanactes: *maneant nostros ea cura nepotes* (505).

RICHARD E. GRIMM.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS.

THE HUMOR OF CATULLUS, *CARM.* 4, AND THE
THEME OF VIRGIL, *CATALEPTON* 10.

Not so long ago, Michael Putnam turned our attention from the vexed questions whether the craft of Catullus was a real one or an imaginary one, and the various intermediate positions held by scholars, to matters of greater interest, such as the personification of the craft, the symbolic meaning of the journey, etc.¹ His premises were, however, flimsy and based on the biographically hazardous and artistically unnecessary assumption that the *erus* referred to in the poem was Catullus himself.²

¹ M. C. J. Putnam, "Catullus' Journey," *C. P.*, LVII (1962), pp. 10-19. On p. 17, Putnam observes that the ship can be freed from its reference to its specific journey and stand as a paradigm for man's journey through life. A great deal of the plausibility of such an observation derives from the fact that Putnam saw sentiment rather than humor as the chief quality of the poem. A very relevant question to ask is whether there is anything in the poem itself to justify such a widening of its import. The lack of any such justification and the fact that the personification of the craft is a groundplan for humor rather than transcendental philosophizing seem to warn us against enlarging the idea of the journey to encompass man's journey through life.

² On p. 10, Putnam (*op. cit.*) observes that it has now been shown that it was possible for the *phaselus* to bring Catullus home from Bithynia. But he goes on from this to the identification of the *erus* in the poem with Catullus. The *erus* of the poem, as far as an appreciation of the literary aspects of the poem is concerned, is not a mystery for us to solve. Had Catullus intended the general reader to take the *erus* as himself, he would have made this clear. As matters stand we must conclude that Catullus did not consider the identity of the *erus* as necessary to appreciate the poem, and we must adopt an attitude of critical indifferentism. The Sirmio-poem, *Carm.* 31, is taken by Putnam as one of the "cycle" of Catullus' journey-poems, but it is essential to observe that there is in the two poems, 4 and 31, a striking difference in artistic focus. In the *phaselus*-poem, there is not a single reference to the poet himself. In the Sirmio-poem, we get an idea of sympathy and the spiritual rapport between the estate and the master, well brought out in vv. 12-13: *salve, o venusta Sirmio, atque ero gaude / gaudete*, etc. By contrast, the *phaselus* is quite taken up with the narration of its former prowess, and we get the impression that the identity of the *erus* is for it a secondary consideration. What it really cares about is the fact it performed its function admirably. The craft

The warning of Frank O. Copley passed neglected,—that the poem is self-contained and therefore “it requires no additaments on our part to make it either believable or understandable.”³ Putnam took the voyage described in the poem to be autobiographical and concentrated on the sentimental aspects he detected in the poem. The poem was stripped of its autobiographical trappings by Roger A. Hornsby⁴ and allowed to parade its purely literary attractions. Hornsby however made the craft of Catullus out to be a heroic and divine ship, portrayed in the manner of a present day Argo, without realizing that this presentation was meant to be humorous.⁵ The purpose

spends no time speaking of any affection it has for its master. Had Catullus wished to portray the attachment between himself and the craft, he would have found a more effective and obvious way of doing this.

³ Frank O. Copley, “Catullus c. 4: The World of the Poem,” *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 9-13. The entire article consists of prolegomena to the study of the poem, emphasizing the poem’s self-contained nature. It does not of course preclude the possibility that Catullus may have taken his inspirational cue from real life. We are simply advised to attend above all to the literary artefact, rather than to probe beyond it, since it is this that the poet has offered to our view.

⁴ In his article, “The Craft of Catullus (*Carm.* 4),” *A. J. P.*, LXXXIV (1963), pp. 256-65. On p. 258, Hornsby says that the effect of the personification and the fact that the craft speaks is to push its deeds into a remote and legendary past, and it seems to him that v. 25, in which the speech of the reporter comes back into focus, reinforces this impression that the craft is heroic. Hornsby is quite correct in his observations that the craft is made out to be an admirable vessel, but the vital contrapuntal feature,—the hints that we are given that its claims are fanciful and false,—passes unnoticed. It is the tension between the aspirations of the craft and its poor quality which gives the poem its chief quality,—humor. The craft does indeed wish to be thought of as one of the old grand vessels of legend, but the end of the poem surely undercuts this ambition rather than aids the glorification of the craft. The deeds have not in fact been accomplished a long time ago; the craft’s retirement is recent and it now dedicates itself. This, too, makes the epicizing build-up emerge as parodic and not serious.

⁵ The Argo, too, in *Carm.* 64, is described in terms which are capable of being interpreted as a personification. The pines from which it was made were ‘born,’ *prognatae* (v. 1), they ‘swam,’ *nasse* (v. 2), and the ship had ‘hands,’ *palms* (v. 7). But the difference is that here, the language is normal for epic, and these aspects do not strike us as being ancillary to prosopopoeia in the same way as similar features in the

of the present study is to show that the device of personification is basic to the humor of the poem, that the craft is in fact made fun of; also, I shall suggest that the theme of this poem and of Virgil's *Catalepton* is essentially the same, with a transference simply from a personified object to a human being.

In the Catullan poem, the poet reports the assertions of the craft itself. The primary, functional quality of the craft is the fact that it speaks.⁶ It is conceived in the manner of an old man,⁷ past his prime and now in fact retired, but endowed with that garrulity which often accompanies old age as it casts a retrospective glance on the past and tends to embroider and exaggerate *res olim gestas*. That the craft speaks is stressed by *ait* (v. 2), *negat* (v. 6), and *dicit* (v. 16). This remarkable craft was in fact speaking even before it received its first baptismal dipping in the sea, even in those early days when it was but a tree on the summit of Mt. Cytorus,—*loquente saepe sibilum edidit coma* (v. 12). Furthermore, to judge from the manner in which the claims of the old craft are presented to us, we have every reason to conclude that they are ridiculous and false. The negative doublets, *neque . . . nequisse* (vv. 3-4), and *negat . . . negare* (vv. 6-7), are not simply ornamental

phaselus-poem reinforce the basic personification. In this matter, the generic background is of importance in assessing the impression the personification makes on the reader. Against the background of an "epyllion," the effect is harmonious and enriches the high style of the whole. But against the background of an epitaphic form, we should be prepared, because of the basic artificiality of making an inanimate object (or an animal) perform as if it were human, to meet with tenderness or humor underlying the personification. In this case the humor is enhanced by the fact that the *phaselus* apes the Argo. Its epic aspirations burst through the slighter epitaphic genre.

⁶ Léon Herrmann in his article "À propos du petit navire de Catulle (Poème IV)," *Collection Latomus*, XXIII (1956), p. 165, thinks that the fact that the craft speaks reflects on Catullus' opinion of himself as a rival of Orpheus! He says: "Il est singulier que ce bateau parle comme le navire Argo . . . sans doute parce qu'il était prédestiné à porter sur son pont un émule d'Orphée, un poète protégé par les dieux."

⁷ There is a family resemblance between the boat and the pathetic and ridiculous figure which the *ponticulus* of *Carm.* 17 cuts in its personification as a weak-kneed, sexually frustrated and frustrating old man. On this cf. Niall Rudd, "Colonia and her Bridge, etc.," *T. A. P. A.*, XC (1959), pp. 238-42.

stylistic devices, as Fordyce⁸ would have it; rather they represent the *contradictions of a denial*. We are meant to hear the disparaging voice of someone deriding the craft and saying that it was incapable of outstripping any *natans trabs*. The craft then vehemently denies this: "I was *not* unable . . ."; and similarly, when whoever makes this remark injurious to the reputation, or rather to the aspirations of the craft, invokes as witnesses the several places (vv. 6-9) which have seen for themselves the performance of the vessel, and doubtless would testify to the poor and ridiculous figure it cut, the craft with equal indignation denies their allegations that it was far from outstanding. We must bear it in mind that Catullus allows the reader to hear only the voice of the craft itself. It is left to our imagination to fill in the words addressed to it, and to be competent at our task we must pay heed not only to the substance of the craft's speech but also to the form in which that speech is cast. The pure *iambi* with their sustained, monotonous drone give a vivid impression of the incessant chatter of the boastful craft. The pointed placement of *ait* in vv. 2, 15, at the beginning of the line, produces a jab, an emphasis on the aspect of *saying*, which is similar to the way *dicit* is used in *Carm.* 70. There, Lesbia *says* that she will be faithful to Catullus, but the truth is otherwise. So here, the *ait* of the *phaselus* is an *ait quidem*, and the sense of the *autem*-clause, which we have to supply from the hints given, is that the craft's claims are fanciful fabrications.

The repeated *sive* in vv. 4-5 gives an impression of the high style, recalling the *sive* used in anaphora in hymns or prayers, as the suppliant gives a list of the various places where the divinity addressed may be present at that time, such as we have in the pseudo-Virgilian *Culex* (vv. 13-15),—*sive educat illum / Arna Chimaereo Xanthi perfusa liquore, / seu decus Asteriae, seu qua Parnasia rupes*. . . . At this point the craft, in keeping with its attitude of concern for a good reputation, is at pains to make it clear that, like every decent ship, it has at its disposal a *deuteros plous*. The list of place names, too, strikes a lofty note, putting the reader in mind of the famous catalogs of Epic,

⁸ C. J. Fordyce, *Catullus, A Commentary* (Oxford, 1961), *ad loc.*, hereafter referred to as Fordyce.

and we may compare the eleventh poem of Catullus, where there occur both the repetition of *sive* in anaphora and the parade of place names.⁹ The description of the *curriculum vitae* of the craft, from the time it was a tree on the summit of Mt. Cytorus, —*tuo stetit dicat in cacumine* (v. 16), reminds one of the beginning of *Carm.* 64, *Peliaco quondam prognatae vertice pinus*, said with regard to the Argo.¹⁰ We detect the epicizing aspirations of the poor craft who wishes to trace his descent in the same manner as grand vessels, in fact in the same manner as the archetypal ship!

At this point we are supplied with some extremely relevant information concerning the material from which our craft was constructed. More than half a century ago, a kind-hearted and overly romantic critic¹¹ spoke in these terms of the *phaselus*, which he supposed was moored on the shores of the Lago di Garda, after it had transported its master home safely: "Among the homely craft of the lake, this genuine *Pontica pinus / silvae filia nobilis* would hold a unique place and be the boast of the neighborhood for many a day." The author does, of course, say that this refers to the past; but the entire point of the craft's having been a tree, and that on the very peak of Mt. Cytorus, which was proverbially productive of box-trees, is surely that it was an excellent representative of the vegetation on that summit. It was in fact made of box-wood. The function of *buxifer* (v. 13), a *hapax legomenon* which may well be a Catullan coinage, is to underline the close link between the

⁹ The prayer-like solemnity of the *sive*-series in anaphora in *Carm.* 11 is noted by D. Braga, *Catullo e i poeti greci* (Florence, 1950), p. 57: "L'anafora del *sive* sembra infondere un sapore di sconsolata preghiera in questo libero vagare della fantasia attraverso regioni e paesi sperduti nell'immensità."

¹⁰ *Prognatae vertice* (64, 1) seems to contain an associational ambiguity which puts the pines on the same divine footing as Athene, who was also sprung from a *vertex*,—that of Zeus. The similarity between the *phaselus* and the Argo of *Carm.* 64 leads E. M. Blaiklock to a remark as fanciful as that of Herrmann's (above, note 6). In his *Romanticism of Catullus* (*Univ. of Auckland Bull.*, no. 53, *Class. Ser.*, no. 1, 1959, p. 27) he says that "Catullus may have imagined himself with secret glee another Jason."

¹¹ C. L. Smith, "Catullus and the Phaselus," *H. S. C. P.*, III (1892), p. 89.

vegetation of Cytorus and the stuff of which our craft is made. Catullus' readers would have been acquainted with the fact that there was a proliferation of box-trees on Cytorus, but the important artistic function which this special birthplace of the craft has, demanded that the poet made his intention clear. The emphasis increases with v. 14: *tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima*.

It is of pivotal importance to observe that there seems to be no evidence that box-wood was used for the construction of ships. Pliny,¹² after a very promising beginning in his paragraph on the box-tree: *in primis vero materies honorata buxo est . . .*, limits its excellence to the fact that it is seldom veined, and then only in the root. The sequel is not encouraging; we are told that the tree is used for adorning gardens, that the wood is very hard, has a pale hue, and produces a flame and a type of charcoal which are not worth having. Elsewhere¹³ he tells us that the wood, among those of other trees, is cut into layers and used as a veneer to cover other kinds of wood. We know from the *T. L. L.* (*s. v. buxus* III, *res a ligno buxi factae*) that box-wood was used in the manufacture of spinning tops, combs, flutes, writing-tablets, and *fritilli*,—boxes from which dice were thrown. Lenchantin¹⁴ does take the tree as a box-tree and considers *silva* (v. 11) as an instance of hyperbole. But this hyperbole he merely attributes to the imagination of Catullus. But the use is not an otiose one. It is a piece of character drawing. In keeping with its propensity to exaggerate, the boat is made to say that it was once "a whole forest."

We have already noted the emphasis the craft gives to the fact that it was born on Cytorus (v. 14). Here we do not have any contradiction of a denial, as in the cases shown above. The craft is willing to call to witness the mountain itself as well as the city of Amastris. His claim that he was perched on the very summit of Cytorus goes well with his assertion that Amastris can vouch for his birthplace. He would have been conspicuously placed for all the townsfolk to see the tree towering above the other vegetation. We must not suppose, however, that it is

¹² *N. H.*, XVI, 70.

¹³ *N. H.*, XVI, 84.

¹⁴ Lenchantin de Gubernatis, *Il Libro di Catullo Veronese* (Turin, 1953), *ad loc.*

simply the fact that Cyturus was its birthplace, of which the craft is proud. What it is proud of is that *although* it was born on Cyturus, and therefore made of box-wood,—rather than of Pontic pine,—it did compete with and indeed outraced the noble breed of vessels whose epic stature is conveyed by the words *natantis trabis* (v. 3). It is the *contrast* between his humble origins and the grandeur of the feats he (claims that he) accomplishes which old Mr. Pinnace is eager to emphasize. The epic flavor of *natantis trabis* is in conspicuous contrast to the rather varied and shifty connotations which the word *phaselus* conjures up for the reader, since this word, meaning a 'pea-pod,' could have been applied to anything from a skiff made of papyrus or clay, to an ocean-going cruiser.¹⁵

In vv. 18-21, the personification of the craft gives rise to two levels of interpretation, and this proves to be a most entertaining feature, one which I believe caught the imagination of Virgil and played no small part in his decision to use Catullus' *jeu d'esprit* as the basis of his own. *Erum tulisse* (v. 19) brands the craft as a slave. But the personification is more extensive than this. On the symbolic level, the craft is portrayed as a solicitous slave, carrying his master through perilous and crowded streets, and pressing on regardless of the people who distract him by calling out to him and of anyone who tries to obstruct his career. *Freta* suggests the confusion and turmoil of a milling crowd, while *impotentia* gives an idea of its unmanageable nature. The comparison of a multitude to a wind-tossed sea was a commonplace,¹⁶ and in Virgil, *Aen.*, I, 142 ff., we find an inversion of this process, for there an actual storm is likened to a *sedition* of the *ignobile vulgus*. *Tumida aequora* in the Virgilian passage (v. 142) recalls the Catullan *impotentia freta*. It is interesting to observe as well that the symbol of the torrent which was used by Homer to denote the warrior impetus of Diomedes, Hector, and Ajax was taken up later by the opponents of democracy and used to signify the ignorance and the *hybris* of the common people.¹⁷ *Unda*, too, is used in

¹⁵ Cf. Fordyce, *ad loc.*

¹⁶ Cf. R. S. Conway, *Vergil, Aeneid Book I* (Cambridge, 1935), his note to vv. 148-53, p. 45.

¹⁷ Cf. Francisco R. Adrados, "El tema del torrente en la literatura griega arcaica y clasica," *Emerita*, XXIII (1965), pp. 7-14.

the sense of the wave-like agitations of a crowd on the move.¹⁸

On the symbolic level of interpretation, the fact that the wind calls to the slave/craft becomes a *hindrance* to his career, just as much as Juppiter is a hindrance, not satisfied with obstructing one of his feet, but falling on them both! *Aura* means 'voice' as well, as it does in Prop., II, 27, 15: *si modo clamantis revocaverit aura puellae*; and *incidere in* + acc. means 'to fall upon,' 'to attack.' Because of the sustained personification of the craft,—the device basic to the art of this poem,—and the special suggestive features of symbolism pointed out above, we cannot help considering the craft as a *servus currens* who fetches his master and acts as a sort of carriage. For the motif of calling out to the running slave, we may compare Terence, *Adelph.*, III, 2, 22 f., where the *servus currens* Geta hurries past his mistress Sostrata, tells her as she shouts to him that she should leave him alone, and does not stop until she says who she is: *revocemus*: "*Geta!*" : : *hem, quisque es, sine me. : : ego sum Sostrata. : : ubi east? te ipsam quaerito*, etc. It seems to have been a practical joke to stop slaves who were running to do their jobs quickly,¹⁹ and speed and agility were qualities of primary consideration in a slave.²⁰

The same notion of hindrance we see operating on the symbolic level in Catullus was taken up by Virgil in *Catalepton* 10, where we find the corresponding lines mentioning the hindrance which the flagging of the mules caused the muleteer,—*laeva sive dextera / strigare mula sive utrumque coeperat* (vv. 18-19).²¹ Also, just as Catullus' craft underlines its unassuming origin

¹⁸ Cf. Lewis and Short, s. v. *unda* II.

¹⁹ Cf., on the Terentian passage quoted, the remarks of S. G. Ashmore, *The Adelphoe of Terence* (London, 1893), p. 115, of Geta: "... he is afraid of trickery and of delay, for it was a common practical joke at Athens to detain slaves in the streets on false pretences, that they might subsequently be punished for loitering."

²⁰ We find these qualities stressed in Plautine passages, and that they were equally emphasized in actual life we gather from a passage in Gaius' *Digest*, quoted by E. Fraenkel, *Elementi Plautini in Plauto* (Florence, 1960), p. 430, under the heading "Catechismo dei doveri di un buono schiavo."

²¹ The text used is that printed by R. E. H. Westendorp Boerma, *P. Vergili Maronis libellus qui inscribitur Catalepton, pars altera* (Assen, 1963), p. 28, hereafter referred to as Westendorp Boerma.

as a mere box-tree, rather than Pontic pine, say, in order to provide a dazzling foil to its phenomenal achievements, so we find that the theme of the Virgilian poem is based on this type of contrast. As Westendorp Boerma says (p. 32): "Argumentum ipsum poëmatís, ludibrium hominis qui humili loco ortus postea ad maiora ascendit ideoque insolenter se gerit. . . ." There is in fact between the two poems a strict parallelism in theme. Virgil simply transferred the application of this theme from an amusingly personified craft to a human being. The imaginative picture of the craft as a *servus currens* is entertaining not only because of the highly suggestive symbolism, but also because the picture proceeds from the words of the craft itself. In his eagerness to exalt himself, the personified craft in fact gives us a picture of himself as a rather banal type, placing himself firmly in the setting of the low life of a metropolis. We can easily imagine the dust on the road, the traffic and the crowds, and the panting slaves trying to make their way onward. In a passage of Plautus, *Aul.*, IV, 1, 14, the speed of a slave is compared with that of a carriage: *quod iubeat (dominus) citis quadrigis citius properet persequi*. What an easy step it must have been for Virgil's imagination to pass from the symbolic slave in Catullus' poem, carrying his master on his back as if he were a common beast of burden, to the motif of the muleteer with his pack-animals that outraced every gig!²²

Finally, on a point of detail and some general remarks. *Hospites* in the first verse of the Catullan poem is a clear pointer to the epitaphic form of the poem. *Quem videtis* is the equivalent of a deictic *hic*²³ which the deceased person would use to refer to himself, the variation being necessary since the

²² We may note that both in the Catullan and the Virgilian poems an inferior type of vehicle claims to have outraced a superior type. The *phaselus* says it outstripped ships of epic stature (*natans trabs*), and similarly the muleteer's pack-animals outstripped passenger-carrying carriages—*cisia*, which Westendorp Boerma defines (p. 39) as: "Gallicum vehiculum leve, binis rotis instructum, erat (cf. *essedum*), ad viatores portandos potius quam impedimentis aptum."

²³ Cf. for instance, *Catalepton*, 11, 8: *hunc superesse patri quae fuit invidia?* where the deictic *hunc* recalls the epitaphic form (Westendorp Boerma, p. 52).

craft does not speak for itself, but rather it is Catullus who reports its speech, and points it out to the *hospites*. When, therefore, with the epitaphic form in mind, we read *cum veniret a mari / novissimo hunc ad usque limpidum lacum* (vv. 23-4), we should realize that the word *novissimo* is functional in the epitaphic framework, and is meant to recall the idea of finality in such phrases as *novissima verba* in Virgil, *Aen.*, VI, 231, and *postremo . . . munere* in Catullus, *Carm.*, 101, 3. This would also be a cogent artistic reason for taking *mari novissimo* with Fordyce (*ad loc.*) as 'last sea to be reached,' rather than as 'remotest sea,' with other editors. It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that this poem contains all the information necessary for us to appreciate it. Despite the fact that *quem videtis* presumes the presence of *hospites* who can look at the craft and see for themselves whether it was a real ship or a votive effigy or a model boat or whatever it may have been, the general reader is not at all handicapped because he has only the poem at his disposal. For the poem itself, if read with care and perception, gives us all the data we need to know about the craft. The humor of the poem, its chief quality, resides in the contrast between the craft's heroic and fanciful claims and the manner in which it is presented to us, as in fact of unglamorous and un-epic proportions. We do not need to examine the boat by autopsy; the poem is quite self-contained.²⁴

H. AKBAR KHAN.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

²⁴ Compare the way in which Catullus in *Carm.* 50 gives details to Calvus of the events of the previous evening, with which Calvus was himself acquainted, but which in reality are meant for the general reader, to ensure that he has at his disposal a sufficiency of data about the background to the poem and to enable him to enjoy the poem as much as the poet knows Calvus will. On this see E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), p. 314.

OPIMIAN WINE.

At an early stage in his Banquet, that far from perfect host Trimalchio had his guests served with a wine described as *Falernum Opimianum annorum centum*; such was the legend on the labels which were affixed to the glass amphorae from which the vintage was served.¹ Trimalchio capped his "generosity" by the celebrated and tactless remark to the effect that he was serving his guests with genuine Opimian (*verum Opimianum praesto*), whereas he had provided inferior vintages on the previous evening for superior guests!

The episode has been taken as merely illustrating the boorish ignorance of the host.² The insult to his guests is palpable. Assuming the dramatic date of the *Satyricon* to fall within the reign of Nero, his Opimian wine would be at least 170 years old. If genuine, such a vintage would not impress the oenosoph as being very potable. Perhaps Petronius intends the joke to be against the ignorant pretensions of self-styled connoisseurs. This would be on a par with Trimalchio's farcical claim to have a monopoly on Corinthian plate³; many other examples could be adduced, without difficulty or profit, from the *Cena*.

However, Opimian wine is an unusually curious vintage, and a study of other literary references is relevant to the Petronius passage, though our confusion is increased rather than cleared.

The most striking allusion is contained in Velleius Paterculus.

¹ *Satyricon*, 34: *Statim allatae sunt amphorae vitreae diligenter gypsatae, quarum in cervicibus pittacia erant affixa cum hoc titulo: "Falernum Opimianum annorum centum."* Dum titulos perlegimus, comploquit Trimalchio manus et "Eheu" inquit "ergo diutius vivit vinum quam homuncio. Quare tengomenas faciamus. Vita vinum est. Verum Opimianum praesto. Heri non tam bonum posui, et multo honestiores cenabant."

² E. g., Becker, in the 1888 English edition of his *Gallus* (p. 492), comments: "A double absurdity: first in assigning a fixed age to wine, which every year became older, and then in calling the *Opimianum* a century old . . . we may easily conceive that at a still later period it was supposed to be drunk, long after it had, in fact, ceased to exist." Friedlaender, in his Commentary on Petronius (Leipzig, 1906), *ad loc.*, describes the allusion as: "ein Beweis der Prahlucht Trimalchios und zugleich seiner Unwissenheit."

³ *Satyricon*, 50.

Immediately after his account of the death of Gaius Gracchus and the punishment of his adherents, Velleius, though not without apology, inserts a reference to Opimian wine.⁴ He asserts that the Opimian wine of 121 can be inferred to be no longer obtainable in the year 30 A.D. (the consulship of Marcus Vinicius) because of the interval of 150 years. Though Velleius is no great stylist, this passage is most obtrusive in the general context, and seems to contain a slightly polemical tinge.

Velleius' observation is hardly staggering. We know little of classical wines, but will not be too surprised by the disappearance of a wine of 150 years vintage. Moreover, his statement seems to be confirmed by no less a person than Cicero. In a passage in his *Brutus*, usually dated to 46 B.C., he refers to Opimian wine, and to wine bottled in the consulship of Anicius (160 B.C.), as being the supreme vintages, but now well past their prime; indeed, in Cicero's day, they are scarcely potable.⁵

Velleius, reinforced by Cicero, seems to have destroyed the pretensions of Trimalchio. But when we turn to the erudite pages of the elder Pliny, our new confidence is shaken. In his account of wines of exceptional age and value,⁶ he includes Opimian as an extant vintage. The wine is reduced to the consistency of bitter honey, and cannot be drunk neat or with water. Its use is now less glorious: it can serve as a seasoning for improving other wines. Its monetary value is unimpaired. The original value is reckoned at 100 sesterces per amphora, but in the reign of Gaius the wine costs 100 sesterces for one-

⁴ Velleius, II, 7, 5: *Rei tantae parum ad notitiam pertinens interponetur. Hic est Opimius, a quo consule celeberrimum Opimiani vini nomen; quod iam nullum esse spatio annorum colligi potest, cum ab eo sint ad te, M. Vinici, consulem anni centum et quinquaginta.*

⁵ Cicero, *Brutus*, 83, 287: *Ut si quis Falerno delectetur sed eo nec ita novo ut proximis consulibus natum velit, nec rursus ita vetere ut Opimium aut Anicium consulem quaerat*—"atqui hae notae sunt optimae," *credo; sed nimia vetustas nec habet eam quam quaerimus suavitatem nec est iam sane tolerabilis.*

⁶ Pliny, *N. H.*, XIV, 6, 55: The passage is too long to quote in full, but the comment on the longevity of Opimian and other vintages runs thus: *durantque adhuc vina ea co fere annis, iam in speciem redacta mellis asperi . . . nec potari per se queant pervincive aqua.* See J. André (Budé ed., Paris, 1958) *ad loc.*; he does not, however, notice our Velleius passage.

twelfth of an amphora. Indeed, Pliny states that he mentioned this point in his (lost) biography of Pomponius Secundus.

What are we to make of this? Pliny, surely, is reliable witness. Opimian wine, then, despite Velleius, did exist in Trimalchio's day. The price seems very high for a mere seasoning, but one cannot be rational about the prices of celebrated vintages. The name was an effective advertisement, especially as snob value. We cannot say much about the ability of Roman wines to keep over long periods. Juvenal's boorish host Virro drank wine bottled in the time of the Social War⁷; Martial defies credulity with references to wines from the reign of Numa,⁸ and to Massic wine of the regal period.⁹ An appeal to the durability of modern wines is of limited validity, though an 1811 Château Lafite was opened at a gathering of guests in 1926 and pronounced perfect.¹⁰

Pliny's account does not conflict too seriously with Cicero, though the latter might well have baulked at the price Opimian wine was fetching in 39 A.D.! If Pliny is right, Velleius is wrong. Is Trimalchio exculpated from the charge of absurd pretension and ignorant bragging? To some extent, yes. But we have not lost the joke. If we follow Cicero and Pliny, then Trimalchio's *faux pas* is in his serving of an old wine now used only for a seasoning as a choice beverage by itself. One could shudderingly conjure up similar solecisms of the table today! Nor is our new interpretation of the joke too subtle. The *Arbiter Elegantiarum* (whom I equate with the author of the *Satyricon*) was surely a connoisseur, and his creations Encolpius and Ascyltos, and the guests at the *Cena* in general, are depicted as either men of taste, or men with aspirations to taste. Either way, the joke works very well.

BARRY BALDWIN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY.

⁷ Juvenal, V, 30-1.

⁸ Martial, III, 62.

⁹ Martial, XIII, 111.

¹⁰ I owe this information to L. W. Marrison, *Wines and Spirits* (Pelican Books, 1957), p. 92. J. André (*loc. cit.*) gives another example: "Un viticulteur de Nuits St. Georges déclarait avoir dégusté en 1949 un Bourgogne blanc de 1843 'encore frais et teinté et qui n'avait rien perdu'."

REVOLUTION OF THE 400: CHRONOLOGY AND CONSTITUTIONS.

New light shed on the end of winter in Thucydides by Meritt¹ may be used further to illuminate the order of political events leading up to the Revolution of the Four Hundred in the winter and spring of 411 B.C. That is, the attempt made in 1948 (*A.J.P.*, LXIX, pp. 272-89) to show that the accounts of Thucydides and Aristotle supplement rather than contradict each other has been criticized by Hignett (*A History of the Athenian Constitution*, pp. 362-4) chiefly on grounds of chronological difficulty, but since Hignett follows Busolt in dating the treaty between Tissaphernes and Sparta to the end of February, the newly established dating in early April necessarily requires a re-examination of the revolutionary time-table.

The summary of the 1948 reconstruction of the Revolution outlined the way in which the accounts of Thucydides (T) and Aristotle (A) interlock and supplement each other (*A.J.P.*, LXIX [1948], pp. 288-9):

“*1st assembly* (early spring, on Peisander's first arrival [T]): Athenians are persuaded by Melobius (A) and Peisander (T) to accept oligarchy in order to obtain Persian aid (A, T). Two decrees are voted: one, proposed by Pythodorus, provides for election of twenty men to serve with ten *probouli* as *syngrapheis* for the preservation of the state (A); the other provides for the despatch of Peisander and ten others to negotiate with Tissaphernes (T).

¹ *Hesperia*, XXXIII (1964), pp. 228-30, Pritchett's statements (*C.P.*, LX [1965], pp. 259-61) to the contrary notwithstanding, since the only reason for giving both Persian and Spartan dates in the treaty recorded by Thucydides (VIII, 58) is that each follows the native calendric custom. We have no more right to suggest that the Persian regnal year was translated into Spartan terms than we have to assume that the Spartan ephorate was changed to the Persian system. Even if the temporal prescript is “not strictly that of the treaty itself, but of the copy to which Thucydides had access” (Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 261, n. 5) there is no reason to think that it would ever have been to anyone's interest to “translate” the Persian date since the Spartan date provided all that was necessary. See now Meritt, *C.P.*, LXI (1966), pp. 182-4.

- "Oligarchic clubs become active with murder, intimidation, and conspiracy. They advertise a deceptively mild program which bars payment except for military service and puts the government in the hands of fewer than 5000 (T).
- "*2nd assembly* (middle spring, during Peisander's absence): 30 *syngrapheis* present proposals: that the *prytaneis* be obliged to put all proposals to the vote and that all legal bars against unconstitutional proposals be suspended; that for the duration no money should be expended except for the war, no officials except archons and *prytaneis* be paid, and government be entrusted to 5000 or more, and ten men be chosen from each tribe to catalog these (A).
- "*3rd assembly* (beginning of Thargelion, after Peisander's return): Peisander and his colleagues suppress the failure of the Persian negotiations and, because that failure necessitates immediate oligarchic control, report that the Persians demand a stricter oligarchy than that of the 5000. They propose that ten *syngrapheis autokratores* be elected to report on a definite day how best the state should be governed (T).
- "*4th assembly* (Thargelion 14 at Colonus): Ten *syngrapheis autokratores* propose only complete *adeia*. Peisander proposes abolition of all offices, cessation of payment, and the selection of 400 who shall have complete power, even to call 5000 (T).
- "Thargelion 14: 400 invade *bouleuterion*, evict *boule*, and organize themselves as a *boule* in every respect (T).
- "Between Thargelion 14 and 22: Army at Samos, unaware of 400's rule, sends Chaereas to report Samian democratic coup. Chaereas, escaping 400, reports back to army the horrors of 400's rule; army swears to put down oligarchy (T). Meanwhile, at Athens, *anagrapheis* draft instrument of 400's establishment.
- "*5th assembly* (Thargelion 22): Double constitution is passed (A), and the establishment of the 400 is accomplished (A, T). 400 sends ambassadors to Samos who hear of army's rampant democracy when they reach Delos (T)."

Now the time-table for these events can best be expressed in terms of the Julian calendar. Since Scirophorion 14, the day

on which a new *boule* should have come into office with the beginning of the new prytany year, was July 9,² Thargelion 14 would have been June 9 (if Thargelion was full³). That the Colonus assembly took place not long after the assembly which authorized it is suggested both by the minimal constitutional preparation required (the ten commissioners brought in only the one proposal that would legalize any oligarchic move) and by the need for some speed in consolidating constitutionally oligarchic gains achieved by less orthodox methods. If then that third assembly met about June 1, the arrival of Peisander can quite surely be dated about May 31. For his departure from Asia Minor and for the elapsed time between that departure and the arrival in Athens Thucydides provides clear evidence: immediately after the failure of negotiations between Peisander and Tissaphernes, Peisander went to Samos (VIII, 56) and Tissaphernes went to Caunus and made the third treaty (VIII, 57-8) which was dated to the thirteenth year of Darius and so must belong after March 29, the date of the beginning of that year.⁴ That the treaty belongs very soon after March 29 is made likely by Thucydides' statement that it was still winter when the treaty was made (VIII, 57); the vagaries of the weather certainly permit a spring as late as mid-April, but a winter lasting much longer than that would have been unusual enough to cause comment.

If then the negotiations between Peisander and Tissaphernes failed in the first week in April, Peisander must have spent seven weeks in Samos and on the return journey to Athens. That Thucydides' narrative assumes an interval of considerable length is clear from the activities assigned to Peisander (and his colleagues): after the oligarchic elements on Samos were firmly established in control (VIII, 63, 3-4) they ordered Peisander

² B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 104-6, as revised in *The Athenian Year*, p. 218. See also *T. A. P. A.*, XCV (1964), pp. 210-11.

³ "And if the Athenians counted the days of 412/1 the way they did those of 407/6, Thargelion can not help but be full, for ἐπάρη φθινόρτος would be omitted in a hollow month!" (B. D. Meritt, *per litt.*)

⁴ B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XXXIII (1964), pp. 228-9. See also A. Andrewes, *Historia*, X (1961), p. 2, n. 4; for the calendar, R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.-A.D. 75*, pp. 9, 33.

and his colleagues to abolish the democracies in the subject cities on their way back to Athens, half going in one direction and half in the other (VIII, 64, 1-2). This roundabout and time-consuming method of return was undoubtedly embarked on to provide oligarchic successes which might offset the immediate lack of Persian support. But that they continued to hold out hope of future Persian support as a spur to increased oligarchic control is clearly stated by Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1304b 10-15:

ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἴθ' ὕστερον βίᾳ κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευσάμενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

Even if news of the third treaty between Sparta and Tissaphernes had reached Athens before Peisander's return the deception could still have been carried out, since it must have been as clear to onlookers as it was to the signers that Spartan-Persian treaties at this time had little real effect and had continually to be replaced. Until news came of strong Persian support to the Spartans Peisander and his colleagues could even claim that Tissaphernes had made the third treaty in order to keep the Spartans quiet and unsuspecting while he waited for the Athenians to achieve the degree of oligarchy he had set as the price of his help.

Thus the time-table from mid-March to the consummation of the revolution in June may be itemized as follows:

Negotiations between Peisander and Tissaphernes—last two weeks March

Tissaphernes to Caunus; Peisander to Samos—first week April
Spartan-Persian treaty; Peisander starts to Athens—second week April

Peisander arrives in Athens—last week May

3rd assembly—first week June

4th assembly—June 9.

The chronology of the period before mid-March presents special problems. The chief one heretofore was the 80 days which Thucydides records as the time during which the Spartan fleet remained inactive in Rhodes with ships drawn up. Now that the end of that period of inactivity must be dated after

March 29, with the third treaty between Sparta and Persia, there is room between the winter solstice and the beginning of the 80 days for all the Spartan activity which Thucydides relates in VIII, 29-44. There is no need for emendation to reduce the period of inactivity to a number of days which might accommodate some modern notion concerning the end of winter in Thucydides.⁵ All of the chronological indications given by Thucydides for this winter combine to confirm the following: winter solstice (VIII, 29) followed by various Spartan fleet manoeuvres; a mid-January withdrawal to Rhodes followed by 80 days of inactivity (VIII, 44, 4) until they agreed with Tissaphernes on new terms about the second week in April (VIII, 58, 1).

One other question about the chronology of this winter concerns the date at which the conversations between Alcibiades and the army leaders on Samos began. The way in which the story is presented by Thucydides makes it appear that Alcibiades had already attempted to sow dissension between Tissaphernes and the Spartans soon after the winter solstice, since it seems obvious that Tissaphernes' miserliness in VIII, 29 was instigated by Alcibiades (VIII, 46, 5); Tissaphernes' refusal to allow the Spartans to fight, which also seems to have been inspired by Alcibiades (VIII, 46, 5), apparently belongs to the situation described in VIII, 38, 5 where the Athenian ships from Samos attempted to lure the Spartans out of Miletus for a sea battle without success.

The intrigue between army leaders and Alcibiades began only after Alcibiades was seen to hold an influential position in Tissaphernes' court (VIII, 47). How long this intrigue went on is difficult to conjecture but it involved Alcibiades' telling visitors from Samos that he would bring Tissaphernes over to them if the Athenians gave up the democracy (VIII, 48, 1), the formation of a conspiracy of the few on Samos and the delivery of a "no help without oligarchy" ultimatum to the many (VIII, 48, 2-3). The next stage is described by Thucydides in the following words: "The conspirators . . . were preparing to send to Athens as ambassadors Peisander and others so that they might both work for the return of Alcibiades and the dissolution of the democracy and make Tissaphernes friendly to the

⁵ See most recently W. K. Pritchett, *C. P.*, LX (1965), p. 260.

Athenians" (VIII, 49). Thucydides then goes on to report the confusing anecdote concerning Phrynichus' attempt to betray Alcibiades to Astyochus (VIII, 50-1). Since this involves a letter sent to Astyochus at Miletus it belongs to the early part of the winter (before mid-January) before the Spartan fleet had withdrawn to Rhodes. It may of course be possible that the conspiracy on Samos was sufficiently full-blown in early January to contemplate sending to Athens to subvert the democracy, but this would mean an extremely "slow-motion" build-up from the time of a presumed mid-January arrival in Athens of Peisander and his colleagues to the mid-March authorization for them to treat with Tissaphernes. But so gradual a growth of favor for the oligarchic forces seems inconsistent not only with the nature of Athenian politics and the need for action but also with the radical change in subject matter between the *Lysistrata* and the *Thesmophoriazusae*, which have been reasonably dated to February and March respectively of this year.⁶ Apparently in February the forces of reaction were still a joking matter; by March politics were (had to be?) studiously avoided in favor of literary escapism.

It seems to me preferable therefore to think that Thucydides' inclusion of the Phrynichus correspondence in its present place in the narrative is not so much chronological⁷ as it is psychological. That is, whatever the truth may have been of Phrynichus' apparent treachery⁸ it was interpreted by Thucydides

⁶ A recent attempt to assign both plays to the City Dionysia (C. F. Russo, *Aristofane, Autore di teatro*, p. 298) seems to me no more cogent or conclusive than an earlier attempt (W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, I, iv, 2, p. 306) to assign *Thesmophoriazusae* to Lenaea and *Lysistrata* to Dionysia. Various arguments are well summarized by Schmid and, more recently, by C. Segal in a review of Russo's book (*A. J. P.*, LXVI [1965], pp. 306-14). The mention of winter in *Thesm.*, 67 would have far less point in the expected wintry weather of February (Lenaea) than if it belonged in March when there might have been a reasonable expectation of an imminent spring except for the unusually protracted winter of this particular year. Thus the new certainty about the end of winter may also shed light on the comic calendar!

⁷ Thucydides' parenthetical remark about Astyochus (ἐν τῷ ὄντι τότε περὶ τὴν Μίλητον, VIII, 50, 2) shows his awareness that the anecdote is not in its chronological place in the narrative.

⁸ See H. D. Westlake, "Phrynichus and Astyochus (Thuc. VIII.50-51)," *J. H. S.*, LXXVI (1956), pp. 99-104.

(and perhaps generally) as motivated by fear that the return to power of Alcibiades might turn out badly for anyone (like Phrynichus) who had opposed it (VIII, 50, 1). If this was the motivation then obviously the place to bring in the story was at the point when the threatened return was about to be effected. Such ordering of events is in every way consonant with Thucydides' usual methods of deferring the accounts of decisions or policies until the situation to which they are relevant has been presented and of waiting for a "flat stretch" (like Peisander's trip to Athens) to insert background material. That is, Phrynichus' opposition to Alcibiades and his desire to discredit him with Astyochus and Tissaphernes must have arisen in the earliest stages of the "flirtation" between oligarchs and Alcibiades (as Thucydides himself makes apparent in VIII, 48, 4). It seems reasonable, then, to date both kinds of intrigue (for Alcibiades by oligarchs; against Alcibiades by Phrynichus) in early January and allow more than a month for the fostering of pro-oligarchic sentiments at this early stage before Peisander and his colleagues were sent to Athens at the end of February.

The Phrynichus story of VIII, 50-1 is followed by a paragraph in which the main line of the narrative is resumed with "after this Alcibiades was trying to persuade Tissaphernes to be friendly to the Athenians." This persuasion takes us back to VIII, 46, 3 and the build-up through intrigue with the leaders from Samos (VIII, 47-8) to the conspirators' decision to send Peisander and other ambassadors to Athens (VIII, 49); but the time now is after the Spartans have gone to Rhodes. Thus the narrative has come full circle, with Alcibiades' conversations with Tissaphernes having had two results: 1) oligarchic moves to use him and Tissaphernes for political purposes; and 2) Phrynichus' efforts to discredit him with both Spartans and Tissaphernes. Although the first of these actually followed the second in time (VIII, 52) Thucydides has reversed the order of telling, apparently so as to use the move for Alcibiades' recall (so much more compelling in the narrative than fear of this as a future possibility) to motivate Phrynichus' letters to Astyochus. But VIII, 52 makes it clear that Alcibiades' persuasion of Tissaphernes was most successful after the Spartans had gone to Rhodes so that the true order is implicit in Thucydides' account: Peisander was sent after the Spartans had withdrawn

to Rhodes; Phrynichus' letters were sent to Astyochus before that withdrawal.

Furthermore, VIII, 52 shows itself highly characteristic of Thucydides' narrative style: in the analysis of Tissaphernes' feelings Lichas is credited with having made true Alcibiades' *earlier* statement about the Lacedaemonians freeing all the cities when he said they could not agree to the king's getting control of whatever cities he or his fathers had once ruled. The statement attributed to Alcibiades is that recorded in VIII, 46, 3; the fact that it preceded the remark made by Lichas in VIII, 43, 3 dramatizes the way in which the Spartan (VIII, 29-44) and Athenian (VIII, 45-54) narratives cover the same period of time and presumably belong to an early draft of the work in which different sources have not yet been amalgamated. It is likely, however, that VIII, 52 belongs to a more finished part which would eventually have replaced the previously recorded statements of Lichas and Alcibiades, since here they are introduced to serve a purpose and with relevant effect.

The summary time-table for the months before mid-March would be as follows:

VIII, 29—winter solstice.

VIII, 29-44, 3—Spartan activity to mid-January.

VIII, 45-48; 52—Alcibiades' conversations with Tissaphernes and leaders on Samos, beginning before winter solstice (after death of Chalcideus in VIII, 24, 1 and the battle of Miletus in VIII, 25, 3-5) and continuing after mid-January (when the Spartans had gone to Rhodes).

VIII, 50-1—Phrynichus' correspondence with Astyochus in Miletus in early January.

VIII, 49—Peisander and other ambassadors sent to Athens toward end of February.

VIII, 53-4—pro-oligarchic activity in Athens culminating in 1st assembly, which authorized Peisander to treat with Tissaphernes about the middle of March.

So much then for a chronology of the Revolution which makes use of all the evidence, both direct and indirect, provided by Thucydides and Aristotle (and even Aristophanes).

Our other concern is the nature of the double constitution as interpreted by Cary in *J. H. S.*, LXXII (1952), pp. 56-61. The

difficulties which he reviews could be eased, it seems to me, if instead of thinking that our historical judgment is superior to the evidence we make a serious effort to understand the accounts of Thucydides and Aristotle.

The apparent incompleteness and ambiguity of both parts of the double constitution (Arist., *Ath. Pol.*, 30-1) is of two sorts: 1) the omission of some complete areas, e. g., the judiciary; and 2) the lack of detail for various procedures. The reasons for these two kinds of omission may well be different, since vagueness in the details of arrangements is likely to have been intentional whereas omission of entire departments may result from the nature of the instrument. That is, as long as all citizens were eligible for jury-duty and the machinery for assigning jurors to courts was as simple as it was in the fifth century (cf. Ar., *Wasps*), any restriction in the number of citizens would have only quantitative effect on the judiciary and there would be no need for qualitative differences to be specified. Vagueness in detail, on the other hand, concerning such matters as the appointment of *bouleutai* would in the circumstances be most desirable in either part of this double constitution: in the provisional (31, 1) so that the narrowly oligarchic base be as little evident as possible (the 400 to be apparently elected democratically by their *phyletai* but actually from a slate nominated by person or persons unknown); in the definitive (30, 3) because there was no intention that the *boulai* would ever be selected and all that was required was something that sounded good.

The clauses of the Provisional Constitution which Cary (*op. cit.*, pp. 57-8) thinks belong rather to the Definitive Constitution should be examined in context, since he uses major surgery to repair presumed tangles in the text of which it is difficult to imagine either origin or motive. What he points out as incongruities may be so only in the context of a misunderstanding initiated by Aristotle and perpetuated by his interpreters: that chapters 30 and 31 are two separate constitutions presented successively. If we remove the introductory clause of chapter 31 ("This constitution they drew up for the future; the following for the present") and consider it as an Aristotelian expansion (for what he thought was clarity) of a single phrase like "for the present," we can view the double constitution properly as, in general, a definitive instrument with particular digressions

or "footnotes" defining the provisional means of government before the definitive constitution could be brought fully into operation.

Since the reduction of the citizen rolls effectively abolished the *ecclesia* as an instrument of government, the source of all power automatically became the *boule*. Hence the constitution is primarily concerned with the composition and operation of that body both in the future and in the transitional period. Since the power of the magistracies derives from and combines with that of the *boule*, only a few additions concerning the election (present and future) of these magistrates are needed to round out the constitutional picture. A summary outline of the two chapters will show the interrelationships; the italicized sections are those which are applicable to a specific time, either present or future:

"Definitive Constitution"	"Provisional Items"
30, 2: annual <i>boule</i> of those over	
30 without pay;	
<i>boule</i> to include listed magistrates; all these to be chosen from <i>bouleutai</i> -nominees by the <i>boule</i> ;	
<i>boule</i> to exclude: all other offices, which are to be chosen by lot; those <i>Hellenotamiai</i> who are actually administering funds.	
30, 3: <i>future make-up of boule: all over 30 to be divided into four boulai (by 100 anagrapheis), one of which allotted to serve each year.</i>	(inserted at the end of the <i>boule</i> of the future before consideration of other matters)
	31, 1: <i>present make-up of boule: 400 (40 from each phyle) chosen by phyletai from nominees over 30;</i>
	<i>special duties of present boule: to appoint magistrates and compose their oath; all else as they think best.</i>
30, 4: duties of <i>boule</i> : to administer finances (expenditure and security) and all other matters to the best of their ability;	
possibility of cooptation; frequency of meetings.	31, 2a (no change of constitution permitted)
30, 5-6: operation of <i>boule</i> outlined; fine for non-attendance.	

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| 31, 2c: <i>after boule is established, strategoi to be elected by boule for year-term with full powers.</i> | 31, 2b: <i>strategoi to be elected from 5000</i> | | | | | | |
| 31, 3b: <i>boule to elect hipparchos and phylarchoi as above (cf. 30, 2).</i> | 31, 3a: <i>5000 to elect hipparchos and phylarchoi</i> | | | | | | |
| 31, 3c: <i>no repetition of office (except strategoi and boule) for these now or in the future.</i> | | | | | | | |
| 31, 3d: <i>afterthought on boule: how present boule of 400 was to be apportioned among four boulai of future.</i> | | | | | | | |

Particular indications that the constitution is to be understood in this way include: 1) the combination of chiasmic with chronological order in the various items (*boule* then to *boule* now; *strategoi* now to *strategoi* then; *hipparchos* and *phylarchoi* now to same then, etc.); 2) 31, 3b, with its reference backward to the previous statement of magistrates' election by *boule*, shows that the order of consideration is first the *boule* (which was to choose the magistrates) and then the magistrates (who were to be chosen by *boule*; 3) the last two items (31, 3c and d) both of which look before and after, reinforce the two-pronged nature of the instrument. The situation and sponsors of the constitution provide both reason and background for the special nature and peculiarities of the document: the emphasis over-all to be on the definitive or eventual set-up (which was to serve as bait but was not planned to be put into effect); the effective instrument for present rule to be inserted almost parenthetically as if it would be temporary in the extreme. The bitter pill was chocolate-coated!

The only item of the constitution which seems awkward on this interpretation is no more convenient by any other: that which provides that for the present the 5000 shall elect *strategoi*, *hipparchos*, and *phylarchoi*. The awkwardness is obvious, since the 5000 had not been brought into existence (32, 3 λόγῳ μόνον ἡπέθυσαν) and so could not have been active under the *boule* of 400. There can be no question but what Aristotle's confusion between the 5000 and the *demos* as the sponsor of the double constitution resulted partly from his assumption that after power had been vested in the 5000 (29, 5) the next moves must have been taken by that body (even though he knew that they

had not been actually named) and partly from the deliberately ambiguous language of the constitution which was designed to confuse the *demos* into thinking that the 5000 would be in power simultaneously with the *boule* of 400.

It is not necessary here to repeat the other arguments for the authenticity and actual passage of this constitution in the 5th assembly which were presented in *A. J. P.*, LXIX. Despite the continuing discussion⁹ of the problems raised by both revolution and constitution, no real objections have been raised to that reconstruction.

MABEL LANG.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

⁹ Hignett and Cary, as above; Sartori (*La crisi del 411 A. C. nell' Athenaion Politeia di Aristotele* [1951]); von Fritz and Kapp (*Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts* [1950]); Vlastos (*A. J. P.*, LXXIII [1952]), and Woodhead (*A. J. P.*, LXXV [1954]).

CADMUS AND THE PALM-LEAF TABLETS.

A substantial majority of the Linear B tablets found in Greece and Crete bear a rather obvious resemblance in shape to palm-leaves, as Ventris and Chadwick have observed.¹ The inference that they were formed in deliberate imitation of the shape of palm-leaves deserves more comment than it has yet excited; for if we may make this observation, it is almost certain that their authors referred to them by some name which was suggestive of this relationship. Even if the Greeks themselves were not responsible for writing them, but had merely seen them or heard of them, it is not unlikely that they might have described them as *φοινικία γράμματα*. Once the Phoenician alphabetic symbols came into use in Greece, however, it is clear that there would have been a confusion of terms in any part of Greece which happened to recall the old writing and the name by which it was known. The implications which this conjecture has for the Cadmus legend are fairly obvious: Cadmus did bring writing to Thebes, but this writing was not the Phoenician alphabet, but Linear B.

Pliny tells us *in palmularum foliis primo scriptitatum*.² The writers of the Linear B tablets were imitating writing on palm-leaves; in fact they may well have continued to use palm-leaves for writing purposes alongside the clay tablets. The syllabic signs in this script are remarkably consistent. There seems to be little variation in their forms from one location to another, especially when one notes how ill-adapted the script was for

¹ *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 111. For photographs of the tablets see *op. cit.*, nos. 140 (Eb 35), Pylos, and 236 (Ta 641), Pylos, facing p. 111; cf. plates in *Scripta Minoa*, II, *passim*, and particularly *Scripta Minoa*, I, p. 45, fig. 21.

² *Nat. Hist.*, XIII, 69. The many uses of the palm were noted by several ancient writers. Strabo, XVI, 1, 14, tells of a Persian song, *ἐν ᾗ τὰς ὠφελείας τριακοσίας καὶ ἐξήκοντα διαριθμοῦνται*, and Herodotus (II, 86; IV, 43) mentions palm-wine and clothing made of palm-leaves. More interesting are the usages in Plato, *Rep.*, 414C and Aristotle, *M. Moralía*, I, 34, 43. In the former Plato uses the adjective *φοινικικόν* to refer to something ancient, though he may be thinking in terms of the equation Phoenician = ancient; in the latter Aristotle appears to be using the word *φοῖνιξ* itself to denote "palm-leaf."

writing on clay. Taken all in all, one must admit the possibility of the use of palm-leaves by the writers of Linear B as well as their use of clay, and perhaps this method of writing continued to be used in parts of the Minoan and Mycenaean world long after the destruction of the civilizations which employed them. There appears to have been some recollection, even in Classical times, of a tradition that the art of writing was "discovered" from writing on palm-leaves. The two most important passages in this connection are in the Suda and in Diodorus, and both need to be examined here. The Suda records a dispute between the Lydians and the Ionians which takes the following form: *Λυδοὶ καὶ Ἴωνες τὰ γράμματα ἀπὸ τοῦ Φοίνικος τοῦ Ἀγήνορος εὐρόντος ἔλαβον, τούτοις δὲ ἀντιλέγουσι Κρήτες, ὡς εὐρεθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ γράφειν ἐν φοινίκων πετάλοις.* It is significant that it was the Cretans who made the argument concerning the palm-leaves.³ The Lydians were, of course, referring to Phoenician alphabetic symbols.

In a passage from Book V, Diodorus tells us that the Cretans claimed: *τοὺς Φοίνικας οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐρεῖν ἀλλὰ τοὺς τύπους τῶν γραμμάτων μεταθεῖναι μόνον.*⁴ The Cretans, then, were aware that the shapes of the symbols they recalled were rather different from those of the Phoenician alphabet. Elsewhere Diodorus tells us that Cadmus first brought the writing to Greece, but that Linus was the first to adapt it to the language of those then inhabiting the country.⁵ This last passage, however, need not imply that we are dealing with two different forms of writing, since the Phoenician alphabet had to undergo changes before it could be used to represent Greek, but the introduction of Cadmus into the story raises chronological difficulties which must be examined.

Herodotus is the most important extant writer of ancient Greece to associate Cadmus with the introduction of writing in anything more than an allusive way.⁶ He claimed to have

³ Evans observed Cretan women wearing Linear tablets as charms when he was excavating in Crete, and it is more than likely that many inscriptions had been found during the Classical period.

⁴ Diodorus, V, 74.

⁵ Diodorus, III, 67. Larfeld, *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik* (1907), p. 173, mentions a number of accounts during the Classical period which attribute the invention of letters to the Cretans.

⁶ Herodotus, V, 58 ff.

seen an inscription engraved in Ionic letters on tripods in the temple of Apollo Ismenias at Thebes, which he dates to the time of Laius. Even if one accepts Ullman's theory that "the alphabet was brought to Greece either toward the end of the Mycenaean period or during the dark ages which followed its end," a chronological difficulty is posed.⁷ Herodotus implies that this writing, dating from the time of Laius, is the writing which Cadmus brought—and the time of Cadmus would appear to mark the period of Mycenaean expansion rather than its disintegration. One must not lose sight of the fact that Herodotus was an Ionian.

Bérard, in rejecting the notion that Cadmus introduced the Phoenician alphabet to Thebes suggests that the writing he brought was syllabic; unfortunately he gave no satisfactory account of the term *φοινικία γράμματα* and his general thesis was rejected by Francis Vian.⁸ He hit close to the mark, nevertheless. Vian suggested that the introduction of the writing to Greece was never intimately incorporated with the Cadmus-legend, although the expression *Καδμεία γράμματα* became current after Herodotus. He goes as far as to reject another attempt to cut the Gordian knot which was made by Bion of Proconnesus who postulated a second Cadmus, but he never really arrives at any solution which tells us how Cadmus became involved in the legend in the first place. The word *φοῖνιξ* with its diverse meanings probably holds the answer to the problem, provided that one is willing to allow that the expression *φοινικία γράμματα* may signify palm-leaf writing as well as the Phoenician alphabet.

If we accept the Ventris decipherment of Linear B as Greek, we may venture a little further, and ask whether there is, in fact, any evidence for the existence of the word *φοῖνιξ* in My-

⁷ B. L. Ullman, *A. J. A.*, XXXVIII (1934), p. 380.

⁸ J. Bérard, "Écriture pré-alphabétique et alphabet en Italie et dans les pays Égéens," *Minos*, II (1953), pp. 65-83; cf. H. Biesantz, "Minoica" (*Festschrift Sundwall*, 1958), pp. 56-60. Biesantz believes that the inscriptions which Herodotus saw at the temple of Apollo Ismenias were in Linear B. This is most unlikely. If they were, how did Herodotus know what they meant? It seems to me that Herodotus saw an inscription in Ionic letters, but that that inscription cannot be dated to the time of Laius. Francis Vian, *Les origines de Thèbes, Cadmos et les Spartes* (Paris, 1936), pp. 52 ff.

cenaeon with the meaning "palm." A selection of tablets reveals the following forms:

- a) po-ni-ke (PY 246-Ta 722)
- b) po-ni-ki-pi (PY 246-Ta 722)
- c) po-ni-ki-ja (KN 270-Sd 0402b, 274-Sf 0428b)
- d) (po)-ni-ki-ja (Se 882)
- e) po-ni-ki-ja (KN X 1017)

Ventris and Chadwick admit only two renderings of these forms, in the Chariot tablets they read "crimson" and in the Footstool tablets "griffin."⁹ Even they admit that the reading "griffin" is by no means sure, and that the meaning "palm-tree" is more directly attested, but they reject this latter possibility on the grounds of probability from context.¹⁰ Their argument is that it is unlikely that there would be a representation of living creatures and plants together especially in such a combination as man, horse, palm-tree, and octopus. This grouping which is found in the Footstool tablets they prefer to read as "man, horse, griffin, and octopus." Yet on a vase from Phaestus,¹¹ are depicted two birds, a fish, and a tree together, and Karo¹² gives an illustration of a six-sided gilded wooden casket from Mycenae on which are depicted an ox-head with symmetrical olive-branches between the horns, a lion, and a stag, around which are stylized palm branches. The advantage that a palm-motif—or any other plant-motif—has over a griffin is that it is more readily stylized than an animal motif, on footstools just

⁹ The numberings given for the tablets are derived from *Documents*; Bennett, Chadwick, and Ventris, *The Knossos Tablets* (2nd ed., University of London, *Institute of Classical Studies Bulletin*, Suppl. No. 7 [1959]); and E. L. Bennett, *The Pylos Tablets, Texts of the Inscriptions Found, 1939-1954* (Princeton, 1955). With the exception of (d) the first numbering is that given in *Documents*.

¹⁰ *Documents*, p. 344 and No. 246 (Ta 722). It would be curious to know exactly what parallels they had in mind when postulating the form "griffin."

¹¹ *Monumenti Antichi*, XIV, plate 37. Evans, *Palace of Minos*, IV, fig. 280 a, b.

¹² *Schachtgräber von Mykenai* (Munich, 1930-1933), I Teil, pp. 143 ff. and plate CXLIII, nos. 808-11.

as well as on a casket.¹³ On other footstools we find decorative motifs such as finials, "grooves," and spirals which appear to be used to fill up space artistically.¹⁴ It seems pointless, therefore, to posit the meaning "griffin" for what is quite well attested as "palm," and makes better Greek as such. From this we may conclude that there is evidence for the oblique form *po-ni-ke* as the Mycenaean for "palm," and—though by inference only—the adjectival form *po-ni-ki-ja*.

Even before the Ventris-Chadwick decipherment Nilsson had designated the introducers of Mycenaean civilization "Greek Vikings."¹⁵ He noted too that the myth about the founder of Thebes did not preserve an accurate tradition of his origin and concluded that this honor was bestowed upon the Phoenicians because they were amongst the most constant visitors to Greece at the beginning of the historical period. The center-point of the controversy has been the name "Cadmus" itself.¹⁶ Obviously

¹³ For the palm-motif in Mycenaean pottery see motifs 14 and 15 in Furumark, *The Mycenaean Pottery* (Stockholm, 1941), pp. 276 ff.

¹⁴ The presence of the octopus in *Documents*, No. 246 need not concern us unduly; see Furumark, *op. cit.*, p. 288 s. v. Hybrids, and motif 21, pp. 302 ff.

¹⁵ M. P. Nilsson, *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley, 1932), p. 126. Cf. R. Dussaud, *Découvertes de Ras Shamra* (1941), pp. 29-30. H. R. Hall, in one of the few attempts to explain the Cadmus legend by understanding the word *φοινῆς* in a sense other than Phoenician, set forth the "Red Men" theory, suggesting that the Cadmeians came from Crete (*Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, XXXI [1909], p. 282). There are a number of difficulties involved in this theory, notably the inference that Mycenaean society resulted from the triumph of the Minoan over the mainland civilization. See Nilsson, *loc. cit.* and Matz in *C. A. H.* (rev. ed., 1962), II, chap. 12, p. 45. Furthermore, it is rather difficult to find a parallel for a name such as "Red Men" in any of the literary evidence.

¹⁶ A great amount of speculation has arisen from the uncertainty of the etymology of the name Cadmus. The best discussion of the most recent evidence appears to be in Vian, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-7. In addition to the bibliography he cites there, one might add Boisacq, *Dict. de la langue grecque etym.*, p. 428, s. v. *κεκασμένος*, where a Greek origin is suggested; Friedländer, *Herakles*, p. 61, suggesting an origin in Asia Minor. Cf. Fick, *Vorgriechische Ortsnamen*, pp. 81, 84, 128, and Strabo, XII, 5, 78. Liddell and Scott, determined to make him a Phoenician, suggest a derivation from the Hebrew *qedem*, meaning "the man from the east." If Cadmus came to Greece from Phoenicia, it is plausible

some kind of Semitic etymology has to be found for the name if we are to believe that he was a Phoenician, unless we admit the possibility that he became known to the Greeks by a name other than that by which he was known to his compatriots. The theory of a Phoenician Cadmus meets with all kinds of archaeological difficulties, however. As yet there is no evidence to indicate that there was ever a Phoenician colony at Thebes, though much remains to be done in the excavation of that city.¹⁷ Even the presence of cylinder-seals from the middle-east and elsewhere could hint only at trading-connexions, not at colonization. The most recent excavations have largely confirmed the earlier findings of Keramopoullos as to the existence of Mycenaean culture at Thebes dating from a time which is not incompatible with the Cadmus legend.

Nilsson's suggestion that Cadmus was a Mycenaean and that Boeotia was a Mycenaean outpost must be taken into account against the Phoenician Cadmus theory, as it is becoming harder and harder to reconcile literary and archaeological evidence, not to mention epigraphical difficulties, if we assume that the founder of Thebes came from Phoenicia. Miss Jeffery has pointed out that "the conflict between literary and archaeological evidence will continue until it can be decided once and for all who were in fact these Kadmeians whom the literary tradition records as present once at Thebes."¹⁸ It is unlikely that any one theory is ever destined to satisfy everyone, and one must not overlook the fact that literary tradition itself is by no means consistent on the issue of Cadmus and the intro-

that Greek-speaking peoples would have called him by this name, though in Greek rather than Semitic. It seems less likely that he would have applied this name to himself in Semitic to identify himself before Greek or any other foreign people.

¹⁷ For Keramopoullos' observations see *Arch. Delt.*, III (1917), p. 5. Information on the recent excavations is perhaps best found in recent issues of the *A. J. A.* and *Kadmos*, notably: E. Touloupa, *Kadmos*, III (1964), pp. 25 ff.; E. Porada, *A. J. A.*, LXIX (1965), p. 173; E. Grumach, *Kadmos*, IV (1965), pp. 45 ff.; *I. L. N.*, Nov. 28 and Dec. 5, 1964; and *Archaeological Reports for 1964-1965* (published as a supplement to *J. H. S.*, 1965), p. 15, which includes a summary of the excavations and some further bibliography.

¹⁸ L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 8 ff.

duction of writing. Perhaps, however, Suda, Diodorus, and the Cretans preserve the clue as to the real answer, and perhaps the fact that the Greeks finally settled on a *prorsus* direction for their alphabetic writing was determined by a recollection of the *prorsus po-ni-ki-ja* rather than as a result of an instinctive rebellion from the retrograde style of their Phoenician instructors.¹⁹ Cadmus was a Mycenaean, and the writing he brought to Thebes was Linear B, which may have been known to Greek-speaking peoples then or later as *φουνικήα γράμματα*.²⁰

F. M. AHL.

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.

¹⁹ It is interesting to note that the Etruscans kept the retrograde patterns of the Phoenicians.

²⁰ Diodorus, XI, 87 mentions the Syracusan form of ostracism, *πεταλισμός*, which is an interesting example of the survival of leaf-writing in the Greek-speaking world. Just as the English word "leaf" in the sense of "a piece of paper" no longer designates the actual material from which the pages of a book are made, so it is possible that the Greek term *φουνικήα γράμματα* could be transferred from writing on palm-leaves to writing on clay tablets which were made in imitation of the shape of palm-leaves. As far as the question of the survival of the Linear scripts is concerned, the most valuable link still seems to be the Cypriot syllabary. For some modern views on this subject see S. Luric, "Noch einmal Mykenisches im Kyprischen?" *Glotta*, 1962, pp. 1-3 and V. Karageorghis, "Histoire de l'écriture chypriote," in *Kypriakai Spoudai*, XXV (1961), pp. 43-60, as well as the monumental work which Masson has done in the investigation of the Cypriot scripts. Dikaïos in *Antiquity*, XXVII (1953), pp. 233-7, suggests that the use of the Cypriot Linear script may extend back beyond the evolution of Linear B, and in *Kadmos*, II (1963), pp. 39 ff. reaffirms his belief in its early use (cf. J. F. Daniel, "Prolegomena to the Cypro-Minoan Script," *A. J. A.*, XLV (1941), pp. 251 and 270.

ROMAN CAMPANIA: TWO PASSAGES FROM
CICERO'S CORRESPONDENCE.*

For our knowledge of social life in Roman Campania in the last years of the Republic, we depend before all else upon Cicero's correspondence. Cicero owned three villas on the Bay of Naples¹; many of the letters were composed in the course of leisurely stays in his Pompeianum, Cumanum, or Puteolanum and contain local allusions; his correspondents, furthermore, included both Campanian residents and Romans visiting their villas in the seaside resorts. The Campanian letters thus do much to illustrate the quality of that Roman *otium* so dear to Cicero and to large numbers of his prominent contemporaries. But many passages of the Campanian letters continue to await elucidation, which certain complementary evidence, both literary and archaeological, may assist. The following are two such passages; the accompanying notes are an attempt to exploit such evidence.

I.

Hortensi legata cognovi; nunc aveo scire quid hominis * * * sit et quarum rerum auctionem instituat; nescio enim cur, cum portam Flumentanam Caelius occuparit, ego Puteolos non meos faciam.

Att., VII, 3, 9 (Oxford text of W. S. Watt)

Orator and *piscinarius*, Q. Hortensius Hortalus (*cos.* 69 B. C.) left great estates behind him when he died in 50.² Among them

* It is a pleasure to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of M. W. Frederiksen, of Worcester College, Oxford; of Professor H. Bloch, of Harvard University; and of Professor H. C. Youtie, of the University of Michigan. I of course bear full responsibility for the views herein expressed.

¹ At Pompeii (before 60 B. C., *Att.*, I, 20, 1); at Cumae, on the eastern slope of *Lacus Lucrinus* (by 56 B. C., *Q. F.*, II, 5, 4); and at Puteoli (inherited from M. Cluvius of Puteoli in 45 B. C., see below, p. 199). The most complete discussion of Cicero's villas remains that of O. E. Schmidt, *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* (1899), pp. 328 f., pp. 466 f. See further W. W. How, *Select Letters of Cicero*, II (1926), pp. 140 f.; and M. W. Frederiksen, "Puteoli," *R.-E.*, XXIII (1959), col. 2059.

² For the *piscinarii*, noble owners of fish ponds, who worried only

was the opulent villa at Bauli in Campania, whose spacious porticoes lend topical charm to Cicero's *Academica Priora*, and where Hortensius is alleged to have wept the passing of a favorite murena from his ponds.³ That the orator's son was Hortensius' principal heir is confirmed by Valerius Maximus (V, 9, 2); that he inherited the villa at Bauli may be inferred from two subsequent epistolary passages which allude to the son's Campanian property near Cicero's own Cumanum at the Lucrine Lake (*Att.*, X, 16, 5; 17, 1).

Certain perplexities obscure Cicero's expression of his interested reaction to the inheritance, communicated to Atticus in December of 50. "*Hortensi legata*," as Shackleton Bailey has observed, "more naturally means 'the legacies left by Hortensius (the father)' than 'the legacies payable by Hortensius (the son).'" But if *Hortensi* is the father, it is difficult though not impossible for *hominis* to be the son."⁴ Shackleton Bailey proposes *heredis* for the *hominis* of the MSS; Watt, regarding *hominis sit* as suspect, supposes a lacuna.⁵ Nor does *Hortensius quid egerit avelo scire* (*Att.*, VII, 2, 7), although clearly relevant to the present passage, resolve the difficulty entirely; again *Hortensius*, though probably the father, is just possibly the son.⁶ Yet despite the textual uncertainty of *quid . . . sit*, the general purport of the passage is clear: Hortensius had possessed

when their bearded mullets refused to eat from their hands, and neglected the business of state, cf. Cic., *Att.*, I, 18, 6; 19, 6; 20, 3; II, 1, 7 (60 B. C.). Hence Macrobius, III, 15, 6, *nobilissimi principes Lucullus, Philippus, et Hortensius, quos Cicero piscinarios appellabat*. For Hortensius' wealth, and his villas at Tusculum and Laurentum, see Vonder Mühl, *R.-E.*, VIII, col. 2475.

³ *Acad. Pr.*, II, 3, 9, . . . in *Hortensii villa quae est ad Baulos*; cf. 125, 145. Pliny, *N.H.*, IX, 172, *Apud Baulos in parte Baiana piscinam habuit Hortensius orator, in qua murenam adeo dilexit, ut exanimatam flesse credatur*. See further Varro, *R. R.*, III, 17, 5; Symmachus, *Epp.*, I, 1, 5 f.

⁴ D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Towards a Text of Cicero: ad Atticum* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 32.

⁵ Shackleton Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 32; W. S. Watt, ed., *Epistulae ad Atticum; Pars Prior Libri I-VIII* (Oxford, 1965), *ad loc.* Compare the comments of Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, III², *ad loc.* (p. 304).

⁶ Shackleton Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

property at Puteoli which, should the young Hortensius put it up for auction, Cicero was in the market to buy. "For if Caelius has bought up so much (of Hortensius') property near the *porta Flumentana* (at Rome), I don't see why I shouldn't make myself the owner of (Hortensius' property in) Puteoli."

Holdings of the Hortensii at Puteoli are not attested elsewhere in the literary sources. Drumann and Groebe were disposed, in consequence, to identify the property mentioned here with the villa of Hortensius at Bauli.⁷ That will not do; the entire width (4 kilometres) of the Bay of Baiae separated ancient Bauli from Puteoli, nor will Cicero have wished to buy additional *voluptariae possessiones* so near his Cumanum.⁸ Further, Cicero's final words constitute a still greater obstacle to regarding the properties as identical. He wrote, not *cur mihi non liceat villam Hortensii Puteolanam emere*,⁹ but *cur . . . ego Puteolos non meos faciam*. These words distinctly imply that the property in question was considerably extensive; it can scarcely have been limited to a single villa. And certain archaeological evidence, which deserves to be better known, confirms beyond doubt what Cicero implies.

In 1928 A. Salač published drawings of a glass vase of Antonine date in the National Museum at Prague.¹⁰ The surface depicts the major monuments and harbor of Puteoli, clearly identifiable through the accompanying engraved inscriptions; and within the central region of the city there appears, adjacent to the shoreline, an "*Ortesiana Rip*" (= *Hortensiana ripa*).

⁷ W. Drumann and P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms*, III², p. 99; noticed (and corrected) by Vonder Mühl, *R.-E.*, VIII, col. 2475.

⁸ On the location of ancient Bauli see A. Maiuri, "Note di Topografia Campana," *Atti della Reale Accademia d'Italia, Rendiconti*, serie 7, II (1941), pp. 249 f. (as against K. J. Beloch, *Campanien*² [Breslau, 1890], pp. 176 f.). For Cicero's Cumanum see M. W. Frederiksen, "Puteoli," *R.-E.*, XXIII (1959), col. 2059; *voluptariae possessiones*: *Att.*, XII, 25, 1.

⁹ So J. C. G. Boot, *Ep. ad Atticum*² (Amsterdam, 1886), *ad loc.* (p. 306).

¹⁰ Ant. Salač, "Le petit flacon de verre gravé du Musée national de Prague," *Listy Filologické*, LV (1928), pp. 289-301 (in Czech). Around the upper band of the vase runs the inscription: *felix pie zesaes cum tuis*, and *Putioli*; Salač (p. 301) associates the vase with the cult of Sarapis at Puteoli. Cf. *Latomus*, XVIII (1959), pls. 6-9.

Salač was the first to connect the *Hortensiana ripa* on the vase with the phrase *regio Hortensiana*, which occurs in a Campanian inscription of debated provenience;¹¹ more recently, and in consequence, M. W. Frederiksen has assigned that inscription to Puteoli, and argued convincingly that the *regio Hortensiana* be added to the four other city districts known from epigraphical evidence to have comprised parts of Puteoli.¹² Thus, an entire district of Puteoli drew its name from the *gentilicium* of the Hortensii; moreover, the name prevailed unchanged in the territory at least until the end of the third century of the Christian era. Here is both striking testimony to the family's prominence in the municipality, and a reliable topographical guide to the location of the family's holdings. A local parallel may be detected in the persons of the Vestorii and Calpurnii, whose importance—and affluence—distinguished them among the commercial families of Puteoli: they lent their names to the *regio vici Vestoriani et Calpurniani*.¹³

The Hortensian town properties which excited Cicero's acquisitive instincts in 50 B. C. (but which he seems never to have actually purchased) may possibly have been acquired by the

¹¹ Salač, *op. cit.*, p. 292, n. 2; *C.I.L.*, X, 521 (= *I.L.S.*, 6325), *dedicata/XVI k(a)l. Iunias domino n. imp. Gordiano / Pio Felice Aug. II et Pompeiano cos. / Geminio Tuti / cio Aemiliano / c. v., / patrono dignis/simo et inconpa/rabili mirabili(s) / munificentiae, / regio Hortensiana*. Mommsen included the inscription among those of Salernum (*C.I.L.*, X, *ad loc.* [p. 64]); but Dessau suspected that it came originally from Puteoli (*I.L.S.*, *ad loc.* [II, p. 581]). Many Campanian inscriptions have been discovered to belong to towns other than those to which Mommsen had originally assigned them; see the instructive observations (and statistics) of Frederiksen, *P.B.S.R.*, XXVII, N. S., XIV (1959), pp. 81-2.

¹² Frederiksen, "Puteoli," *R.-B.*, XXIII (1959), col. 2057. Other *regiones*: *regio portae triumphalis* (*C.I.L.*, X, 1695); *regio clivi vitrarum et turarii* (*Eph. Epigr.*, VIII, 365); *regio vici Vestoriani et Calpurniani* (*C.I.L.*, X, 1631); *regio Palatina* (*ibid.*, 1700). The partition of the city into *regiones* seems to date from Augustan times, or still earlier: cf. Frederiksen, *op. cit.*, col. 2057; and see further C. Dubois, *Pouzzoles Antique* (*Bib. des Éc. Fr. d'Athènes et de Rome*, XCVIII [Paris, 1907]), pp. 237 f.

¹³ *C.I.L.*, X, 1631. For the Calpurnii, see Dubois, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-7. L. Calpurnius Capitolinus arranged for the construction of Puteoli's temple of Augustus (*C.I.L.*, X, 1613). For the Vestorii, *ibid.*, pp. 51-2.

consul of 69 during the Sullan confiscations.¹⁴ They will not, in any case, have consisted primarily of pleasure villas.¹⁵ Cicero's own links with the municipal gentry of Puteoli may be invoked as analogous, and they suggest that the holdings of the Hortensii were designed primarily for *fructus*, not *voluptas*.¹⁶ It will be recalled, from Cicero's letters of 45, that when M. Cluvius died Cicero had a share in the inheritance.¹⁷ Relying upon the shrewd legal services of C. Vestorius of Puteoli—a man as skilful with his account books as he was hopeless in philosophical discussion¹⁸—Cicero managed first to buy out the other heirs, then to put his new property to productive use. Part of the inheritance consisted of shops, two of which were so dilapidated as to require the attentions of an architect in the spring of 44.¹⁹ But the obliging Vestorius helped turn loss into profit. After repairing and renting out the buildings, Cicero boasted that from Cluvius' legacy he cleared 80,000 sesterces the first year, and hoped that the annual income was then increasing by 20,000 sesterces.²⁰ Apart from the shops, Cicero kept for his own pleasure the "*horti Cluviani*" on the seashore; these he later called his Puteolanum.²¹ The properties in the

¹⁴ For Hortensius' connections with Sulla cf. Vonder Mühl, *R.-E.*, VIII, cols. 2471 f.; for his possible rewards from the confiscations cf. T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, I (Baltimore, 1933), p. 398. It may be that additional traces of Hortensius' connections with Puteoli are to be detected in the recurrence of the *gentilicium* in local inscriptions: cf. *C. I. L.*, X, 2525; 2526; 3412.

¹⁵ Despite Frederiksen, *op. cit.*, col. 2057.

¹⁶ Late jurists distinguished between productive estates and those designed to give pleasure alone; cf. *Digest*, L, 16, 198, "*urbana praedia*" *omnia aedificia accipimus, non solum ea quae sunt in oppidis, sed et si forte stabula sunt vel alia meritoria in villis et in vicis, vel si praetoria voluptati tantum deservientia*, . . .

¹⁷ For details of the inheritance see Cicero, *Att.*, XIII, 48, 1; 37, 4; 45, 2; 46, 3; 47 a; 50, 2. On M. Cluvius see further *R.-E.*, IV, cols. 120-1; Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁸ *Att.*, XIV, 12, 3, . . . *apud Vestorium, hominem remotum a dialecticis, in arithmeticis satis exercitatum*. See further *R.-E.*, VIII A, cols. 1789-90.

¹⁹ *Att.*, XIV, 9, 1, *Sed quod quaeris quid arcessierim Chrysippum, tabernae mihi duae corruerunt reliquaeque rimas agunt*.

²⁰ *Att.*, XIV, 10, 3; cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Towards a Text, ad loc.* (p. 67).

²¹ *Att.*, XIV, 7, 1; XV, 1b, 1; *De Fato*, I, 2.

regio Hortensiana—also on the waterfront near the heart of the city's commercial traffic—were doubtless similarly deployed: most hired out as shops or business offices, some perhaps reserved for the family's personal use.

In 63, when the establishment of private productive estates in the *ager Campanus* was threatened, it was observed that the owners could then use profits from their inland farms to defray the costs of luxury living in their pleasure villas on the coast.²² The foregoing analysis illustrates that Roman grandees knew of an alternative scheme whereby to defray such costs: eschewing agricultural holdings, one might invest in real estate in the coastal towns, then rent those properties at substantial profits. At Puteoli, the income derived by Hortensius and Cicero from town holdings and investments must have provided a welcome contribution to the expense of maintaining their villas at Bauli and at the Lucrine Lake. A resourceful Roman sojourner, while enjoying his leisure on Campania's mild coast, might also keep a watchful eye upon his investments.

II.

Itaque te cum video, omnis mihi Granios, omnis Lucilios, vere ut dicam, Crassos quoque et Laelios videre videor. Moriar si praeter te quemquam reliquum habeo in quo pos-
sim imaginem antiquae et vernaculae festivitatis agnoscere.
Fam., IX, 15, 2 (Oxford text of L. C. Purser)

Acknowledging (late in 46) two letters from his cultivated friend L. Papirius Paetus, Cicero pronounced him fully the equal of famous wits of an earlier day: Lucilius the satirist, Q. Granius the *praeco*, L. Licinius Crassus (*cos.* 95, censor 92), and C. Laelius Sapiens (*cos.* 140).²³ Paulus Manutius²⁴ found it

²² Cic., *De Leg. Agr.*, II, 78, *neque istorum pecuniis quicquam aliud deesse video nisi eius modi fundos quorum subsidio familiarum magnitudines et Cumanorum ac Puteolanorum praediorum sumptus sustentare possint.*

²³ On the playfulness of C. Lucilius cf. Hor., *Sat.*, II, 71 f.; Cic., *De Or.* (ed. A. S. Wilkins, Oxford, 1892), I, 16, 72, with note *ad loc.* (p. 114). Q. Granius: *De Or.*, II, 60, 244, *Granio quidem nemo dicacior*; cf., for other references, Wilkins, *ad loc.* (p. 349). L. Licinius Crassus: *De Or.*, II, 60, 244; 66, 264, and *passim*. C. Laelius Sapiens: *De Or.*, II, 5, 22; 71, 286, with Wilkins, *ad loc.*; he was famous for his *hilaritas*, *De Off.*,

curious that Cicero should fail to include, in even so brief a catalogue of celebrated humorists, the name of C. Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, whose unrivalled preeminence *festivitate et facetiis* is attested in the *Brutus* (48, 177). The omission need not surprise. Cicero here exhibits the zest for topicality and allusion which is entirely consistent with his practice in the familiar letters.

As is manifest from repeated references in *Fam.*, IX, 15-26, L. Papirius Paetus was a permanent resident of Neapolis.²⁵ Campanian connections are also attested for each of the four wits with whom Paetus is compared. Lucilius was born at Suessa Aurunca and was honored, at his death, by the city of Neapolis;²⁶ the *gentilicium* of Q. Granius proves him to have been a native of Puteoli;²⁷ L. Licinius Crassus (whose friendship with Granius their older contemporary Lucilius explicitly attests²⁸) owned hot baths by the sea, probably near Baiae;²⁹ and Laelius Sapiens is the earliest Roman known to have pos-

I, 30, 108. See further Tyrrell and Purser, *op. cit.*, IV², *ad loc.* (p. 426); How, *op. cit.*, II, *ad loc.* (p. 417). The latter observes (p. 417) that Crassus and Laelius were "Roman nobles of distinction, (and) are for that reason separated from the more plebeian wits." Note further that the names in each pair are in reverse chronological sequence: Granius and Crassus were the younger contemporaries of Lucilius and Laelius.

²⁴ Paulus Manutius, *ad loc.*, *miror hic omissum esse Caesarem illum, Catuli fratrem, qui dicacitate et facetiis omnes vicit.*

²⁵ E.g., *Fam.*, IX, 15, 3-4; cf. *Att.*, IV, 9, 2. See in general Hanslik, in *R.-E.*, XVIII, col. 1071.

²⁶ Suessa Aurunca: Juv., I, 20, with Kappelmacher, *R.-E.*, XXVI, col. 1618. Neapolis: Hieronymus, *Ol.*, 169, 2 (= Suetonius, ed. Roth, p. 295, 10 f.), *C. Lucilius saturarum scriptor Neapoli moritur ac publice funere effertur*. . . .

²⁷ Dubois, *Pouzzoles Antique*, p. 49, notes that the Granii known from inscriptions are nearly all from Puteoli (cf. *C.I.L.*, X, 2187, 2484-9, 2607, 2651). On Q. Granius see further Münzer, *R.-E.*, VII, col. 1818 (Granius 8).

²⁸ They dined together during the tribunate of Crassus: Cic., *Brut.*, 43, 160, *nisi in eo magistratu cenavisset (sc. Crassus) apud praeconem Granium idque nobis [bis] narravisset Lucilius, tribunum plebis neciremus fuisse.*

²⁹ Pliny, *N.H.*, XXXI, 2, 5, *vaporant et in mari ipso quae Licinii Crassi fuere*; the waters are mentioned in the context of Pliny's discussion of the remarkable properties of the water in *Baiano sinu* (*N.H.*, XXXI, 1-2). Cf. Beloch, *Campanien*², pp. 185-6.

sessed a villa at Puteoli.³⁰ By contrast, we have no reason to associate Vopiscus with persons or places in Campania;³¹ and thus, however sharp his sense of the ridiculous, his name would have been out of place in the passage under consideration here. For Cicero's point is precisely that Paetus' wit was Campanian in flavor; it belonged within the tradition of pungent humor which characterized the Campanian towns since the days of Atellan farces, and which achieved wider recognition in a later age when Lucilius and Laelius, and their younger contemporaries Granius and Crassus, consorted together both in Campania and in Rome. Paetus, we may readily believe, would see at once the point of Cicero's allusion, and would be especially pleased to be regarded as the last representative of an honored regional tradition.

JOHN H. D'ARMS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

³⁰ Suetonius, *Vita Terenti*, 3, *Nepos auctore certo comperisse se ait, C. Laelium quondam in Puteolano*. . . . For sepulchral epitaphs of other Laelii at Puteoli, cf. *C. I. L.*, X, 2638-40.

³¹ See Diehl in *R.-E.*, XIX, cols. 428-31 (Iulius 135).

TITUS IN JULIAN'S *CAESARES*.

When the Flavians appear during the review of the emperors at the beginning of this work, Zeus turns to Serapis and, pointing to Vespasian, says (p. 311 a): πέμπε . . . τὸν συμκρίνην τοῦτον ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγύπτου ταχέως, ἵνα τὴν φλόγα ταύτην κατασβέσῃ· τῶν παίδων δὲ τὸν πρεσβύτερον μὲν παίζειν κέλευε μετὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς πανδήμου, τὸν νεώτερον δὲ τῷ Σικελικῷ θηρίῳ παραπλησίως κλοῦψ δῆσον. The flame to be extinguished is consuming temples of the gods.

The characterization of Vespasian and the role that he is to play need no comment, though the introduction of Serapis and Egypt suggests that Julian knew more about events than he would have been likely to learn from an epitome.¹ Nor is the judgment passed on Domitian unexpected. But what are we to suppose that Zeus and Serapis have in mind in bidding Titus to sport with Aphrodite Pandemos? In his recent and now standard edition of the work in the *Collection Budé* C. Lacombrade cites the debauches of Titus and his liaison with Berenice.² This explanation is at least as old as Pétau's commentary of 1630 and is that regularly found in later scholars.³ It is easy to understand why it should occur to a reader. Certainly the excesses of the young Titus and his notorious connection with Berenice damaged his reputation and made contemporaries think of Nero, and no doubt of Antony and Cleopatra. Moreover, Julian is a severe moralist and is quick to condemn such

¹ Suet., *Vesp.*, 7 appears to be the most obvious source; cf. also Tac., *Hist.*, IV, 81-2.

² *L'Empereur Julien, Oeuvres complètes*, II, 2 (Paris, 1964). He refers to Suet., *Tit.*, 5 and 7. The first chapter merely mentions Titus' visit to Cyprus to consult Venus Paphia and is hardly pertinent.

³ The older commentaries, including Spanheim's, are collected in J. M. Heusinger's variorum edition of the *Caesares* (Gotha, 1736). On the passage see also the Abbé de la Bletterie, *Histoire de l'empereur Jovien* . . . (new ed., Paris, 1776), p. 182, n. 3; E. Cauer, *Ueber die Caesares des Kaisers Julianus Apostata* (Breslau, 1856), pp. 19-21; E. Talbot, *Oeuvres complètes de l'empereur Julien* (Paris, 1863), p. 267, n. 6; A. Rostagni, *Giuliano l'apostata* (Turin, 1920), p. 190, n. 4; G. Ricciotti, *L'imperatore Giuliano l'apostata* (Milan, 1956), p. 273 ("Tito, libidinoso").

weaknesses.⁴ Nevertheless, the explanation may well leave one with doubts.

First, it will have been noticed that Serapis is to command Titus to sport with Aphrodite Pandemos; this is not one of Silenus' jests. It may appear rather strange that Zeus and Serapis should be represented by Julian as responsible in some degree for reprehensible conduct; compare the condemnation of Jesus for condoning licence and crime (p. 336 a-b). Then too, Aphrodite Pandemos is Zeus' daughter, and on a terrestrial level at any rate her reputation and character could be defended.

But these points need not be pressed, for there is an unambiguous and, in my opinion, decisive objection of another kind. To dismiss Titus as a mere voluptuary without a good word for him is quite out of keeping with a well-established tradition. Suetonius⁵ and even Tacitus⁶ are clearly favorable in judging Titus, as is Dio.⁷ Though their accounts note his faults before his accession, they emphasize his change for the better⁸ and certainly do not suggest a sweeping condemnation. The writers of Julian's own century are highly favorable and eulogistic:

⁴ E. g., Maximian, p. 315 c; apparently also Antoninus Pius, who however is duly praised, p. 312 a.

⁵ On the encomiastic tone of the life see F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie* (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 9-10. The most recent study is that of G. Luck, *Rh. Mus.*, CXVII (1964), pp. 63-75.

⁶ We do not have of course Tacitus' account of his reign, but Titus is mentioned a number of times in what remains of the *Histories*. The significant passages are II, 1, 2: *augebat famam ipsius Titi ingenium quantaecumque fortunae capax, decor oris cum quadam maiestate*; II, 2, 1: *fuere qui accensum desiderio Berenices reginae vertisse iter crederent; neque abhorrebat a Berenice iuvenilis animus, sed gerendis rebus nullum ea eo impedimentum: laetam voluptatibus adolescentiam egit, suo quam patris imperio moderatior*; II, 5: (his skill as an intermediary) . . . *Titus prava certamina communi utilitate aboleverat, natura atque arte compositus adliciendis etiam Muciani moribus* (cf. also II, 74 and 79); IV, 52 (his generosity toward Domitian); V, 1 (his excellent qualities as a commander); V, 11: *ipsi Tito Roma et opes voluptatesque ante oculos*. Cf. the remarks of R. Syme, *Tacitus*, I (Oxford, 1958), pp. 45, 214.

⁷ See especially LXVI, 18-19. This book is abbreviated and fragmentary.

⁸ See Suet., *Tit.*, 7, 1: *at illi ea fama pro bono cessit conversaque est in maximas laudes neque vitio ullo reperto et contra virtutibus summis*; cf. the passages quoted or cited in nn. 6-7 from Tacitus (*Hist.*, II, 2, 1) and Dio.

Aurelius Victor (10), the *Epitome de Caesaribus* (10), Eutropius (VII, 21-2), and Ausonius (*De XII Caes.*, 2 and 4 and *Tetrasticha*, 11). In the *Historia Augusta* Titus is one of the *optimi imperatores*.⁹ Later, Joannes Lydus lists him with Augustus, Trajan, and Marcus as a model emperor (*De mag.*, II, 28, p. 83 Wuensch; cf. I, 49, p. 51 and II, 29, p. 84). The sympathetic portrait of Titus in Philostratus may also be mentioned.¹⁰ Most impressive, however, are two passages in Ammianus Marcellinus. In one, he writes of Gallus: . . . *tantum a temperatis moribus Iuliani differens fratris, quantum inter Vespasiani filios fuit Domitianum et Titum* (XIV, 11, 28). The other occurs in a eulogy of Julian himself: *namque incrementis velocibus ita domi forisque colluxit, ut prudentia Vespasiani filius Titus alter aestimaretur* . . . (XVI, 1, 4). Thus an eminent historian who had been a member of at least the outer circle of those surrounding Julian did not hesitate to compare him with Titus, specifically in regard to one of the four great virtues.¹¹ It does not seem fanciful to assume that a comparison between these two members of the two Flavian dynasties was made in court circles during Julian's lifetime, and was found acceptable. However that may be, and whether Julian had read fuller sources or merely knew the common opinion of his own time as reflected in Ammianus and epitomes, it would have been perverse to dispose of Titus with a reference to Berenice and the like; to do so might well have appeared to Salutius¹² and other readers to make his satire here seem uninformed, misdirected, and lacking in point.¹³

⁹ *Pesc. Nig.*, 12, 1; *Hellog.*, 1, 2; *Alex. Sev.*, 10, 2; *Aurel.*, 42, 4; *Car.*, 3, 3.

¹⁰ *Vita Apollonii*, VI, 29-34. Julian may have known the work; see *Ep.* 30 in the edition of Bidez and Cumont with their notes, p. 57 = *Ep.* 16 in W. C. Wright's Loeb edition.

¹¹ Trajan, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus are also mentioned in this passage. Julian's *prudentia* has a prominent place in Ammianus' eloquent obituary, XXX, 4, 1.

¹² The *Caesares* appears to have been dedicated to him; as Lacombrade remarks, he was "le lecteur par excellence." Salutius was born and educated in Gaul and almost certainly he must have known Suetonius. For his identity see Lacombrade's edition, pp. 18-19; K. F. Stroheker, *Der senatorische Adel im spätantiken Gallien* (Tübingen, 1948), pp. 213-14, no. 343; and R. Étienne, *Rev. Ét. Anc.*, LXV (1963), pp. 104-13.

¹³ Gibbon's praise may be too strong (ch. 24 = II, pp. 479-80 Bury),

Another explanation of the passage deserves consideration and seems to me preferable.¹⁴ This is that Julian had in mind, first, the well known phrase with which Suetonius' life begins: *Titus . . . amor ac deliciae generis humani*. The phrase *amor ac deliciae* itself was not markedly original, whoever first applied it to Titus;¹⁵ in the Late Republic a public figure might be called *deliciae atque amores populi Romani*.¹⁶ To add or substitute *generis humani* took little imagination.¹⁷ But original or not, the phrase was memorable¹⁸ and became firmly attached to Titus. In one form or another, it is found in Aurelius Victor,¹⁹ the *Epitome*,²⁰ Eutropius,²¹ and Ausonius.²² It seems fair to assume that in the time of Julian anyone with even a superficial knowledge of the earlier emperors would have been able to identify Titus as *amor ac deliciae humani generis*, at

but Julian was well informed and writing with some care and a serious purpose. Gibbon found the *Caesares* "one of the most agreeable and instructive productions of ancient wit."

¹⁴ The explanation is given in the *editio princeps* of C. de Chanteclère (Cantoclerus) of 1577. His note (*alludit ad id, quod Suetonius ait . . . Amor et delitiae generis humani*) is quoted by Spanheim and Heusinger but seems to have been subsequently ignored.

¹⁵ Luck, *loc. cit.* (n. 5), p. 75 suggests that the phrase may be Tacitus'. One might suspect that Tacitus was alluding to it when he wrote *breves et infaustos populi Romani amores* (*Ann.*, II, 41), but there is no telling who did coin the variant and apply it to Titus, if Suetonius did not.

¹⁶ Cic., *Phil.*, XIII, 26. In another oration, addressed to the people, he calls the same man, L. Antonius, *amores deliciasque vestras*. The *T. L. L.*, V, 448 lists a considerable number of instances of *amor(es) ac deliciae* and variants.

¹⁷ Cf. *I. L. S.*, 485 in which Mamaea is addressed as *matri domini n(ostri)* . . . *et castrorum et senatus et patriae et universi generis humani*.

¹⁸ On a seal of what became Brown University one finds *amor et deliciae humani generis* above the busts of George III and Queen Charlotte. Very possibly the phrase has been borrowed for others.

¹⁹ *Generis humani delicias* (10, 6).

²⁰ Twice: *deliciae atque amor humani generis* (10, 6) and *delicias publicas* (10, 16).

²¹ *Amor et deliciae humani generis* (VII, 21, 1).

²² *Orbis amor* (*De XII Caes.*, 4 and *Tetrasticha*, 11). I should note also *amor generis humani Titus* in Pacatus, *XII Pan. Lat.*, II (XII), 11, 6 (A. D. 389). Titus appears here again with other *optimi imperatores*.

least in the Latin West; some may have remembered little more about him.

It remains to be explained why Titus, *amor humani generis*, should consort with Aphrodite Pandemos. The difficulty does not seem great: πάντες γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἐρωτος Ἀφροδίτη.²³ Quite obviously, in writing his *Symposium* Julian had Plato's directly in mind.²⁴ Few readers will fail to recall the prominent role that Aphrodite Pandemos plays in that dialogue.²⁵ She owes her place in later literature almost entirely to it.²⁶ In the passage being considered here, as I understand it, Julian manages to introduce Plato's Aphrodite Pandemos into his own dialogue while alluding to the epithet which had long served to identify Titus.

The passage has some interest beyond whatever it may reveal of Julian's wit and mentality. It is probable that he would have known *amor ac deliciae humani generis* from Latin authors,²⁷ among whom the phrase originated and became a commonplace in accounts of Titus. Thus if the passage is correctly explained here, it supports the view that Julian did read in Latin, especially imperial history and biography.²⁸ The *Caesares* remains a not very substantial source for the history of the first three

²³ Plato, *Symp.*, 180 D. It seems unnecessary to conjecture whether Julian had any thought here specifically of the Neoplatonic Eros Pandemos.

²⁴ The proper title of the *Caesares* is Συμπόσιον ἡ Κρόνια. It begins with a reminiscence of Plato's dialogue, and connections have long been noted. See e.g. R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, II (Leipzig, 1895), pp. 344-5. It should be added that Plato is only one of his sources and models.

²⁵ 181 B-185 B. She appears also in Xenophon's *Symposium*, VIII, 9-11.

²⁶ Notably Plotinus, *Ennead.*, III, 5, 2-3 (cf. VI, 9, 9); also, partly through Plotinus, in Ficino and Renaissance Neoplatonism, an attractive account of some aspects of which is found in E. Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (New York, 1939), pp. 129-69 (for Aphrodite, especially 142-5).

²⁷ It is found later in the Greek translators of Eutropius and in those who used them: see Droysen's edition, *M. G. H., Auct. Antiq.*, II, p. 133. Plutarch, whom Julian read, evidently did not write lives of any of the Flavians and is not his source here.

²⁸ For recent discussions of Julian's sources see Lacombrade's introduction, pp. 6-13 and his study in *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Toulouse (Pallas, IX)*, 1960, pp. 155-64. Cf. also the summary of a paper by G. Rochefort, *R. E. G.*, LXXV (1962), p. xxii-xxiii. The question would repay further study.

centuries, instructive as it is in some ways.²⁹ But it is not completely negligible even in this regard, for it has been shown that in one case at least the nature of Julian's reading may have some real importance in evaluating the historical tradition and actual events.³⁰

J. F. GILLIAM.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

²⁹ E. g., it is instructive for any student of the *Historia Augusta*, even if he is not inclined to accept Baynes' thesis, to consider Julian's representation of Severus Alexander.

³⁰ A. Alföldi, *Zu den Schicksalen Siebenbürgens im Altertum* (Budapest, 1944), pp. 60-8. Because of the date and place of publication this important analysis of the *Caesares* seems to have remained unknown to students of Julian.

REVIEWS.

ALEXANDER TURYN. *Codices Graeci Vaticani Saeculis XIII et XIV Scripti Annorumque Notis Instructi.* Bybliothea Vaticana, 1964. Pp. xvi + 206; 205 pls.

Man, Jespersen has said, is a classifying animal. Our exact sciences seem to have as their aim the observation, comparison, and classification of data, the reduction of manifold variety to that ordered and fixed stability suggested in the etymology of the Greek word for exact science, *ἐπιστήμη*. The biologist, for example, not settling for the relatively uncritical classifications of language and conventional observation, minutely observes and compares the vast number of species at his disposal and, on the basis of comparative anatomy, genetics, behavior, ecology, etc., classifies them into expanding hierarchies of genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom. Without this kind of observation, comparison, and classification, no body of knowledge can claim to be an exact and objective science.

One discipline which however long in the practice is still drastically short on exactness and objectivity is Greek paleography. For while the considerably larger number of Latin manuscripts can be dated and localized with some degree of accuracy, Greek manuscripts, with their infinitely greater and more bewildering variety of handwriting styles, especially for minuscules, make the business of estimating date and provenience hazardous in the extreme. Greek paleographers have long recognized the need for a complete catalogue of certainly dated manuscripts equipped with photographic specimens of each hand as well as the evidence for dating. Such a catalogue would serve as the paleographer's Archimedean point—the point of fixed scientific accuracy—against which manuscripts of unknown date and origin but identical handwriting style could be compared and classified. To be sure, this would not absolve the Greek paleographer of the need to acquire that sensitive capacity for discerning stylistic differences which comes from prolonged observation of a variety of hands. But in the absence of genuinely dated criteria, the most discriminating eye will slip into haphazard judgments analogous to those of the layman who ignores the fixed and refined taxonomic criteria of biology and, basing his judgments merely on superficial resemblance or identical environment and behavior, goes on to classify whales with fish or spiders with insects.

More than forty years ago Victor Gardthausen urged that such a catalogue was vital to the status of the discipline as a science, and even proposed a plan for its execution (*Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 1920, pp. 35-9). For one reason or another (mainly, perhaps, the fact that the manuscripts are widely scattered and often difficult of access, perhaps also the dearth of interested parties) the proposal has not been completely realized. But giant strides have

been taken in that direction in such works as Roberts' study of papyrus scripts, *Greek Literary Hands 350 B. C.—A. D. 400* (1956), Omont's *Fac-similés des manuscrits grecs datés de la Bibliothèque Nationale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle* (1891), the volumes of Cereteli and Sobolevski, and especially the monumental work of Kirsopp and Silva Lake, *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200* (1934-1945). Devreesse's *Introduction à l'étude des manuscrits grecs* (1954) contains an invaluable appendix which lists dated Greek manuscripts from A. D. 514 to 1593. Now we have Turyn's critical study of thirteenth and fourteenth century dated Greek manuscripts in the Vatican Library.

In planning the present work, Turyn tells us he first set himself the task of taking up where the Lakes left off, that is, of investigating dated Greek manuscripts from 1200 to 1400 in western European libraries of rather easy access and then of publishing specimens thereof. Soon finding this beyond the comfortable limits of a single volume, he considered it the next best thing to narrow the scope of his investigation to the Vatican Library. His preparatory exploration took him through recent inventories and catalogues of the Vatican collection, numerous critical editions and studies of ancient and Byzantine literature, both sacred and secular, and involved what must have been an exhausting search for pertinent subscriptions in the large number of codices not yet included in recent catalogues (over 1500 *Vatic. gr.* and over 400 *Barberin. gr.*). Then, for all those manuscripts which this investigation placed within the period under consideration, Turyn addressed himself more critically to subscriptions and notes containing dates, using ultraviolet light in the case of badly preserved material, rigorously excluding those with doubtful or unclear letters or numbers and those written by another hand than the scribe's or whose date represents the time of the completion not of the manuscript but of the prototype (e. g. *Ottobon. gr.* 440).

For each of the 107 manuscripts studied, Turyn has given a full scale photographic specimen of each hand (citing what portion of the text it contains and, in most cases, what critical edition of the work may be consulted), a description of the contents, critical data on origin and provenience, and a complete bibliography of other studies and reproductions. In addition, the colophons themselves are photographically reproduced and transcribed so that the reader himself may easily ascertain how sound the evidence for dating is and how accurately Turyn has assessed it. Wherever a colophon is found to yield considerable insight into the history and culture of the middle ages, Turyn accordingly brings it to the reader's attention. In cases where more than a single scribe worked on a manuscript but only one was responsible for a subscription, Turyn includes more than one facsimile only if he is able to demonstrate unequivocally that the codex was written continuously. It is in such cases that he shows himself the master of his art, when he certifies the date of the whole manuscript as that of the single subscription by an analysis of how that manuscript came to be assembled out of the various contributions of its scribes.

As one might expect, his descriptions of the contents of the thirty

manuscripts not as yet treated in the recent catalogues are more painstaking (*Barberin. gr.* 164, 297, 455, 503, 515, 541, *Vatic. gr.* 867, 899, 918, 920, 932, 980, 984, 1070, 1081, 1118, 1134, 1296, 1455, 1755, 1877, 1899, 1973, 2019, 2153, 2205, 2220, 2281, 2383, 2563). This is not to say, however, that his discussion of the other codices is cursory, for while he understandably avoids repeating all the particulars one may readily find in a catalogue entry, he nonetheless makes it his aim to indicate at least summarily the nature of each manuscript's contents. It is imperative that we have this information in analyzing the samples, for, as Turyn demonstrates, *genre* must be considered along with time and place of origin as a factor which determines variety of scripts. Some examples: one Romanos, the scribe of *Vatic. gr.* 1070, uses his everyday style in the colophon, then a solemn and careful style with rather few abbreviations for the psalms, and a third style, more cursive and relaxed with more abbreviations, for the *Quicumque Vult*; the scribe of *Vatic. gr.* 867 uses a solemn, expansive style with few abbreviations for the spurious *Lexicon* of Cyril of Alexandria, a more relaxed but still quite elegant hand with a moderate number of compendia for a Greek translation of Symeon Seth's *Stephanites and Ichneutes*, and, finally, for legal documents, a more cursive hand with small letters and a large number of compendia. Nor does a simple sacred/secular criterion, evident in these examples, suffice in every case for variety of style by a single scribe: one of the two scribes of *Vatic. gr.* 984 uses small letters and frequent compendia for Josephus' *Antiquitates Judaicae*, and a more formal and larger hand with fewer compendia for the same author's *Bellum Judaicum*.

A close study of so many thoroughly analyzed and documented specimens will not only enable trained paleographers to date other manuscripts with more precision, but may, so Turyn hopes, occasionally bring it about that they recognize some of the hands reproduced here in other manuscripts with which they happen to be especially familiar, thereby discovering much more about their dates, scribes, and places of origin, as well as possibly learning what role these scribes played in the manuscript tradition of certain works. Turyn often points the way as, for example, when his own acquaintance with the hand of Nicolaus Triclinius leads him to the strong suspicion that *Urb. gr.* 126 is the work of that scribe (pp. 112 f.). In the same way he recognizes the hand of *Vatic. gr.* 7 (clearly dated 1310) in *Ambros. L* 39 *sup.* and *L* 44 *sup.*, and thereby reveals the error of the cataloguers and other scholars who have attributed the latter to the close of the fourteenth century (p. 109 and *addenda*). Another and more important example of the same kind of thing occurs when, in analyzing *Vatic. gr.* 175 (pp. 124-30), Turyn recognizes the hands of the same anonymous scribe and the same learned corrector-rubricator, Ioannes Katrares, as in *Ven. Marc.* 616 (now 663, and appearing under the siglum G in most editions), which contains the seven extant plays of Sophocles and the Byzantine triad, *Agamemnon*, and *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, with annotations, various scholia, etc. in Katrares' hand, the more significant of which are the argument to the *Persae* and the "proto-Triclinian" metrical scholia to *Pers.* 1 and *Ag.* 1 and 40. Turyn reasons that, since the collabora-

tion of these two scribes is associated with a period of time somewhere around 1321/1322 (the firmly certified date of *Vatic. gr.* 175), and since the "proto-Triclinian" portions of *Ven. Marc.* 616 cannot have come before the time of Triclinius' scholarly acme, *Ven. Marc.* 616 must now be assigned to around 1320-1325, whereas previously it had been ascribed to the fifteenth century (e. g. by Merkel, Wecklein, Wilamowitz, Mazon, Murray, Fraenkel, and even Turyn himself), too late for serious consideration. This piece of evidence adds solid support to his own earlier conclusion and that of R. D. Dawe (*The Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus*, pp. 189-94) that *Ven. Marc.* 616 represents a less contaminated stage of the tradition than *Neapol.* ii.F.31 (= Tr), the autograph of Triclinius' final edition. Also, by recognizing the hand of Kattrares in the Euripidean P (= *Palatin. gr.* 287 and *Laurent. Conv. Suppr.* 172), which served as printer's copy for the *editio princeps* of Euripides in 1503/1504, Turyn is able to date it in the same period as *Ven. Marc.* 616.

Turyn takes nothing for granted in what a scribe may say in the subscription. He often catches one writing his date with discrepant year and indiction numbers, or with the wrong month or even day of the week. Neither does he take for granted what other scholars have had to say about the manuscripts under study. He corrects the Vatican cataloguers' transcription of the difficult monocondylion in the colophon of *Ottobon. gr.* 145 from Πέτρος ὁ εὐτελὴς μοναχός to Πέτρος ὁ Τελέμαχος and then invites the reader to verify his attribution by comparing *Ottobon. gr.* 145 with the known works of Petros Telemachos, *Coislin.* 168 and *Athos Laur.* I 70 (pp. 157 ff.). He exposes the serious misdating of *Palatin. gr.* 7, containing the *Batrachomyomachia* (V^s in Allen) and the *Odyssey* (R^s in Allen) by showing that it is the work not of George Chrysococcos the fifteenth century scribe, but of a learned physician-astronomer-scribe with the same name who flourished a century earlier. Students of the manuscript tradition of Aristophanes will find, thanks to Turyn, that White (*C. P.*, I [1906], p. 17) has not only misnumbered *Vatic. gr.* 38, but has failed to indicate that it contains the *Frogs* in addition to the *Plutus* and the *Clouds* (p. 130). Scrupulously re-examining the date in *Vatic. gr.* 2281, he turns up the forms ἔρον . . . εἰς τὸν κόσμον κτλ. (not the expected ἔτους . . . ἐκ τὸν κόσμον as transcribed in Franchi de' Cavalieri-Lietzmann, *Specimina codicum graecorum Vaticanorum*², p. xv, no. 35), and then cites for comparison the occurrence of ἔρον for ἔτους in certain inscriptions found in Syria. These are but random samples. A complete list of points like these where Turyn corrects or significantly qualifies scholarly work on the manuscripts in question would be too long for a review of the present kind. Suffice it to say that scholars involved directly or indirectly with the manuscripts that fall within the scope of Turyn's study would be rash indeed to overlook this book.

The text has been handsomely laid out, and (except for an unfortunate slip on the cover) meticulously proof-read. It is equipped with all the aids one expects of a good reference work of its type: an index of the manuscripts studied, page headings which include manuscript titles, plate references, and dates, a detailed *index nomi-*

num et rerum containing, among other things, names of scribes, key phrases from the colophons found to be helpful in identifying a manuscript by time or place of origin, and a list of manuscripts cited other than those which are the book's main concern (to which should be added, for the sake of completeness, a reference to *Vatic. gr.* 569 on p. 109).

"*Taedium perquirendorum codicum declinabam, non solum quia bibliothecarum pulvere vesci minime amo, sed etiam quia alios talia multo melius ac facilius expedire probe scio.*" So said Wilamowitz in the introduction to his critical edition of Aeschylus. His distaste for the centuries of dust that old books collect is not unique. He speaks for generations of philologists who have either given the tedious scrutiny of manuscripts short shrift or abandoned it entirely to scholars like Alexander Turyn who are at once more patient and more competent to lay the grounds of an exact science of Greek paleography and thereby to prepare in relative obscurity the indispensable pre-conditions for what, by the standards of the day, seem to be the more marketable wares of their colleagues.

JOHN J. PERADOTTO.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO.

T. A. DOREY (ed.). *Cicero. Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence.* New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1965. Pp. xiii + 218. \$4.95.

This work is the first in a series of publications under the general supervision of D. R. Dudley and T. A. Dorey. If the present volume is any indication, one can look forward eagerly to its successors on Lucretius, Latin Historians, and Roman Drama. Seven eminent British scholars have contributed essays and the product is even more than one is led to expect. It is not just a study of Cicero as a literary figure, but also as a politician, a thinker, and a man. The book is designed primarily for the non-specialist, who is certainly well-served here. But there is sufficient scholarly apparatus, controversial judgment, and novel interpretation to stimulate as well the serious student of Latin literature and Roman history. Naturally, with seven contributors, the results will be uneven; but the general level is high. Many will find fault with details, but the conception is to be applauded. A satisfactory book on Cicero has yet to be written in English and, until one is, this collection of essays, all produced specifically for the volume, fills at least part of the void in admirable fashion.

H. H. Scullard's essay is a sketch of Cicero's political career in 25 pages. How does one perform a task of such magnitude in so brief a space? It is a venture easy to criticize, difficult, perhaps impossible, to carry off. Scullard, on the whole, has eschewed generalities and presents the events of his subject's career in chronological sequence. This calls for judicious selectivity, a matter of personal

taste and judgment. Documentation, inevitably, is slender. Many conclusions are expressed, but, under the circumstances, few can be proved. For the average reader it is not easy to distinguish the demonstrable conclusions from the questionable hypotheses. Scullard issues a salutary warning on the usage of the terms *optimates* and *populares*. They refer to methods rather than policies (p. 4). It follows from this, however, that they do not define coherent or consistent groups. Yet Scullard goes on to employ them in precisely that fashion when speaking of Cicero's desire to appease or criticize these groups (cf. especially pp. 8-9, 11, 13). He rightly stresses the importance of the *Pro Roscio Amerino* (p. 7). But it is not easy to agree that Cicero's references to Sulla's power were "tactful." The praise of Sulla is lofty and excessive. A comparison with Jupiter must be irony (*Rosc. Am.*, 131; cf. 22). Would the 26 year old *novus homo* fire barbs at the omnipotent dictator in public? Scullard has not considered what changes might have been made in the speech when it was prepared for publication, probably after Sulla's death.

Other remarks provoke disquiet. The traditional view that the 60's witnessed a series of intrigues engineered by Crassus and Caesar against the absent Pompey is unfortunately restated by Scullard (pp. 10-11). It is especially distressing to see those two politicians referred to again as "popular leaders" (p. 13). The fact is, as L. R. Taylor has shown (*T. A. P. A.*, 1942), the actions of Julius Caesar in this decade indicate that he sought to attach himself to Pompey's following. That Cicero believed Crassus and Caesar to be behind the Rullan agrarian bill is undemonstrable and probably unlikely; in any case, there is no reason to accept the orator's view that the measure was directed against Pompey. It was Pompey's troops who would most likely benefit under such a program. Similarly, the statement that "the triumvirs gave Clodius (Cicero's) head" in 58 reproduces a prevalent but dubious and oversimplified thesis (p. 16). One ought not to neglect the evidence for Clodius' independence of the dynasts and the shaky nature of their coalition at least prior to Luca; cf. the reviewer's article in *Phoenix*, 1966. Again, the estrangement between Pompey and Caesar in 52 is affirmed, not argued (p. 20). The trial of Milo in that year shows continued opposition between Pompey and the enemies of Caesar who came to Milo's defense (*Ascon.*, 34 C).

Dorey's article is essentially an apologia for Cicero. Mommsen and Carcopino are the chief villains here. To temper their denunciations is useful, if perhaps superfluous. Those scholars have been refuted more than once on this score. Dorey's advocacy, unfortunately, borders on the whitewash. To be sure, our evidence is insufficient to establish Cicero's venality. Yet he could bank 2 million sesterces after a year in Cilicia and Dorey can offer no explanation. That item continues to baffle and embarrass Ciceronian advocates. The money which the orator borrowed from Caesar proved very awkward in 49. Dorey's reply that this loan only provided compensation for the loss of Cicero's property in 58 is singularly unsatisfactory and without foundation. Loans were not generally offered on such grounds; nor does the evidence show that

Cicero's property was destroyed by "Caesar's henchmen" (p. 42). Cicero worked actively, if reluctantly, on behalf of the triumvirs in the year following Luca. Whether this was under the compulsion of blackmail and threat of force, as Dorey suggests, cannot be proved (pp. 40-1). Cicero himself explains: "since the powerless won't love me, I may as well try to win the love of the powerful" (*Ad Att.*, IV, 5, 2). Perhaps it is wrong to judge Cicero's actions by modern standards (p. 41). But it is a rather sorry conclusion to offer in defense of Cicero examples of political misbehavior by his contemporaries. Cicero does not shine more resplendently because Ap. Claudius was corrupt, Cato hypocritical, or Bibulus stupid.

Cicero was, among other things, a Roman politician, a *novus homo*, and an ambitious individual. The achievement of his personal and political aims often required maneuvers, manipulations, and compromises. The picture presented by J. P. V. D. Balsdon is balanced and judicious. Not blind to Cicero's faults, he is also capable of placing them in proper perspective, and, more successfully than his co-authors, he offers perceptive general observations which are at the same time backed by pointed documentation. The loyalty to political principle and to Pompey in 49 does Cicero credit. So also does his defiance of Caesar in that year and his astute and intrepid policy on behalf of republicanism six years later. At the same time Cicero had his weaknesses as a man and a politician. He nurtured his *dignitas* relentlessly and perhaps to excess. The desire for a triumph after an insignificant military success in Cilicia bordered on the ridiculous. His advocacy of the aims of *novi homines* was largely an advocacy of himself. His sensibilities were easily aroused, his composure frequently ruffled. To his supporters he awarded exaggerated plaudits, to his enemies vicious and often unjustified assaults. On Cicero's friends, family, and political associates Balsdon offers especially trenchant remarks. He recognizes, for example, the natural affinity between Caesar and Cicero in personal and cultural tastes and the absolute barrier between them in their political principles. The latter can be most dramatically illustrated in Cicero's correspondence with Matius after Caesar's death, an exchange unaccountably neglected by Balsdon. The author affirms rightly that Cicero was neither an intransigent Stoic, nor an unprincipled time-server. The pursuit of republican ideals in a changing world required compromise and flexibility: "to accept realities was the behaviour of the Ciceronian Sapiens" (p. 185).

Not all of Balsdon's assertions and *obiter dicta* will find favor. Cicero "opposed the Sullan settlement even while Sulla was still alive" (p. 179). That statement is not buttressed by documentation. Presumably the reference is to the *Pro Roscio Amerino*. But even if the speech was delivered as we have it, it does not show opposition to Sulla's settlement. On the contrary, it urges the dictator to live up to his system by renouncing a freedman who threatened to upset it and to upset the aristocracy whose hand Sulla had sought to strengthen. Cicero "might well have become consul at any time at all when the Roman world was, generally, at peace" (p. 171). It does not seem that Balsdon himself believes that statement (cf. pp. 178-9). "Harmless filibustering was as far as Cato would go in

the way of political protest" (p. 185); an odd comment in view of the fact that Cato more than once was manhandled while espousing his views at public meetings (Plut., *Cato*, 27-8, 32-3, 41-4). Balsdon affirms that Cicero buried the hatchet with P. Vatinius in his later years (p. 190). That neglects the revealing anecdote of Quintilian who shows Cicero inquiring eagerly and hopefully into a report of Vatinius' death (VI, 3, 84). Cicero's conceit is recorded and denounced (pp. 192-3). But the orator did not always take himself as seriously as some of his critics do (cf. *Ad Att.*, I, 14, 3-4). Cicero, Balsdon maintains, was deceived by self-imposed academic logic into justifying his slaying of the Catilinarians as an execution of *hostes* (p. 199). That may be true, but it will not do to hold up Brutus' sparing of C. Antonius as an honorable contrast. Brutus had other motives; he had not yet abandoned hope of compromise with the brother of C. Antonius. On that issue Cicero had passed the point of no return.

R. G. M. Nisbet offers a concise and incisive analysis of nine of Cicero's speeches. The examples chosen are appropriate to illustrate the varieties of Cicero's style and technique. Nisbet has gone about his task in an intelligent fashion: not summaries of arguments or general reflections, but pointed and selective judgments on central issues in each of the orations. Though many of the comments are controversial, they are almost all fresh and stimulating. In general, Nisbet gives full recognition to the vigor, variety, and richness of Cicero's oratory; but the brunt of his paper is an attack on the speeches for disingenuousness. Is that a proper line of attack? The moral obligation of the advocate is primarily to his client. Winning the sympathy of his audience by adopting all available techniques is the very function of the forensic orator; in the *Pro Cluentio*, *Pro Caelio*, and *Pro Milone* Cicero demonstrates mastery of the art, as Nisbet himself acknowledges. But to label his devices as "humbug" or "rodomontade" is perhaps to miss the point. As for moral content, Nisbet appears often deliberately to overlook or to soft-pedal it. Moral arguments are central in the *Pro Roscio Amerino* and the *Verrines*; yet Nisbet concentrates on the style and the control of information in those two speeches (pp. 49-58). The *Pro Sestio* is, to be sure, "a political tract" (p. 66), but the trial of Sestius was an attack on Cicero's politics and those of his supporters. Nisbet's examination of the *Pro Marcello* is confusing, if not self-contradictory. He regards the praise of Caesar as hypocritical and sycophantic; Cicero is urging Caesar "to do the things that he wants to do already" (p. 74). Yet the author also affirms that Cicero's aims are patriotic and the speech an effort to salvage constitutional government (p. 75). The moral energy of the *2nd Philippic* is given its due, but not all will agree with the verdict that this is untypical (p. 76). Nisbet objects also to the "unreality" of some of the speeches. That may be closer to the mark. Some, like the *Catilinarians*, as Nisbet notes, published later, deal with a wider situation than the occasion which called them forth (pp. 62-3). But Nisbet does not prove that Sallust's monograph is designed to rectify Cicero's account by damning the consul with faint praise (pp. 63-4; cf. the arguments of Broughton, *T. A. P. A.*, 1936 and Syme, *Sallust*,

pp. 105-11). Dissent with conclusions is unavoidable, but, as a whole, Nisbet's essay is delightfully provocative and a real contribution.

That Cicero was not an original or an especially creative thinker is generally acknowledged. Cicero acknowledged it himself (*Ad Att.*, XII, 52, 3). Yet the volume of his philosophical works alone and their survival, obviously not entirely by accident, have left a powerful impact upon all succeeding speculative thought. The task of dealing within a short space with his philosophical contributions and their reception in later ages is a Herculean one. Hence the essay of A. E. Douglas, unlike those of Dorey, Baldson, and Nisbet, tends to be a general survey. Cicero's dialogues and treatises are run through hurriedly with the briefest summaries of their contents and arguments. The fate of his writings in the following two millennia receives even more abrupt and truncated treatment. The latter might best have been left out altogether, since the article of Clarke is specifically designed to trace Cicero's reputation through the ages. Nonetheless, Douglas' paper is not without its interesting insights. The traditional contrast between Greek metaphysical speculation and Ciceronian concentration on ethics is effectively challenged (pp. 136-8). The search for the good life was the quest also of Plato and Aristotle. Cicero advocates a healthy and moderate skepticism. Moral choice depends upon the practicable and attainable; common sense and Roman hard-headedness weave together the New Academy and the Stoa. For Douglas, Cicero comes down ultimately on the side of Stoicism (p. 146). That is not easily established, and, in any case, no discussion of Cicero's relations with the Stoics should have left out his lampoon of that sect in the *Pro Murena* (61 ff.). Douglas rightly points out that medieval acquaintance with Cicero was not as wide as is often thought and that it was based frequently on erroneous information (pp. 158-60). Occasionally, however, the author seems to have set up straw men. The Renaissance indeed was "the recovery of ancient Rome" rather than the revival of Greece (p. 160), but does anyone really believe the reverse?

Little comment is called for on the article of M. L. Clarke and the reviewer claims little competence to deal with the details of his discussion. Clarke's task is the most sweeping of the lot, and the results correspondingly sketchy, as is unavoidable: a summary of the reaction to the Ciceronian corpus from his own day through the 19th century. Under the circumstances the author can only hit the highlights. One problem, however, dogs the reader of this piece. Clarke is not precise as to what he means by "Ciceronianism" or "Ciceronian." In general, the criterion is a stylistic one, but then Cicero's own style varied considerably depending upon the type of work he was writing. A clearer definition of terms would have been welcome. Although Clarke makes an early differentiation between the influence of Ciceronian oratory and that of the philosophical dialogues, this vanishes after the first few pages and "Ciceronianism" remains a vague and all-inclusive expression. The survey becomes thinner as the essay progresses; only England is considered after 1600 and only Cardinal Newman can be cited for the 19th century. There is no equivalent in English for Zielinski's *Cicero in Wandel der*

Jahrhunderte; hence, even a brief and sketchy account by a scholar like Prof. Clarke is of value. Yet one might have preferred an essay on Cicero's rhetorical works, a subject for which Clarke is also eminently qualified and which receives but scant attention in this volume.

Plutarch (*Cic.*, 2, 4) asserts that Cicero was the best poet in Rome as well as the best orator. That judgment is not supported elsewhere and there are few who would adopt it today. As Cicero lacked originality in philosophy, he lacked inspiration in verse. That his poetic achievement warranted a separate chapter in a short work on Cicero may be questioned. G. B. Townend makes out as good a case as can be made for Cicero's importance; i. e. not a very good one. Following the line of Malcovati, he argues that Cicero's translations of Aratus added some fresh inspiration to a dry text and exercised some small influence on Virgil (pp. 113-17). From statistics provided by Bailey and Ewbank there is indication, as Townend points out, that Cicero played a role in the development of Latin poetical techniques from the often heavy-handed verses of Ennius to the hexameters of Virgil (pp. 126-9). But the fragments are too few to permit any definitive conclusions. The problem is illustrated by Cicero's poem "Marius." Our understanding of that work, Townend justly remarks, depends on the date of its composition (p. 121). But his discussion of the date arrives at no conclusion, an implicit admission of futility. Townend does show that the most vicious ancient attacks on Cicero's poetry rest largely on an unfair concentration upon two notorious and unfortunate lines. On the other hand, he must admit that even the lines of which the poet himself was most proud do little to enhance his reputation in this sphere (*Ad Att.*, II, 3, 4; *De Div.*, I, 17).

As so often, dissent tends to dominate a review. That ought not to obscure the fact that this book not only opens up Cicero for the intelligent non-specialist but will provide much stimulation also for scholars in the field.

ERICH S. GRUEN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

OSWALD SZEMERÉNYI. *Syncope in Greek and Indo-European, and the Nature of Indo-European Accent*. Naples, 1964. Pp. xv + 420. (*Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli: Quaderni della Sezione Linguistica degli Annali*, No. III.)

It is generally said that Greek, from Homeric (or even Mycenaean) to Hellenistic times, has a so-called pitch or musical accent whereby syllables significantly differ from one another in pitch, and that this prosodic condition endows the Greek vowel system with a peculiar stability. Especially vowel syncope, some have argued, does not occur in Greek because such shrinkage is incompatible with a pitch accentuation. Szemerényi seeks to demonstrate that this doctrine is untenable. He aims to show that "in a considerable number of

instances pre-Hellenistic Greek suffered vowel-losses which can only be described as syncope of the well-known type" (p. ix). If such examples can indeed be found, then "we must change our views concerning the characteristics of a so-called pitch-accent. We must admit that under certain favourable circumstances syncope can occur even in languages with a pitch-accent" (p. ix). The other possibility, namely, that Greek simply did not have a pitch accent but rather had, like Latin, a stress,¹ Szemerényi does not contemplate: "... the continued existence of the inherited musical accent cannot be doubted..." (p. 471), at least until the Hellenistic period. But he does suggest that pitch accent is not the kind of phenomenon philologists had thought it to be, in particular that it is not a natural obstacle to syncope. "In the eyes of some scholars, almost any explanation, however ill-founded or contrived, seems preferable to a conclusion which clashes with long-held theoretical views. In the present case the 'sacred cow' is the nature of musical accent, its 'incompatibility' with vowel-loss. But the duty of the linguistic historian is to marshal the evidence and allow it to speak for itself" (p. 29).

Szemerényi's marshalling of the evidence is erudite and massive. It consists of citing and discussing in minute detail all discoverable cases of syncope of *i* and *u*, and of *e* and *o* (Chapter I, pp. 3-100, Chapter II, pp. 101-257, respectively). Syncope of *a* does not take place, for phonetic reasons, Szemerényi thinks: only the short high (*i*, *u*) and mid (*e*, *o*) vowels, being inherently shorter than the low vowel (*a*), are subject to being squeezed out (pp. 258-9).

Szemerényi then examines (Chapter III, pp. 258-83) under what phonological conditions syncope does occur in Greek, and what is presumably the nature of Greek pitch accent. First, arguing from the mere logic of the case, Szemerényi says this: "Those who maintain that a pitch-accent does not cause any changes comparable to those found in languages with a stress-accent, i. e. vowel-weakening, syncope, etc., proceed to act as if it were established that in languages with a pitch-accent syncope, etc., are impossible. It does not require great expertise in logic to see that the one does not follow from the other. Even if pitch were not the active cause (the *causa efficiens*) of such changes, there might be causes which could produce these changes, provided that pitch-accent is not interpreted as prohibitive of such changes. It is clear that the latter assumption is quite unjustified" (p. 280). Second, Szemerényi gathers from recent acoustic and phonetic investigations and experiments concerning the prosodies of various languages that one must not oppose stress and pitch to one another with irreconcilable polarity and mutual exclusiveness in the way many Hellenists and Latinists are wont to do, but that the two prosodic traits may and do co-occur in a given linguistic structure. "With the theoretical foundation knocked out of place, if not out of existence, resistance to acknowledging syncope even in languages with a so-called pitch-accent will, it is hoped,

¹ I am quite aware that some scholars, especially Frenchmen, deny stress also for Latin; the majority, myself included, disagrees with them; so does, implicitly, Szemerényi.

gradually diminish" (p. 282). Chapter III is obviously the core of the whole work, meant to display the conclusions derived from a close scrutiny of the available evidence as cited in Chapters I and II, and to support them with an underlying linguistic theory of accentuation. Toward the end of the chapter, therefore, appears the summation: "The result of the present work can, it seems, be generalized into a permissive rule: *syncope can take place even in languages with a so-called pitch-accent but only unaccented vowels of a certain range (usually high and mid vowels) are affected, provided that the environment and syllabic structure are favorable*" (p. 282).

Having established to his satisfaction the compatibility of pitch and syncope, Szemerényi wonders "whether there are any other cases [viz., in Greek itself, in other Indo-European languages, even in Proto-Indo-European]² which can only be explained, or most readily explained, on this theory" (p. 284). Chapter IV (pp. 284-402) is devoted to this investigation. The result is again positive: there are such instances of syncope in various idioms which are said to have a pitch accent.

Hence the Epilogue (pp. 403-4) proposes this conclusion: "If the points made in Chapter III are correct, we must revise our whole concept of the established contrast between stress accent and pitch accent, especially as concerns the presumed stability of the vowel system in a language with pitch accent" (p. 403). Syncope in Greek turns out to be covered, not by a regular, stringent soundlaw, but by what Szemerényi calls a "permissive rule" (p. 282), that is, a statement on linguistic change that cannot properly be termed a soundlaw since it lacks complete or nearly complete regularity. But since he suspects "that the measure of fluidity in the development of the Indo-European languages which is here introduced and advocated might prove dangerous from the point of view of strict soundlaws" (p. 403), Szemerényi seeks to assuage these fears by referring to "the view recently advanced that there is what may be called a 'weak phonetic change,'³ a change which is at variance with the regularity of broad changes, and is easily overlooked or underrated because its predictability is very low" (p. 404).

So far the book, which is clearly a work of great learning, meticulous attention to documentation, and acumen in interpretation of the record. Now some remarks are in order.

(1) I am a bit wary about making inherent durations of sounds (short *i*, *e*, *o*, *u* as opposed to long *a*) responsible for their different fate as regards syncope under otherwise equal conditions, especially in a language in which each vowel can appear in a distinctively

² Szemerényi uses 'Indo-European' in both the generic (the Indo-European languages) and the specific sense (the Indo-European parent language); for the second, 'Proto-Indo-European' is a common and more distinctive term.

³ In a footnote reference is made to two articles by Yakov Malkiel: "Weak Phonetic Change, Spontaneous Sound Shift, Lexical Contamination," *Lingua*, XI (1962), pp. 263-75, and "Etymology and General Linguistics," *Word*, XVIII (1962), pp. 198-219.

(phonemically) long or short variety. I rather think that Szemerényi has a point here, but to buttress it properly he should, I believe, instead of relying so strongly on inherent phonetic features of the vowels, have employed the theory of distinctive features (as proposed by Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Linguistics* [The Hague, 1956]) and brought to bear the findings of acoustic and psycho-acoustic phonology.

(2) As noted, two chapters set forth the evidence for syncope in Greek on 255 pages, and another chapter of 117 pages presents additional cases in Greek and other languages. "I have tried to base my findings on the fullest possible evidence" (p. 2), Szemerényi assures us. The result is that there are brought to light exactly 38 instances of syncope in the first group (14 for *i*, *u*, 24 for *e*, *o*), and 12 in the second group (6 more in Greek, 6 outside of Greek)—a grand total of 50 cases of syncope, of which 44 are in Greek.⁴ The meagre count raises the dreadful possibility that this is perhaps not a large enough number within the context of the entire Greek lexicon to challenge effectively the traditional view on the relation of syncope and pitch accent. (See below, under 5 and 6.) Szemerényi, however, thinks he has made his point; he says that the case for syncope in pre-Hellenistic Greek has been established "in a sizable group of words" (p. 284), "in a considerable number of instances" (p. ix). But he also feels the need to hope for more: "Once attention is focused on the fact that syncope is nothing unheard of in Greek, it can be hoped that many more cases will come to light" (p. 289). But how? Has not Szemerényi himself been as competent and thorough in his search as anyone can be? Would he not, had it but been humanly possible, have been only too glad to put forth more examples? Can one really expect additions to the list that will change the figure significantly?

(3) I wonder how many linguists really still hold the opinion that a pitch accent is truly and wholly *prohibitive* of syncope. In any event, the matter can be easily settled by reference, not to dead idioms whose orthography reveals even less of their non-segmental (prosodic) than of their segmental (phonetic) nature, but to living dialects in which co-occurrence of pitch and syncope can be observed: Slovene, for example, seems to fit into that category. (Of course, as Szemerényi implies, classical philologists never deigned to bother themselves with excursions outside the classical domain.) Yet it is not thereby ruled out that pitch, whatever its function or potency in the whole prosodic structure, may be an *inhibitive* factor in syncope: this view has more adherents, and Szemerényi does not explicitly reject it.

(4) Szemerényi is quite right in pointing out that one should not describe Greek as a pure pitch language and Latin as a pure stress language, since recent phonetic and acoustic investigations and ex-

⁴ Why is it, by the way, that the inherently shorter and higher *i* and *u* are less frequently syncopeated than the inherently longer and lower *e* and *o*? This contradicts Szemerényi's own thesis of which I spoke above under (1). Possibly this is so because we are not dealing with a statistically significant number.

periments have shown that such prosodic conditions do not exist. But since he does seem to uphold, and I think rightly, the thesis that Greek has a pitch component in its prosodic structure, and one that is stronger than that of Latin, it is not easy to banish the idea that, no matter what name one gives to the prosodies of Greek and Latin, the different behavior of these two idioms in regard to syncope has something to do with their admitted prosodic divergences, which seem to be of a typological magnitude. But instead of putting it in the form 'here pitch and no syncope, yon no pitch and syncope,' a simplistic formula which Szemerényi properly refutes, I think it would have been of the essence to examine just what *complex* of phonological properties,—if it is not pitch alone, although pitch may well be an inherent and unsubtractable parameter of the total—causes the peculiar behavior of Greek as regards syncope.

(5) I say 'peculiar' because, even if Szemerényi's 44 instances of syncope suffice to put to rest the untenable notion that pitch, in Greek and elsewhere, completely prevents syncope, the number is really very small. Hence there does seem to be something in Greek phonology in general, and in prosody in particular, that does not exactly favor syncope (whereas there is something in Umbrian, for example, or in late Spoken Latin, or indeed in Modern English, that does). As a matter of fact, syncope (like assimilation, dissimilation, anaptyxis, etc.) is not really a phenomenon of diachronic change that, at least in the Indo-European languages I have knowledge of, can be termed a soundlaw, because it does not ever occur with the necessary high statistical probability, sometimes nearly total regularity, that causes us to use the term soundlaw and to find it operative in the first place; consequently, I rather think that even if one insisted—mistakenly—upon the 'law' that pitch precludes syncope, as few as 44 cases could be listed as 'exceptions' without actual damage to the law itself: all linguistic laws, or rules, which are but statements of regularities extracted from the evidence by hindsight, suffer exceptions, and whether 44 of them are perhaps too many for simply being shunted onto a sidetrack labeled 'Exceptions' or whether they had better be considered as tokens of another law, is as much a question of terminology as of fact. In other words, the stubborn who cling to the rule that pitch and syncope are incompatible cannot be, and need not allow themselves to be, persuaded or perplexed by 44 contrary instances.

(6) Szemerényi believes that 44 cases are enough to establish at least a weak sound change, hence to nullify the rule that pitch languages suffer no syncope—and this view, as noted, cannot be dismissed if 'weak sound change' has reference, not to a soundlaw, but merely to a relatively small number of occurrences (if there are enough of them one might even speak of a trend, or a tendency). But it seems to me that Malkiel's notion of the weak sound change, which is appealed to here, is not apposite. Malkiel, if I read him aright, does not at all wish to assign a kind of structural status to his 'weak phonetic change.' On the contrary, he wants to relieve the linguist of the obligation of having to account for non-regular or (which comes to the same thing) statistically insignificant phenomena of diachronic change through a soundlaw that would have

to be, but often cannot be, accommodated in the total structural history of the language.⁵ Hence Greek syncope, precisely if viewed as a weak sound change, should not, and certainly need not, be regarded as the touchstone of the functional capabilities or consequences of Greek pitch accent or of any other phonological property of Greek. Conversely, even if no single instance of syncope in Greek had been discoverable, there would be no proof in this that pitch, whether it was the sole, or the chief, or a partial feature of Greek prosody, is the cause of this lack.

Even if, however, there was no necessity for Szemerényi to use the case of Greek to disprove the theory of the incompatibility of pitch and syncope, or to prove that Greek could have syncope despite pitch, and even if he has not given a reason why Greek has so relatively few cases of syncope (a problem, to be sure, that he never posed, but whose solution would have led, I believe, to illuminating conclusions on the prosodic structure of Greek and the role of pitch within it), the great and indisputable merit of this book is to have brought to light a whole number of cases of loss of vowels in Greek, and to have demonstrated that they all could properly be classified as syncopes. Szemerényi's work is admirable for various reasons, above all for the thoroughness of documentation, the intelligence, openmindedness, and skill with which an enormous quantity of original sources and a great mass of earlier scholarship have been handled, and for the author's obvious mastery of Indo-European and Greek linguistics. To this one may add the adroit, orderly, and systematic presentation of the principal thesis. One must be grateful to Szemerényi for assembling in one book the vast learned apparatus displayed in Chapters I, II, and IV, on 365 pages devoted to the indefatigable and thorough analysis of 50 items. If one finds a weakness in the general theoretical premises and conclusions (which I do, though others quite possibly may not), a shortcoming that is somehow attested in the brevity of Chapter III, entitled "The conditions of syncope and the nature of pitch accent" and covering a scant 35 pages, there cannot be but unanimity of approval for Szemerényi's scholarly procedure and conduct of research.

ERNST PULGRAM.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

⁵ This is what Malkiel actually says (p. 266): "It [the notion of weak phonetic change] prevents him [the linguist] from bogging down at a disadvantageous point of his inquiry and maintains the momentum of his advance, at the cost of saddling him with a term not fully explicated."

Propertius, Elegies, Book IV. Edited by W. A. CAMPS. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965. Pp. ix + 167. \$2.95.

Properzio, Elegie, Libro IV. Testo critico e commento a cura di PAOLI FEDELI. Bari, Adriatica Editrice, 1965. Pp. xlvii + 311. (*Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia della Università degli Studi di Bari*, 1.)

These two editions of Propertius, Book IV, have very different aims. Mr. Camps has in mind "the conjectural needs or interests of a fairly wide range of readers, from the enterprising sixth-form boy to the classical schoolmaster or don whose special expertise lies in another field. It is designed as a reader's edition . . ." (p. vii). Signore Fedeli has produced a fairly thorough and comprehensive edition along Enkian lines, with bibliography, a full critical and literary introduction, and some useful indices, although a metrical index is unfortunately lacking. Camps has based his text and apparatus on Barber's O. C. T. of 1960, admitting 80 or so divergences, which he lists; Fedeli for his text has made a complete re-examination of the MSS. As might be expected, Camps' text is eclectic and he prints five emendations of his own, none of them particularly persuasive (2, 49 *haec* for *et*; 4, 7 *contra* for *fontem*; 6, 57 *aut ea* for *altera*; 11, 19 *vindex* for *index*; 11, 53 *cui, iusta suos* for *cuius tiasos*). In more modest contrast, Fedeli offers only one suggestion of his own (*cuius cassos* for *cuius tiasos*), which he prints in the apparatus. Camps, as he admits (p. vi), does not claim any scientific value for his apparatus, but the bias of his edition is towards textual criticism—he even lists those readings in Luck's 1964 edition that are not to be found in his own text or apparatus. But given the aims of his edition—a reader's edition!—it is difficult to see why this is the emphasis: p. 32, for example, has 9 lines of apparatus for 26 lines of text. The inflation is partly explicable by his admission of a number of unimportant MS readings and an excessive hospitality to scholarly conjectures, proper perhaps to an edition of the scope of Fedeli's but hardly suitable for the audience Camps professes to have in mind. His explanation that the apparatus "may offer practical convenience to a reader who wishes, as he goes along, to be informed of the readings of the Neapolitanus and to get some impression of the other branch of the tradition" (p. vi) does little to dispel one's doubts.

Fedeli's text is generally conservative. Where the MS reading is manifestly wrong he tends to choose emendations that follow most closely the *ductus litterarum* and he frequently sets himself the task of defending lines and passages that previous commentators have found impossible in their present state or position (e. g. 1, 87-8; 8, 19-20). This is not perhaps such a bad thing in a text as bedevilled by emendation as Propertius' and in a standard edition with as full an apparatus as Fedeli's. Occasionally his conservatism, although it is not uniform, leads him into some dubious *literary* interpretations (notably his defense of 1, 87-8, which then becomes *la prova più convincente della ridicolizzazione di Horos*).

The commentaries of both editions leave something to be desired. Camps, apart from his inappropriate textual bias, has an air of brisk commonsense and is properly undogmatic about the poet's exact literal meaning, but the layout and style of the notes are sometimes confusing. Given his elementary level, more should have been said on 1,150 *Cancrī*, since there are a number of astrological and literary texts connecting the Sign of the Crab with wealth; on 4,39 *patrios . . . capillos*; on 5, 32 *sitim* and the usual attribution of drunkenness to bawds; on 6, 3-4 Philetas and Callimachus; on 11, 4 *adamante*; on 11, 31 *Libones*; and on 11, 48 *nec possis*. Fedeli on the other hand is diffuse and chatty and by studding his own comments with *verbatim* comments from other scholars he makes his style excessively macaronic. He indulges in a spray of references when he has little to say, although in the case just mentioned of *Cancrī* (1, 150), he makes no mention at all of the connection of the Crab with wealth and its possible significance for the Propertian passage.

The appearance of any new edition of Propertius naturally raises hopes of more than an improved text and commentary. Book IV in particular offers problems of great interest to the student of literature: how was the book composed and published; why is it so different from Propertius' earlier work; does it signalize a radical departure from Propertius' earlier poetic aims; is it a partial surrender to Augustan literary pressures; above all, what is the exact significance of the long and puzzling IV, 1?

On such questions Camps offers little illumination. He warns us (p. vii) that he will only "try to elucidate (at the intellectual level) the sequence of the poet's ideas and the meaning of his language, as one condition for the enjoyment of the poetry. The poetry will be found in the poems themselves; and the reader must in fairness be warned not to look for it in my part of the book, which is dry stuff." Camps' way of elucidating the meaning of a poem is to supply references and a few helps towards construing. The introduction shows complete unawareness of the real difficulties of the book and contents itself with repeating the stock clichés of our literary histories: Propertius' first three books were mainly personal love elegy, "the emotional glow" of Book I muting to "the more professional manner" of Book III, although Propertius still insists on his status as a love-poet; "Book IV marks a new departure . . . his talent is to be at the service of his country, and he will write on Roman themes." Even in the love poems "the treatment . . . is now altogether different from that of the earlier books . . . the relation between the poet and his material is also new; it has become objective" (pp. 1-2).

Fedeli is more conscious of the larger problems of the book and devotes considerable discussion to them, summarizing earlier views and advancing solutions of his own. Despite one's doubts about his conclusions and literary tact, Fedeli displays some inkling at least of the right way to approach a poet as complex as Propertius. He is aware, for instance, of the irony and humor present in the later work and is at pains to explain its purpose; he thus provides a suitable and properly documented basis for critical discussion.

Finding no common tone or inspiration in the "public" and "private" themes of the book, Fedeli concludes that it was edited and published posthumously by an unknown friend, who used the principle of alternation (Birt's *Abwechslung*) in his arrangement of the elegies. The poems on Cynthia (5 and 8) belong to the period of Book II, whereas the aetiological elegies, including IV, 6, and the introductory poem were all composed in or after B. C. 16 and were the incomplete remains of an organic cycle of such elegies which was interrupted by death. Propertius' friend mistakenly took the second part of the first elegy (71 ff.) as a genuine *retractatio*, whereas it is really an ironic attack on the poet's sceptical critics in the person of the charlatan Horos, who like them does not think that Propertius *can* write anything other than love poetry. This part of the poem, argues Fedeli, confirms Propertius' intentions rather than retracts them.

The two important premises in this argument appear to be, first, that the aetiological elegies are an artistic advance on the non-aetiological poems of the book and so seemed to Propertius, and, second, that elegy I, despite its surface appearance, is in no way a *retractatio*. These partly aesthetic, partly interpretative bases are important because a number of factual consequences are made to flow from them. And a difficulty is that Fedeli's literary assertions do not carry conviction. IV, 8, which Jacoby called with some justice *regina elegiarum*, is grossly underestimated by Fedeli, who advances unconvincing criticisms of its solemn opening style which, he alleges, is not in tune with the rest of the elegy. This is to disregard most of the sources of comic effect in the poem with its closing parody of diplomatic language. This then allows him the easier to date the poem to the period of Book II. But one now asks, why was it not published at that time?

In his interpretation of the first elegy, Fedeli argues that lines 71-150 are not on the same plane as apparently similar *recusationes* in earlier books, because in Book IV we do have examples of a new poetic genre and Horos, far from being a Calliope or an Apollo, is a ridiculous charlatan, an ironic caricature of Propertius' critics. There are several objections to this theory. Why did Propertius use roughly the same form of *recusatio* as earlier, but this time not mean it? How could the unknown friend so radically misconceive Propertius' intentions and produce the sort of book we have? Most importantly, is not this elegy, as it stands, a most peculiar opening to a serious and ambitious aetiological cycle? For Fedeli, as the cycle was not completed, it would have to be written first, or nearly so: more naturally, such an introductory elegy would be written towards the last. Irony there is of course, but is the target Propertius' critics or, as in previous books, Propertius himself and his ventures into non-erotic elegy?

Any hypothesis about Book IV has to take into account a number of facts. The book is no shorter than Book I and it is, whatever the principles of arrangement, a well-edited book, even though we may be unable to decide who did publish it. Secondly, most of the non-aetiological poems are very much superior to the aetiological elegies. Thirdly, the vein of irony and humor, observed in some of

the poems (often with surprise) by critics, contrasts oddly with the solemn interpretation of the aetiological elegies and their introduction offered by Fedeli. Whether we relegate the Cynthia poems to an earlier period or regard them as belonging to the period of the rest of Book IV, the change of style they display requires explanation.

Given this, it seems to me more consistent with Propertius' artistic development to take IV, 1 as a *recusatio* along the lines of the earlier *recusationes*: this time, however, as a preface to the admittedly poor and (if the pervasive irony and humor I detect is really there) not altogether serious attempts at "public" themes. The good work in the book thus shines out and justifies Horos' predictions. I find it unlikely that Propertius' taste, which in earlier books had kept him from court themes, had so deserted him that he thought his aetiological elegies worth more than they were. If he did, Horos is a strange trumpet to blow. Of course it is not impossible that lines 71 ff. were added to the opening elegy after the first few aetiological elegies had been written and found wanting. But whether it was Propertius' inclinations or Propertius' talents that found the announced task uncongenial, it is a more delicate business to decide.

That the task was uncongenial may be established, I believe, from a cursory inspection of the relevant elegies. Elegy 2, on the god Vertumnus, is scarcely more than an exercise, but the elegy on Tarpeia (IV, 4) shows a peculiar emotional incoherence: when Tarpeia's emotional state is described, the love-poet in Propertius seems properly engaged, but when the poet speaks for himself we find a perfunctory adoption of the obvious patriotic standpoint—thus perish all traitors! The tenth elegy, on Jupiter Feretrius, again has all the signs of perfunctoriness. Three great episodes in Roman history, the personal slayings of enemy commanders by Roman generals, are, it would not be too much to say, dismissed in a mere 39 lines, leaving the elegy far shorter than the average for the book. IV, 9, on Hercules, begins in an apparently serious strain but soon develops touches of humor. How else are we to take a demi-god who pleads for water from a fountain reserved for women by saying "a soft brassière once held my hairy breast and for all my horny hands I was a suitable girl" (*mollis et hirsutum cepit mihi fascia pectus, / et manibus duris apta puella fui*)? Such light touches of course would be appropriately Callimachean but Propertius' tone is inconsistent and the effect therefore discordant.

With the notorious IV, 6, the poem on Actium, the problem seems a question of intention. It is generally regarded as a frigid failure, full of absurdities, but was it intended as a genuine panegyric, which failed only because of Propertius' inadequacy, or is it the climax of Propertius' *recusatio*, the ironic proof of his inability or unwillingness to write the sort of poetry that others in the Augustan circle could produce better? A review of course is not the place to look into such minute matters, but it is a tribute to Fedeli's sturdy broom that we are tempted to look at the cobwebs he has brushed aside.

J. P. SULLIVAN.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS,
AUSTIN.

HEINZ SCHRECKENBERG. *Ananke*. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortgebrauchs. München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964. Pp. viii + 188; 8 pls. (*Zetemata, Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 36.)

In his study of the origin of Greek tragedy (Δράμα, 1960) H. Schreckenberg used lexicography as an approach to the solution of a specific problem in the history of culture. His new monograph is again a word-study; and although it is directed to no one specific problem, its intention is also to make a contribution to Greek cultural history through semasiology. He has chosen a good area and a large undertaking. The word *ἀνάγκη* has long needed a careful study; while it is perhaps not as important to Greek culture as *φύσις*, *ψυχή*, *σοφία*, *νόος* and others, still it has long been recognized as a key word (Spanhemius *apud* Ernest, *Callimachi Hymni* [1761], pp. 480 f.)

Schreckenberg's basic approach is to pinpoint (apparently in Homer) *ananke*'s primary meaning (*semantisches Etymon*, p. 165) by finding an allophone designation or synonym (word, image, concept?) by substitution technique. Then (chs. II-V) he tries to verify this root meaning by reducing *ananke* to or deriving it from the allophone in each new area of usage; and he seeks to explore *ananke*'s newly developing nuances and affinities by presenting topically the various interrelated areas of *ananke*'s usage or application (semantic fields?), proceeding generally from more concrete to more abstract usage (concrete, figurative, abstract, personified). When the root meaning has been found and verified by topical reduction, he then (ch. VI) seeks the historical etymology in the area of the root meaning.

His results in outline are these: The Semitic word *chanak* (*hmk*: choke, strangle) was borrowed by the Asiatic Ionians, after psilosis had set in, to designate the Semitic custom of chaining prisoners together in a row by wooden neck-halters (pp. 8 f., 17, 124, 165 f., and pls. 1-7). This Semitic loan word had already begun its purely Greek development in Homer (pp. 173 ff.), where it was already used rather abstractly in some occurrences (p. 62, n. 23). The oldest (still concrete) sense of the word is found in the Homeric formulae *δαμῶν*, *ἄγειν*, and *ἵσχειν ἀνάγκη*. The second formulaic phrase (8 occurrences in Homer, e.g., *Il.*, IX, 429) is the most noteworthy (p. 16), and is paralleled by *δήσαντα ἄγειν* (*Il.*, II, 229; XIII, 571) in the sense of binding captives for transport. This parallelism suggests the semantic identity of *ἀνάγκη* and *δεσμός* (pp. 8, 175) which is confirmed by post-Homeric paraphrases (p. 17) and by post-Homeric substitutions (Hes., *Theog.*, 614 ff., Aesch., *Prom.*, 108 ff., etc.). The other half of the "Doppelaspekt der Grundbedeutung von *Ananke*" (p. 38), namely *ζυγόν*, is already suggested by the Homeric formula, *δαμῶν ἀνάγκη*, and is confirmed by the *Hymn Dem.*, 216 f. (pp. 13 f., 29, 72) and by the proverbial phrase, *ἀνάγκης ζυγόν* (pp. 18, n. 16; 79, n. 20).

Now the usages of *ananke* and its allophone *desmos-zygon* in other topical categories are considered. The closest area is physical

bondage in slavery; then comes the situation of unwilling subjection, where command is "binding." This is again generalized to any binding situation (e.g., siege, prison, *aporia*). Likewise *ananke* as torture is generalized to suffering. Now the usage is further abstracted to (anthropocentric) natural law as physical desires, needs, and states. The main usage here is the sex-drive; other related areas are indispensable sufficiency, kinship-friendship, and death. Closely related to this binding nature is binding fate either as the will of the gods (Hdt., IX, 16; Emped., B115) or as the necessity of nature independent of the gods (Eur., *Alc.*, 962 f., Aesch., *Prom.*, 105, 515). And closely related to these areas is the area of cosmic binding (in this section pp. 101 ff. the yoke of law is treated). This is the longest section and is devoted principally to the philosophers (Pythagoras through the Hermetic Corpus). The evolution and interrelations of their usage are considered in varying degree. Here *ananke* seems generally to be some kind of binding lawfulness (mathematical, logical, material, causal, etc.) or the cosmic binding itself. The myth of Er is considered at length and interpreted (p. 97) as a two-stage mythologization. The usage in the final area of magic binding begins with Bacch., 11, 45. Beginning as a concrete binding command, *ananke* is generalized to become the binding goddess who controls man's imprisonment in or release from the binding corporeal state and its natural drives and passions.

I will comment on practical matters first. In general, Schreckenberg's exposition is good, but at times he is unclear (p. 86, where the introduction of *Phd.*, 108E really does not connect *ananke* any closer to the idea of equilibrium), even perhaps contradictory (on p. 82 the *Tim.* has not helped in understanding *Rep.*, 616B 7 ff., but on pp. 91, 97 ff. the *Tim.* is a good commentary on this section), or needlessly repetitive (pp. 94 f. begins anew on the same material as pp. 88 f.: αὐτοῦ and ὑποζώματα, *Rep.*, 616C1-3). The register of passages cited is an essential feature and quite accurate, but the quotation of *Hymn Dem.*, 217 on p. 39 is not listed and Theognis, 848 is miscited as line 837 for p. 26. As far as I checked, technical errors are relatively few: ἐφηστῆς on p. 77; S. 90. (67) Anm. 29 on p. 80; reference to Aristot. *Rhet.* 1430b32 on p. 88, n. 38; Xenophons *Memorabilien* (*Kyropädie*) on p. 102; der Paarung . . . im *Gorgias* (where? *Protagoras*?) on p. 105; oben S. 102 (p. 76, n. 13) on p. 141; and the citation of Frisk for the etymological relation of δμῶς to δαμάω rather than to δόμος (vice versa) on p. 174.

Schreckenberg's work deserves further study on five counts: 1) He has amassed a large collection of excerpts for the study of *ananke*. He does not aim to be exhaustive, but whether his collection is comprehensively representative remains to be judged. 2) For handling (and finding?) this material he claims the success of some new semasiological methods (and/or theories?). First one must consider whether he follows the methodology of Snell and/or the Trierian school (p. vii) faithfully, and then how effective their methods and/or his are. 3) He has suggested a new etymology for *ananke*. If the linguists accept this etymology and its historical conditions, it will give us a new means to date the *ananke*-passages in Homer. 4) He has completely rejected the possibility of an early or a specific

Orphic *Ananke*. This must be considered in future studies of Orphicism (cf. also A. Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke," diss. Princeton, 1962, apparently not known to Schreckenberg. In Appendix C I also reject early Orphic *Ananke* using somewhat different evidence). 5) Finally he believes that he has demonstrated the semantic identity of *ananke* and *desmos* (—*zygon*). All will agree, I believe, that he has traced their semantic relations more fully than any previous investigator.

As this last point seems to be the main burden of his work, it might be well to consider it further. First, the idea of a close semantic contact between *ananke* and *desmos* (or the idea of binding) is not new (cf. E. W. Fay, *T. A. P. A.*, XLI [1910], p. 45, iii and my dissertation, p. 2 with n. 4 and p. 157). Secondly, even in this area of usage Schreckenberg has missed some pertinent passages (e.g. Theognis, 193-6; Plato, *Laws*, 847B1, and *Phdr.*, 264B7-8, which last seems especially relevant to his idea of *Rottenfesselung*). Thirdly, although in such a work it is difficult to avoid all forced interpretations and impossible to satisfy everyone all the time, still at times he seems to me to be reading the idea of binding (fetter-yoke) into *ananke* on the basis of rather long chains of assumptions and associations. At p. 59 on Semonides, fr. 7, 62 (*ἀνάγκη δ' ἄνδρα ποιῆται φίλον*) he finds (with Marg cited in n. 20) the *ananke* here first fully understandable from comparing (line 115) the unbreakable, fettering *desmos* of Zeus; that is, *ananke* is man's erotic drive or woman's attractiveness. I suggest the *ananke* is better understood by comparing the *ananke* in line 44 (*μόγυς*) and by seeing this statement about the Mare-woman as in responsion to that about the immediately preceding Cat-woman (line 53), who is man-crazy. Likewise I find it hard to follow him, *inter alia*, at pp. 55 f. on Plato, *Phdr.*, 240C, at p. 66, n. 27 on Eur., *Hec.*, 847, and at pp. 68 f. on Pind., fr. 207 (196 OCT, especially in his comparison with Aesch., *Pers.*, 747, which has a totally different context). Fourthly, when he declares that the concrete fetter-yoke image was always in *ananke* for the Greek and all its usages derive directly from this root meaning (pp. 34, 82, 135, 176), we would be surprised to find areas where this was not (could not be?) demonstrated by him. Yet this is the case with the usage group meaning "ausreichend," "unabdingbar," "sachgesetzlich" on pp. 64 f. (further, the subsumption of this group and of the types cited, p. 51, under the category of the bond of human nature is questionable; for in both instances the idea is generalized beyond human nature). Likewise the derivation of the stereotype *ἀνάγκη ἐστίν* from the yoke-fetter root (pp. 30 ff., 106 ff.) is rather disappointing and inconsistent for so basic a usage. Further, even Schreckenberg has to admit (pp. 117, 140) that the *ananke* of atomism and magic involves both binding and loosening (without realizing that Empedocles' *Ananke*, which he interprets as steering *Philia* and *Neikos*, also involves both, pp. 111-13). Fifthly, I feel that he has not done justice to the relation of *ananke* and *τύχη* because of his interest in binding. Indeed, the two are often closely assimilated in the idea of fate (pp. 33, 37, 77), but they are also contrasted (Arist., *Rhet.*, 1368b32 f., *E. N.*, 1112a23 f.) and at times even opposed (Plato, *Rep.*, 561D3 ff., *Phdr.*, 264B3 f., Arist., *Poet.*,

1450b26 f.). Thus, the frequent association of *tyche* with *εἰκῇ* and *ταῦτόματον* and of *ananke* with binding, *τάξις*, and later the syllogism makes their assimilated usages worthy of particular study. Yet on p. 54 Schrekenberg considers *ananke* in Gorgias, B 11, 19; but fails to note its relation there or at 1, 6 f. with *tyche*. More serious is his characterization of *ananke* in the *Timaeus* on p. 121 as fettering in comparison to the freedom of *nous*. He fails to mention its description at 48A6 as the *πλανωμένη αἰτία* or to consider its probable connection to the six irregular motions at 43B1-2 (*ἀτάκτως, ὅπη τύχοι*) which produce *τὸ τυχὸν ἄτακτον* (46E5) and which seem related to the "*ἄτακτος κίνησις*" of chaos (30A4-5). All in all *ananke* seems an unbound sort of thing in itself, and more bound than binding in its relations to *nous*.

Schrekenberg seems even more uninterested in the relation of *ananke* and *βία*; he mentions it only briefly on p. 162. Although one of Aristotle's basic definitions of *ananke* (*Met.*, 1015a26, cited pp. 16 and 167, cf. also *Met.*, 1072b12) is *βία* contrary to impulse or choice, Schrekenberg does not give the Greek and his only comment is the translation *Gewalt*. Likewise on pp. 2 ff. he considers Plato, *Symp.*, 195C3 on the different reigns of *Ananke* and *Eros*. The first brings *ἐκτομαί, δεσμοί*, and other *Gewalttaten* (*βίατα*, cf. also 196B 8 f.), while the second brings *φιλία* and *εἰρήνη* (this opposition of *ananke* and *eros* is not related to their union as sex-drive at pp. 54 ff., nor to their union as equilibrium, harmony, and *φιλία* in the *syndesmos* of Er at pp. 84 ff. and 105 f., in spite of his topical approach praised on p. 175. Cf. also *Eros* and *ananke*, *Phdr.*, 252B8 ff.). Further, at pp. 83 and 106 he cites *Rep.*, 519E4 where law harmonizes citizens by *πειθῶ* and *ananke*, but does not cite the parallel passages, *Gorg.*, 517B6 and *Laws*, 722B6 with *πειθῶ* and *βία*. In many of his excerpts, *βία* is closely associated in the same context with *ananke* (e.g., pp. 1, 40, 46, 50, n. 1, 81, 118, 141, 155), but he takes no notice of this. Although many passages could be added (cf. especially Arist., *Rhet.*, 1368b32 f.), a far more important omission is Hdt., VIII, 111, 2 on Themistocles' goddesses *Peitho* and *Anankaia*, called *Peitho* and *Bia* by Plut., *Them.*, 21, perhaps as a result of the cults of *Ananke* and *Bia* (Paus., II, 4, 4, and *I. G.*, III, 43790). Schrekenberg might very well have treated *βία* more fully in relation to *οὐκ ἐθέλων, οὐχ ἐκόν* at pp. 29 or 39 (cf. Hom., *Il.*, I, 430; Arist., *E. N.*, 1109b35 f.), or at p. 32 where he related *ananke* to *ισχύς* and *ἀλκή*.

Another area which needs fuller consideration in a semasiological study is the stereotype *ἀνάγκη ἐστίν*, an extremely frequent usage. Schrekenberg rather vaguely reduces this usage to the binding obligation of command (pp. 30, 38) and then, without connection, to the binding cogency of argument (pp. 106, 107, n. 85, 124) with another possibility of binding fate (p. 73). This usage should not only be related to *δεῖ, χρῆ, -τέον* (cf. Goodell, *G. Q.*, VIII [1914], pp. 91 ff.), but also to *εἰκός* (Plato, *Rep.*, 519B7, *Gorg.*, 515D9) and *ἀδύνατον* (*Rep.*, 478A12, *Soph.*, 252D9). Again, the usage as punishment (e.g. *Rep.*, 347C1 f.) should be considered, as also the Dio-

medeian *ananke* (Aristoph., *Eccl.*, 1029; Plato, *Rep.*, 493D5 f.). Many other important occurrences should be considered; for instance, Simonides, fr. 4, 21 (p. 79, n. 21 ascribed to Pittacus with no mention of Simonides); Pindar, *Ol.*, 2, 58 f. (Orphic?); Bacchylides, *Encom.*, fr. 20a Sn.; Aristarchus, fr. 2 N.; Agathon, fr. 8N.; Callimachus, *Hymn. in Delum*, 122 f.

The methodology which Schrekenberg applies in this work might be considered at great length; I will limit myself to three points which disturbed me most. First, I do not understand his criticism of the historical approach to the study of *ananke* nor his opposition of the historical and the semasiological points of view (p. vii in reference to Gundel). Indeed, at times he seemed to me to neglect the historical approach to his detriment. And when he did make historical judgments, I could not always confidently agree. His insistence (pp. 139, 176) that personified usage follows abstract usage historically does not convince me (cf. Snell, *Discovery of the Mind*, p. 230, following Usener, *Götternamen*, pp. 364 ff.). Secondly, in his consideration of the philosophers, I feel that he relied at times too heavily on semasiology, when he could have profited more from the study of doxographical traditions (especially for Pythagoras and Philolaos) and from the study of the historical development of philosophical problems (Anaxagoras' unqualified dichotomy of matter and spirit?). Thirdly, I am not convinced that two words can have semantic identity, that this identity is persistent, or that it can be ascertained by substitution technique (cf. F. Hirth, *Studia Linguistica*, X [1956], pp. 57 f. and XI [1957], pp. 8 f.; N. C. W. Spence, *Trans. Philol. Soc.* [1961], pp. 87 f.; and C. D. Buck, *A Dictionary of Selected Synonyms*, Pref. pp. v ff.)

Despite my reservations, I feel that H. Schrekenberg has produced a basic study in which he has seriously undertaken the true task of philology,—to understand and reveal the inner workings of human minds through their language.

A. WOOLEY.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

WILHELM KAMLAH. Platons Selbstkritik im *Sophistes*. München, 1963. Pp. 64. (*Zetemata, Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 33.)

The Selbstkritik for which Prof. KamlaH argues is not the usual one, Plato's animadversions at *Soph.* 248 on the "friends of the Ideas." He finds instead a full rejection of the *Republic's* image metaphor for the relation between Forms and phenomena, and a withdrawal by Plato from any metaphysical doctrine of non-being (as of falsity and image-being) to a narrower logical treatment of these matters ("Reduktion des Nichtseienden auf Relationen der Rede" [p. 58]). In fact, it is KamlaH's fairly startling view that, in the *Sophist*, "sind ihm [sc. Platon] die 'wahren Dinge' keineswegs die Ideen, sondern einfachhin das, was jedermann die 'Wirk-

lichkeit' nennt" (p. 18, cf. pp. 30-1). I do not believe these radical theses are convincingly developed or defended, but they do direct attention toward important aspects of the dialogue. Even if Kamlah's own view will not command any wide assent, his attempt to deal with these deserves careful study.

Kamlah begins with a compact summary of the "classical" theory of Ideas and of the problems posed for it in the *Parmenides* (pp. 3-11). Some gratuitous allusions to Christian Platonism are included, but the account, though excessively brief, is skilfully done. Chapters 3-6 discuss the *Sophist*, attempting at once both a partial paraphrase of the dialogue and brief interpretative comment (pp. 12-48). A three-page chapter on the *Politicus* and *Philebus*, four pages on the *Timaeus*, and four pages of review conclude the work. Many problems arise in these overly brief concluding chapters, most of all in the treatment of the *Timaeus*—a topic crucial for Kamlah's argument, as we shall see. An elaborate index of citations and names has been provided.

Kamlah's account of Plato's metaphysical commitments in the *Sophist* rests on three related points:

- (A) At 265-266, Plato notes two types of divine *poiesis*, one bringing forth originals (all natural things—ourselves, all living creatures, and the elements) and the other making likenesses of these. He does not suggest that products of the first sort are themselves but images of Forms.
- (B) 233D-235A: the young are deceived by images because they are "still far removed from the truth of things." The context lacks any metaphysical connotations; Plato's "wahren Dinge" there are not at all Ideas, but "einfachhin die uns umgebenden Dinge" (p. 32).
- (C) Plato thus avoids any metaphysical employment of the image metaphor, and that is why, in 251-264, he analyzes falsehood and non-being solely as a function of human speech and thought (not—as in *Rep.* V—as an ontological constituent of Becoming).

Each of these points requires comment. (A) Kamlah believes that in the *Sophist*—and consistently after the *Parmenides*—Plato does not regard phenomena as images of Forms; the divine *poiesis* that produces this world is not a *mimesis*. Now, it seems rash to deduce such doctrine from the brief remarks at *Soph.*, 265-266. (Cf. Cornford's view of the restricted aim of that passage [*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 323 ff.], and perhaps compare the curious doctrine about god's creation of the Forms that is suggested in *Rep.* X, but is surely not strict Platonic *Lehre*.) Quite apart from this, however, the obvious counter-argument to Kamlah's view is the entire *Timaeus*. He accepts (*contra* Owen) a late date for the work (p. 49), and thus must argue that, in spite of all appearances, Plato does not there employ the copy-model metaphysics of his "classical" theory of Forms (pp. 16, 36, 52-5). This important argument is by far the flimsiest part of the book. Kamlah finds four main changes in the theory of the *Timaeus* (pp. 52-3):

- (1) *The entire cosmos, "nicht die Einzeldinge," is now the "image."* This is false. The macrocosmic perspective is of course more marked than before, but at *Tim.*, 49D-51B particular masses of the elemental bodies are also imitations of Forms (n. b. 50C4-6, 51B4-6).
- (2) *The relation of Form to phenomenon is no longer that of Ursprung to Abkunft.* The role of the demiurge-creator is of course greater than before, but at *Tim.*, 50D2-4 Plato explicitly commends the idea that the Form is a father, the Receptacle a mother, and the image an *ekgonos*. (This is not the main line of the *Timaeus*' myth, to be sure, but the passage is enough to refute Kamlah's claim that Plato has rejected such a view.)
- (3) *The goodness of the creator, rather than the Idea of the Good, is now the source of Becoming.* This is a valid difference—typical of Plato's increased emphasis on soul as the source of cosmic motion in several later works—but it does nothing to support Kamlah's idea that Plato altered his ontology of Forms. Even *Sophist*, 249B5-10 makes it clear that the rational activity of *nous* itself requires a fully stable object, i. e., a Form (cf. *Tim.*, 37A5-C3, 51D3-E6; also *Laws*, X, 897D-898B with *Tim.*, 34A1-3 and 40A7-B2).
- (4) *Plato now emphasizes the world's likeness to the Forms, not its defectiveness and deceptiveness.* Again, this change in "tonality" is genuine and important, but quite consistent with the multiple, ambivalent connotations of the classical imaging-metaphor (cf. Gregory Vlastos' remarks, *Philos. Rev.*, LXVI [1957], pp. 232, 238). Kamlah cites Aristotle's attitude toward physics as an extension of the *Timaeus*' view, but there is less real change in Plato's thought than he suggests: the "tone" of *Tim.*, 91D6-E1 is the same as that of *Rep.*, VII, 529A-530C.

Thus we must reject Kamlah's idea that there is a significant attenuation in the copy-model metaphysics of the *Timaeus* (though I would not deny there are *some* changes in it). But once we do so, and accept (with him) a late date for that work, his reading of the *Sophist* must seem most improbable. What of its other supports?

(B) Kamlah correctly notes that *Soph.*, 233D-235A speaks of images without referring to the metaphysics of Forms. He does not point out that this passage is alive with echoes of *Rep.*, X, 598B-599B. Much of that latter passage also operates without explicit reference to Forms, but the context is of course pervaded by the sense of their presence, and the reader cannot help but see that Plato's point extends to the metaphysical error in which all "cave dwellers" share (cf. *Rep.*, VII, 515A-B). This brings us squarely before a key problem in interpreting the *Sophist*. It is replete with themes and metaphors from the *Republic*. (One of Kamlah's real virtues is his stress upon the way the *Sophist* is focally concerned with *mimesis* [pp. 13, 17].) But the *Sophist* offers no support for the metaphysical extension of these themes to the relation between Being

and Becoming. Kamlah concludes from this that Plato has abandoned such a metaphysical extension (drawing support from the dubious view of the *Timaeus* that we have remarked on). One might also conclude that the *Sophist*—much like the *Theaetetus*—is an aporetic scrutiny of certain concepts, problems, and themes that were important to the *Republic* theory; that the dialogue makes no deliverances (positive or negative) about the bearing of its own results upon that metaphysical theory; but that—precisely by quoting and echoing the *Republic*—it encourages the reader to pursue such applications and extensions for himself.

(C) The dialogue also encourages this sort of extension in another way: through the structure of the central discussion. Kamlah notes that Plato confines his "answer" to the problem of falsity and non-being to the sphere of *logos*. He concludes from this that Plato here abandons the metaphysical contrast of Image and Original as Reality and Appearance, True-being and pseudo-being. What he fails to notice is that Plato repeatedly formulates the *problem* he will deal with in both ontological and logical terms. This is done with care and clear design at 239D-241B. Cf. 260A-261C, and note, too, that 243D-251D forms a unit posing two sorts of problems about being that must be solved (in accord with 241B-243D) "together with" the problem of non-being: 243D-251A sets out ontological problems drawn from the theories reviewed there, and 251A-D sub-joins certain logical problems about predicative being. It is surely the fundamental *structural* enigma of the *Sophist* that despite Plato's careful statement of the problem as a fully general one with clear metaphysical import, his solution is limited in scope. This peculiarity profoundly occupied Cornford, who finally dealt with it by discovering a dramatic change-in-subject at 249D-251A and a "conscious shelving" of the ontological problem (cf. Cornford, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-52, 302, 321-3). His view made the entire ontological problem a "loose thread" (p. 248), though the degree of design exhibited by the dialogue surely makes that reading unpersuasive. Kamlah's way with the enigma is to assume that Plato quite rejects the metaphysical problem—but his view runs afoul of the *Timaeus*, and leaves it most opaque why Plato ever posed the ontological problem in the *Sophist*. This reviewer's suggestion would be that the peculiar structure of the work encourages the reader to extend the dialogue's results to the ontological problem, though Plato does not here develop the resultant view: that is done in the *Timaeus*.

As I have tried to show, Kamlah's account of Plato's metaphysical commitments in the *Sophist* is developed with consistency in response to genuinely enigmatic features of the dialogue. I have no doubt that his view is mistaken (especially in light of the *Timaeus*), but it has the virtue of directing our attention toward aspects of the content and structure of the *Sophist* that have not—especially of late—received sufficient study. Kamlah's monograph was written without knowledge of J. M. E. Moravcsik's detailed study of *Soph.*, 243-264, "Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*" (*Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XIV [1962], pp. 23-78). His treatment of some logical questions rather suffers in comparison with that work. For example, Kamlah (at pp. 19-27 and 42-48) imputes to Plato the thesis that

an assertion 's is P' is false, when some other predicate Q which is "contrary" to (incompatible with) P holds true of s. As he is aware, however, Plato himself seems not to draw the distinction between such "contrariety" and mere "non-identity" or "otherness" (*Verschiedenheit*). Kamlah imputes it to him nonetheless, but rests his case only on Plato's *examples* of "sitting" and "flying" at 263A (p. 26). This is overly casual interpretation. Details of the difficult lines at *Sophist*, 257-258 may afford some concrete evidence for Kamlah's reading (cf. Moravcsik's discussion at pp. 66-73), but he does not grapple with these (p. 44, n. 1). Like much of the rest of the book, his treatment of this question is far too short, considering the subtlety and magnitude of the problems of interpretation with which the *Sophist* confronts us.

EDWARD N. LEE.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Ambrosii Theodosii Macrobiani *Saturnalia et Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* edidit IACOBUS WILLIS. 2 Vols. Lipsiae, B. G. Teubner, 1963. Pp. x + 466; 247.

Since the last Teubner edition of the two major works of Macrobius,¹ the manuscripts, particularly those of the *Saturnalia*, have been the object of intensive investigation. Antonio la Penna has been industrious and perspicacious in the inquiry, and the present editor has profited notably from his work.

The result of la Penna's investigations² was the establishment of a three-branched stemma. His *alpha*-group consists of N (Naples VB 10, s. ix *in.*) and P (Paris 6371, s. xi); his *beta*-group, of M (Montpellier 225, s. ix), B (Bamberg M. L. V. 5n. 9, s. ix), and R (Vat. Reg. 1650, s. x); and his *kappa*-group comprises A (Cambridge, uni. lib. 260), F (Florence, Laur. plut. 90 sup. 25, s. xii), L (Laur. plut. 51 n. 8, s. xiii), and V (Vat. Reg. 2043, s. x). Willis, in an article in *Rh. Mus.* (C [1957], pp. 152-64), confirms and extends la Penna's findings on the basis of his own careful collations; and he makes some further elaborations in the present introduction. He adds two manuscripts to the *alpha*-group, D (Bodleian Auct. T. II 27, s. ix *ex.*) and T (Escorial Q 1.1, s. xv). The latter, in my estimate, is too late and too obviously edited to deserve citation as a possible variant-carrier. To the *beta*-group he adds Z (Escorial E.III 18, s. xii-xiii *parte priore*) which, for the earlier part, is useful. It should be noted that Willis interchanges la Penna's *sigla* for the two *Reginenses*, now calling 1650 V and 2043 R. Finally, he eliminates L on the ground that it is a direct copy of R. This is all useful and welcome clarification.

Willis contests la Penna's three-branched stemma on the cogent

¹ Ed. Franciscus Eyssenhartd (Leipzig, 1868 and 1893).

² Antonio la Penna, "Studi sulla tradizione dei Saturnali di Macrobio," *Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa*, XXII (1953), pp. 225-52.

ground that *beta* and *kappa* both omit about a full line of prose at I, 7, 14. The two groups, he contends, must therefore share a hyparchetype, which he designates *mu*; and he gives a sizeable selection of variants which, for the most part, reinforce his contention. The result is the familiar two-one split, *beta* and *kappa* against *alpha*; and only *mu*, the reconstructed common exemplar of *beta* and *kappa*, can give variants equal in stemmatic value to *alpha*'s. Naturally, since *beta* contained only the first three books of the *Saturnalia*, *kappa* is a presumptive variant-carrier for the four later books.

But a grave problem—apparently unnoticed by Willis—emerges when one examines the critical apparatus with a view to carrying out the reconstruction of *mu*. In several cases *beta*³ or *kappa*⁴ gives a reading obviously true while the other (*kappa* or *beta* respectively) agrees with *alpha* in an error. Under these conditions *mu*—and so the archetype—must be reconstructed to show the erroneous reading.⁵ So, according to the logic of the stemma, the true reading stands as a sub-variant, which is to say, it has no stemmatic value; but this is impossible unless the reading is the result of scribal conjecture. Moreover, if such were the case then an indeterminable amount of editorial activity would have to be ascribed to both *beta* and *kappa*.

An example of the problem occurs at I, 2, 15: *Servius . . . iuxta doctrina mirabilis et amabilis verecundia*, where *alpha* and *beta* give *doctrinam*. The cause of the error is clear: the scribe(s) took *iuxta* as a preposition, not an adverb. Yet, no matter what the cause, *mu* must be reconstructed as giving *doctrinam* also. For if it be claimed that the error is simple enough to have occurred independently, could we not justly expect it to show up in at least one of the manuscripts of the *kappa*-group? As it is, the distribution of occurrence accords too exactly with the makeup of the stemma to be explained by chance; nor is this an isolated instance. The result is a dilemma. Willis is perfectly correct in postulating *mu*; but that produces an intolerable anomaly. The only solution I can think of is that *mu* itself was edited; but that would render the entire *mu*-branch highly suspect.

Despite such uncertainties about the stemma, Willis has produced a good text—certainly superior to Eyssenhardt's. Fortunately, there seems to be little corruption that cannot be cured by employing the manuscripts in an eclectic manner. Willis' emendations are on the whole convincing, or at least well aimed. He discusses several conjectures in the *Rh. Mus.* article, and makes or suggests a few more in the present edition. In addition, he makes many improvements by adopting readings from manuscripts which he is the first to use. For example, the received text of I, 2, 2 had given . . . *post illa convivium romana profectus Neapoli moraretur*; but Willis rightly adopts the correction found in D, *Roma* for *romana*. The editor deserves particular praise for his judicious use of square brackets and of such comments as "*fortasse recte*," "*locus suspectus*," and the like in his apparatus.

³ I, 5, 4; 6, 2; 6, 19; 16, 26.

⁴ I, 2, 15; 12, 39; 16, 13; 17, 55.

⁵ Cf. Paul Maas, *Textual Criticism* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 5 ff.

The introduction seems to me much too cursory. Willis refers us to the *Rh. Mus.* article, but that too is a rather brief discussion. This edition, after all, is likely to be standard for some time to come, and it should contain within its own pages a full treatment of the manuscripts and transmission of the text. We can, for example, safely credit the assertion that la Penna's L was copied from Willis' R; but it is preferable to have at least a minimum of evidence set before us. Moreover, a separate list of *sigla* is much superior to the old-fashioned system Willis follows of identifying the *sigla* during the course of his introduction. Such a list ought to include explanations of *sigla* like *P^m* (which indicates, one supposes, *marginalia*) and abbreviations of the names of previous editors or commentators like Meurs., Zeun., *et al.* Indeed, a brief conspectus of earlier editions would not be at all otiose.

At the end of this first volume there is an *index librorum* meant to serve both the *Saturnalia* and the *Commentarii*. It is far from complete. I note the absence of the following:

Courcelle, Pierre, "La postérité chrétienne du Songe de Scipion," *R. E. L.*, XXXVI (1958), pp. 205-34.

———, *Les lettres grecques en occident de Macrobie à Cassiodore* (Paris, 2nd ed., 1948).

Duhem, Pierre, *Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, III (Paris, 1915).

Stahl, W. H., "Dominant Traditions in Early Medieval Latin Science," *Isis*, L (1959), pp. 95-124.

The salient achievement of Willis' edition of the *Commentarii* is his use of three manuscripts hitherto unknown to editors. They are D, the same Bodleian codex used for the *Saturnalia*; C, London, B. M. Cott. Faust. C I, s. ix *ex.*; and E, Paris n. a. 16677, s. ix *in.* It may be that D is the "*bodleianus*" mentioned by von Jan on information found in Abraham Gronovius;⁶ if so, Willis deserves the credit of being the first to collate it thoroughly and see its importance. Also, again following la Penna ("Le par. lat. 6370, etc.," *Rev. Phil.*, 1950), he recognizes the worth of Paris 6370 (S), and his apparatus confirms the opinion. In addition, he uses P and B, the Paris and Bamberg manuscripts on which Eyssenhartd based the previous Teubner edition.

With the support of the new manuscripts Willis has made several improvements in the text, e.g. at I, 8, 4 (*mundo insunt* for *in mundo insunt*), and at I, 13, 14 (*vincli* for *vinculis*). At I, 16, 4 S gives *qui in vicem scire nos possumus*, which is much preferable to the received text, *qui nos invicem scire non possumus*. Willis follows S, but emends *qui* to *quos*, a mere trivialization, it seems to me.

In some instances the editor is over-conservative. At I, 6, 78 (*sine haustu spiritus ultra horas septem, sine cibo ultra totidem dies vita non durat* in the received text) Willis reverts to the unten-

⁶ Ludwig von Jan, ed., *Macrobian Opera* (Leipzig and Quedlinburg, 1848), p. lxxii.

able *sine cibi* of all manuscripts except the corrected E. He wishes, apparently, that *haustu* be understood after *sine*; but, to pass over the inelegance of such an ellipsis, *haustus* does not have the generalized sense of "intake" which would allow it to refer to the ingestion of solid food. In another case, at I, 5, 3, Willis rejects Bentley's excellent emendation *vaorá* (referring to metallic bodies as "solid") in favor of the nonsense *vasta* of the manuscripts.

The critical apparatus is marred by inconsistency in the editor's method of reporting variants. He begins with a "positive" apparatus, i. e. one in which he reports only variant readings; but soon he begins to use the "negative" form, and that haphazardly, giving support for an accepted variant as well as the rejected readings. Coming as it does after two misprints in the apparatus (at I, 2, 4 *casusque*, *casusque* EP in the apparatus should be *casuque*; at I, 2, 10 *ex hac ergo*, *ex hac ergo* PD in the apparatus should be *ergo ex hac*), the initial instance of support for the text (I, 2, 10 *in aliam rursum*, *in aliam rursum* SP, *in aliam rursum* EDC, *rursum in aliam* B) appears at first to be yet another misprint. Since only six manuscripts are used, consistent adherence to a single method does not involve the danger of a cluttered apparatus; indeed the opposite is true. Some reports are wretchedly confusing, e. g. at I, 6, 59 where the apparatus reads 11 *generibus conversionum*] *conversionum* P, *conversionibus* D. Properly it should read 11 *generibus* om PD *conversionibus* D.⁷ The editor plainly desires to facilitate comprehension; but such inconsistency invariably destroys the clarity and economy of an apparatus.

Having gained a signal advantage over previous editors by using his new manuscripts, Willis relinquishes it by ignoring many other early manuscripts of whose existence he is surely aware. A glance at the *Prolegomena* to von Jan's edition shows that Willis has passed over, without saying why or even whether he rejects them, eleven manuscripts of s. xii or earlier. They are the following:

Munich, lat. 4612, 6362, 6364, 6369, 14353, 14436, 19471⁸
 Bern, lat. 265 and 347
 Leiden, Voss. lat. Q 2 and Q 44.

Surely there must exist in addition to these other manuscripts of the *Commentarii* equal in antiquity and authority to those which Willis uses. Moreover, of the considerable amount of work done on the *Somnium* itself, whether alone or as part of the *De re publica*, much is definitely germane to the study of the tradition of the *Commentarii*. Willis mentions in his *index librorum* the important article of Sicherl, "De somnii Scipionis textu constituendo" (*Rh. M.*, 1959); but remains unaccountably silent, in the apparatus of his own text of the *Somnium* (vol. II, pp. 155 ff.), about the work of any other scholars—unless by the vague "*libri*" which spangles it

⁷ Another confused passage is I, 3, 5, where Willis reads *nomen est non* and gives *nomen est non* SP in the apparatus. According to Eysenhardt B omits *est*. Does the editor intend to read *nomen non* in the text?

⁸ These are the current signatures of the Munich MSS. Not all of them were in Munich at the time of von Jan's edition.

he means everything that everyone else has done. For example, in his *Somnium*, at I, 2, he writes, . . . *ipse recreor, ita* . . . ; and his apparatus reads, "recreor ipse D, *sane malim ipso ita vulgo edunt, itaque libri*." In Ziegler's Teubner text of *De re publica* one finds . . . *recreor ipso, itaque* . . .

Inspection of the apparatus discloses a predictably high incidence of agreement between P and D. Comparison with von Jan's apparatus shows great similarity between D and von Jan's F, now elm 6362. Investigation of such connections could elucidate the tradition of the *Commentarii*.

Willis' discussion of the transmission of this text is brief, and I quote it in full:⁹

"Et in Saturnalibus edendis discere potui quae ratio cognationis inter diversos libros manuscriptos intercederet: in *Commentariis* in *Somnium* Scipionis idem non licuit. inanes enim illae de anima et de sphaerarum concentu et de septenario numero cantilenae adeo medii aevi hominibus in deliciis fuerunt ut nihil paene libentius exscripserint. scilicet in omnibus monasteriis si quis frater reperiebatur adeo inutilis, adeo nec sibi nec alteri (ut dicitur), ut ne terram quidem versare sciret, sine mora is Macrobio exscribendo deputabatur. itaque in tanta omnium contaminatione eas lectiones secutus sum quae et maxime Macrobiana mihi viderentur et quae facillime a monachis corrumpi potuisse viderentur. saepe enim evenit ut unus tantum liber adhuc genuinam lectionem retineat, sed et illam variis lectionibus nugacissimis circumvallatam. unde si cui videar magis quam par est iudicio meo indulsisse, velim ignoscat et ceteros quam primum doceat quatenam melior ratio sit sequenda."

Among the reasons for this assertion that a stemma cannot be made, one misses the assurance that the editor in fact attempted the task.

The second volume contains four figures illustrative of passages in the *Commentarii* and *indices scriptorum et rerum* to both works.

JAMES J. M. CURRY.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.

C. A. VAN ROOY. *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory*. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965. Pp. xiv + 229. 24 Guilders.

Those who have followed the lengthy debate on the origin and theory of Latin satire and who have wished for a review of the problem will find Professor Van Rooy's study most rewarding. Not that this book is merely a summation of earlier scholarship—far from it. Van Rooy has read most of this scholarship but he wisely relegates it to the footnotes, while confining his text to the presen-

⁹ Vol. I, Praef. pp. ix-x.

tation of his own views. Not only is his material stimulating, but he offers so many opinions, closely argued and vigorously presented, that neither a review nor a cursory reading of his book can do it full justice.

The scope of this study extends from the origin of the term *satura* to an explanation of why, finally, in the seventh century Isidore defined the Latin satirists as [*comici*] *novi qui et satyrici . . . et nudi pinguntur eo quod per eos vitia singula denudentur* (*Etym.*, VIII, 7, 7). Van Rooy begins with Diomedes' definition of *satura*, which is included and translated preceding Chapter I, and which, he argues against Ullman, Hendrickson, and others, goes back to Varro through Suetonius or, less probably, Valerius Probus (pp. 12, 124 ff., 186-7). From there Van Rooy ranges over the Greek and Latin contributions to the genre of Roman satire, considering both literary and philological problems, with slightly more emphasis upon the latter. A summary of his major topics will illustrate the comprehensiveness of his treatment.

In Chapter I Van Rooy argues that originally the term *satura* was the feminine form of the adjective *satur* with a passive meaning, "filled" and applied to the dish of first fruits, the *lanx satura*. When the latter phrase was eventually shortened to *satura* the adjective turned into a passive noun; this noun then became active ("filling") when it was applied to a kind of stuffing (*farcimen*). By the early second century B. C., when Ennius was starting his career, the term *satura* had become abstract, meaning "a medley" or "a miscellany" and it is in this sense that Ennius applied it to the individual books of his poems, which contained a variety of metres and subject matter. During this period also (200-150 B. C.), the abstract noun was used in the legal phrase *lex per saturam lata*, and after 150 B. C. it probably referred absolutely to the omnibus law itself.

Following a discussion in Chapter II of the three major factors influencing Ennius' creation of the genre, *satura* (his debt to Hellenistic literature, particularly the diatribe and iambi, his own personality, and the needs of his Roman audience), Van Rooy resumes his examination of the term *satura* as it is used by the satirists and several non-satiric writers (Chapter III). He traces the shift in its meaning from "a collection of miscellaneous poems" in Lucilius to "a collection of satirical poems" sometime before his death in 102 B. C., and maintains that the titles of Varro's works, *Saturae Menippeae* and *Saturae*, allude to their satirical tone as well as to their varied content (pp. 56-7). Horace deliberately avoids the term in his first book of satires, Van Rooy believes, because it connoted a lack of artistry, but after he created "a new literary standard in the genre" (p. 70) in *Sermones* I he extended the term *satura* to refer to both the individual poem and the genre (*Serm.*, II, 6, 17; II, 1, 1). Persius and Juvenal, while continuing these usages, hark back more to the original concept of a "miscellany."

In Chapter IV Van Rooy investigates satiric elements in selected Greek authors from the seventh to the fifth century B. C. (the *Margites*, Archilochus, Solon, Xenophanes, and Aristophanes). Although he finds some satire in each of these writers, he does not clarify the

relevance of these findings to the Latin *satura*. Whether or not he intended it, his conclusions confirm his thesis in Chapter V, where he argues that Quintilian's remark, *satura quidem tota nostra est*, emphasizes the uniquely Roman origin of the genre, satire, and denies the existence of any analogous Greek genre.

The last three chapters of Van Rooy's study treat three problems arising from Diomedes' statement on *satura*: the false etymology of *satura* < *σάτυροι* (Chapter VI), the varied usages of the terms *σατυρικός*, *satyricus*, *saturarum scriptor*, etc. (Chapter VII), and, finally, the confusion in literary theory which led Joannes Lydus (late sixth century A. D.) and Isidore to consider Latin satire a form of dramatic comedy (Chapter VIII). These chapters are particularly valuable because Van Rooy has studied the unpublished material on *satyricus* in the archives of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* and has added several references of his own. He offers here the first comprehensive analysis of both the philological and the literary misunderstandings of the *satura* in late antiquity. His research should clarify much of the confusion created by writers of the fourth to seventh century and perpetuated in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

While most of Van Rooy's arguments are convincingly presented, certain statements, in this reviewer's opinion, lack sufficient evidence. In Chapter I, for example, he points out that at some time during the development of the term *satura* its connotation shifted from one of "fulness" to "a miscellany" or "a variety" (pp. 4, 19). He describes this shift as "quite natural" (p. 4) and in proof refers the reader to a passage in Plautus:

In *Amphitruo* 667 ff. the chief accent is still on fulness, but there is a double pun on the word. When the slave Sosia says "Alcumenam ante aedis stare saturam intellego" (vs. 667), he means that she is 'full' in the original sense of 'full of food.' *Amphitruo* however takes 'saturam' to mean 'gravidam' (vs. 668, cf. vs. 681), i. e. 'full' in the sense of 'pregnant.' The audience, knowing that Alcmena is expecting two children from two different fathers (cf. vs. 483), no doubt grasps the significance of the word as a pun on the substantive 'satura' and therefore meaning 'full of a miscellany' (pp. 4-5).

I am not convinced that this shift in connotation is so "natural" (something can equally well be full of a single substance), and although I am open to persuasion, I hesitate to accept a single pun as sufficient proof, particularly when one must assume that the audience grasps a triple word-play. I would also like to see firmer evidence that before Lucilius' death *satura* came to mean "a collection of satirical poems" rather than simply "a collection of miscellaneous poems." Van Rooy offers little proof other than that Lucilius' contemporaries must have recognized his distinctive contribution to the *satura*, a polemical spirit, and thereafter used the term with a new connotation (p. 55).

More serious, however, is the relative weakness of Chapter IV, "The Satirical Elements in Greek Literature." Although he avoids

a discussion of Hellenistic literature because of the earlier studies of Geffcken and Gerhard,¹ Van Rooy still tries to cover five writers in roughly fifteen pages with the result that his discussion remains somewhat superficial. His conclusions offer little new insight into the satiric element in Greek literature: the *Margites* he finds satiric merely because it parodies Homeric verse and its hero is realistic (p. 95); Archilochus is the first to write personal satire "in the sense that the greater part of his polemic emanates from private animosity, and is directed at personal enemies" (p. 98); Solon and Xenophanes, however, turn out to be moralists and teachers rather than satirists (p. 101). The *Frogs* is examined more closely (specifically 389 ff., 1470-8, and 1491-9), but Van Rooy hesitates to oppose the scholarly consensus which denies that Aristophanes is a conscious satirist and so he concludes rather indecisively:

In general we shall do well always to bear in mind that his plays are in the first place comedies, written to raise laughter . . . and that in so far as they do contain satiric elements, their satiric function, exercised by means of criticism and invective, by ridicule and the *spoudogeloion*, is on the whole a secondary one (p. 108).

Equally inconclusive, to my mind, is Chapter VI, in which Van Rooy attempts to prove that the false etymology *satura* < *σάτυροι* arose in the early first century B. C. and hence appeared in Varro's discussion of the *satura*. Diomedes states that both the *satura* and the satyr play deal with *ridiculae res pudendaeque*; this similarity, Van Rooy argues, can only have been noticed after Lucilius had introduced the elements of derisive laughter and obscenity into the Latin *satura* and after the Greek satyr play had begun, in the third century B. C., to deal with realistic situations and topical events. In support of this last point Van Rooy traces the changes in the satyr play from the late sixth century when "the setting remained pastoral, while the themes were grotesque and burlesque representations of mythological events and ancient legends" (p. 125) to the early third century when the emphasis shifted to "topical allusions, subtle parody, and even outspoken criticism of contemporary men and affairs" (p. 136). He then concludes:

As a consequence of the new style we may expect that the word *σατυρικός* in a metaphorical sense (originally 'grotesque, burlesque') acquired the meaning 'mocking,' 'derisive,' or 'satirical' in our sense of the word, though without any moral connotation (*ibid.*).

Van Rooy's approach to the problem may be right, but I am not entirely convinced by his evidence. The adjectives *ridiculae* and *pudendae* suggest to me bawdy erotic humor and the whole phrase seems more descriptive of the earlier satyr plays than the later ones.

¹ J. Geffcken, "Studien zur griechischen Satire," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, XXVII (1911), pp. 393-411, 469-93; G. A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon* (Leipzig, 1909).

Despite these weaknesses, Van Rooy's book remains an important contribution to the history of Latin satire. It also emphasizes the need now for a close study of the poetic techniques of Latin satire (the *persona*, unifying devices, verbal repetition, imagery and metaphor, etc.). In a philological study such as this one Van Rooy may be excused from considering such topics, yet his decision not to do so makes his evaluations of the Latin satirists rather one-sided. He confines Lucilius' main contribution to the introduction of a censorious tone (p. 53); he mentions that Horace established "a new standard in the genre" (pp. 68, 70) but never describes or defines this standard; he accepts the well-worn but, in my opinion, erroneous picture of Persius as more of a Stoic moralist than a satirist (pp. 74-5), and he scarcely penetrates the surface of Juvenal's satiric talent. Perhaps it is unjust to find fault with Van Rooy on this point, but is it not possible that certain poetic techniques, such as the use of a satiric *persona*, may play an important role in determining the "true nature" or *physis*, as Van Rooy calls it (pp. 53, 55) of the genre of Latin *satura*?

In addition to a lengthy, up-to-date bibliography, this book also contains useful annotated indices of subjects, names, Latin terms, and Greek terms.

CYNTHIA DESSEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN,
MADISON.

T. C. Skeat, ed. *Papyri from Panopolis in the Chester Beatty Library*, Dublin. Dublin, Hodges Figgis and Co., 1964. Pp. xliv + 194; 3 pls. (*Chester Beatty Monographs*, No. 10.)

Anyone who imagines that the great discoveries in papyri are over should look into this volume of deceptively modest appearance. If one excepts the Michigan tax rolls, which are lists rather than texts in the conventional sense, this volume contains the two longest continuous Greek documents preserved on papyrus, running to about 9,000 and 6,000 words, respectively.

The importance of the texts will be examined in a moment. But first the detective-story part:

"Among the Greek papyri acquired by Sir Chester Beatty at various dates . . . prior to 1957 was a roughly made papyrus codex, largely blank, but containing here and there a few tax-receipts bearing dates between A.D. 339 and 345. . . . The codex consisted of a number of sheets of papyrus, doubled over to form a single unwieldy quire. The leaves, unsecured by any form of sewing, were extremely thick, and examination quickly revealed that they were formed from two thicknesses of papyrus gummed together. In some places where the adhesive had loosened its hold, it could be seen that the whole of the inner surfaces were covered with writing, in which could be deciphered references to the Panopolite nome and to other nomes of Upper Egypt.

"Since the writing on the inner surfaces of the leaves, i. e. those which had been gummed together, promised to be of much greater interest than the tax-receipts, [it was] agreed that the codex should be taken to pieces. This delicate operation, which involved prolonged soaking of the papyrus, was undertaken . . . and the results exceeded all expectations. The papyri which had been re-used for the manufacture of the codex proved to come from two long rolls containing official correspondence of the Strategus of the Panopolite nome, and dating from A. D. 298 and A. D. 300 respectively" (pp. vii-viii).

Further as to the contents:

"Papyrus 1 contains copies of letters sent out by the Strategus of the Panopolite nome, either to his superiors in the official hierarchy or to local officials and employees. The roll is written in five or six different hands . . . all were presumably clerks in the office of the Strategus.

"The second roll . . . consists entirely of correspondence received by the Strategus, Apolinarius, from Aurelius Isidorus, Procurator of the Lower Thebaid. Apart from the contents of the letters, this roll provides some interesting data about the speed and frequency of postal communications between leading officials of the administration, since not only are the letters themselves dated, but the dates on which they were received are noted in every case.

"Papyrus 1 is largely concerned with preparations for the forthcoming visit of Diocletian to Panopolis, preparations which consist principally of arrangements for provisioning the body of troops accompanying the Emperor. . . . [In] Papyrus 2 . . . the most striking feature is the long series of orders issued to the Strategus to supply money or provisions to a wide variety of military units scattered throughout the Thebaid" (pp. xxii-xxvi).

As we peruse these letters and orders, there passes before our eyes an unprecedented parade of early Byzantine bureaucracy: over a hundred different offices, including a dozen different kinds of *epimeletai*, and two dozen different kinds of *apaitetai*, *apodektai* and *diadotai*. Skeat has resisted the temptation—which must have been great—to work out the intricacies of the relationships between and among these functionaries, high and low, careerist and liturgic (there are surely the makings of a doctoral dissertation here). In an exemplary introduction he provides us with a description of the papyri and an exposition of the new information which they contribute in several areas. The sections of the introduction are titled: 1. The Papyri. 2. The Historical Background. (The question of the date of the revolt of Domitius Domitianus, which we had thought settled a mere five years ago with the publication of *P. Cair. Isidor.*, is apparently reopened.) 3. The Division of Egypt. 4. The Strategus and His Correspondence. 5. The Army. (This section includes a table and analysis of donatives and other issues recorded in Papyrus 2.) 6. Taxation and Finance. 7. Panopolis and the Panopolite

Nome. 8. Style, Lexicography, and Onomastics. There follow the texts and translations, conveniently arranged on facing pages; the notes, not the least merit of which is that they assist the reader through the labyrinth of the texts with constant cross-references; *P. Lond.*, 1260 and 1271, published as appendixes; and the customary indexes. Two excellent plates give a very good idea of the professional hands that copied the various items of correspondence into these official "ledgers."

The general impression that emerges is that most of the instructions recorded in this correspondence were carried out, though not always efficiently or on time. The creaking of the administrative machinery is strikingly revealed by the frequent injunctions, threats, and references to fines, penalties, condemnations, and other legal proceedings; even the strategus of the nome and his assistant are subjected to a fine for failure to submit monthly accounts on time (*τὸ ὀρισθὲν ἐπὶ τούτῳ πρόστιμον*, 2, 67; *sim.* 2, 62).

I turn now to consider a number of individual points. Page 22, line 182: Though most liturgic offices involved the keeping of written records, a specific stipulation such as this, that the candidate must be *γραμματῶν ἔμπορον*, is rarely found; other examples are *S. B.*, 9050, V-VI and *P. Amh.*, 82 (late first and late third/early fourth centuries). Page 23, line 185: Comparison with lines 167, 181, and 242 shows that these ships are being "repaired," not "constructed"; *κατασκευάζω*, which elsewhere in these documents means "construct," is here obviously an error or a synonym for *ἐπισκευάζω*. Similarly, *ἐπισκευή* at page 51, line 374, is "repair" rather than "building"; cf. lines 333 and 335. Page 33, line 258 (and page 93, line 227): "Duty" is unnecessarily vague for *epimeleia*; "superintendence" and "oversight," used elsewhere, are to be preferred as more precise. Page 44, lines 335-6: From these lines it now at last becomes clear beyond doubt that the office of *epeiktes* was a compulsory one (cf. also page 154, lines 11-12). Page 49, line 361: I take *ᾧδε* to mean "thus," explained by what follows. Page 60, line 34: As the editor's note points out, we now learn that in this kind of context *περιφορά*, tentatively interpreted half a century ago as a "turntable" and so recorded in LSJ, really means a "period of grace." Page 70, line 93 (cf. 94 and 97): Can *προφάσει βαλλαντίων . . . διδόμενα* mean that the bankers were not accepting the new coinage (*folles*) at face value but insisting upon a handling discount? On the rapid depreciation of the currency and its stimulus to malpractice cf. the note to lines 215-21. Page 76, line 129: Here is further proof of the view asserted by the editor over thirty years ago, that *ὑπόλογος* is a noun, not an adjective with *γῆ* understood. This passage also confirms the view on land reclamation in this period put forth by me in *J. E. A.*, XXIX (1943), pp. 71-3. Page 81, line 150: "Inquisition" is too strong for *ἐνόχλησις*. Page 82, lines 162-4: These lines settle the date of Diocletian's accession as November 20th and provide the new information that his birthday was December 22nd; an excellent note summarizes the data and their implications. Page 114, note to 120: Read *C. I. L.* iii.18 = 6586. The promotion from *magister rei privatae* to *catholicus* (= *rationalis*) is another evidence

for the close connection of the two offices (on which cf. now my article in *Journ. Jur. Pap.*, XV, especially note 3). Page 150, the note to 267-8 should be revised with reference to line 205.

This excellently edited and excellently produced volume provides the material for much study for many years to come.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

E. LOBEL. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XXX. Edited with Notes. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1964. Pp. 98; 13 pls. 55s. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 44.)

This volume of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* contains an odd lot of minor literary fragments ranging from early elegiacs to Euphorion edited with his usual skill, ingenuity, learning, sobriety, and laconic style by Edgar Lobel.

2507 and 2508, fragments of columns no more than a dozen letters in width, fourteen and twenty-five lines respectively, are identified as elegiac and possibly as Archilochus because of the occurrence of *δωρον επιστ[* in the former. Although this is too elementary a matter for Lobel to mention, the identification of the fragments as elegiac depends on the sequences *ο--ο* and *ο--οο* in lines 8 and 9 respectively and is supported by the occurrence of the pentameter clausula mentioned above at the proper interval. This clausula has the quality of a formula and is therefore no guarantee that the fragment is Archilochus. The content of both fragments is martial. It is tempting to speculate how *θεσσαλ[* of 2507, 8 is to be taken. If it is a form of *Θεσσαλίη* it would apparently be the earliest reference to that land. Although *καρύσ[* and *ερετρ[* appear in adjacent lines in 2508 and Archilochus does refer to the warlords of Euboea, it seems gratuitous to think of relating this fragment to the Lelantine war.

Fr. 2509, we may readily agree, is a proper addition to the already extensive remains of Hesiodic catalogue poetry. It gives us a goodly portion of twenty-one lines dealing with Chiron, Actaeon and his hounds. The Actaeon story seems, however, to be dealt with only briefly and proleptically.

Fr. 2510 is ascribed to early epic on the basis of close adherence to Homeric style and the fact that it deals with the rescue of the corpse of Achilles by Odysseus and Ajax. One must agree that it is probably not from the *Aethiopis*, but from whatever source is represented by the scholiast on *Od.*, V, 310. As a matter of detail *οισωμ[εν* seems unlikely as a verse end.

Fr. 2511 is tantalizingly close to Merkelbach's fragment O from presumably Hesiodic verse and unless Lobel was able to see much more than appears on the photograph of line 10 his tentative identification is hardly to be rejected, certainly not on the basis of strongly Homeric line endings.

Fr. 2512 and 2513 are satisfactorily identified as early hexameters and 2514 and 2515 with proper caution merely as hexameters, but not much more can be said of them.

Antimachus is represented by 2516 and 2518-19. The first is made up of fourteen minuscule fragments, and if enthusiasm were not unseemly one might offer a rousing cheer for the acumen which produces an identification which rests on "the coincidence in fr. 4 of five syllables distributed over three lines with these same syllables occurring in three half lines quoted as a lemma in a commentary on Antimachus already known." While these fragments cannot be identified with the *Thebais*, those of 2518 can with certainty and those of 2519 with some probability but little gain in knowledge of the poem. Even to suggest, as Lobel does, that the nondescript piece of a diagonal, which he says might e. g. be λ of a stichometric notation, could mean 1100 is unworthy of his caution and not to be excused by the agility with which he withdraws the suggestion even as he makes it. The pip could, of course, from its position be part of a stichometric notation, but even if this identification were certain it would be more likely to be part of the line under the letter, of which we have a good example in 2524.

Number 2517 is inserted in the midst of Antimachus texts for an odd reason. It is part of a Homeric lexicon which happens to contain the phrase $\theta\omicron\omicron\nu\ \delta\acute{o}\mu\omicron\nu$ the last word of which occurs in 2516, fr. 4, 2, and which is attested as occurring in Antimachus by the Homeric *epimerismoï*. The fragment is part of a single folio from a codex which Lobel places not later than the second century, a rarity, as he remarks. It is more interesting for its format than for its content. The entries are in alphabetic order for their first two letters and extend from $\theta\alpha$ through $\theta\rho$. It will not have been a lengthy work. At the transition from $\theta\iota$ to $\theta\omicron$ in the middle of the column there is a heading $\theta' \kappa\alpha\iota \acute{o}$, a kind of guide which is common in Byzantine compilations but which I do not recall having seen elsewhere in so early a text. There is also a numeral $\mu\beta$ in the upper right corner of the verso and traces of what is probably a similar numeral in the same position on the recto, which would suggest that the codex was equipped with page numbers throughout, a convenience which was not to be established as standard until after printing. At a rough guess the whole book would have contained a little over a hundred pages.

2520 is composed of fifteen fragments from a hexameter poem convincingly identified as an otherwise unknown epic on Philip of Macedon. The identification is based on the occurrence of $\phi\iota\lambda\iota\pi$ [, $\iota\epsilon\rho\omega\nu\mu\omicron\varsigma$, $\alpha\rho\kappa\alpha\delta\iota\eta\nu$, $\alpha\mu\mu\nu\tau\omicron\rho\alpha\varsigma$, $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\nu\kappa\alpha\delta\mu\omicron\iota\omicron$ and the like, along with inferences that can be drawn from them. The language is that of Homeric battle scenes and Euboeans and Illyrians are referred to. There is no indication of the use of divine apparatus.

The Hellenistic period is also well represented by the remaining numbers. 2521 is a set of nine hexameters the subject of which is elusive but has something to do with Lagus, whose name appears in the last verse in the lower margin.

2522 is composed of one fragment of a second century manuscript

(A) and two fragments of another second century manuscript (B). The two fragments of B coincide with lines on the opposite sides of the column represented by A, a coincidence indeed! The whole that can be made of these pieces adds parts of eighteen lines to the very little we know of Rhianus' *Messenica* if Lobel's plausible arguments be accepted, as it seems to me they should be.

2523 and 2524 are scraps of Hellenistic or later hexameters, the second showing superficial Dorisms.

The promise of Euphorion material in 2525-2528 arouses expectations but does not go far toward satisfying them. 2525 gives small parts of twenty-two lines, guaranteed by coincidence with two lines preserved in Schol. T *Il.*, XI, 18, comparing nightly visits to the camp of Nestor before Troy with the visits of a physician. It is typical of the sad fate of this poet, whose reputation suffers from Cicero's contempt for his imitators, that this fragment shows that the book from which it came was reused for a copy of the Scholia minora on *Iliad* II. Although there are examples of the copying of literary texts on the back of documents, as was the case with the text of Aristotle's 'Αθ. πολ., it must be a relatively rare thing for a literary text to suffer the indignity of being reused for a less ambitious purpose. 2526 is made up of thirty-four fragments in size from a single letter to fourteen part lines. The identification depends in this case on consideration of content and style, but seems highly probable. Spondeiazontes are not infrequent.

A piece of commentary (2528) is tentatively identified as being "either by, or on a poem by, Euphorion." This seems the least convincing of all the identifications in this volume. It depends on the statement πε]ρὶ ἧς ἐν ταῖς χίλι/άσιν διαλεξόμεθα. Although I cannot offer another author of *Chiliades* as early as the second century I should not be surprised if there had been one. In any case Lobel's question mark is well justified.

Three minute bits of Callimachus (2529, 2530, and addendum to 2258) complete the volume. As a score-keeping matter let it be recorded that *P. Oxy.* XXX brings an increment of twelve more or less certain entities to the treasures of L. S. J.

LLOYD W. DALY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

ADOLF LIPPOLD. *Consules. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des römischen Konsulates von 264 bis 201 v. Chr.* Bonn, Rudolf Habelt Verlag, 1963. Pp. xi + 413. (*Antiquitas*, Reihe 1, Band 8.)

The title of this work is *Consules*, but its subject is the course of political and cultural relations during the greater part of the third century in Rome, with emphasis on the leadership provided by the chief magistrates. Thus it overlaps, though with a different point of view, the studies of Cassola and Scullard. The author is

concerned to show that in the period of the First and Second Punic Wars there developed among the Roman nobility an ideal of individual achievement, as opposed to that of group or family, which is expressed in the early sources and is exemplified in the actions of a goodly number of the leading magistrates. This ideal is expressed in such documents as the Scipionic Epitaphs and the *laudatio* of Caecilius Metellus (Cos. 251 and 247), and its effect may be seen in the succession of names in the Fasti. This development may be divined, he holds, from the older strata of our sources and was encouraged by greater opportunities to win personal wealth and the holding of distant commands over longer periods. Not Scipio Africanus only, but a number of magistrates were leaders and originators of policy in spite of increasing senatorial prestige and control. While this is not to be overlooked, the saying that "the magistrates of the Roman republic were not much more than the executive arm of the Senate" remains also inapplicable.

The first chapter subjects the sources to a searching review, analyzing them into earlier and later strata. The earlier Roman ones, as opposed to the non-Roman, tended not to differentiate the leaders as individuals, while the later ones, as in the case of Regulus, exalted them as types of good men in the "good old times." The earlier strata and Polybius, therefore, provide the best evidence. Good, but in this connection it seems hazardous to reject even Polybius on the breach of the truce between Rome and Carthage in 203 and Scipio's dismissal of the Carthaginian envoys because of the silence of a brief and summary early papyrus fragment in which, apparently, the envoys come directly back to Carthage (see M. Treu, *Aegyptus*, XXXIII [1953], pp. 30 ff.). It is clear, however, that the ideals and virtues represented are genuine and true to the time: they are assumed, if only for purposes of comic contrast, as Earl has shown, in the plays of Plautus; and for Sallust they represent a good old tradition. But the evidence hardly suffices to show how new they were.

The second, and most important, chapter presents a detailed analysis, year by year wherever possible, to show how individuals determined elections and decisions on policies. It is encouraging to find the author's rejection of parties in any modern sense, and his recognition of factors that limited the influence of the presiding officer in an election, such as the number and availability of suitable candidates, although undeniably he was in a position to favor his relatives and friends. It may also be granted that while experience and success were very important considerations during the crisis of the Second Punic War, members of noble families had an advantage in the opportunity to gain them. Nor can we automatically assume the solidarity of all the members of a *gens*. The author grants that both Flaminius in 217 and Varro in 216 had a considerable senatorial following who wanted an active policy. It would have been difficult to win an election in the centuriate assembly without it, and Polybius confirms it for 216 (III, 107-9): a decree of the Senate in 216 before Cannae instructed the commanders to engage Hannibal. The opposition between Fabius and Flaminius makes the hypothesis of their earlier cooperation (p. 144) surprising: it is based on the

uncertain tradition that Fabius named Flaminius his Master of Horse in 221 (Dorey's suggestion, Minucius, seems more probable), and that Flaminius was praetor the year after Fabius' consulship. Fabius' influence on the elections and the strategy of the war from 216 on and his drive for power, not unconnected with his patriotic desire to assure a safe strategy, remain undeniable. There seems, however, to be an ample background of conservative and religious feeling to explain why Marcellus was found to be *vitio creatus* in 215. It is a great tribute to him that although no plebeian college of consuls held office until 172 his election almost produced one at the crisis of the war. In estimating the effect of family alliances caution remains necessary, even though the rigidity of earlier patterns is considerably relaxed in this book. It is reasonable to find, for example, signs of an activist alliance of Cornelii and Aemilii, yet even among the Cornelii branches like the Lentuli, Cethegi, and Scipiones had become pretty distant relatives, and later Scipiones even are found on occasion as rivals for the same office. The suggestion (p. 202) that the son of Marcellus was unfriendly to Scipio in 205 may be true, but the fact that a Cornelius Cethegus had gathered witnesses and agitated against his father in Sicily in 210 gives it little support. Indeed, Marcellus' consulship followed that of a Cornelius Cethegus (197).

Two chapters are devoted, respectively, to the rise of Hellenistic influence in Rome and the increases in the number of triumphs and foundations of temples and cults. In this the author may rightly look for signs of individual search for glory, but it is hard to place Fabius among the philhellenists because of the honors he paid to a deity so long established in Rome as Hercules.

The whole is a welcome study, valuable for its command of material, and its detailed as well as independent analysis of sources and situations.

T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

G. M. A. GRUBE. *The Greek and Roman Critics*. Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1965. Pp. xi + 372. \$8.25.

Professor Grube sets out "to provide a clear and reliable account of what the Greeks and Romans said about literature, and of the development of literary, critical and stylistic theories during the thousand years or so from Homer to the third century A.D." A more logical man for the task could hardly be found. The scope of the book is generous and much of it is rewarding, from "the seeds of criticism" in the opening chapter to the brief epilogue on Plotinus and the early commentators.

Balanced and sympathetic criticism abounds. In laudably short order the first chapter handles the multiple headings: Homer, Hesiod, the Homeric hymns, the age of lyric, moral criticism (Xenophanes, Heraclitus), Pindar, the tragedians, and the sophists. Later chapters on "Alexandria," "The schools of philosophy," "Roman beginnings,"

"From Augustus to Nero," and "The second Sophistic and its satirist" also cover much ground concisely. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Dionysius, Horace, Quintilian, and Longinus fill the leading roles, but with commendable thoroughness bit parts are assigned to, among others, the *Tractatus Coislinianus*, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, Lucilius, and Lucian.

There are many instances of felicitous judgment. Grube insists on Aristophanes' admiration for Euripides as well as for Aeschylus. Isoerates is "not a great thinker, a great orator, a great critic or a great writer, but . . . a very great teacher." Plato's fears of poetry derive from an ardent belief in poetry's power. Grube sharply compares the liveliness of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with the frigidity of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. In "Roman beginnings" he outlines gracefully some of the differences in character between Greek and Roman literature and criticism and stresses that Latin criticism, as opposed to Greek, began at the same time as Latin literature, forcing the latter to be self-conscious from the start. His analyses of Cicero's views on prose-rhythm in *Orator* and on wit in *De Oratore* II are stimulating. The *Ars Poetica* is shown to be impersonal, in contrast to those *Satires* which deal with literary criticism, because the genres considered in the *Ars Poetica* are not among Horace's own. Quintilian, X, 1 is not an independent piece of criticism but a reading list for the developing orator. The recurring Latin tendency toward archaism complements the desire to bring out the more native, rather than the Greek, qualities of the language.

Clarity marks several technical discussions. Grube reiterates his stand (see *A. J. P.*, LXXIII [1952]) that Thrasyarchus did not originate the periodic style. He doubts the traditional attribution of the four virtues of style to Theophrastus. Peripatetic criticism is presented as dominant in the Hellenistic age, and Grube argues, against Solmsen (see *A. J. P.*, LXII [1941]), that even the formula of the four sections of a speech is essentially Peripatetic rather than Isoeratean. He summarizes recent scholarship on the perplexing structure of the *Ars Poetica* and leans himself toward modified acceptance of the Neoptolemic *πολῦμα—πολῦτοις—ποικιλῆς* pattern. He restates his position (see *A. J. P.*, LXXX [1959]) that Theodorus of Gadara was not a significant literary critic but as narrow a rhetorician as his older rival Apollodorus.

Despite its many excellences, however, the book is somewhat disappointing. We expect more from Grube than we get. Here is a leading expert, capable of unravelling the intricacies of ancient criticism, who too often avoids his responsibility. His chief emphasis, the preface declares, will lie in what the ancient critics actually said, not in subjective interpretation, but this approach results more than once in mere paraphrasing. The Tacitus and Longinus chapters (the latter by Grube's own admission, "I have, to a large extent, let our author speak for himself . . .") certainly suffer from this weakness, and to a lesser extent the Dionysius and Quintilian chapters. We could almost as well betake ourselves to translations, or epitomes of translations, of the texts involved. The Cicero chapter, by contrast, ranges from topic to topic, enabling Grube to guide us through, not just place before us, Cicero's critical theories.

The chapter is essentially Grube's article in *Phoenix*, XVI (1962); its form might well have been followed more generally.

Grube also shuns his duty when he circumnavigates important issues. The *Poetics* "represents a tremendous advance in critical thinking on anything which preceded it" and is the "greatest work on poetry in the classical centuries"; yet its author "had very little feeling for poetry as such." We are on a merry-go-round here. Why not just admit that Aristotle is not writing about poetry at all but about things like plot construction? Similarly, in implicit contrast to Aristotle, Dionysius is lauded as loving great literature for its own sake; yet Grube points out that in the *Demosthenes*, which supposedly compares the best of Demosthenes with the best of Plato, Dionysius can find no better example of Plato than the questionable *Menexenus*. On a lesser scale, Herodotus is dismissed (incorrectly, I think) as a conscious critic of his genre and "does not indulge in any theoretical discussion of history," but in the next paragraph Thucydides "is anxious to differentiate his conception of history from that of his predecessors, including Herodotus." Again, the "only aim or purpose of poetry, in Homer, is to give pleasure," but the Homeric bard receives respect and reverence because he "confers immortality on men," i. e. does far more than just please.

Two dating problems are confronted timidly. The Longinus chapter comes last, after that on the second Sophistic, and Grube argues at some length against a first century A. D. date for the treatise and against a pupil-teacher relationship between Longinus and Theodorus of Gadara. He therefore makes it pretty clear that he favors a late date but then says that author and date should be regarded as uncertain. Better to follow through to the (wrong) conclusion toward which his arguments and chapter arrangement led than to back off. Tacitus' *Dialogus* is described as "the fullest discussion we possess on the causes of the decadence of *eloquentia*." Thus, at what point and under what emperor it was written does matter, but no stand is taken (surely a late date is right), deepening the impression of superficiality made by the paraphrasing character of the chapter.

On the other hand, Grube's early date, ca. 270 B. C., for Demetrius *On Style*, proposed in *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto, 1961), defended in *Phoenix*, XVIII (1964), and reiterated here, is quite the opposite of timid. It was and is reckless, and his feeling that "recent scholarship . . . tends to revert to an earlier date" has suffered a serious blow, though one coming too late for Grube to take into account in the present book, in D. M. Schenkeveld's *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Amsterdam, 1964), which argues very carefully and cogently (pp. 135-48) against Grube's position in *A Greek Critic* and supports the traditional first century A. D. date.

Why is Polybius included in a chapter on "Roman beginnings"? His membership in the Scipionic circle? This does not qualify him as an early Roman critic (if he is a critic at all) any more than Panaetius (who is referred to as Posidonius on p. 154) qualifies as an early Roman philosopher. In the same chapter, Grube deals briefly with the critical portions of the prologues of Plautus and

Terence but seems to accept happily all Plautine prologues as genuine and all Plautine plays without prologues as originally written so. In chapter one, the phrase "development of tragedy from the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus to the *Oedipus Coloneus* of Sophocles" ignores the probability that the *Suppliants* should no longer be regarded as the earliest extant tragedy.

These instances of uncritical inclusion are joined by a few of exclusion. The comments on the younger Seneca omit mention of *Epistle* 59 which discusses features of style. The twenty-four pages on Quintilian find no space for a few lines on the moving prooemium to Book VI. Apuleius, though deserving, is not considered along with Fronto as a representative of the *elocutio novella*.

Many more misprints slipped through than should have. Almost a hundred were observed, and there are certainly more. Some cause confusion. P. 231: the Horace references should be to *Epistles* I.1 and I.19, not II.1 and II.19. P. 261: Nero should be brought to the throne in 54, not 57. P. 293: Quintilian's discussion of the laughable occurs at 6.3, not 4.3. P. 350: choice of words is Longinus' fourth source of great writing, not third. More serious, and scarcely a misprint, is the statement, p. 308: "Pliny the younger was called *Secundus* to distinguish him from his scholarly and prolific uncle." Both shared the family cognomen *Secundus* from birth, and the younger was in fact generally known as Pliny, e. g. the question put to him in the theater, *Tacitus es an Plinius?*

Grube's preface expresses the hope that *The Greek and Roman Critics* "may be equally useful to classical students and scholars, since this is a field which many of them have neglected." Neglected by most the field certainly is, and Grube's book is welcome, useful, and readable. What it misses, and what it could have had, is the stamp of real authority.

MARSH MCCALL.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THOMAS W. AFRICA. Rome of the Caesars. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. xiii + 254. \$5.95 cloth, \$2.95 paper.

This book is the first of a series on cities important in history (others published or announced describe 16th century Nuremberg, Calvin's Geneva, and Boss Tweed's New York), under the general direction of medieval historian Norman F. Cantor.

Professor Africa's entry presents not so much a portrait of the city as selected vignettes of the social, intellectual, and religious character of the Mediterranean world from Augustus to Septimius Severus. The first chapter does describe the city, but the eleven which follow are biographical sketches of men representative of the varied professions, sects, and nationalities found within the Empire: Sejanus, Herod Agrippa, Paul, Seneca, Josephus, Apollonius of Tyana, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Galen. Political history is hastily gathered into a few terse para-

graphs, and the bulk of each chapter is given over to biography, comments on Roman life and society, and generous excerpts from Greek and Roman writings. The selection of subjects is refreshing, the style lively and contemporary, garnished with lines from Dos-toevsky, Eliot, and Auden. Throughout, the material is presented in unequivocal sentences. On occasion more caution would have been in order. Tacitus, e. g., "libeled the reigning emperor Hadrian," by making of his account of Augustus' death "a tasteless parody of the events surrounding Hadrian's succession."

The emphasis on the eastern—especially the Jewish—element of the Empire is pronounced. Since many textbooks on Roman history tell the student little or nothing about Jews and Christians during the first and second centuries, Professor Africa should be commended for trying to redress the balance. There is much here of value, but the author's penchant for describing antiquity in an American idiom is not always helpful. A student's ignorance of first century Palestine will not be significantly diminished by the statement that Jesus was crucified by "orthodox bigots," or that in 66 A. D. the Jewish rebels were motivated by a "blend of social protest and bigotry." Polemic against the Christians culled from Tacitus, Lucian, and Celsus is sufficiently clear, and analogous blasts from H. L. Mencken only encourage the student to think in terms of the twentieth century instead of the second. With that exception, Professor Africa's book provides the student with a good introduction to some neglected aspects of imperial Roman history.

ROBERT DREWS.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic. Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Notes by E. I. J. Rosenthal. Cambridge, *University Press*, 1966. Pp. xii + 339. \$16.50.

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Strauss (Leo). Socrates and Aristophanes. New York, *Basic Books, Inc.*, 1966. Pp. 321. \$8.50.

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WHOLE No. 351

THE CONTENT OF THE *LEX CURIATA*.

A number of ancient references to the *lex curiata*¹ have aroused speculation as to the content and function of the law. Since in many of the passages reference is made to *imperium* it is commonly held that the *lex curiata* conferred or re-inforced exclusively the *imperium* of the higher magistrates and some scholars restrict its application to the military side of this power. The law is often called simply the *lex de imperio* and it is held to be applicable only to holders of the *imperium*. A smaller number believe that the law either conferred or in some way reinforced or recognised the magistrate's right to take auspices or else that the carrying of the law was part of the initial auspication of a magistrate taking the field.

Since there is such variety of opinion the subject might seem almost beyond discussion. Yet in the many writings devoted to the subject² some matters seem not to have received the attention they deserve. The word *imperium*, for example, can be used of other things than a superior magistrate's power to command and some of the contexts in which this word occurs might be looked at more closely than they have been. Again,

¹ Cicero, *De Lege Agraria*, II, 26-31; *Ad Familiares*, I, 9, 25; *Ad Quintum Fratrem*, III, 2, 3; *Ad Atticum*, IV, 16, 12 and 17, 2; *De Re Publica*, II, 25, 31, 33, 35; Livy, V, 52, 16 and IX, 38, 15; Caesar, *Bellum Civile*, I, 6, 6; Dio Cassius, XLI, 43 and XXXIX, 19, 3; Tacitus, *Annals*, XI, 22; M. Valerius Messalla in Aulus Gellius, XIII, 15, 4.

² For a review of some of the material see E. S. Staveley, "The Constitution of the Roman Republic 1940-1954," *Historia*, V, 1 (1956), pp. 84-90.

whatever may be thought of the soundness of Cicero's constitutional arguments in the *De Lege Agraria*, there can be no doubt that he knew the procedures of the curiate assembly and the form of the curiate law. There is some chance, then, that a close examination of the section of *De Lege Agraria*, II, which deals with the election of the decemvirs will suggest what Cicero thought the curiate law was about.

A basic question must be considered first. Did the *lex curiata* have a law-like content? Was it, in fact, a true law and did the assembly of lictors vote on an issue and come to a decision? These questions are answered in the negative by H. Siber³ who compares the law with the *lex horrendi carminis* of Livy and with the declaration made by the *curio maximus* in Ovid's account of the Fornacalia.⁴ In Siber's opinion the curiate law was merely a solemn declaration ("feierliche Erklärung"), a unilateral adoption ("einseitige Ergreifung") of *imperium* made by the higher magistrate quite independently of the approval or disapproval of the assembly. There is, of course, a lot of truth in this view. The lictors did form a purely passive audience in the sense that they certainly could not have succeeded in refusing an affirmative vote. Yet there does not seem to be sufficient reason to believe that, in form, the *lex* was simply a declaration and did not take the form of a proposal to be voted on. Siber argues that since the assembly either never rejected or was not entitled to reject the *lex*, then the law could not have involved a decision. It is incomprehensible, he says (p. 235), how an assembly could have been prevented from rejecting a measure if there was a vote. He supports his position by showing, what is admittedly true, that some meetings of the curiate assembly were non-voting.⁵

We do not know whether at some early stage those present at the meeting did ever vote against the law. In the first century B. C. the thirty *curiae* were represented by thirty lictors and the vote was obviously a formality. In these conditions there seems no difficulty in accepting that a formally organised meeting of

³ "Die ältesten römischen Volksversammlungen," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Rom. Abt.*, LVII (1937), pp. 234-6.

⁴ Livy, I, 26, 6; Ovid, *Fasti*, II, 527-32.

⁵ On this see G. W. Botsford, *The Roman Assemblies*, pp. 152 ff.

the curiate assembly should have had before it a proposal, actually in the form of a law, which it never rejected although constitutionally competent to do so. This is a matter simply of the prevailing constitutional climate and similar situations occur in other constitutions. The Royal Assent in British institutions is a case in point. Technically the assent of the sovereign is required to validate legislation of the British parliament and of the parliaments of the British Commonwealth. The assent is never refused either by the sovereign or by the sovereign's representatives, the governors of Commonwealth countries. Refusal is possible, but unthinkable. In the curiate assembly some matters were certainly the subject of a vote. There was a vote on adoptions and probably on wills as well.⁶ And at least in the later period these votes were probably mere formalities. The fact, then, that the *curiae* were represented by lictors shows that no serious decisions were taken, but in no way shows that the *lex curiata* did not have a law-like content. Conclusive evidence on this point is provided by the language of Roman writers who consistently use of the curiate law expressions proper to the passing of genuine proposals.⁷

The view that the *lex curiata* was especially concerned with auspices, that it either conferred or reinforced the magistrate's *ius auspicii* is most fully argued by Altheim.⁸ The argument relies heavily on the passages in Cicero's *De Lege Agraria*⁹ in which a connection with the auspices seems to be asserted. The passages run as follows:

Nunc, Quirites, prima illa comitia tenetis, centuriata et tributa, curiata tantum auspiciorum causa remanserunt
(II, 26-7)

and

⁶ See Botsford, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1 on adoptions and pp. 157-60 on wills.

⁷ Cicero, *De Re Pub.*, II, 25: *tamen ipse de suo imperio curiatum legem tulit*; Caesar, *B. C.*, I, 6, 6: *neque easpectant . . . ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur*.

⁸ F. Altheim, *Römische Geschichte*, II, pp. 86-8 (and notes). See also S. Mazzarino, *Dalla monarchia allo stato repubblicano* (Catania, 1945), pp. 218 ff.; A. Heuss, "Zur Entwicklung des Imperiums der römischen Oberbeamten," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Rom. Abt.*, LXIV (1944), pp. 57 ff.

⁹ II, 26-7 and 31.

Sint igitur decemviri neque veris comitiis, hoc est, populi suffragiis, neque illis ad speciem atque ad usurpationem vetustatis per triginta lictores auspiciorum causa adumbratis constituti (II, 31).

From these passages Altheim concludes that the effect of the curiate law was to endow the magistrate with the right to take auspices before his official actions (p. 86). In a note (note 150, p. 459) he adds: "Cicero's Erklärung, *ut esset reprehendendi potestas, si populum beneficii sui poeniteret*, lässt sich damit vereinigen. Denn ohne Auspizien waren die Amtshandlungen ungültig."

Altheim (so also Heuss, Mazzarino, Mommsen, and others) takes the *auspicia* of these passages to refer to the auspices of the elected magistrate. He thinks of the *ius auspicii* itself while Heuss speaks of auspices of a military kind ("Auspizien des Auszuges"). If Cicero is referring here to these auspices then he must have had in mind some intimate connection between the *lex* and the auspices, since he says "*tantum* auspiciorum causa." Yet an examination of the many other references to *auspicia*¹⁰ shows no other evidence of this kind, although other sources and repositories of *auspicia* are found. In view of this and in view of the fact that the words *de imperio* are so often used in connection with the law, a close connection with *auspicia* in the sense that the *lex* exclusively conferred the right to take auspices seems unlikely. It seems preferable to look for another interpretation of *tantum auspiciorum causa* and, indeed, another interpretation, namely that *auspicia* here refers to the auspices appropriate to the curiate assembly itself, seems to be more consistent with Cicero's language. If this view is correct we have here simply one of the many examples of Roman conservatism in respect of *sacra*. Cicero will be saying merely that the curiate assembly is a formality, preserved because it is desirable to maintain the traditional religious practices associated with it.

Take these extracts in their wider context. In §16 of *De Lege Agraria*, II Cicero begins a discussion of the proposed method of election of the decemvirs. They are to be elected not

¹⁰ See the articles in Pauly-Wissowa and in the *Thesaurus* and especially the discussions in Cicero's *De Divinatione* and *De Natura Deorum*.

by the full tribal assembly, but by seventeen tribes chosen by lot. A *lex curiata* is to be carried in their favour. Cicero, who in this no doubt tendentious speech is contrasting the anti-popular conduct of Rullus with the sound honesty of established institutions, claims that the election by a majority of nine out of seventeen tribes is no genuine election (§ 26) and pretends to believe that Rullus is relying on the curiate law for the validity of the decemvirs' authority (§ 27). His purpose at this point is to diminish the importance of the curiate law and this he would hardly have done by attributing to it the power of conferring the *ius auspicii* just as he would hardly have asserted that Rullus "potestatem . . . curiatis eam comitiis . . . confirmavit" if it was known that the law conferred *only* the auspices ("tantum auspiciorum causa"). In both the passages Cicero is contrasting the genuine and authoritative *comitia* (*prima comitia, vera comitia*) with what he affects to regard as a mere constitutional or rather religious survival. Here his words have nothing to do with the magistrate's auspices, but simply with the ceremonies of the assembly.

Altheim offers support for his view by claiming that there is express evidence that election to office and the grant of the *ius auspicii* were separate procedures. This evidence is seen in a statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and in two incidents from Roman history.¹¹ This is an important issue, since if Altheim's view is correct we would need to revise the commonly held belief that the auspices are bound up with the holding of a magistracy¹² and are conferred by election to a magistracy.

The passage of Dionysius obviously cannot support Altheim's interpretation. It says nothing about the *lex curiata* and Dionysius' phrase (καὶ τὰ μαντεύματα ἐπεκύρωσε) has τὰ μαντεύματα for its subject and refers to the procedures which Dionysius has described in II, 6, 1—the auspices taken on entering office. What can be said of the historical incidents?

The first is the story of the recall of Camillus and his appointment as dictator during the Gallic siege of the Capitol. The important parts of this incident are in § 10 and § 11. In § 10

¹¹ Dion. Hal., *Roman Antiquities*, IV, 40, 2. The incidents are found in Livy, V, 46, 7-11 and in Dio Cassius, XLI, 43, 2.

¹² Cicero, *De Legibus*, III, 3, 10: *omnes magistratus auspicium iudiciumque habento*. See Cicero, *De Div.*, II, 76.

we hear of a decree of the senate "uti comitiis curiatis revocatus de exsilio iussu populi Camillus dictator extemplo diceretur." In § 11 Livy says "quod nec iniussu populi mutari finibus posset nec nisi dictator dictus auspicia in exercitu habere, lex curiata lata est dictatorque absens dictus." A straightforward reading of the passage shows that the role of the curiate assembly here is not to confer authority on Camillus, but simply to recall him from exile. In § 10 "comitiis curiatis revocatus de exsilio" is a separate action preceding "iussu populi dictator diceretur." In § 11 "nec iniussu populi mutari finibus posset" refers to relief from exile (as does "lex curiata lata" at the end of § 11), while the auspices are clearly said to depend on nomination to the dictatorship. The reference to a *lex curiata* in this passage is clearly not to a secondary law, but to a situation in which the curiate assembly is thought of as replacing the centuriate assembly. This, of course, could not be assembled on the Capitol. The passage may not be good evidence for the fourth century but it shows that Livy or his source thought of *auspicia* as going with a magistracy. His account does not support the contention that election and the grant of the *ius auspicii* were separate procedures.

The second incident is the story of the supposed elections to be held in the Pompeian camp at Thessalonica.¹³ Dio begins his account of the incident by saying that in 48 B. C. there were two sets of magistrates. The party in Rome had elected consuls and other officers, while in Thessalonica no such measures were taken, although the Pompeians had about two hundred senators and the consuls of 49 and, as well, had acquired a site for the taking of auspices (*καί τι καὶ χωρίον ἐς τὰ οἰωνίσματα, τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐν νόμῳ δὴ τινι αὐτὰ δοκεῖν γίγνεσθαι, δημοσιώσαντες*).

The reason why there was no election, but merely a prolonging of existing offices, was, according to Dio, that the consuls of 49 B. C. had not carried the curiate law and this in some way made an election impossible.¹⁴ Altheim believes that the Pom-

¹³ Dio Cassius, XLI, 43. See the basic discussion of the passage in J. Rubino, *Über den Entwicklungsgang der römischen Verfassung bis zur Höhepunkte der Republik* (1839), pp. 368 ff.

¹⁴ A similar view is sometimes taken of Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 17, 2 (the scandal connected with the elections for the consulship for 53 B. C.). See below for a comment on this.

peians were checked by a lack of the *ius auspicii* in the consuls consequent on their failure to carry the curiate law. This, however, does not follow from Dio's words. In the passage the clause about the curiate law can be taken as relating only to the earlier *τοιούτο μὲν οὐδὲν προπαρεσκευάσαντο* and it singles out no precise reason for the disability. On the contrary, the clear statement that a place for auspices had been acquired suggests that this was a point on which there was no doubt. The view sometimes put forward that the authorities in Thessalonica had "forgotten" about the *lex curiata* and only realised its importance at the last minute cannot be accepted. In any case, the consuls had already exercised the *ius auspicii* without a *lex curiata* early in 49 B.C., for they had held meetings of the senate in January of that year and such meetings required the taking of auspices, as is shown by the statement of Varro recorded in Aulus Gellius (XIV, 7): "immolareque hostiam prius auspicarique debere qui senatum habiturus esset."

In an article in *Historia* (see above, note 2) Dr. Staveley has suggested that the *lex* afforded "popular recognition of the right of the newly elected magistrate to take auspices in an official as opposed to a private capacity." Its purpose was thus "formally to confirm his *auspicia* as *auspicia publica* or *auspicia populi Romani*" (pp. 89-90). He begins by considering the fact that a centuriate and not a curiate secondary law was passed for censors.¹⁵ This seems to show that the content of the secondary law could apply to censors (who did not have *imperium*) as well as to, say, consuls (who did), but it raises the question why the curiate law was not used in this case. Staveley's answer is that this is an accident. The offices involving *imperium* were all, if one discounts, for the reasons given, the praetorship of 366 B.C., established before the censorship, at a time before the curiate assembly had lost its importance.¹⁶ This fact, rather than the lack of *imperium* is said to be the reason for the censors' centuriate law. The view faces a serious objection. If in 443 B.C. when censors were appointed (or at any later date) a secondary law was felt to be either necessary

¹⁵ Cicero, *De Lege Agr.*, II, 26.

¹⁶ I leave aside for the time being the question whether the *lex* was restricted to holders of *imperium*.

or worth while, then this can have been so only if the existing curiate law was felt to be necessary or worth while. If the curiate assembly could be got together for the other magistrates it could as easily be assembled for censors, and, in fact, it must have been always more troublesome and costly to call the centuries together. For these reasons Staveley's explanation seems unsatisfactory. We need to find another reason for the centuriate secondary law in this case. The problem is especially acute for Staveley who supports his view (p. 90) by stressing the strong religious associations of the curiate assembly, as against the timocratic, essentially military nature of the centuriate assembly, as making the former especially appropriate for the secondary law.

It must however, be agreed that the centuriate and curiate secondary laws fulfilled the same function for both censors and other magistrates. Staveley follows this observation with the argument that since the magistrates for whom a secondary vote was taken had one thing in common—they were all *magistratus maiores* and had the *auspicia maxima*—it is reasonable to suppose that the *lex curiata* was concerned with the auspices.

Let us defer for the present the question whether the curiate law applied to other than the *magistratus maiores* and content ourselves with the observation that the men concerned had something else in common: they were all magistrates and had been elected or appointed to some office. There is therefore no compelling reason to think only of auspices in this context, just as it must be said that there is no reason to think of auspices in connection with the two historical incidents which are said to support a connection between the curiate law and the auspices.

The first incident is contained in a few of Cicero's letters.¹⁷ Appius Claudius Pulcher, the consul of 54 B. C., found his way to a province hindered by the fact that he had not been able to carry the curiate law. In Cicero's report of Claudius' statements there is no mention of auspices. On the contrary, Claudius is reported as saying "se . . . lege Cornelia imperium habiturum" and *imperium* here can mean either (1) the *imperium* proper or (2) simply the magistracy or office, the legitimacy of which has been called in question. Similar con-

¹⁷ *Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 25; cf. *Ad Quint. Fr.*, III, 2, 3.

siderations apply to the case of Pomptinus.¹⁸ There is no suggestion in the source that auspices are in question. "Negant enim latum de imperio" is what Cicero reports and *imperium* would hardly be the word used if auspices especially were involved.

At first sight the case for a close connection between the curiate law and the *imperium* seems stronger. Yet two considerations suggest that this case is not as strong as it is often thought to be. The first is the usage of the word *imperium* which in many contexts means simply the magistracy of a higher official rather than some special power which such magistrates are said to have. The second consideration is that there is some evidence to show that a curiate law was passed for magistrates who did not have *imperium*. And if, as seems very probable,¹⁹ the curiate law had the same content as the centuriate law passed for censors, then this content will not have been concerned with *imperium*.

We may, then, temporarily suspend judgment on the many passages which speak of the law being carried *de imperio*. When Cicero writes of a *lex de imperio* for some of the kings he uses the phrase to describe the kingly power and not some part of the kingly power. Similar considerations apply to passages in which the law is said to be carried *de imperio* for higher magistrates. In these *imperium* may, and probably does, refer merely to the magistracy. Such passages are consistent with a belief in a necessary connection between the *imperium* and the curiate law, but they are not cogent evidence for such a belief.

More importance has been attached to two passages²⁰ which link a curiate law in some way with military power. Both passages, however, lose much of the force they are said to have when they are considered in their full contexts. It may be said of both of them that they do not purport to describe the *whole* force of the curiate law and that for this reason they cannot be taken as offering a precise indication of the content of the law.

¹⁸ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 16, 12.

¹⁹ Staveley, *art. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁰ Cicero, *De Lege Agr.*, II, 30: *consuli, si legem curiatam non habet, attingere rem militarem non licet*. Livy, V, 52, 16: *comitia curiata, quae rem militarem continent*.

In the first passage Cicero is criticising those provisions of Rullus' bill which protected the decemvirs against the effects of a tribunician veto against their *lex curiata*. If there was such a veto they were still to hold their office "eodem iure quo qui optima lege." The criticism involves a contrast between the high office of consul (whose curiate law was subject to veto) and the office of the decemvirs. To make the contrast effective Cicero singles out what he and his audience would consider the most important part of the consul's authority—the military power. The passage, then, has meaning not only if the *lex curiata* conferred the military *imperium*. It has the same force if what the law did was to recognise or authorise the whole consular authority, the magistracy itself of which the military power was an important part. The same sort of interpretation is possible of Camillus' words in Livy, V. If *comitia curiata* in this context does refer to the *lex curiata*, then it should be observed that there is no suggestion that the whole content of the law is here defined in the words "rem militarem continent."²¹ The whole function of the centuriate assembly is not defined in the reference to that body, but merely an important part of its activity. Similarly, Livy represents Camillus as selecting an important, to him the most important, aspect of the curiate law.

There are several other passages which have been thought to suggest that the *lex curiata* was especially concerned with the military *imperium*. Perhaps the most important of these is contained in a letter from Cicero to Lentulus, the governor of Cilicia.²² The letter was written towards the end of 54 B.C. and the section here considered deals with the intention of the consul Appius Claudius Pulcher to supersede Lentulus in Cilicia even though no curiate law had been passed for him. Perhaps the most significant thing about this passage is the doubt expressed in it on the constitutional position ("varias esse opiniones intellego. Sunt qui putant posse te non decedere, quod sine lege curiata tibi succedatur; sunt etiam, qui, si decedas, a te relinqui posse, qui provinciae praesit"). It seems clear from this doubt that the curiate law cannot have conferred the mili-

²¹ The verb "continere" is used to describe the vaguest of connections.

²² Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, I, 9, 25. See on this A. Heuss, *art. cit.*, pp. 71-3; H. Siber, *art. cit.*, pp. 240-1. See also Cicero, *Ad Quint. Fr.*, III, 2, 3; *Ad Att.*, IV, 16, 12.

tary *imperium*. For this would have been an unambiguous action and could hardly have given rise to doubt. The passage suggests as strongly as the passage in *De Lege Agraria*, II (27 and 31: "auspicioium causa"), that the curiate law was in the first century B.C. a survival the precise force of which was uncertain.

The curiate law to which Claudius' remarks refer is the law he should have carried early in his consular year. There is no question here of a new *lex* to initiate the proconsular year. It is not clear what precise difficulties the lack of the law produced. It seems that Claudius was worried about the matter as early as October of 54 B.C. since his *lex curiata* was a central feature of the scandal that occurred during the campaign for the elections for 53 B.C.²³ What was the interest of the parties concerned in this affair? Siber thinks that both groups, the consuls and the candidates, were anxious to have a curiate law recognised—the consuls for the sake of their provinces and the candidates for the sake of the validity of their own election. This may be the case, but another view is possible. Heuss (see note 23) has shown that the passage may merely mean that the competitors were offering an advantage to the consuls (i.e. easier access to their provinces) in return for assistance in securing election, necessary in view of the charges of *ambitus* against the candidates and the difficulty in holding elections at all. It seems impossible on the evidence available to decide between these views. Claudius himself, according to Cicero, said a number of things about the curiate law. Scholars who use this evidence sometimes confine their remarks to the section from "legemque curiatam consuli ferre" to "in urbem introisset," and suggest an especially close connection between these clauses. Claudius would be saying, then, that a consul had no great need of the *lex curiata*, even though it would be a useful adjunct,²⁴ since Sulla's provincial law was sufficient warrant for a governor's authority. What are we to say, however, about the preceding sentence? Claudius' troubles seem to have arisen in the

²³ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 17, 2. See especially Siber, *art. cit.*, p. 241 and Heuss, *art. cit.*, pp. 74-5, n. 41.

²⁴ For a similar contrast between *opus esse* and *necessarium* see Cicero, *De Oratore*, II, 43.

senate. His first remarks concern the sortition for the consular provinces; there seems to have been some difficulty about performing this without the *lex curiata*. We know as well that there was difficulty about the grant of money and other provision for Claudius' governorship.²⁵ There may have been a feeling amongst some senators, or a pretence, that Claudius' consulship was not fully legitimate and it is possible that the words "*legemque . . . non necesse esse*" refer back to this situation. Appius Claudius proposed to overcome his difficulty by making an arrangement with his colleague and relying on two supports, the first that a decree of the senate had already declared Cilicia a consular province and the second that a Cornelian law gave him *imperium* until his return to Rome. Here again it is not clear whether *imperium* refers to the military power of the proconsul or simply to the whole office of the proconsul. In any case, the force of the curiate law is in this situation vague indeed. The lack of it seems to have been raised as an objection for the sake of objecting. And this seems true of the other references to a lack of the curiate law in this period. Appius seems to have carried his point. There is no reference to the passing of the law, but Appius was in Cilicia in 53 B. C.

So with the case of Pomptinus.²⁶ He was praetor in the year of Cicero's consulship. He went as governor to Transalpine Gaul in 62 and 61 B. C. and put down a revolt of the Allobroges. He appears to have been still in this province in 60 B. C. and when superseded by Caesar returned and stayed outside the city waiting for the award of a triumph. This was for a time denied him on the grounds that he had not carried a valid *lex curiata*.²⁷ Here again it is certainly a case of objection for the sake of objecting and it should be noted that Cicero considers the matter not in terms of constitutional right but in terms of the forces,

²⁵ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 17, 2: part of the deal was the provision of two consulars *qui se dicerent in ornandis provinciis consularibus scribendo adfuisse*. Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 16, 12: *Appius sine lege suo sumptu in Ciliciam cogitat*.

²⁶ Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 16, 12; *Ad Quint. Fr.*, III, 4, 6; *In Pisonem*, 58; Dio Cassius, XXXIX, 65.

²⁷ In his case there was apparently some religious flaw in the ceremony: *Ad Att.*, IV, 16, 12: "*negant enim latum de imperio, et est latum hercule insulse*." *In Pis.*, 58: "*religionibus enim susceptis impeditur*."

the personages for and against Pomptinus. There is here no suggestion that Pomptinus lacked the *imperium*. We know of no attempt to bar him from his province in 63 B. C. and there is no evidence that he acted in Gaul *sine imperio*. This would presumably have caused him more serious trouble than the mere blocking of a triumph. The argument of Cato and Servilius Isauricus will have been that there was a certain defectiveness in Pomptinus' position that disqualified him for a triumph. Appius Claudius opposed this view and helped Pomptinus to his triumph of November 54 B. C.

Dio's account of the appointment of officials at Thessalonica in 48 B. C.²⁸ is sometimes thought to throw light on this subject. What actually occurred in the republican camp, however, is by no means certain. It is commonly assumed that the Pompeians made preparations for holding elections to the magistracies, but refrained from doing so because the consuls had not carried the *lex curiata* in 49 B. C. This conduct is incredible in itself. As well, it is not certain that this is what Dio in fact says. Dio begins his chapter by saying that in the next year (48 B. C.) there were two sets of magistrates. In Rome, consuls, praetors, and other officers had been elected. In Thessalonica no such step was taken. The date at which they refrained is not clear. It could have been at some time in 48 or even in 49 B. C. Now, what is not clear in Dio's account is the precise reference of the long string of concessive phrases (*καὶ τοὶ τῆς τε ἀλλῆς βουλῆς . . . οὐκ ἐσεννόχουν*). It is possible that these represent considerations in the minds of the Romans at Thessalonica. It is equally possible that they represent the reflections on the situation of Dio or of his source. If the latter is the case, then the reference to a curiate law here may have no more point than another reference to such a law in Dio's thirty-ninth book²⁹ where Siber has shown conclusively that Dio's account must be in error and has suggested that his statements about the *lex curiata* are probably derived from late republican sources such as Cicero's *De Lege Agraria*, II. What follows, however, if the standard interpretation of Dio is accepted and there was in fact talk or thought of an election and then a decision not to

²⁸ Dio Cassius, XLI, 43, 1-5.

²⁹ Dio Cassius, XXXIX, 19, 3. See on this Siber, *art. cit.*, pp. 242 ff.

go ahead because of lack of the curiate law? This decision cannot have been taken because of any lack of *imperium*. Not only had the consuls raised troops and formed armies but we have the clear testimony of Cicero, in a context in which he is thinking of the legal position, that the consuls and many others who crossed to Greece in 49 B.C. did so *cum imperio*.³⁰ If there was a real change in plan some reason other than lack of *imperium* must be found or guessed at. The most probable guess is that the high command at Thessalonica did not want elections. The prolonging of office was politically most expedient. It would cause less dissension in the camp and provoke less criticism in Rome. If the curiate law was mentioned at Thessalonica it can only have been as a vague pretext for inaction.

The evidence so far considered suggests that there was no intimate connection between the curiate law and the auspices of a magistrate. It suggests as well that the law cannot have been essential to the holding of *imperium*. There is, however, obviously some sort of connection between the law and the *imperium* and it is sometimes thought that the law *originally* conferred this, but later became a mere formality. This view fits the evidence so far examined. Is there any evidence against it?

Some ancient passages suggest that the *lex curiata* was carried for magistrates who did not have *imperium*. Some of this evidence is admittedly very weak and two passages may be briefly dismissed.³¹ Siber has said enough to discredit the story that P. Clodius in 56 B.C. held up public business by blocking the passing of the curiate law. The chapter of Tacitus is more difficult to assess. One must agree with those who say that

³⁰ *Ad Att.*, VIII, 15, 3. The comment of Ed. Meyer on this situation (in *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus*, p. 311, n. 3) cannot be accepted. Especially after the troubles of 54 B.C. it is most unlikely that Cicero would have overlooked the consequences of a failure to carry the curiate law; the story of the Pompeians making the initial preparations and becoming conscious of the lack of a *lex curiata* at the last moment deserves no credit. It is clear that Cicero did not think that a lack of the curiate law was a bar to the exercise of *imperium*.

³¹ Dio Cassius, XXXIX, 19, 3 and Tacitus, *Annals*, XI, 22, 2-4. On the Dio passage see Siber, *art. cit.*, pp. 242 ff.

Tacitus is not strong on questions of the republican constitution. Alongside this must be set the possibility that Tacitus has here transcribed—in his own language, of course, as "gliscentibus negotiis" shows—this information from an earlier source. The constitutional development outlined in the chapter, the turning of a selective office into an elective one, is by no means incredible. It must, however, be admitted that this is very poor evidence for an early curiate law for quaestors. All that may be deduced from the passage is that Tacitus or his source thought such a *lex* possible: the value of the deduction depends on something we do not know, the source of Tacitus' information.

A more positive view should be taken of the statement of M. Valerius Messalla reported by Aulus Gellius.³² The passage runs as follows: "Minoribus creatis magistratibus tributis comitiis magistratus, sed iustus curiata datur lege, maiores centuriatis comitiis fiunt." These words are the end (or, more precisely, the last words quoted by Gellius) of a passage which Gellius uses to make clear the distinction between the *magistratus maiores* and *minores*. Gellius had to hand the first book of Messalla's work *De Auspiciis* and settles his question by a quotation from it. The manuscripts suggest no doubt about the tradition of Gellius' words. A glance at the apparatus of, say, the Teubner edition shows nothing but the suggestions of scholars. However, some recent writers have condemned the passage as faulty and in need of emendation.³³ They do this for two main reasons. They say that the piece is grammatically objectionable and as well that it is meaningless because it is tautological in some parts and appears to contradict the known

³² Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, XIII, 15, 4.

³³ Staveley, *art. cit.*, p. 86; Heuss, *art. cit.*, pp. 75 ff.; K. Latte, "Zwei Exkurse zum römischen Staatsrecht. I. Lex Curiata und Coniuratio," *Gött. Nachr., Phil.-Hist. Klasse*, 1934, pp. 59 ff. (especially p. 60); U. von Lübtow, "Die Lex Curiata de Imperio," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Rom. Abt.*, LXIX (1952), pp. 154 ff. (especially pp. 170-1); *idem*, *Das Römische Volk* (1953), pp. 194-5. The material of von Lübtow's article is reproduced with some minor modifications in his book (pp. 180 ff.). The emendation of Gellius that he offers in the book differs from that of the article and represents a change of opinion. See also J. H. Oliver, *Demokratia, the Gods and the Free World* (1960), p. 81, n. 15. The original text is defended by Altheim in *Römische Geschichte*, II, p. 460, n. 152.

facts. It will be seen that the grammatical objections are closely linked with the objections to the content of the passage. The case against acceptance of the passage as it stands is most strongly put by Latte (see note 33). He begins (p. 60) by saying that after Messalla has set out the different auspices of the magistrates he wants to explain more precisely the difference between the *magistratus maiores* and *minores*. Now there is no doubt that Messalla does explain this difference in terms of the method of election. But the emphasis may not be quite as Latte represents it. It is worth pointing out, as a possible explanation of what may seem looseness in Messalla's language, that we cannot be sure that Messalla's chief interest was the same as that of Gellius. He may not have had such a very strong interest in making the distinction as precise as possible. Messalla seems rather to have been concerned with categories of auspices and the distinction between methods of election is subsidiary to his main purpose. It is a possibility, then, that the passage comes to us as Messalla wrote it: that after dealing precisely with the process of election of the minor magistrates through the tribal assembly and the curiate law, he dismissed the higher magistrates briefly simply because the facts about them were well known, while a full account would have called for the distinction between the secondary law of the censors and that of the other magistrates.

How serious are the grammatical objections to the passage? The answer is that they are not objections at all and only have force for those who interpret the passage in a certain way. Latte assumes that the principle of Messalla's distinction is the method of election. He objects to the participial phrase "*minoribus creatis magistratibus tributis comitiis*" as subordinating too much the action expressed in "*creatis*," so that the expression is not a proper balance to the later "*maiores centuriatis comitiis fiunt*." "*Creatis*" as against "*magistratus datur*" is, he says, impossible because it is tautological and does not observe the proper temporal sequence. As well, he remarks that "*sed*" is meaningless: "man kann sagen: die Wahl in den Tributkomitien erhält ihre volle Rechtskraft durch die *lex curiata*, aber nicht vor *sed* einen Einschnitt machen, wozu die Partikel doch zwingt" (p. 61). The difficulties disappear when it is assumed that Messalla is thinking of an election in

the tribal assembly which is later confirmed or assented to by the curiate assembly, so that the magistracy can now be said to be "iustus" and the magistrate a "magistratus optima lege." It is unsound to condemn a passage simply because of a tautology and in this case it may be asked whether there is tautology at all. "Magistratus datur" does not merely repeat "magistratibus creatis" and the reasons for this are obvious. "Creatis" refers to an action of the presiding magistrate, an action which is one part of the election of a magistrate. Messalla is saying that when the presiding officer has pronounced the formula of the *creatio* (which presumably ended the proceedings in the assembly) then the effect of the whole procedure is to bestow the magistracy. This is then made "iustus" by a formal act of the curiate assembly. Of course, the meaning of "iustus" here is still to be discovered. But the language of Messalla is surely capable of this reasonable interpretation. It involves the association of "tributis comitiis" with the verb "datur." Latte offers (p. 61) an emendation of the passage but calls his reconstruction a mere possibility ("blosse Möglichkeit"). He suggests: "Minoribus creatis magistratibus tributis comitiis magistratus ratus est; maiores centuriatis comitiis fiunt, sed ius <tus magistrat>us curiata datur lege." Professor Oliver proposes a similar transposition of the phrase about the curiate law: "Minoribus creatis magistratibus tributis comitiis, magistratus maiores centuriatis comitiis fiunt, sed ius <magistrat>us curiata datur lege." These suggestions have the merit of taking account of the well-known forms of scribal error but it is by no means certain, or even likely, that there is a need for such extensive changes. The main objection raised to the acceptance of the passage as it is transmitted is that the words as they stand seem to imply that there was a curiate law for the minor magistrates but none for the higher. This is surely a perverse interpretation. The silence of the extract about a secondary law for the higher offices does not necessarily suggest that the writer of the piece did not envisage such a law. There are at least three possibilities here: 1) that the text is corrupt and subject to emendation, 2) that the text is sound and that Messalla merely omitted reference to the secondary laws of the higher magistrates, and 3) that Messalla did go on to make the distinction but that Gellius has not quoted the end of the sentence. Of

4, and so believes that the curiate law was required for the minor as well as for the major magistrates ("Loi curiate," pp. 198-9). To some extent, for Magdelain, the curiate vote is a second vote on a candidate's magistracy.³⁷ He is, however, unwilling to accept the view of Mommsen that the curiate law gave the magistrate no powers in addition to those flowing from his initial election in either the centuriate or tribal assembly. Magdelain's objection to this opinion is that a merely confirmatory vote in the curiate assembly would be useless. "Alors à quoi bon voter?" Mommsen's theory, he says, rests on a belief that the magistrate at his election derives all his powers from a law establishing his office, whereas there is no good evidence that there were such laws. The *lex curiata* is only mysterious if one believes that there were such laws establishing the details of a magistrate's office. If there are such laws, then the second vote is mere homage and useless, whereas, for Magdelain, it is in fact "la pièce maîtresse du régime républicain." He continues: "Elle (i. e. *la loi curiate*) emplit le vide constitutionnel qu'ouvre l'absence de toute loi à l'origine des magistratures anciennes. Les magistrats ne tiennent pas leur pouvoir d'une constitution préétablie. Aucune loi fondamentale ne confère à l'élu, comme

"Auspicia" respectively. The second article ("Auspicia") is essentially a discussion of the *interregnum* but in the course of his discussion Magdelain put forward an interesting theory of the *ius auspicii*. He believes, I think rightly, that this was not *conferred* on a magistrate by his predecessor or by any one else, but was created within the magistrature by each act of election. Election is a necessary preliminary and designates the man who has a right to *auspicium*. But the man assumes the power himself by the taking of auspices. This is not the place to expound or discuss the validity of Magdelain's views on *auspicium*. We are, however, concerned with his associated belief that both the *imperium* and the *auspicium*, in fact the details of a magistrate's powers, were the object of an "investiture sacrale" at the moment of election (or at the *dictio* of the dictator) and of an "investiture civile" when the curiate law was passed.

³⁷ Magdelain attributes to the *lex curiata* of the first century B. C. more real importance than many will be willing to concede. See his brief statements in the first few pages of "Note sur la loi curiate" where he accepts, amongst other things, Dio Cassius, XLI, 43 to show that the lack of the law prevented elections at Thessalonica. On p. 201 of the same article he accepts Dio Cassius, XXXIX, 19 as showing that lack of the law could hold up judicial business.

de nos jours, une compétence préconstituée. Ce sont les curies qui investissent individuellement chaque magistrat. La loi curiate est une loi d'investiture. L'élection est un choix, vient ensuite la collation de la magistrature par une loi renouvelée tous les ans" ("Loi curiate," p. 200). The interpretation, then, which Magdelain offers of the *iustus magistratus* given by the curiate law is that the law defines the detailed powers of the magistrate; it takes the place of the non-existent ancient law establishing the magistracy.

Three criticisms can be made of the view put forward by Professor Magdelain. The first is that no evidence has been offered to support the opinion that the initial election in the centuriate or tribal assembly was merely a selection and did not confer magisterial powers. In fact, this idea is not supported by the language of the surviving texts which speak consistently of the magistracy, or of *imperium* or *potestas*, as flowing from the election by the people. The second criticism is that the notion that the secondary law would be "useless" if the primary election conferred the detailed magisterial powers is methodologically unsound. It is easy to find examples of political survivals which may be called useless simply because the original purpose has been forgotten. The third criticism concerns the notion that the curiate law made precise reference to the actual details of the magistrate's powers. Magdelain writes ("Loi curiate," p. 201): "La République double l'investiture sacrale d'une investiture civile par les curies; la loi curiate ne se borne sûrement pas à reproduire en termes législatifs la collation des mêmes pouvoirs, elle en trace certainement les limites et les modalités, principalement l'annalité." Now it is not necessary to try to settle the question whether there were or were not actual laws constituting the various magistracies. Magdelain says there were not and many will agree with him. As well, many who might accept the existence of laws setting up the praetorship, censorship, and aedileship would agree that there was probably no legislation on the details of the powers and functions of these magistracies. But when Magdelain argues that the constitutional void created by the lack of such laws was filled by the curiate law he merely shifts the problem to another sphere. For one might well ask how the detailed provisions got into the curiate law. The argument might be

put very simply: if the curiate law, which all admit to be early, contained detailed provisions concerning the powers of the magistrates, then these provisions must have come from a law or from a law-like decision or from convention. If the provisions came from any of these sources, then they might just as well have been referred to in, or assumed by, the vote in the primary assemblies. It is, then, not true to say that Mommsen's position involves belief in a constitutive law for each office.

Added to these considerations is the very important one that in the late Republic the curiate law does not have the importance that a constitutive law would have. We must look elsewhere to determine its force. Cicero's evidence seems to agree with that of Messalla that in some way the law made the magistracy more regular. To match the "iustus" of Messalla we find in the *De Lege Agraria*, II a quotation from Rullus' bill to the effect that if the curiate law should not be passed for any reason then the elected men shall be decemvirs "eodem iure quo qui optima lege." It is a question then of some sort of legitimation. It is almost certain that in the late Republic this legitimation was a mere formality and very imperfectly understood. And Mommsen's view that no new power was granted by the law³⁸ is probably correct. Although Cicero says that the tribunes often interceded against the law (§ 30), we hear almost nothing of the effects of this intercession. It is likely that, if it did occur, then the failure to carry the law was disregarded. The failure to carry the law became news in 54 B. C. when some opponents made a debating point of it against Claudius and Pomptinus. But even here the opposition was ineffective. It is possible that lack of the *lex curiata* was used to hold up the sortition of provinces and the voting of funds for a province. But there is no reason to believe that there was a close and constant link between these activities and the passing of the curiate law.

It is an odd constitutional survival, but such survivals are not unknown, while the first century B. C. was a good period for them. Consider, for a further example, the proceedings against Rabirius in 63 B. C. Can we go farther back and offer a useful hypothesis about an earlier period? It is perhaps

³⁸ *Römisches Staatsrecht*, I³, p. 612.

reasonable to assume that the wording of the law would be maintained and there is a reasonable chance that Cicero's generation had something like the original form of the curiate law before them. It might be supposed, then, although it is a mere assumption, that at some stage the curiate assembly carried laws to ratify appointments and that at some stage these had real significance. It is possible, since a similar law was carried for censors, that this occurred in the early fifth century, even from the beginning of the Republic. If the tradition of curiate activity under the kings has any foundation, then the institution of the curiate and centuriate laws might simply represent a desire to preserve the function of the *curiae* in some way (*tantum auspiciorum causa?*) when the centuries began to elect magistrates. The problem of the censors remains. Why was their secondary law a centuriate law? The answer is suggested by Siber.³⁹ The censor had far-reaching powers and is in a very special position. He could influence for good or ill the fortunes of all citizens as no one else could. Further, the election of censors, coming at such long intervals, was an especially solemn event. This, perhaps, explains why the secondary law was carried in the centuriate assembly. It was a massive vote of confidence in officials who would have in their hands the shaping of the assembly itself.

J. J. NICHOLLS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY.

³⁹ Siber, *art. cit.*, p. 244, n. 2.

VERGIL'S *CAELATUM OPUS*: AN INTERPRETATION
OF THE THIRD *ECLOGUE*.

I

The ancient critics objected that *Eclogues* 4, 6, and 10 were not truly pastorals.¹ They were in a sense right, but failed to draw from their observations the significant conclusion, namely that Vergil intended to do more in the *Eclogues* than reproduce perfect examples of the pastoral convention. His poems form a kind of dialogue not only with the pastoral tradition, but with the poetic tradition of the past as a whole. Recent studies of the Sixth *Eclogue* have shown how expansively Vergil could conceive of the pastoral framework;² and the suggestion has been made that in some of the *Eclogues*, again the Sixth and also the Seventh, Vergil is attempting to sketch his "poetics" of pastoral or even his view of poetry in general.³ This "poetics" would also include an attempt to define the relation of poetry to other areas of life. Thus Vergil often steps beyond the limits of his pastoral frame to a vantage point which offers a larger perspective on poetry and pastoral. In *Eclogues* 1 and 9 and the proem to 8 he develops the contrast between poetry and themes of war and empire; in *E.* 6 and (to a lesser degree) in *E.* 10 he introduces larger mythological and traditionally high poetical subjects; in *E.* 4 and 5 he is concerned with great historical issues, the destiny of Rome and the happiness of the

¹ See Donatus, *Vita*, 302-4 (Brummer); Servius, *Proem. in Buc.* (Thilo-Hagen, III, fasc. 1, p. 3, lines 20 ff.). Also J. P. Elder, "*Non iniussa cano*—Virgil's Sixth Eclogue," *H.S.C.P.*, LXV (1961), pp. 116-17, with note 32, p. 124.

² See Zeph Stewart, "The Song of Silenus," *H.S.C.P.*, LXIV (1959), pp. 179-205 and Elder (preceding note), *passim*.

³ On *E.* 7 see E. E. Beyers, "Vergil: Eclogue 7—A Theory of Poetry," *Acta Classica*, V (1962), pp. 38-47, especially 41-3. On Vergil's expression of the relation between pastoral and historical realities in *E.* 1 and 9, see my essay, "*Tamen cantabitis, Arcades*—Exile and Arcadia in *Eclogues* 1 and 9," in *Arion*, IV (1965), pp. 237-66. Also B. Otis, *Virgil* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 128 ff.

human race, but still invokes the pastoral Muses to announce his broader themes:

Sicelides Musae, paulo maiora canamus!
non omnis arbusta iuvant humilesque myricae.

And throughout the *Eclogues* runs the theme of love, sometimes happy, more often sad, culminating in Gallus' lament, the *omnia vincit amor* (69), and the poet's own *amor* (73) for his friend in the Tenth *Eclogue*.

The Third *Eclogue* gives an initial impression of being a pastoral poem pure and simple, of belonging entirely to the world of *arbusta* and *humiles myricae*. I shall attempt to show, however, that even in this most "pastoral" of the *Eclogues* Vergil attempts to indicate his awareness of the limits of the pastoral form, that he is consciously seeking, through the poem, to establish his peculiar relation with the pastoral tradition. Vergil explicitly announces, in mock-epic language, that his subject is a matter of no small significance: *sensibus haec imis (res est non parva) reponas* (54). And, as I hope to show, the subject-matter, structure, and tone of the Third *Eclogue* point to the areas of art and poetry (and not, for instance, political allegory) as the field of this *res . . . non parva*.⁴

Recently, D. E. W. Wormell, approaching the poem from a very different angle, has stated the need for "a reassessment of the tone and purpose of the Third *Eclogue* as a whole," and has rightly pointed to the poet's concern with larger themes than pastoral realism:

Despite touches of Theocritean vividness and rustic coarseness it is not meant to be a realistic picture of country life—lines 84-87 should have put critics on their guard. What is here encountered is that characteristic blend of naturalism and artificiality, of ingenuousness and sophistication, which gives the *Eclogues* their peculiar flavour and special charm.⁵

In pointing to this sophistication, Wormell has placed special

⁴ The political interpretation of *E.* 3 is offered by J. J. H. Savage, "The Art of the Third *Eclogue* of Vergil (55-111)," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 142-58.

⁵ D. E. W. Wormell, "The Riddle in Virgil's Third *Eclogue*," *C. Q.*, n. s. X (1960), p. 32.

stress upon the riddles (lines 104-7). These riddles, as will appear, do indeed play an essential part in the structure of the poem. They have not generally been considered in relation to the poem as a whole and will be so considered later in this essay.

Vergil could not have begun the Third *Eclogue* on a more conventionally pastoral note. In his first two lines he translates literally the first two lines of Theocritus' Fourth *Idyll*, a realistic genre-scene of shepherd life. He then moves quickly to Theocritus V, another poem of realistic rusticity, from which he imitates (much diluted) the erotic suggestion of 8-9 (see Theocr., V, 12 ff.).⁶ As happens elsewhere on the *Eclogues*, notably in the Ninth, this close imitation of Theocritus serves a double purpose: it acknowledges a debt, but it also alerts the reader to possible differences and innovations to follow. It sets up the norm of pastoral convention against which can be read the significance of individual deviations and modifications.

Thus here, after the "lower" pastoral vein of the opening lines, the tone begins to change: it shifts gradually away from rustic crudity to the "higher" aspects of the pastoral tradition. The change is perhaps prepared for already in the *faciles Nymphae* of 9—a hasty glance into the mythological realm which Vergil will explore more fully in *Eclogues* 6 and 10. It is intimated also in the *veteres fagos* of 12, the familiar and reassuring scenery of calm, beautiful Arcadia (cf. *sub tegmine fagi*, *E.*, 1, 1; *inter densas, umbrosa cacumina, fagos*, *E.*, 2, 3).

A more significant change of mood comes in line 21, where Vergil introduces the theme of song (*an mihi cantando . . .*) which is taken up emphatically in Menalcas' reply in 25, *cantando tu illum. . .*. Vergil is still within the rustic limitations of Theocritus V, for lines 25-7 are closely modelled after lines 5-7 of the Fifth *Idyll*:

τὴν ποίαν σύριγγα; τὸ γάρ ποκα, δῶλε Σιβύρτα,
ἐκτάσω σύριγγα; τί δ' οὐκέτι σὺν Κορύδῳ
ἀρκεῖ τοι καλάμας αὐλὸν ποππύσδεν ἔχοντι;

⁶ For Vergil's borrowings from Theocritus in *E.* 3 see A. Cartault, *Études sur les Bucoliques de Virgile* (Paris, 1897), pp. 127 ff.; H. J. Rose, *The Eclogues of Vergil* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942), pp. 40 ff. (unsatisfactory); K. Büchner, "P. Vergilius Maro," *R.-E.*, VIII A 1 (1955), cols. 1193-4.

Cantando tu illum? aut umquam tibi fistula cera
iuncta fuit? non tu in triviis, indocte, solebas
stridenti miserum stipula disperdere carmen?

But Vergil has here treated his original with a freedom and poetic originality which are far from the close translation of his opening lines. He focuses on the theme of song (*cantando*) rather than the pipe (*syrinx*). He also replaces Theocritus' coarse taunt, δῶλε, with *indocte*, a word which at this time invokes a realm of associations quite different from those of Theocritean rusticity, namely the literary sophistication of the *docti poetae*. With this adjective the poet opens the way to further departures from his crude pastoral beginning.

The next exchange contains another noteworthy departure from the Fifth *Idyll*, for now Vergil turns to another poem of Theocritus, his First *Idyll*. As in his opening lines, Vergil gives a fairly close imitation (29-31):

ego hanc vitulam (ne forte recuses,
bis venit ad mulctram, binos alit ubere fetus)
depono. . . .
αἰγά τέ τοι δωσῶ διδυματόκον ἐς τρὶς ἀμέλξαι,
ἃ δὺ' ἔχουσ' ἐρίφως ποταμέλγεται ἐς δύο πέλλας
(I, 25-6).

But there follows forthwith Vergil's most elaborate use of—and departure from—Theocritus in this *Eclogue*, the motif of the cup of *Idyll*, I, 27-61.

Theocritus' First *Idyll*, unlike his Fourth and Fifth, has little rustic frivolity. It is, rather, a poem of much lyrical beauty in the descriptions of the country and culminates in the *pièce de résistance*, Thyrsis' beautiful song of lament for Daphnis. Yet the structure of the First *Idyll* is very like that of the Fifth: an introduction consisting of pastoral dialogue occupying nearly half the poem, a song, and a final pronouncement. Vergil draws more heavily for his structure on *Idyll* V, with the amoebean contest and the umpire speaking the closing lines. But his fusion of *Idylls* I and V within a single *Eclogue* indicates that he perceived the similarities of structure between the two poems, and he turns this connection to his own purposes.⁷ He creates

⁷ Vergil's ability to borrow at will from different Theocritean contexts indicates in itself that he conceives of his pastoral settings differently

thus a gradual progression from the humbler themes of *Idylls* IV and V to the loftier and more elaborate subject of *Idyll* I. At the same time he effects a complex fusion of three different Theocritean poems: the kindly rustic conversation of IV, the more acrid banter and competitive spirit of V, and the peaceful elevated tone of I.

It is at this point, when his fusion of these different elements begins to take effect, that Vergil makes his most significant departure from Theocritus, his treatment of the shepherds' cups. Theocritus' cup gives a panoramic view of his pastoral world. It contains, on the outside, ivy and helichryse (I, 29-31), the floral luxuriance and beauty that are recurrent and fundamental elements in his pastoral settings (e. g. V, 45 ff.; VII, 7-9, 135 ff.; XI, 45 ff.). There follow scenes of rustic life, set down with a delicate and amusing realism and forming a kind of pastoral Shield of Achilles (there are in fact echoes both of Homer and of the Hesiodic Shield of Heracles).⁸ First appears a handsome woman, coyly inattentive to two rival admirers (32-8); then a hearty old fisherman drawing his nets (39-44), and finally (45-54) a boy intent on weaving a cage and two foxes with designs on the boy's knapsack and the grapes he is supposed to be watching. Acanthus enframes the whole, making it an *αἰπολικὸν θάγμα* (56), "a wonder for shepherds," or more plausibly, "a wonder from the world of shepherds."⁹

This phrase, *αἰπολικὸν θάγμα*, perhaps indicates that Theocritus intended the scene to serve as a kind of general introduction to the poetic possibilities of his rustic world and as a foil to the loftier tone and sadder subject of the second half of the *Idyll*, the lament of Daphnis. Vergil, perceiving this possibility, uses the passage to set forth and clarify his own ideas about the

from Theocritus and has different notions about the unity of a poem. See Büchner's fine remarks (*loc. cit.*): ". . . bei Vergil hat alles Sinn und Funktion in der individuellen Ordnung eines Gedichtes, ist mithin unvertauschbar, bei Theokrit hat alles seine Ordnung in den objektiven Gegebenheit des Lebens der Hirten."

⁸ Theocritus, I, 40-1 imitates the Hesiodic *Aspis*, 213-15. Cf. also Theocritus, I, 34 and 46 with *Iliad*, XVIII, 506 and 561 respectively.

⁹ An inferior tradition gives at line 56 the reading, *αἰολικὸν θάγμα*, "a brilliant sight" (confusing *θάγμα* and *θέαμα*). See A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus* (Cambridge, 1950), *ad loc.*, II, p. 13. Gow suggests as the meaning, "an object for a goatherd to marvel at."

range and limits of his pastoral world¹⁰ (from the point of view of *Eclogue* 3, of course, Theocritus' actual intention is irrelevant: cf. Vergil's famous "mistranslation" from Theocritus I in *E.*, 8, 58).

In Theocritus' *Idyll* the cup is one of two gifts (the other being a goat) intended to persuade the talented poet-shepherd to sing. Theocritus has the single shepherd offer both cup and goat. The two gifts are of coordinate value. Together they are part of a unified pastoral framework which easily contains both high poetry and rustic realism. Hence after the Daphnis-song the shepherd can say of his cup,

ἤνιδε τοι τὸ δέπας· θᾶσαι, φίλος, ὥς καλὸν ὄσδει·
Ὡρᾶν πεπλυσθαι νυν ἐπὶ κράναισι δοκησείς (149-50);

and then, after bestowing the goat, he can turn to his own goats, who at this moment are behaving in realistically caprine fashion (151-2). Theocritus' transition from the "high" poetic effect of line 150 to the realism of his last two lines is perfectly smooth; and even within line 150 the addition of *δοκησείς*, "you will think," makes it entirely clear that the poet is able to juxtapose his two levels without confusing them or feeling them in conflict.

For Vergil, on the other hand, there is a cleavage between the two realms. He creates quite a different balance between the rustic and the poetic by tempering Theocritus' realism with the total unreality of myth and imagination. This imaginative transformation of Theocritus (to stress an often-made, but important point) pervades the *Eclogues* and is essential to their suggestiveness and poetic concentration.¹¹

Here Vergil's Damoetas makes the conventional gesture of staking a cow. Menalcas, however, declines competition on these

¹⁰ It is, of course, highly characteristic of Vergil to define his own ideas of a poetic form and his own place in a poetic tradition by reference to and modification of that tradition. See Elder (above, note 1) and Stewart (above, note 2), *passim*: also W. F. J. Knight, *Roman Vergil* (London, 1945), p. 121.

¹¹ On this transformation of Theocritean realism see B. Snell, "Arcadia: The Discovery of a Spiritual Landscape," in *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), chap. 13. This subject is treated in connection with a single poem of Vergil, *E.* 2, by F. Klingner, *Gnomon*, III (1927), pp. 579-81.

terms and offers the cups instead: *de grege non ausim quicquam deponere tecum* (32). It is true that his reason is a practical one: the watchfulness of his father and his stepmother, who is a traditional *iniusta noverca* (33). But this dickering over the prize is more than another piece of rustic "realism." It introduces an unexpected "jog" in the progression of the action. It leads to the description of the cups and to the loftier tone which that description strikes. Thus it begins to create that division between "rustic" and "poetic" which is lacking in Theocritus. Menalcas makes a value-judgment which does not merely affect the present context, but soon ramifies to include the question of the nature of Vergilian pastoral and its relation to its predecessors.¹² His cups, Menalcas asserts, are of far greater significance than the cow (35-7):

verum, id quod multo tute ipse fatebere maius
(insanire libet quoniam tibi), pocula ponam
fagina, caelatum divini opus Alcimedontis.

The addition, *insanire libet quoniam tibi*, is a small, but important touch in establishing this more "poetic" atmosphere. The phrase suggests that these shepherds may look away from the practical realities of their flocks, away from questions of price and value. They may succumb to a "poetic" moment, a moment of excitement, rashness, passion, a moment when engraved cups appear as more valuable than a solid cow, the artistic object more valuable than the practical. It is noteworthy

¹² In his treatment of Theocritean rusticity in *Idylls* IV and V and of the cup of I, Vergil would probably have agreed with the youthful judgment of a later "Augustan," Pope, in his "Discourse on Pastoral Poetry": "He [Theocritus] is apt to be too long in his descriptions, of which that of the Cup in the first pastoral is a remarkable instance. In the manners he seems a little defective, for his swains are sometimes abusive and immodest, and perhaps too much inclining to rusticity; for instance, in his fourth and fifth *Idyllia*." Note too what Pope does with the cup-motif in his own pastoral: he makes the adornments even more elevated and grander than Vergil did ("Spring: The Pastoral, or Damon"):

And I this bowl, where wanton Ivy twines,
And swelling clusters bend the curling vines:
Four figures rising from the work appear,
The various seasons of the rolling year;
And what is that, which binds the radiant sky,
Where twelve fair Signs in beauteous order lie?

that neither shepherd makes any claims for the *usefulness* of his cups; both stress the maker and the adornment. It is interesting too that *insanire* is the verb used of the passionate poet-lover of *Eclogue* 10, Gallus, who does not properly belong to the pastoral world and who, for the moment, is abandoning everything, even life itself, to the intensity of his passion: *Galle, quid insanis . . . ?* (*E.*, 10, 22).

This scene of bargaining, then, begins to open the dichotomy between practical and aesthetic, "rustic" and "poetic" (note the deprecating reference to the "rustic Muse" in the second half of the poem: *Pollio amat nostram, quamvis est rustica, Musam*, 84). The poem, however, does not yet commit itself fully to the "poetic" side. Damoetas retains his rustic hard-headedness and practical sense of values. "If you make any comparison with the cow," he says, "you'll have no grounds for praising the cups" (*si ad vitulam spectas, nihil est quod pocula laudes*, 48). But now Menalcas, in his turn, is carried away by his confidence in his skill. Thus he agrees to compete even on these terms and accedes to Damoetas' initial proposal of 29 ff., the cow: *numquam hodie effugies; veniam quocumque vocaris* (49).

The issue between them, then, cups or cow, aesthetic or practical, is still unresolved at the moment when Palaemon, the umpire-to-be, appears and brings an end to this first half of the poem. But the whole episode of the wager (29-49, nearly a fifth of the entire poem) gives the contest itself a significance which goes beyond a mere singing-match. Damoetas' *res est non parva* (54) may refer to more than the value of the cow. Both the cups and the contest of which they are the prize become meaningful at a level other than that of rustic realism: both are transformed into something symbolic.

It is this process which Vergil is engaged in throughout the *Eclogues*. It is a characteristic mode of his art, both here and in his later works, to find new possibilities in the traditions of the past and through original syntheses and transformations to reawaken them to a new and different life. Ernst Curtius, in an essay that deserves to be better known, has aptly described the process:

Denn es ist eine Grundkraft und ein Grundwille Virgils, das Währende durch allen Wandel hindurch zu bewahren.

Wiederholung als Wiederbringung, Finden als Wiederfinden, Erneuerung als Bestätigung und Erhöhung des Besessenen,— das ist ein Herzensanliegen Virgils gewesen. . . . Das Verlorene und Vergangene auf fremden Boden, in neuem Stoff aufzubauen, das ist Wille und Weg virgilischer Weisheit.²⁸

And Curtius, looking also to the *Aeneid*, seeks the deeper roots of this attitude in the Roman, and generally ancient concern with continuity, history, tradition:

Jenes Persönliche verbindet sich aber mit einem Überpersönlichen: mit der römischen Funktion der Kontinuität, ja vielleicht mit einem für die ganze Antike geltenden Lebensgesetz, wonach alles Neugeschaffene seine Bestätigung von einem Altüberlieferten hier erweisen und auf es verweisen muss: die Kolonie auf die Mutterstadt, die Satzung auf einen Gründer, der Sang auf die Museen, das Abbild auf das Urbild und die Kunstübung auf Muster.

Thus it is that Vergil's motif of the cups takes on meaning beyond the concrete situation, meanings which lead symbolically to the broader "continuities" of which Curtius speaks. Theocritus' cup in *Idyll*, I, 150, it is true, seems to approach having symbolical value: "You will think it was washed in the springs of the Seasons." But, as noted before, the addition, "you will think," subtly keeps real and symbolic clearly distinguished and holds fast to the particularity of the objects in their specific setting. The cups of Vergil's Menalcas, however, shade off inevitably into the realm of symbol:

36 pocula ponam
fagina, caelatum divini opus Alcimedontis,
lenta quibus torno facili superaddita vitis
diffusus hedera vestit pallente corymbos.
40 In medio duo signa, Conon, et—quis fuit alter,
descripsit radio totum qui gentibus orbem,
tempora quae messor, quae curvus arator haberet?
43 Necdum illis labra admovi, sed condita servo.

The cups themselves are of beechwood (*fagina*, 37) and hence a part of the rustic world wherein beech trees are so familiar a part of the scenery (see line 12, and the passages cited above). Yet they are also the work of a highly skilled, indeed inspired

¹³ This and the following quotation are from Ernst Curtius, "Virgil," in *Kritische Essays zur europäischen Literatur* (ed. 2, Bern, 1954), p. 14.

craftsman, *caelatum divini opus Alcimedontis* (and it is not surprising that this Alcimedon is totally unknown to us and is very likely Vergil's invention). They do not contain scenes of the simple events of daily rustic life, but allude to learned astronomical research. Though the actual carving on the cups presents only the figures of the two astronomers, presumably in medallion-like design, they comprehend by implication the wider terms of lines 41-2 (one thinks of the famous *caelique meatus/describent radio* of *Aeneid* VI). They present the *totum orbem*, the large suggestions of the astronomers' benefactions to all mankind (*gentibus*), and the rhythms of the natural world—the seasons of harvest and sowing—which astronomy helps indicate and measure.

Vergil thus incorporates themes of a broader nature than those of Theocritus—the *paulo maiora* of heavenly phenomena as they are to appear fleetingly in the *caelum altum* of *E.* 4 (cf. lines 5 and 50-1) and the stars of *E.* 5 (cf. 23, 43, 51, 56 ff., 62) and are to be more fully developed in *E.* 6 (33 ff., especially 37). The passage seems to foreshadow too the Iopas song of *Aeneid* I and especially the expansiveness of the *Georgics*, with their translations from Hellenistic astronomical poetry (see *G.*, I, 231-56, 351 ff.) and their praise of natural science, especially the knowledge of the movements of the heavens (*caelique vias et sidera . . . , defectus solis varios lunaeque labores*, II, 475-8). And it is interesting in this connection that the singing contest here in the Third *Eclogue* begins with an adaptation of the opening lines of Aratus' *Phaenomena*.¹⁴

Nor is Vergil troubled by his shepherd's knowledge of the name of an Hellenistic astronomer. Indeed, this fact, like the translation from Aratus, is part of his attempt to state the dignity and complexity of his pastoral art. This motif of the learned, or pseudo-learned, shepherd probably comes again from Theocritus' Fifth *Idyll* (104-5), where Comatas sings,

ἔστι δέ μοι γαῦλος κυπαρίσσιος, ἔστι δὲ κρατήρ,
ἔργον Πραξιτέλεως· τᾷ παιδὶ δὲ ταῦτα φυλάσσω.

¹⁴ Vergil may be referring to Theocritus, XVII, 1; but, as commentators have often pointed out, the second part of his line, *Iovis omnia plena*, confirms the connection with Aratus: see *Phaen.*, 2, *μεστὰ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγνιά, κ. τ. λ.*

But Theocritus, with his clear separation and balancing of rustic realism and "higher" themes, uses this reference to Praxiteles with deliberately humorous intent in order to add another fine stroke to his rustic character portrayal. The simple shepherd has only heard vaguely of Praxiteles and claims him boastfully as the author of his bowl, intending, doubtless, to profit from his companion's equal ignorance, though he himself thereby displays his own naive ignorance of Praxiteles' work.¹⁵ At the same time Theocritus further limits any seriousness in the theme by having his shepherd keep the bowls as gifts for his girl-friend (τῇ παιδὶ δὲ τὰυτα φυλάσσω, 105).

Vergil, on the other hand, treats the cups of *E.*, 3 with a seriousness which derives from the fact that they are not just rustic gifts, just as his pastorals are not just rustic songs or realistic genre-scenes. He emphasizes the *art*, the act of creation that has made the cups (note *caelatum*, *torno facili*, 37-8), just as he emphasizes the inspiration of the maker (*divini Alcimedontis*, 37). He is self-consciously aware that his cups are an *opus*, a work of art. Hence his addition of the epithet *divinus* may not be a mere rhetorical adornment, as Cartault had claimed,¹⁶ but part of an intentional modification of his source.

So too Vergil has doubled the motif of the cups and put a second set of cups, also by Alcimedon, into the hands of the other shepherd, Damoetas (44-7):

Et nobis idem Alcimedon duo pocula fecit,
et molli circum est ansas amplexus acantho,
Orpheaue in medio posuit silvasque sequentis.
Necdum illis labra admovi, sed condita servo.

Damoetas' cups are surrounded by "soft acanthus," an obvious reference back to the enframing acanthus (ὄγρος ἄκανθος) that closes the description of the cup in Theocritus I. Yet these

¹⁵ This interpretation of the Praxiteles-reference is supported by the scholia and maintained by Gow (above, note 9), II, p. 110: "He means that it is a very splendid piece, and therefore assigns it to the most eminent artist he has ever heard of." Gow cites as parallels Martial, IV, 39 and Phaedrus, 5 *prol.*

¹⁶ Cartault (above, note 6), p. 133: "L'adjonction de l'épithète s'explique par un motif de rhétorique. . . ." It is perhaps possible too that the epithet *divinus* was suggested by Theocritus' τὴ θεῶν δαίδαλμα (I, 32). For *divinus* in connection with poetic inspiration in the *Eclogues* see *E.*, 6, 67 (*divino carmine*); *E.*, 5, 45; 10, 17 (*divine poeta*).

cups contain the image of Orpheus, the pastoral poet *par excellence*, the poet who can move the natural world in sympathetic response to his art: *Orpheaque in medio posuit silvasque sequentis* (46). Orpheus occurs throughout the *Eclogues* as the symbol of the poet, especially the divinely gifted poet who stands in intimate and mysterious relation to the world and brings a kind of order to its diversity through the beauty of his song, the poet who thus recreates a lost harmony between man and nature.¹⁷

In the juxtaposition of the two sets of cups, then, Vergil balances the ordering of the heavens (note *descripsit*, 41) for the good of man with a kind of ordering of the natural world (*silvasque sequentis*) by the inspired poet. Both are in profound contact with the rhythms of the cosmos and both are concerned with the establishment of an harmonious relation between the cosmos and man. And both are encompassed in the art-work of the inspired craftsman, the *caelatum opus*.

If Vergil is then using Theocritus' cup to suggest something of the scope of his own pastoral, there may be some significance in his alteration of the enframing designs. To the ivy of Theocritus, I, 29-31 he adds the vine: *superaddita vitis* (38); and the verb *superaddita* (perhaps the first occurrence of this rare compound in Latin) makes the addition stand out with special emphasis. There are, to be sure, grapes in Theocritus, but only as a separate scene, not as one of the framing devices. Vergil's addition is perhaps to be connected with his calling the creator of the cups *divinus*. Wine is traditionally associated with poetic inspiration and is perhaps especially appropriate since Orpheus is to follow (46). One recalls Silenus, a Dionysiac figure, in the Sixth *Eclogue*, *inflatum hesterno venas, ut semper, Iaccho* (15); and like Orpheus in *E.* 3, Silenus is a poet whose song evokes response and participation from the natural world (*E.*, 6, 27-8):

¹⁷ For Orpheus and the power of inspired poetry *E.*, 6, 27-30 is the *locus classicus* in the *Eclogues*; see also *E.*, 6, 82 ff.; 4, 55; and for the sympathy between nature and the poet, 8, 2 ff.; 9, 19 f.; 10, 8; 10, 13 ff. For Orpheus' connection with other inspired poet-figures, see Elder (above, note 1), p. 115 and G. P. Sullivan's unpublished Harvard Honors Thesis, "Elements of Unity in the Sixth Eclogue: Some Notes on Vergil's Literary Method" (1953), in the Harvard College Library. Vergil will return to Orpheus in his associations with the creative forces of life

tum vero in numerum Faunosque ferasque videres
ludere, tum rigidas motare cacumina quercus.¹⁸

Indeed the following two lines of *E.* 6 (29-30) make an explicit link between Silenus and Orpheus:

nec tantum Phoebus gaudet Parnasia rupes,
nec tantum Rhodope miratur et Ismarus *Orphea*.

And Phoebus Apollo will play an important role in *E.* 3 also (see 62, 104, and *infra*).

The two sets of cups, then, set the stage for the contest to follow and fix it within a larger perspective. They introduce material deeply connected with the nature of poetry, but (in the case of Menalcas' cups) extending beyond the conventional limits of pastoral poetry. Vergil is not simply changing Theocritus' subjects for the sake of *variatio*, nor is he necessarily inferior to his model as Cartault maintained:

Il les a donc remplacés d'une part par les deux astronomes, de l'autre par Orphée charmant les forêts; cette dernière représentation est banale, la première est prétentieuse et froide, bien que Virgile se soit appliqué à mettre ses savants en relation avec l'agriculture. Quant à la distribution des deux guirlandes entre deux coupes différentes elle témoigne d'une véritable pauvreté d'invention.¹⁹

But rather than being impoverished in invention, Vergil is creating a typical fusion of different elements into a new complex and suggestive unity. His poet-shepherds, united through a single creative impulse, the work of the "divine Alcimedon," are put in touch with the beauty both of cultivated (42) and uncultivated (46) nature, with the obviously useful aspects of

more deeply at the end of the *Georgics*: see my article on *Georg.* IV in *A. J. P.*, LXXXVII (1966), pp. 307-25.

¹⁸ For the Dionysiac aspects of Silenus and his associations with inspiration see E. de Saint-Denis, "Le chant de Silène à la lumière d'une découverte récente," *Rev. Phil.*, XXXVII (1963), pp. 23-40. Note also *E.*, 10, 26 ff., where, shortly after the description of the sympathy of pastoral nature for the poet, Pan himself appears, the embodiment of Arcadian energy and the spirit of remote pastoral nature, *Pan deus Arcadiae*; and he is *sanguineis ebuli bacis minioque rubentem*, very much like the drunken Silenus in *E.*, 6, 22. The vine is added to the ivy also in another imitation of Theocritus, I. 29 ff.: Nonnus, 19, 25.

¹⁹ Cartault (above, note 6), p. 134.

creative effort (astronomy and agriculture) and its purely non-utilitarian expression (poetry), with historical figures and real human beings like Conon and with totally mythical and half-divine figures, like Orpheus. This scene, then, presents in small that fusion of the real and the mythical which is characteristic of the *Eclogues* and lies at the heart of their suggestive power.

With the larger themes adumbrated in the two sets of cups, the way is fully open for a significant change of tone. This comes with the appearance of the umpire, Palaemon. Vergil is still following Theocritus V (see V, 62 ff.), but with a difference: in Theocritus no real change in tone occurs, nothing analogous to the broad, calming effect given by Palaemon's lines (55-7):

Dicite, quandoquidem in molli consedimus herba.
Et nunc omnis ager, nunc omnis parturit arbos,
nunc frondent silvae, nunc formosissimus annus.

The lines present an ideal of pastoral beauty and serenity: nature at the height of gentleness and fruitfulness, inviting rest and song.

The lines recall several Theocritean contexts (see, e. g., *Idylls*, I, 12 ff. and 21 ff.; V, 31 ff. and 45 ff.); but in Theocritus this gentler pastoral atmosphere is diffused over the whole poem, from its beginning on. In Vergil, however, the poem begins on a harsher, more acrid note and only gradually wins its way to the peaceful breadth of view in which song is possible. The universal fertility is emphasized by the four-fold *nunc* and by the heavy and dignified rhythm of the concluding *nunc formosissimus annus* that sums up the preceding lines. The verses put a definitive end to petty quarreling and recall Damoetas and Menalcas to their heritage and obligations as rustics who are poets as well as shepherds.

These lines come in the exact center of the poem. Vergil seems to have reserved for this late moment what he elsewhere in the *Eclogues* sets forth at once. *Eclogues* 5 and 7 are especially close parallels:

Cur, non, Mopse, boni quoniam convenimus ambo,
tu calamos inflare levis, ego dicere versus,
hic corylis mixtas inter consedimus ulmos? (*E.*, 5, 1-3).
Forte sub arguta consederat ilice Daphnis (*E.*, 7, 1).

Eclogue 1 also begins by establishing the calm of the pastoral world (*Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi . . .*). And in *E.* 9 a pastoral description, delayed, but still far earlier in the poem than that of *E.* 3, partially soothes the disturbance and restlessness with which the poem began and leads, eventually, to pastoral song (7-9):

Certe equidem audieram, qua se subducere colles
incipiunt mollique iugum demittere clivo,
usque ad aquam et veteres, iam fracta cacumina, fagos. . . .

The Third *Eclogue*, however, is an exception to this familiar pattern, and the difference seems to underline the fact that the meditative peace necessary for song is not always easily obtainable or readily at hand. Sometimes it comes slowly or by a happy accident. *Eclogue* 9 perhaps comes closest to this delayed effect; but this feature in *E.* 3 is unique and perhaps bears on its relation to other poems in the collection (see part II, below).

As the representative of this larger pastoral setting, Palaemon has a dignity hitherto lacking in the rival shepherds. Hence he can bring order to their songs and direct their quarrelsome energies into poetry (*E.*, 3, 58-9):

Incipe, Damoeta; tu deinde sequere, Menalca.
Alternis dicetis; amant alterna Camenae.

Palaemon brings a reminder both of beauty and of order; and both are needed before the songs can begin. He awakens to life what was carved, static, and inanimate, on the cups: the vitality of the natural processes and the beauty that lies all around (55-7) and the presence of the creative energies in man: the Muses (*Camenae*, 59). His speech ends on *Camenae*, and the songs begin forthwith.

The shepherds begin, significantly, with an invocation to the gods of order in both nature and art: Jupiter, the Muses, Apollo (60-3):

Dam. Ab Iove principium Musae: Iovis omnia plena;
ille colit terras, illi mea carmina curae.
Men. Et me Phoebus amat; Phoebos sua semper apud me
munera sunt, lauri et suave rubens hyacinthus.

Damoetas' opening lines are especially interesting in that they link the pervasive presence of Jupiter with the Muse. The first

part of line 60 has two possible meanings (taking *Musae* as genitive):²⁰ "From Jupiter is *my* Muse's beginning," and "From Jupiter is the beginning—origin, foundation—of the Muse (of poetry in general)." Vergil departs subtly but significantly from his Greek models by substituting a more abstract and suggestive noun, *principium*, for Aratus and Theocritus' totally unambiguous verb, ἀρχόμεσθα. Even though in this translation he is preceded by Cicero in his translation of Aratus (*A Iove Musarum primordia*, *De Leg.*, II, 3, 7), his singular is more general (and in his verse also more ambiguous) than Cicero's plural. At any rate the change wrought by Palaemon's presence is immense, for the first line spoken after his exhortation claims for poetry an intimate affinity with the divinity who orders the world.

Damoetas' second line, reinforces this connection of poetry with the divine ordering of the world: Jupiter looks after the earth's fertility, and yet is concerned with the shepherd's songs: *ille colit terras, illi mea carmina curae*. Jupiter literally "cultivates the earth"—just as the human race itself does in the description of the cups (41-2). Jupiter as god of the heavens, as the "source" of the Muse, and as sponsor of agriculture thus looks back to the scene of the cups. The union of cosmic and poetic order in Jupiter here is paralleled in that scene too, possibly in the juxtaposition of artist (*divini Alci-medontis*) and astronomers (*descripsit radio qui gentibus orbem*, 41) within the first set and certainly in the combination of astronomers and Orpheus between the two sets.

Commentators on line 60 generally refer to the Aratus and Theocritus passages cited above (note 14). But Vergil may have in mind a yet more exalted source, one that would further link humble pastoral with lofty themes and the highest poetic inspiration, namely Hesiod (*Theog.*, 94-6):

²⁰ Editors are divided as to whether *Musae* in 60 is genitive or vocative. See the discussion and passages cited in Conington, *ad loc.* If *Musae* is understood as genitive (as I believe it should be), the linking of poetic and cosmic order is especially close. The singular, *Musam*, in 84 also helps confirm this interpretation. Cartault (above, note 6), pp. 140-1 arbitrarily condemns Damoetas' invocation as inferior to its immediate source, Theocritus, V, 80 ff.: "Au v. 60 sq. il invoque Jupiter, ce qui lui donne un début plus magnifique mais plus banal que celui de Théocrite."

ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἐκὼς Ἀπόλλωνος
 ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί,
 ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες

Vergil's emphasis on Apollo in the next two lines helps support this further reference; and in the Sixth *Eclogue*, adapting another, and more famous, passage from the proem of the *Theogony* (22 ff.), Vergil makes Hesiod his model of the inspired poet: Silenus reports Linus' words, sung *divino carmine*, as he presented his flute to Gallus (*E.*, 6, 69-71):

Hos tibi dant calamos, en accipe, Musae,
 Ascræo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat
 cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos.

The language has some obvious connections with the Third *Eclogue*. Hesiod here is like Orpheus in *E.*, 3, 45; and he would be relevant also as a poet whose works—both the *Theogony* and the *Erga*—strongly assert the connection between poetic and cosmic order.

Vergil seems to have intentionally given a rather grandiose invocation to an amoebean singing match. He has here made a distinct departure from his immediate source, for although Theocritus' shepherds call upon the Muses and Apollo, they do so still in a purely pastoral context of goats, rams, and rustic festivals (*V.*, 80-3):

—ταὶ Μοῖσαι με φιλεῦντι πολὺ πλεόν ἢ τὸν ἀοιδόν
 Δάφνιν· ἐγὼ δ' αὐταῖς χιμάρως δύο πρᾶν ποκ' ἔθυσσα.
 —καὶ γὰρ ἔμ' Ὀπόλλων φιλέει μέγα, καὶ καλὸν αὐτῷ
 κριὸν ἐγὼ βόσκω· τὰ δὲ Κάρνεα καὶ δὴ ἐφέρειπει.

But this divergence is only a part of a larger attempt at a redefinition of pastoral in loftier terms. In the songs which follow, the two shepherds can offer to the familiar pastoral loves, Amyntas and Galatea, such poetically elaborate gifts as *aëriæ palumbes* (69) and *aurea mala* (71). Pollio can make a prominent appearance (84-9), and the Muse again—*quamvis est rustica* (84), precisely when, after 60-3, she is considerably less "rustic." Or the simpler pastoral and the loftier, "poetical" tones can be juxtaposed in contiguous couplets, as in 88-9 and 90-1:

Qui te, Pollio, amat, veniat quo te quoque gaudet;
 mella fluant illi, ferat et rubus asper amomum.

Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina, Maevi,
atque idem iungat vulpes et mulgeat hircos.

The first couplet has, of course, Hesiodic echoes again and intimations of the Fourth *Eclogue* (see *E.*, 4, 25, 30); but the answering couplet, though more "rustic," is still literary in its reference and rhetorical in its style. How different this juxtaposition is from Theocritus, where there is a much freer mixture of rusticity and lyricism and much less concern for maintaining a certain level of poetic decorum. In the Fifth *Idyll*, for instance, to round out a beautiful description of trees, cool springs, birds, and fleeces "softer than sleep" (a phrase borrowed by Vergil in *E.*, 7, 45), one goatherd tells the other, "Your goats smell worse than you do yourself" (45-52).

This interplay in the Third *Eclogue* between these two levels of poetry, the high and the low, is present most clearly in the differences between the two halves of the poem. But it operates in the second half also and here takes the form of an alternation between the themes of love and poetry in the songs of the two shepherds. Of the twenty-four couplets which they sing, only four deal with purely pastoral themes. Twelve couplets deal with love; six—just half that number—with poetry.²¹ (I omit the two riddling couplets which have a special relation to the others and will be considered separately below.) This alternating pattern appears as follows:

60-63	Poetry (traditional: the Muses, Apollo)	2 couplets
64-83	Love (among shepherds)	10 "
84-91	Poetry (contemporary: Pollio)	4 "
92-99	Pastoral themes	4 "
100-3	Love (in animals)	2 "

This alternation of rustic love and poetry has its place in the first half of the poem too, for there the two shepherds gradually move from rustic themes of an erotic nature (see 7 ff., 12 ff.) to the subject of song (25 ff.). Indeed, this division between love and poetry is hinted at in the characters of the two contestants, for Menalcas (12-15) lost his temper over a gift of

²¹ For a somewhat different division of the subjects see Büchner (above, note 6), col. 1192.

bow and arrows to Daphnis (love presumably being involved),²² while Damoetas became similarly angry because of a singing-contest (21 ff.). At the end of the match this balance between love and poetry is still maintained, for it is again Damoetas who is on the side of poetry, offering as the prize for the solution of his riddle, *Et eris mihi magnus Apollo* (104), whereas Menalcas, true to his earlier propensity, states as his prize, *Et Phyllida solus habeto* (107).

We come now to the riddles themselves (104-7):

Dam. Dic quibus in terris—et eris mihi magnus Apollo—
tris pateat caeli spatium non amplius ulnas.

Men. Dic quibus in terris inscripti nomina regum
nascantur flores, et Phyllida solus habeto.

The riddles are puzzling, as riddles are meant to be. Whether or not we can believe the story about Caelius given in Servius, the riddles do serve a unifying function. As the last words of the two shepherds they take up several themes suggested earlier in the poem and provide a kind of summary of certain major motifs.

The riddles refer back, both directly and obliquely, to the description of Menalcas' cups and to the invocations in 60-3; and these references, especially the latter, make a kind of ring-composition, an ending that turns back to the beginning. The *caeli spatium* (whatever the truth of the Caelius story) recalls the astronomical subject of Menalcas' cups; and the paradox *in terris . . . caeli spatium* recalls also the fusion of earth and sky—the divisions of the sky for the sake of the cultivation of the earth—in 41-2. In the second riddle, though the subject is more terrestrial, the word *inscripti* is perhaps an echo of *descripsit* in 41. Astronomers "describe" figures which are of use to the generality of men—the "reaper and bent plowman"—for the continuation of life; but the figures "inscribed" by the gods involve kings (*regum*) long dead and, however beautiful, have no practical use.

The *magnus Apollo* in 104 recalls also Phoebus in Menalcas'

²² For the probable erotic implications of the situation compare *E.*, 2, 29, where hunting is part of the love-relationship; and note too Menalcas' couplet on hunting with his beloved, Amyntas, later, *E.*, 3, 74-5.

invocation in 62. The connection with this passage is strongly emphasized by the second part of that invocation: *Phoebo sua semper apud me / munera sunt, lauri et suave rubens hyacinthus* (62-3). The flower of the riddle is, of course, the hyacinth. The answer to Menalcas' riddle is thus contained in his opening lines. This fact gives an important clue to the first riddle, for perhaps in Damoetas' *caeli spatium* there is some reference to his own invocation which dwelt upon the pervasive influence of Jupiter the sky-god (*Iovis omnia plena*, 60) and claimed that this Olympian deity took care of the earth (*ille colit terras*, 61).

Perhaps more interesting for the thematic significance of the riddles, however, is a recent suggestion of Wormell. Wormell has taken up and defended an old suggestion that the answer to the first riddle, "Where on the earth does the space of the sky extend not more than three cubits," is a celestial globe or sphere, perhaps to be connected with the orrery of Archimedes brought to Rome by Marcellus (see Cicero, *De Re Publ.*, I, 14, 21-2).²³ If this is so—and it is the most plausible solution that has been given—one answer to the first riddle, like that of the second, is clearly contained in the preceding portion of the poem. The *quis fuit alter* of 40 might even refer to Archimedes, whose name will not fit into hexameter verse.

If this solution is correct, the parallel between the two riddles is reinforced by the fact that both solutions are anticipated within the preceding text of the poem itself. This parallel is structurally and thematically significant too. Astronomy (the celestial sphere) in the first riddle would thus be juxtaposed with poetic myth (*nomina regum*) and love (*Phyllida* and the story of Hyacinthus) in the second. Vergil would then be resuming his earlier contrast between creative activity for utilitarian purposes (astronomy and agriculture) and the "pure" creativity of poetry (Orpheus).

The two riddles, then, concentrate a number of important contrasts presented throughout the poem: the astronomers and

²³ Wormell (above, note 5), pp. 29-32. This solution, notes Wormell, is as old as J. Martyn, 1749. Like the second riddle too the first has a double answer, it being possible to reply "at Rome" (where Archimedes' device presumably still was), or "at Rhodes," where there was a similar device made by Poseidonius. A new solution has recently been proposed by M. C. J. Putnam, *Mnemosyne*, ser. IV, XVIII (1965), pp. 150-4.

Orpheus, erudition and simplicity, useful scientific knowledge and poetic myth, sky and earth, large themes of cosmic significance (*caeli spatium, magnus Apollo*) and humbler pastoral song (*Phyllida*). There is also a tension between sadness and happiness, for the joyfulness in the prize offered for the solution of the riddles (*eris mihi magnus Apollo; Phyllida solus habeto*) is in contrast with the sadness of the content, at least in the second riddle with the allusion to Hyacinthus' unhappy love and Ajax' death, and possibly in the first riddle too, if there is any truth in the story about the tomb of Caelius (there is no reason, of course, why the riddles cannot have more than one answer).

This tension is maintained in the closing lines, Palaemon's speech (108-11) (the translation and interpretation presented here follow the manuscript-reading at the famous crux in 109-10):

Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.
Et vitula tu dignus et hic, et quisquis amores
aut metuet dulcis aut experietur amaros.
Claudite iam rivos, pueri; sat prata biberunt.

It lies not in us to resolve such great quarrels; both you and he are deserving of the cow, and (so is) whoever will either fear love-affairs when they are sweet or will have experience of them when bitter. Now close off the streams, my lads; enough have the meadows drunk.²⁴

The wisdom of a serene and ideal figure like Palaemon includes both the joys and the sadnesses of life and love. He stands beyond the two shepherds' intense involvement in love, just as he stands outside the contest itself. Yet he knows more both of love and of pastoral beauty than they do. His role at the

²⁴ This interpretation of 109-10 seems to me satisfactorily defended by E. de Saint-Denis in his Budé edition, *Virgile, Bucoliques* (Paris, 1942), p. 38, n. 5, noting that both shepherds have sung of the happiness and of the misery of love (lines 64-83). Savage (above, note 4), p. 144 is not altogether convincing in emphasizing the different characters of the love-affairs of the two shepherds. Heyne remarked pessimistically (and with a characteristic acerbity) on these two lines, "Ut haec verba per se sensum satis obvium habeant, non tamen, quid ad reliquam sententiam faciant, ab ullo interprete monitum aut dictum est, neque unquam dici posse existimo. Referre interpretum commenta nil attinet; frigere enim ea cum ipso carmine necesse est."

end is exactly analogous to that at his first appearance: he introduces a sensitive and compassionate wisdom which puts the contestants in touch with the rhythm and balance in things which they have forgotten. He is perhaps to be compared also with the inspired craftsman of the cups, whose work can include both the exuberance of winding ivy and vine and the toil of reaper and "bent plowman."

The doubling of the subject of the second riddle, the reference to *two* princes, Hyacinthus and Ajax, is a detail that has puzzled scholars.²⁵ But it may also be part of this balancing of "sweet" and "bitter" of Palaemon's *aut—aut* formulation and the general opposition of rustic and lofty in the poem: Hyacinth's story is a pathetic love-tale involving a tender youth and full of vaguely pastoral elements; Ajax' is a high-tragic theme of a great hero, self-willed and intransigent; one death is accidental, the other sternly chosen and grimly executed.

We were told at the beginning that the contest involved issues of no small moment (*res est non parva*, 54); and Palaemon, at the end, confesses himself unable to decide "such great quarrels" (108). May not these "great issues" be none other than the fundamental opposites hinted at throughout the poem: the simplicity of pastoral poetry and the call to loftier themes of Apollo and Jupiter; the concrete goodness of the physical world, with its *aëriae palumbes* and *inscripti flores*, and the larger concern for the *totum orbem* and the *caeli spatium*; the carefree exuberance of amoebean song and the sad reminders of unhappy loves and premature, wasteful death? Or may they be understood as an opposition between pastoral and reality, between the fictions which poetry (or any art) uses and the "truth" which poetry conveys? Probably no single formulation is possible; none, certainly is totally adequate. Yet it is characteristically Vergilian not to resolve these conflicts, to see and present the heavy truth that they are unresolvable, exist only in tension: *Non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites*.

So it is that neither poet is the winner. Though Menalcas

²⁵ Wormell (above, note 5), p. 29 refers the doubling of the hyacinth motif to Euphorion's *Hyacinthus* (frag. 40 in Powell's *Collect. Alex.*), where Euphorion's *μία φῆμις* implies that he also gave a second story. For an ingenious, but unconvincing attempt to account for the doubling, see Savage (above, note 4), pp. 148-9.

may be inclined more to love, Damoetas more to poetry (see above), yet the larger vision of the *caelatum opus* is made to belong to Menalcas. Conversely, though these astronomical themes are initially Menalcas' (40-2), Damoetas is the one to begin his song with Jupiter (60-1), and his is the riddle about the *caeli spatium*. It was Menalcas too who invoked Phoebus Apollo at the beginning of the contest (62-3), but it is Damoetas who respectfully recalls Apollo at the end (104). Both shepherds, then, are capable equally of singing of love and of dealing with larger themes. Hence both have cups carved by the "divine Alcimedon."

Structurally too the poem expresses this interplay of opposites. It falls evenly into two halves, the first (1-54) consisting of rustic banter, the second (55-111) of pastoral song. Yet within the first part the humble and lofty are juxtaposed in the contrast of the rusticity of the opening dialogue (1-31) and the cups of Alcimedon (32-54). In the second half, lofty invocation is conjoined with simple pastoral themes, culminating in the multiple contrasts of the riddles.

The riddles effect still another confrontation and fusion of opposites. The riddle as a form of speech is a folk-motif and belongs naturally to simple people, to the rustic world from which this complex poem gradually emerges (although curiously there are no comparable riddles in Theocritus).²⁶ The first riddle seems to be a version of an especially popular and widespread "folk-riddle."²⁷ But Vergil has taken this popular form and made it the vehicle for the learned themes of astronomy and mythology within the complex, allusive structure of his own poem. What he does with the riddles, therefore, is only another example of what he does with the whole of the Theocritean pas-

²⁶ W. Schultz, "Rätsel," *R.-E.*, I A 1 (1914), col. 117, says that Vergil in *E.* 3 "ahmt den Wettgesang theokritischer Hirten nach"; but I can find no Theocritean instance of riddles used in a rustic amoebean contest.

²⁷ On the folk-element in this riddle see K. Ohlert, "Zur antiken Räthselpoesie," *Philologus*, LVII (1898), p. 599: "Wir haben vielmehr ein echtes Volksräthsel vom Brunnen vor uns, dem der Dichter nur die schöne Form gegeben hat." He quotes an old German form of this riddle (*Strassburger Räthselbuch*, ed. Butsch, 1876):

In wölchem landt ist der hymmel nur drey eln langk?
In einer pfitzen oder lachen, in sollicher gröss wird er
also gesehen.

toral world: transform the rustic frame by infusing into it an elaborate poetic sophistication and a self-conscious sense of structure and symbol.

In view of what may be called the creative suspension in which Vergil has framed the antitheses of the poem, it may be significant that it is not one of the competing shepherds, but Palaemon, the arbiter and the bringer of pastoral calm, who ends the *Eclogue*. There is an interesting structural device here too, for while the exchange of songs (60-107) begins and ends with gods, Jupiter and Apollo, with celestial or regal themes, the poem as a whole begins and ends with pastoral subjects. A pastoral frame thus includes elements of greater significance, just as the ivy and vine on Alcimedon's cups enframe the learned astronomers.

Palaemon's closing speech brings the poem back to its rustic setting (108-9):

non nostrum inter vos tantas componere lites.
et vitula tu dignus et hic. . . .

The cups and the long debate on the relative value of cups and cow (29-49) are now forgotten. The poet returns to and reaffirms the simplicity of his original pastoral setting after he has intimated the larger possibilities which lie within it, possibilities symbolized by the *caelatum opus*. May there be here also a touch of the reputed modesty of Vergil (see *Vit. Donat.*, 11; *Vit. Serv.*, 8), an acknowledgment of the limitations of his form even though he has, within the poem itself, transcended these limitations?

Perhaps it is in terms of these possibilities that we are to understand Vergil's ending:

claudite iam rivos, pueri; sat prata biberunt.

On the one hand this line seems to be a final return to the pastoral frame. It is a practical gesture belonging to the realities of goatherding and agriculture, to the world of the *curvus arator*. But these "streams" seem to be at least as metaphorical as they are real, and the line thus resumes the "dialogue" between practical activity and the "pure" creation of beauty. Yet now this opposition approaches being dissolved or transcended. The poem's striving to blend the lofty and the humble, the useful and the beautiful, and ultimately the real

and the symbolic, is now completed in the pure and smooth fusion of metaphor which, gracefully and without violence, puts an end to the previous division. Such too was the graciousness of Palaemon's first appearance (55-9), heralding a deeper awareness of and connection with the beauty of the pastoral world. Now, with Palaemon's concluding four lines—the only return of continuous discourse in the poem since his first speech in 55 ff.—amoeban rivalry is over. Fusion through metaphor succeeds competitive juxtaposition.

Simultaneously the concrete realism of the pastoral setting gives way to a vagueness and indefinite mixture of reality and unreality. Here "streams" and "meadows" blend into the realm of metaphor and symbol (contrast the specific *hic ad veteres fagos*, 12). The opposition of trivial and serious ends with a pastoral motif which is *both* real and metaphorical, both rustic and "poetic." The poem has moved beyond even the pastoral ideality of the "soft grass" and the *formosissimus annus* of Palaemon's first description. Here the pastoral reality of streams and meadows is one with the universal and symbolic "streams of song" from which the pastoral rivulet flows.²⁸

²⁸ E. Derenne, "Le jugement de Palémon," *L. E. C.*, XXI (1953), pp. 184-5, stresses the return to a Roman practicality in the last line: "S'étonnera-t-on que Palémon quitte immédiatement la poésie pour envisager la réalité? Il ne serait pas Romain s'il ne considérerait pas la littérature comme une bagatelle, et s'il ne tirait pas de l'aventure qui l'a fait arbitre d'une joute poétique une sorte de conclusion morale qui, malgré sa forme plaisante et ironique, lui est inspirée par son bon sens d'homme pratique." And he goes on, "Propriétaire dont les pieds prennent solidement appui sur ses terres, Palémon ne se soucie guère de poésie." Yet this view greatly oversimplifies the situation, for Vergil's rustics are seldom unpoetic. It also neglects both the metaphorical implications of Palaemon's last lines and the highly "poetic" tone and function of his first speech (54-9). On the metaphor of the last line Conington (*ad loc.*) remarks, "If Palaemon says this to his slaves, it also alludes metaphorically to the streams of bucolic verse." The metaphor of the streams of song is, of course, an obvious and familiar one. See, *inter alia*, Callim., *Hymn*, 2, 108 ff.; Longin., *De Sublim.*, 35, 4; Hor., *Serm.*, I, 4, 11. Vergil himself elsewhere makes the comparison of poetry to a refreshing stream of water: *Tale tuum carmen nobis, divine poeta, / . . . quale per aestum / dulcis aquae saliente sitim restinguere rivo* (*E.*, 5, 45-7). There is also, of course, the familiar motif of the "fountains" of poetry: *Georg.*, II, 175; Lucret., I, 927; Propert., III, 1, 3 ff. See generally Sittig, "Hippokrene," *R. E.*, VIII, 2 (1913), cols. 1853-6.

Thus by the end of the poem Vergil has transformed the pastoral world with which he began. Palaemon's closing lines complete the movement which he himself initiated. Pastoral setting and love are united, but on a higher plane and in a more inclusive statement than was possible for the simpler pastoral figures, the two contestants. Given Palaemon's importance in the poem, it is significant that Vergil has him appear only after the two competitors have established a "lower" pastoral atmosphere. By thus reserving until the center of the poem (55 ff.) the pastoral peace and beauty which he sets forth early in other *Eclogues*, Vergil perhaps suggests that this peace and ideality evolve, as it were, that they sometimes come into being only slowly, even fortuitously, when there appears a Palaemon to evoke them out of life's petty, surface disturbances, one who can see through to the beauty and promise that are easily forgotten even by those who live in the midst of them, the inhabitants of Arcadia themselves. Is not such a task, after all, the eternal vocation of the poet?

II

The harmony and resolution of opposites at the end of the Third *Eclogue* may also contribute to an understanding of its relation to the other poems in the collection. Though one must beware of imposing a rigid *schema* on these delicate and elusive poems, there is in the first half of the *Eclogues* a suggestion of a progression, almost poem by poem—though by no means a completely clear or even progression—into the peace of the pastoral world (it should be emphasized, of course, that this progression has to do only with the final carefully planned arrangement of the collection; it implies nothing about the order of composition).

In *E.* 1 this peace is troubled by political disturbance and the threat of exile; in *E.* 2, it is obscured by passion and uncertainty of the value of the pastoral realm (cf. *sordida rura/atque humiles habitare casas*, *E.*, 2, 28-9; *sordent tibi munera nostra*, *E.*, 2, 44). But finally in the Third *Eclogue* its beauty and tranquillity can be reached despite petty quarrels. Thus by the Fourth *Eclogue* the poet can hope that the whole world may be touched and permeated by this ideal of pastoral beauty and peace. In the Fifth *Eclogue*, the world of pastoral nature can then even

console man for the losses that are part of his existence (see *E.*, 5, 20 ff., 58 ff.), until the grief of nature over his *crudeli funere* (20) is answered by a universal joy (*voluptas*) and a pervasive concord like that of the Fourth *Eclogue*:

Ergo alacris silvas et cetera rura voluptas
 Panaque pastoresque tenet Dryadasque puellas.
 Nec lupus insidias pecori, nec retia cervis
 ulla dolum meditantur; amat bonus otia Daphnis.
 (*E.*, 5, 58-61)

This movement within *E.* 5 resembles that larger movement from the *discordia* of the First *Eclogue* (71) to the *concordes Parcae* of the Fourth (47).

The Third *Eclogue*, then, seems to articulate an important point in the movement of the collection, a point after the pastoral world has been entered in the first two *Eclogues*, but just before the larger, calmer atmosphere of *Eclogues* 4, 5, 6. If there is any validity to the triadic arrangement of the *Eclogues* (1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10 by itself),²⁹ *Eclogue* 3, with its alternation of humbler and larger themes could be seen as intimating the expansive possibilities of the triad to follow and thus marking a transition to these "non-pastoral," or "supra-pastoral," poems. As noted earlier, the references to Pollio and line 89 (*mella fluant illi*) seem explicitly to anticipate the Fourth *Eclogue*; and the inclusion of Hellenistic learning and astronomy is perhaps a vague anticipation of *E.* 6.

The Third *Eclogue* is also obviously related to the Seventh, for both are amoebean contests involving a third shepherd; and their connection may be part of the often noted correspondence between poems in each of the two halves of the collection (i. e. 1 and 9, 2 and 8, etc.). In *E.* 7, also, the third person is the one to create the setting of pastoral calm; but, unlike *E.* 3, he appears at the very beginning of the poem. Thus the atmosphere of politeness, amity, rural tranquillity is established from the start. Yet here, though the setting is initially more harmonious, the two competing poets are judged unequal. These

²⁹ For the theory of the arrangement of the *Eclogues* by triads see E. A. Hahn, "The Characters in the *Eclogues*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXV (1944), pp. 239-41. On the structural unity of the *Eclogues* see now Otis (above, note 3), pp. 128 ff.

two points of contrasts with *E.* 3, the setting and the judgment, are perhaps connected. The issues in *E.* 3 can be left unresolved, for the whole setting is less homogeneous, itself contains tensions and contraries, and is in a state of development and evolution. The uniformity of the setting in *E.* 7, part of an equilibrium and clarity of definition achieved after a much longer immersion in the pastoral world, makes possible a clear standard and consensus.

But there may be another reason more closely connected with the characters of the Third *Eclogue*. *E.* 3 contains no judgment because *both* shepherd-poets admit a connection with and indebtedness to a larger realm—Jupiter and the Muse, Apollo and Orpheus. Both express some sense of the unresolved contraries of existence, the interplay of beauty and death in the riddles, confirmed by Palaemon's epilogue on "sweet or bitter loves." But in *E.* 7, as a recent study has re-emphasized,³⁰ the two poets are not equal in their relation to nature and the gods. Corydon humbly invokes the Nymphs with a prayer and seeks divine inspiration (21-4), while Thyrsis begins with a command, asserts his victory in advance, and speaks of *invidia* (25-8).³¹ The knowledge of sweetness and bitterness that is shared by both shepherds in *E.* 3 is divided between the two contestants of *E.* 7 (cf. *dulcior*, 37; *amarior*, 41). While Corydon is appreciative of seasonal change and open to its beauties (45-8), Thyrsis defies the powers of nature, confident in man-made comforts (49-52), and tends to put himself in the center of things (cf. 59: *Phyllidis adventu nostrae nemus omne virebit*; 67: *saepius at si me, Lycida formose, revisas* . . .). Thus what both poets latently possess

³⁰ For the differences between the two poets in *E.* 7 see Beyers (above, note 3), *passim*, especially pp. 44 ff. I find Beyers' explanation for the final judgment on the whole more convincing than that of F. H. Sandbach, *C. R.*, XLVII (1933), pp. 216-19 (followed by Rose, above, note 6, pp. 145-7), where great stress is put on minor metrical and other technical flaws. But surely a poet with the mastery to write a line like *muscosi fontes et somno mollior herba* (*E.*, 7, 45) does not need to make minor details of technique the focal point of an entire poem. On the inadequacy of the "technical" interpretation see now H. Dahlmann, "Zu Vergils siebentem Hirtengedicht," *Hermes*, XCIV (1966), pp. 218-32, especially 228-9.

³¹ On the opposition of intellect and inspiration in *E.* 7 see Beyers (above, note 3), pp. 39 and 44 ff.

in *Eclogue* 3, a reverent sense of the larger powers of the world, a balance between joy and suffering, a feeling of the mystery of man's sharing in the beautiful through knowledge and art—these are fully realized in the Seventh *Eclogue* by one poet only, however clever and confident his rival seems to be.

The balance between these elements suggested in the Third *Eclogue* is perhaps even more fully developed in another pastoral singing match, *Eclogue* 5. Here, as in *E.* 7, the poem asserts from the beginning an atmosphere of gentleness and reconciliation. One shepherd defers to the other (4) and each offers his song freely as a gift, not in competition (indeed, this is the only *Eclogue* where this occurs, for in *E.* 8 also the two shepherds are involved in a contest, *certantis*, 3). Each shepherd, in *E.* 5, even finds his companion's song beyond the value of any gift he can give (53, 81). Perhaps we are to feel that the vision of universal harmony in the Fourth *Eclogue* has made possible a partial resolution of elements which are still in opposition in *E.* 3.

As in the Third *Eclogue*, the Fifth also draws upon Theocritus I (the lament for Daphnis), but Vergil transforms his model even more radically. In the gentler setting of *Eclogue* 5 the dead poet can be restored to a life of a higher sort, and a mortal can pass beyond the boundaries separating earth and heavens, and can thus unite remote Olympus and the humble rustic world in a joyous new vision (56-9):

Candidus insuetum miratur limen Olympi
sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis.
ergo alacris silvas et cetera rura voluptas
Panaque pastoresque tenet Dryadasque puellas.

And just as *Eclogue* 3 contrasts elaborate cups with the lowly cow, so the end of *E.* 5 contrasts the "fragile pipe" offered by Menalcas (*E.*, 5, 85-7) with the rough shepherd's crook offered by Mopsus (88-90). The former is a work connected with artistic creativity, like the *caelatum opus* of *E.* 3; the latter belongs fully to the realm of "realistic" pastoral utility, like Damoetas' cow. Yet in *E.* 5, with its hopeful reconciliation of contraries, not just one, but *both* gifts are presented. Here even the rough crook, shod with bronze, is still *formosum* (90), the epithet of pastoral beauty used of Corydon whom the "fragile

pipe" sang (86; note also *formosissimus annus*, *E.*, 3, 57). The two gifts, so different, come together in an harmonious resolution of fragility and firmness, imagination and reality.

In *Eclogue* 3 that resolution is not yet achieved, for the poet is still struggling to penetrate the superficialities of the pastoral world. The Nymphs who in *E.* 5 lament the death of Daphnis (20 ff.) appear in *E.* 3 only briefly (9), to laugh in carefree fashion at rustic antics. Yet the cups adorned with astronomers and with Orpheus, Palaemon with his evocation of pastoral peace and beauty, the invocations to Jupiter and Apollo—all suggest the larger potentials of the pastoral frame which are to be developed in *Eclogues* 4, 5, 6, and 10. Trivial and celestial, learning and inspiration, love and death are all present, but not yet fully ordered into a unified vision. The riddles at the end, not present in any of Vergil's Theocritean models, raise this lack of a unified focus to a new dimension, for the riddles may be there to suggest those primally unresolved—and unresolvable—elements that lie at the heart of perhaps all poetry and certainly of Vergil's.

CHARLES PAUL SEGAL.

CENTER FOR HELLENIC STUDIES.

COMMENDABILES IN AMMIANUS.

Ammianus begins his description of the career of Valentinian I as follows: *Cuius meritis* [Gratian's] *Valentinianus ab ineunte adulescentia commendabilis, contextu suarum quoque suffragante virtutum*. . . .¹ The elder Gratian had been born into the lower classes (*ignobili stirpe*) but had risen from the ranks to the very top of the military hierarchy. After serving as an imperial guard at the court of Diocletian he had held field commands in Illyria and then was given command of the forces of Africa and Britain.² Valentinian was, therefore, *commendabilis* because of his father's military achievements. The significance of this for Valentinian's career is that he was a colonel of the imperial guards by 357, when only 36 years old.³

Jovian, Valentinian's predecessor, is similarly described: *Iovianus eligitur imperator, domesticorum ordinis primus, paternis meritis mediocriter commendabilis*.⁴ Though only 32 at the time he was already senior officer in the élite *schola domesticorum*. This precocious seniority was due no doubt to the fact that his father as Count of the Domestics had charge of corps' roll and so could enroll him while still a child. Jovian was married to the daughter of Lucillianus, another general, and this too probably helped his career.⁵

There is a third example of this particular use of *commendabilis* by Ammianus. In his description of the battle of Adrianople he notes that thirty-five field officers (*tribuni*) fell,

¹ Ammianus, XXX, 7, 4; cf. *Épitome de Caesaribus*, 45, 3: *ob cuius apud milites commendationem Valentiniano imperium resistenti ogeritur*. The questions of common source or *contaminatio* need not be considered here.

² Ammianus, XXX, 7, 2; cf. O. Seeck, "Gratianus," no. 2, *R.-E.*, VII (1912), col. 1831. A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, III (1964), p. 16, n. 61, considers Gratian the earliest attested *comes rei militaris*. His commands were very likely emergency assignments, indicating position of special trust (Jones, *op cit.*, pp. 19-21).

³ A. Nagl, "Valentinianus," no. 1, *R.-E.*, VII A (1948), cols. 2159-62, reviews the evidence.

⁴ Ammianus, XXV, 5, 4; cf. Eutropius, X, 17, 1: *consensu exercitus lectus est, commendatione patris militibus quam sua notior*.

⁵ O. Seeck, "Jovianus," no. 1, *R.-E.*, IX (1916), col. 2006, collects the evidence.

and that among these was Potentius, *bono cuique spectatus, meritis Ursicini patris, magistri quondam armorum suisque commendabilis*.⁶ Ammianus paused to mention Potentius mainly, no doubt, out of respect for his former commander and patron Ursicinus; nevertheless, it is clear that in this case as in the other two an officer could have a certain standing and prestige among his fellow-soldiers which was either entirely or partly hereditary in nature. This was a new kind of hereditary status, since the officer class was quite separate from the senatorial aristocracy. A new, non-senatorial term was needed to describe this new status; hence the term *commendabilis*.⁷ The purpose of the following notes is to suggest the origin and significance of this term.

* * *

In Ammianus' description of Potentius there is a phrase—*bono cuique spectatus*—which is drawn directly from the vocabulary used since the Republic by and of members of the upper classes.⁸ Although the word *commendabilis* is not recorded earlier than Livy, and does not have a social connotation before Ammianus,⁹ nevertheless it is obviously connected with the terms *se commendare*, *commendatio*, and *commendaticiae litterae*, all of which are associated with the ancient cluster of Roman institutions connected with patronage and with the obligations imposed by *amicitia* and *fides*.¹⁰

⁶ Ammianus, XXXI, 13, 18.

⁷ Ammianus is not consistent in this, as in other matters of nomenclature. Once he uses *commendabilis* for a barbarian prince (XIX, 1, 10: *nobilitate commendabilis*), and once for a senatorial aristocrat (XXIX, 2, 16: *virtutum pulchritudine commendabilis*). Nevertheless, it is clear from a number of other cases that when Ammianus wished to describe the status of a senatorial he preferred to use—quite naturally—the traditional epithets, such as *egregius* (XXIX, 2, 9); *clarissimus* (XXVIII, 1, 27); *clarus* (XVIII, 1, 1; XXIX, 2, 11); *nobilis* (XXVIII, 1, 16 and 30); *praeclarus* (XXIX, 2, 5); *consularis* (XXI, 6, 4); *honoratus* (XXIX, 2, 13).

⁸ J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République* (Paris, 1963), pp. 484-95 (on *boni*) and pp. 465-6 (*spectatus*).

⁹ *T. L. L.*, s. v. *commendabilis*.

¹⁰ L. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley, 1949), ch. II ("Nobles, Clients and Personal Armies"), gives a valuable and recent review of the subject. It is based on the classic studies of M.

Of the many aspects of this subject, three deserve special emphasis here. First, in Roman society a man's status (*dignitas*) was indicated by the extent and number of his friendships (*amicitiae*). Indeed Cicero sums up success in the phrase "friendships and wealth."¹¹ Roman aristocrats were, therefore, unceasing in their efforts to further the interests of their friends, for by increasing the *dignitas* of the friend one increased one's own as well. Thus Pliny writes to Trajan that he hopes to rejoice in the "increased status" (*exornata dignitate*) of his friend, "that is, in my own."¹² Nevertheless, whatever the element of personal advantage in *amicitia* it was never allowed to set the tone; the relationship was always considered to be based on moral and reciprocal ties. To help a friend was to discharge a duty (*officium*). Thus Cicero assures a friend that he will perform "all the services due you by virtue of our close friendship" (*omnia summae necessitudinis officia*).¹³

Second, one of the central institutions based on *amicitia* was the recommendation (*commendatio*), usually in the form of a letter (*commendaticiae litterae*). To give a friend one's *commendatio* was a valuable and appreciated *officium*. Its essential significance was to place one's friend under the protection (*in fide*) of another, and in doing so the person giving the recommendation himself assumed a definite and important responsibility. Thus Cicero notes, "in forming new connections it is always important to know what sort of introduction there is, and by what *commendatio* the doors of friendship, as it were, have been opened."¹⁴ Hence Horace's warning to a friend, "Think over carefully what sort of person you recommend (*qualem commendes*), in order that another's failings may not

Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (Berlin, 1912 = *Kleine Schriften*, I [Wiesbaden, 1962], pp. 19-135: citations are to latter edition) and N. Fustel de Coulanges, *Les origines du système féodal* (Paris, 1890), ch. IX ("Le patronat et la 'commendatio' dans la société romaine"), pp. 205-47.

¹¹ Cicero, *Pro Balbo*, 18: *amicitias et rei familiaris copias*; cf. Hellegouarc'h, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹² Pliny, *Ep.*, X, 26; cf. Hellegouarc'h, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

¹³ Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, III, 4, 2; cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-3. The Loeb translation of *summae necessitudinis* ("official relationship") is wrong, as the context quite clearly indicates.

¹⁴ Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, XIII, 10, 4; cf. Gelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-5, and Hellegouarc'h, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-8.

cause you shame.”¹⁵ To recommend someone was, as a modern writer has put it, “to testify that one’s protégé could be added without danger to the community of friends.”¹⁶

This explains the importance of supporting someone whom one could be sure was worthy—or, to use Ammianus’ term, *commendabilis*. The converse of this is that the person who came armed with suitable recommendations was accepted by aristocratic society whatever his origins, so that *commendatio* provided a means by which the ruling classes could recruit talented men. That these men did in fact accept assimilation into the oligarchy is implied quite clearly by Tacitus, when he is discussing the reaction to Nero’s death in the various social classes. Alongside the senatorial and equestrian upper classes he ranges their clients and freedmen, who rejoiced at Nero’s death, as opposed to the *plebs sordida*, which mourned him.¹⁷

Third, *amicitia* and *commendatio* were fundamental in military affairs, particularly in awarding commissions. Throughout the history of the Republic all field and staff officers were drawn from the ruling classes and, conversely, only men with military experience could hold political office.¹⁸ A young *nobilis* would normally begin his career as an officer on the staff of a general, whom he served *amicitiae causa*.¹⁹ Out of this developed the general’s *comitatus* (*cohors praetoria*, *cohors amicorum*), the original core of Roman provincial and military administration.²⁰

* * *

¹⁵ Horace, *Ep.*, I, 18, 76-7; cf. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), p. 319, and pp. 316-21 on the poem as a whole, which is addressed to a young man about to attach himself to a patron.

¹⁶ A. Guillemin, *Pline et la vie littéraire de son temps* (Paris, 1929), p. 6; pp. 1-12 (“Conception de l’amitié”), is an original and valuable contribution on the subject. Cf. Fronto, *Ad Amicos*, I, 1: “The custom of recommendation (*mos commendandi*) is said to have arisen originally out of good will, when every man wished to have his own friend made known to another friend and made intimate with him.”

¹⁷ Tacitus, *Hist.*, I, 4, 10: *pars populi integra et magnis domibus annea*; cf. E. Koestermann, “Der Rückblick Tacitus Hist. I. 4-11,” *Historia*, V (1956), pp. 213-37, especially pp. 217-18.

¹⁸ Gelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-31.

¹⁹ Caesar, *B. G.*, I, 39, 2; cf. J. Suolahti, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republic* (Helsinki, 1955).

²⁰ Gelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4; Hellegouarc’h, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-60. *cohors*

Under the Principate these Republican institutions continued to exist and flourish, for they were associated with a class which continued to exist and flourish. *nobilitas non obscuratur sed inlustratur a principe*, said Pliny proudly.²¹ Indeed patronage and *commendatio* became if anything more important, for they gained official status. Emperors themselves had clients and wrote letters of commendation. "Friends of the emperor" (*amici principis*) constituted a recognized group of state officials; dismissal from office could take the form of the emperor "withdrawing his friendship" (*amicitiam renuntiare*).²²

Most important, for our purposes, is the fact that army commissions continued to be reserved for members of the nobility and their nominees. Most aristocrats seem to have taken their military duties lightly, being mainly interested in "pleasures and furloughs."²³ Hence the rise of a new class of officers, *virī militares*, ambitious men from the provincial élites. Generally, however, they at least began their careers through senatorial patronage.²⁴ Thus, when Juvenal describes the power of an imperial favorite, he says that the favorite awards army commissions and so has usurped the prerogative of the nobility: "Are you still courting members of the nobility? Now it is an actor who makes captains and majors."²⁵ From the extant *commendaticiae litterae* of Pliny and Fronto we can see quite clearly the qualities stressed by patrons. Always it was necessary to certify a newcomer's culture, loyalty, and dependability, the

amicorum does not occur before the Empire, but Appian, *Hisp.*, 84, and Sallust, *Jug.*, 98, 1, use Greek equivalents.

²¹ Pliny, *Paneg.*, 69, 5; cf. M. Gelzer, "Die Nobilität der Kaiserzeit," *Kleine Schriften*, I (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 136-53.

²² Pliny, *Paneg.*, 23, 1, mentions the clients of Trajan; in *Ep.*, X, 58, he gives a *litterae commendaticiae* of Domitian. On the role of the emperor's *amici* see J. Crook, *Consilium principis* (Cambridge, 1955), and R. Rogers, "The Emperor's Displeasure," *T.A.P.A.*, XC (1959), pp. 224-37. Suetonius, *Div. Aug.*, 46, mentions the use of municipal *commendatio publica* under Augustus.

²³ Tacitus, *Agricola*, 5.

²⁴ Cf. R. Syme, *Tacitus*, II (Oxford, 1958), pp. 649-59 (appendices 16-18) on *virī militares*, and ch. 42 ("Novus Homo") on the rise of new groups in general; E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1961), pp. 141-2, on patronage.

²⁵ Juvenal, 7, 90-2; cf. G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 23-7.

qualities which would make him an acceptable and useful member of the "community of friends."²⁶

We can see military patronage best in the letters of Pliny the Younger. Thus he writes genially to a friend:

I have decided to approach you with this request for two reasons. First, you command a very large army; hence you have many favors to confer (*hinc tibi beneficiorum larga materia*). Second, you have held office long enough to have provided for your own friends. Now turn to mine—they are not many.

Pliny then goes on to ask that his friend be given a commission, saying that his "grateful appreciation of favors reveals him as worthy of more."²⁷

Equally instructive is a letter sent to the biographer Suetonius Tranquillus. Pliny writes to Suetonius after having gained for him a tribune's commission in the army of Britain. Suetonius declined the commission but asked that it be given instead to a relative, Caesennius Silvanus. Pliny replies that "Since your name has not yet been entered on the muster roll I can easily substitute that of Silvanus."²⁸ Nothing could illustrate more clearly the extent and importance of senatorial patronage in awarding commissions. And equestrian officers formed the core of the new ruling class created by the Principate.²⁹

²⁶ Thus, e.g., Fronto, *Ad L. Verum*, II, 7, 6 (Loeb, II, p. 156) assures his correspondent concerning the person commended that *Nihil isto homine officiosius est, nihil modestius, nihil verecundius*. This is not always expressed, but is the implicit basis of the system. For a modern parallel, see M. Kenny, *A Spanish Tapestry* (Bloomington, 1962), p. 136: "Reciprocity is the first rule of patronage, which is not merely a one-sided affair. The client has a strong sense of loyalty to his patron and voices this abroad."

²⁷ Pliny, *Ep.*, II, 13; cf. Birley, *op. cit.*, p. 72, and Syme, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 83, notes, 632.

²⁸ Pliny, *Ep.*, III, 8: *liberum est nobis Silvanum in locum tuum subdere*. Whether or not this means Pliny could personally have the commission transferred at Rome, rather than by working through his friend the general, is not clear, but the language implies the former.

²⁹ A. Greenidge, *Roman Public Life* (London, 1911), pp. 364-5: "Nothing shows more clearly the true military character of the new monarchy than the fact that even its civil and Republican posts were administered by soldiers; nothing explains more adequately the subservience of the Senate than the fact that it was composed mainly of ex-officers, trained

Patronage was also important because it allowed a man to move ahead quickly. Otherwise simple seniority usually prevailed. Thus Pliny excuses a request for a friend by saying that "in a state where every office is held on the principle of 'first come first served,' appointments are not seasonable but overdue when deferred until the legitimate time."³⁰

* * *

This nexus of institutions based on the patron-client relationship continued to exist unimpaired in the fourth century, and it was familiar to Ammianus. His description of the Roman nobility makes it clear that the ancient institution of the morning call (*salutatio*) by clients was still maintained, along with the ancient custom of giving clients a small dole (*sportula*); the traditional rigid distinction was also maintained between the mass of clients and the individual singled out for *amicitia*.³¹

Wherever an aristocrat went he was attended by a vast retinue of servants and clients.³² One great aristocrat, Petronius Probus, is described by Ammianus as being famous for his "birth, influence (*gratia*), and wealth"; he furthered vigorously the fortunes of his "slaves and clients," and indeed he sought public office not because of personal ambition but rather in order to protect the interests of his "important friends."³³ A patron continued to be responsible for one whom he had commended; we even hear of one patron who on his own authority had his servants execute an erring client.³⁴

in the habits of rigid obedience and in unwavering respect to the *sacramentum*—of men to whom Caesar was not Princeps but Imperator. Cf. H. Mattingly. *The Imperial Civil Service of Rome* (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 64-74.

³⁰ Pliny, IV, 15: *in ea civitate, in qua omnia quasi ab occupantibus aguntur, quae legitimum tempus expectant, non matura, sed sera, sunt*; translation from Loeb edition, I, pp. 323-5.

³¹ Ammianus, XIV, 6, 12-14; note especially 13: *Agnitus vero tandem et asscitus in amicitiam*. . . .

³² Ammianus, XXVIII, 4, 8-12.

³³ Ammianus, XXVII, 11, 3-4 (reading in 3 *ob iurgia familiarum ingentium*; but the sense is basically the same); cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-7.

³⁴ Zosimus, V, 2; Lucian is explicitly stated to have entered the *clientela* of Rufinus [οὗτος ἐχρητο προστάτη 'Ρουφίνῳ], and Rufinus had commended him to the emperor Theodosius himself.

Within the army patronage continued to be as important as ever, if not more so. Thus the prefect Abinnaeus proudly claims to have received his commission "by imperial recognition of my labors" (*iudicio sacro . . . laborum meorum*) as contrasted with those men promoted "through influence" (*ex suffragio*).³⁵ Imperial edicts distinguish between officers promoted "after long service" (*post emensum laborem*) as opposed to those who gained a commission "through the patronage and favor of the influential" (*suffragio vel potentium gratia*).³⁶ Another edict affirms that public honors shall be given only to men who have served in the Palace or in the provinces, or "have been recommended by good men" (*bonorum virorum suffragio*).³⁷

Nevertheless, all this does not explain why Ammianus and his contemporaries used a new term for persons worthy of *commendatio*. Indeed the very continuity of institutions based on patronage makes this seem unnecessary. The explanation for this new term is a new factor affecting Roman society in the fourth century, the antagonism between the civilian and military élites.

This antagonism is quite apparent in Ammianus' work, and in fact it is clear that he considered it a well-known and established fact. Thus he says that when Rufinus spoke to the soldiers he was in great danger, since the troops were without food "and are always inclined to be harsh and savage toward men in civil positions."³⁸ His entire account of the career of his patron Ursicinus is in terms of a conflict between the eunuchs and courtiers of the Palace, on the one hand, and the general who was "always a soldier, far removed from civilian wranglings."³⁹

Above all, it is clear from Ammianus and other sources that at the death of Constantius II the military élite actually took control of the Empire. Constantius had claimed to emulate the

³⁵ *P. Lond.*, 447 recto, lines 12-13 = H. Bell, *et al.*, *The Abinnaeus Archive* (Oxford, 1962), p. 35.

³⁶ *C. Th.*, VI, 24, 3 (A.D. 364); cf. *C. Th.*, II, 29, 1 (A.D. 362) on patronage in general; VI, 4, 10 (A.D. 356) on patronage in the army.

³⁷ *C. Th.*, VI, 22, 1 (A.D. 324).

³⁸ Ammianus, XIV, 10, 4.

³⁹ Ammianus, XIV, 9, 1; cf. E. A. Thompson, *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus* (Cambridge, England, 1947), pp. 42-55, which argues that Ammianus himself shared certain military prejudices.

practices of "civilian emperors," and "he never let the military lift their heads too high."⁴⁰ At his death, however, the military élite took control.

This was made clear to all by the harsh measures of the Tribunal of Chalcedon. Ostensibly a court of investigation set up by Julian, it became in fact a means by which the military leaders paid off scores against members of the civil services. It was dominated by a military majority—four generals as against two civilians—its sessions were held in the midst of troops, and the accused were without exception all civilians. Among those tried was the treasurer Ursulus, his only crime being a bitter remark criticizing the generals which he made when he saw the ruins of Amida. When he was executed, says Ammianus, "Justice herself seems to me to have wept, and to have accused the emperor of ingratitude." Julian could only excuse himself by saying it was due to the "resentment of the military" (*militaris ira*).⁴¹

At Julian's death the military took complete control. First they chose Jovian emperor, then Valentinian; both of them were young officers, relatively untried, and recommended mainly by their connections—in short, *commendabiles*. A new class had taken control.

Several documents of the time reveal much about this class. For one thing, it was quite conscious of being new and different. Thus Mamertinus in 362, in his formal speech on assuming the consulship, said: "Today men of a new type enjoy the emperor's favor. They are a vulgar lot in the eyes of the aristocrats, rustic and hostile to flattery. But they do not take other people's money, and value above all else the welfare of the commonweath and the glory of the emperor." Similarly Symmachus, though himself an aristocrat, dismisses senators as "idle persons" (*otiosi*) and accepts the right of the military to rule: "Men sunk in sloth cannot decide public affairs. . . . Let those who bear arms choose the man who will be their leader."⁴² Nothing,

⁴⁰ Ammianus, XV, 1, 3 (*ad aemulationem civilium principum*); XXI, 16, 1 (*numquam erigens cornua militarium*).

⁴¹ Ammianus, XXII, 3, 7-8; cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-8.

⁴² *Pan. Lat.*, III (XI), 21, 2; Symmachus, *Oratio*, 1, 9; cf. A. Alföldi, *A Conflict of Ideas in the Late Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 51-2, 105-6.

however, illustrates the conflict between the new and old élites better than this terse statement about Valentinian: "he disliked the well dressed, the well educated, the well born, and the rich."⁴³

This sharp division between the élites explains why a new term was used for hereditary distinction among the military. Although *commendabiles* held control of the empire from 364 on they could not dispense with the services of the senatorial aristocracy, which still continued to dominate the civil services. The two élites remained separate.⁴⁴ Hence the use of a new term—*commendabilis*—in the fourth century.

In the fifth century, however, the new term ceased to be used. *Commendatio* and *se commendare* continued and passed into the institutions of the successor states and the Church,⁴⁵ but *commendabilis* did not persist.

RICHARD I. FRANK.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE.

⁴³ Ammianus, XXX, 8, 10; cf. Alföldi, *op. cit.*, p. 134, n. 21.

⁴⁴ V. Sirago, *Galla Placidia* (Louvain, 1961), pp. 48-52, reviews the factors which developed in the fourth century and which continued to keep the two élites quite separate in the fifth.

⁴⁵ E. g., *Lex Visigothorum*, V, 3, 1: *si vero deditur alium sibi patronum elegerit, habeat licentiam cui se voluerit commendare*; cf. Fustel de Coulanges, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-66.

THE STATESMAN AS A POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

The aim of this essay is to isolate and discuss those remarks in Plato's *Statesman* that comprise a contribution to systematic political science. By "political science" I mean a descriptive, and not a prescriptive, academic specialty that seeks to relate how political activities are in fact carried out. By "systematic" I mean merely that the accounts given are more than occasional or sporadic or allusive. Systematic political science is a discipline that describes political happenings in a manner that "hangs together."¹ The analyses that follow will employ five rubrics from that discipline. They are (1) the scope of rulership, (2) the politics of transition, (3) the legal framework, (4) the bureaucratic apparatus, and (5) the reactions of the public.²

The conversations in the *Statesman* light, of course, on many subjects. Politics is the chief focus only in the last forty-five percent of the dialogue; and even there the express purpose of the examination is not just to acquire a better understanding of politics.³ The dialogue had begun with an attempt to define the statesman. After a first definition failed, the Eleatic Stranger, to demonstrate why, told a myth about the age of Cronus when men were (literally) earth-born, grew younger rather than older, and were ruled by the gods. Together with

¹ Explaining the genesis (causes) or function (effects) of political phenomena may help make the account cohesive, but explanation does not seem a defining characteristic of the discipline. Statistical summaries and correlates are often viewed as more than adequate substitutes.

² Precise identification of the generic subject matter of political science is, consequently, not crucial to this paper, though such formulae as "the authoritative allocation of values for a society" (D. Easton), "the function in society of Control" (G. E. G. Catlin), or "the establishment, organization, disorganization, and interrelations of communities, and . . . the formation and carrying out of community policies throughout the world" (W. Anderson) are obviously, and intuitively, close to the mark.

³ "Now then, why our inquiry about the statesman? Has it been put forth for the sake of this man himself rather than for our becoming more dialectic about everything?" "Quite evidently to be so about everything'" (285D). (All translations in this article are mine.)

Young Socrates he then fashioned an improved definition, but it too failed his subsequent probing. A paradigmic discussion of weaving next ensued, preceded by a brief and intricate explanation of paradigm in terms of another paradigm and followed by an excursus on the notion of just measure. Only at that point (287AB) does one finally reach the second,⁴ and obviously political, part of the dialogue.

The first half of the *Statesman*, in short, is largely methodological. It demonstrates such techniques of Plato's later dialectic⁵ as diaeresis, mythopoeism, and *paradeigma*, and explicates the distinction between just and comparative measures. The second half ignores these methods almost entirely—indeed, categorization by dichotomies is explicitly abandoned (287BC)—and concentrates instead on a rather informal analysis of political occupations, tasks, and responsibilities in a postulated city. So slack a version of the dialectic method is employed here that the student of politics scarcely needs any acquaintance at all with its rules.⁶

One may still, without doubt, see an artistic unity in the dialogue. Thus, the notion which Plato introduces "in a place which is materially the center of the dialogue is truly its dynamic center. It is the notion of *just measure*: τὸ μέτρον."⁷ Indeed, if one extends the term to encompass "making the proper distinctions," the whole of the *Statesman* might appear a series of variations on that theme. For the early definitions proceed by dichotomous differentiations; the myth of Cronus divides human history into two great eras with different rulers' tasks; weaving illumines a distinction between direct and contributory causes; laws receive criticism because they do not adequately consider the differences between men or between situations; the statesman, whose role the discussants in the dialogue distinguish from others in the city, decides the right

⁴ A. Diès (*Le Politique* [Paris, 1935], p. viii) divides the dialogue into three parts, and J. B. Skemp (*Plato's Statesman* [New Haven, 1952], pp. 113-18) into eight; but a simple bifurcation suffices for our purposes.

⁵ See J. Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic* (trans. D. J. Allan; Oxford, 1940).

⁶ For these rules in capsule form see Diès, *op. cit.*, pp. xv-xxx.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

occasions for subordinates to employ their specific talents; and so on.

Yet, however impressive the artistic unity of the dialogue, from the viewpoint of systematic political science its first part remains barren. It may logically separate the statesman from other sorts of rulers—from herders of sheep and of pigs or from the gods who were once shepherds of men's affairs in the age of Cronus—and show that he takes care not of animals or birds but of human beings and is of the same species over which he rules; but in doing so, it clarifies at great length errors into which relatively few people ever fall. One rarely confuses a king with a pig farmer. The discussion up to that point remains politically inadequate because it differentiates the statesman from other caretakers of flocks instead of systematically describing the range of political persons and occupations within a city.⁸ As a consequence, the focus of this essay need not be on the entire *Statesman* but only on its last half.

1. The Scope of Rulership

The aim of the statesman is to produce a happy city; and to that end he has ultimate charge of all aspects of civic and personal life.

This then let us say is the end of the web of political activity, interweaving through direct weaving the character of the courageous and the moderate, whenever by similar outlook and friendship the kingly science has gathered them together into their common life, having completed the best and most fitting of all webs, and enfolding all the others in the city, slaves and freemen, it rules and watches over it (311BC; cf. 305C-E and 309D).

The means available to the statesman range from the drastic

⁸ The stranger admits the fault when he says, doubtless punning: "Well then, the king has been separated from most of the sciences that graze together—or rather from those concerning herds. But there are others, we say, in the city itself both of those contributing and directly causing which must first be distinguished from one another" (287B). The words *king* and *statesman* are, incidentally, employed synonymously in this dialogue (see 259D and 309CD); but to reduce confusion we will always, except for some direct quotations, refer to this actor as a statesman.

(slaying and banishing) to the routine (enforcement of law codes by a complex bureaucracy).⁹ Indeed, the science of statesmanship includes deciding "whether through persuasion or through some force even against anybody it is necessary to do anything whatever or else keep entirely still" (304D). Action or inaction, through inducements or requirements, against these persons or those, on this issue or that: truly it would be difficult to frame a more wide-sweeping statement of authority.

A statesman, in the proper sense of the word, is defined solely by his possession of this science of statesmanship. It does not matter whether or not he rules (259B); or, if he does, whether he is rich or poor, rules over persons who are willing or unwilling, or rules with or without laws (293A-D thrice and 296C ff.). All qualities other than a knowledge of this science are accidental; but that does not mean the statesman lacks them. On the contrary, he has to have such characteristics. He must be rich or poor or something in between. His subjects must be willing or unwilling or of some intermediate position. He must use laws or some laws or no laws. He is a statesman no matter what these qualities, just as he is whatever his height or weight. But precisely as he has height and weight, he also has these attributes—and they are observable in, and describable for, his society.¹⁰

When the term *statesman* or *king* is used in its ordinary sense, however, distinctions made in common parlance become salient. A king then differs from a tyrant in that one rules over willing subjects and the other by force (276DE). So too, in ordinary cities such features as the number of rulers or the presence or absence of laws are held to differentiate political systems. With the resources of modern type fonts Plato could perhaps have indicated more easily the specific sense in which he was employing ambivalent terms;¹¹ but referents are usually clear from contexts, sometimes explicitly so (303BC), and to see an irreconcilable contradiction between the earlier and later remarks about the statesman is to import unnecessary difficulties.¹²

⁹ For details see sections 2, 3, and 4 *infra*.

¹⁰ The statesman's relationship to laws is pursued in section 3.

¹¹ Cf. W. Lippmann's use of "the public" and "*the public*" in his *The Public Philosophy* (New York, 1956).

¹² Contrast G. H. Sabine (*A History of Political Theory* [revised ed., New York, 1954], p. 74), who states, alluding to 296CD and 276E,

Ordinary statesmen differ from true ones in lacking the science of statesmanship. Unfortunately, though, the forceful language¹³ employed in excoriating this "chorus concerned with the affairs of the city" (291C) is not matched by any clear statements delineating the content of that science. A democracy, to be sure, could not be ruled by statesman, nor in all probability could an aristocracy or an oligarchy. "Right rule" can come only from one or two or at most a few men (292E-293A), and those systems all require too broad a leadership stratum. But just how one may distinguish a *single* tyrant from a scientific statesman, or how the people at large may do so, is never made clear in the text. The lacuna is serious because a statesman, unlike (say) a queen bee, is not unmistakably identifiable to the senses (301DE). Indeed, this difficulty may lead persons unwittingly to revolt against a true statesman and to introduce in his place some more ordinary political system (297E ff.).¹⁴

A true statesman, to sum up, differs from a sham in his possession of the science of politics. Precisely wherein this science consists and how one may separate the genuine statesman from the tyrannical imitator the dialogue does not tell.¹⁵

"There is no way in which the two positions can be made compatible, but it is apparent that Plato is not willing to abandon either."

¹³ "Consequently, those too who share in all these political systems except the scientific one must be rejected as not political but factional, and being bosses of the greatest illusions they are themselves also likewise, and being the greatest imitators and tricksters they become the greatest sophists of the sophists" (303BC).

¹⁴ Consideration of the inferior political systems (monarchy, aristocracy, the two kinds of democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny) lies apart from the main drift of the *Statesman*. It also lies apart from the topic of this essay, for Plato's comments here are occasional rather than systematic and speculative rather than descriptive. Furthermore, though the six-fold classification and its rationale have become part of the traditional nomenclature of political theory, they are in fact highly formalistic and non-observational. Plato himself was capable of far better analyses than this two-by-three typology of official façades. As section 4 shows, he could demonstrate how the nominal investment of total authority in a single individual necessitates the parcelling out of initiative and responsibility to many other persons, how even a powerful dictator requires a bureaucracy.

¹⁵ Plato's position on sham leaders rather parallels that of Carlyle, both in what he says and in what he omits to tell.

Still, it does seem clear that the ability and knowledge required are not impossible skills for mortal men. The statesman, for example, cannot and need not "ever sit always beside each person and ascribe exactly what is proper" (295AB). Nor must he be able to tell the future, for like a doctor he may change his prescriptions to fit changes in climate or unexpected acts of gods (295D). Yet, because he has the requisite insight, he knows what is necessary to make a city truly happy and can employ any and all techniques to that end.

2. The Politics of Transition

Imagine an ordinary Greek city into which a statesman has come and over which he now rules. He strives to transform the community into one that accords with his vision of a really good city. In a relatively short time a new constitution, a new legal framework, and newly regularized procedures will have been instituted. But just as revolutionary fervor and martial law and military trials often attend the overthrow of a regime in the outside world, only to dissipate as its successor is more fully established, the politics of transition managed by the statesman during his change-over will also likely be marked by summary orders, edicts, and violence.

The range of drastic alternatives open to the statesman is impressive.

And whether they purge the city for its good by killing some or exiling, or make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere as does a hive of bees, or increase it by introducing some others from somewhere else and making them citizens, so long as they also make use of knowledge and justice and preserve it and change it from worse to better so far as possible, this then even according to such characteristics must be said by us to be the only correct political system (293DE).

How frequently and by what mechanism the statesman employs his capability for extraordinary action¹⁸ is not specified in the

¹⁸ The statesman's powers of personnel rejection are especially striking.

Those who cannot share in courage and moderation and such other qualities as tend toward excellence, but by force of an evil nature are carried away to godlessness and violence and injustice, it removes by deaths and exiles and punishes by the

dialogue, and there is no sure way to reconstruct the necessary evidence. Presumably, though, its utilization is a function not of the statesman's personal character but of the condition of the city in which he finds himself. A fairly adequate city will require fewer and milder treatments than a deficient or malignant one. In either case the distribution of such actions over time should approximate an extinction curve as the need for them gradually diminishes.

In his rule the statesman may act "according to or without laws."¹⁷ Whatever that phrase means—see section 3—it can refer only to the polity in transition. For once the constitution is routinized, the decisions of the statesman in fact furnish the basic legal code for the city. The statesman, in short, performs a Solonian function. Viewed against the previous political system, he may seem a destroyer and violator of laws; but seen in terms of the nascent system, he is, indeed, the founder and defender of laws. Furthermore, if he is as wise as he is supposed to be, he will rarely force the choice to be expressed so starkly. As far as possible he will be "legislating through ancestral customs" (295A), picking and choosing from among the various and occasionally valid legal prescriptions of the earlier regime,¹⁸ and thus having the best of the old and the new political worlds.

3. The Legal Framework

Despite general agreement in the secondary literature that the *Statesman* contains Plato's explicit, though somewhat ambiguously phrased, criticism and rejection of laws,¹⁹ the statesman in fact constructs and employs a legal code. The major

greatest deprivals of rights. . . . And those wallowing in ignorance and further in much cravenness, they yoke into the slave class (308E-309A).

Admittedly, the precise purport of the quotation is unclear; but even if its first sentence merely denotes that "those who commit crimes will suffer penalties," the second evinces drastic authoritarianism.

¹⁷ *ἐάντε κατὰ γράμματα ἐάντε ἄνευ γραμμάτων*, 293A; *ἐὰν κατὰ γράμματα ἢ χωρὶς γραμμάτων*, 293B; *ἐάντε κατὰ νόμους ἐάντε ἄνευ νόμων*, 293C; *ἢ κατὰ γράμματα ἢ παρὰ γράμματα*, 296E.

¹⁸ Cf. Skemp, *op. cit.*, p. 198 n.

¹⁹ See, for example, E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory* [London, 1918], p. 278; Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Skemp, *op. cit.*, p. 47; and especially Diès, *op. cit.*, pp. li ff.

evidence allegedly to the contrary consists, first, in remarks by the Eleatic Stranger to the effect that a correct political community has "the ruler truly knowledgeable and not just seeming so, whether they rule according to laws or without laws, over willing or unwilling persons, being rich or poor—none of these is to be taken account of according to any true reckoning" (293CD; cf. note 17); and, second, in the objection by Young Socrates: "The rest, Stranger, seems to be measurably stated, but its being said that there ought to be rule without law is harder to hear" (293E). Even together, though, these quotations do not show that the statesman's city is without laws. The comment by Young Socrates hardly constitutes proof, since throughout the dialogue he jumps to many mistaken conclusions.²⁰ As for the Stranger's assertions, they merely define the statesman according to a single characteristic, a knowledge of the science of statesmanship.²¹

There is, on the other hand, ample evidence in the dialogue that the statesman rules a city that does contain laws. In the first place, Young Socrates is immediately and explicitly refuted. As the Stranger remarks about "the correctness of those ruling without laws": "Still in a way it is evident that law-making is part of kingship . . ." (294A). Admittedly, in an ultimate sense it is "best not that the laws be in power but rather the kingly man of wisdom." Best or not, though, this very man must act as legislator and

make the law for the many and so for the bulk and thus rather more coarsely for individuals. . . . For how could anyone, Socrates, ever sit always beside each person throughout his life and ascribe exactly what is proper? Since, I think, if anyone of those who partook of the kingly science were thus able, he would scarcely put obstacles ever in his own way by writing these so-called laws (295AB).

²⁰ He erroneously divides herds into those of men and of beasts instead of dividing by species (262A ff.); he agrees with an "entirely so" to the first definition of the kingly man, which the Stranger then shows is inadequate (267A ff.); he similarly and wrongly greets the revised definition of king or statesman (276E ff.); and he responds affirmatively to the Stranger's question, "Does it not seem to you according to nature to say that the greater must be greater than nothing other than the less, and the less less again than the greater and nothing else?" only to be rebuked a few lines later (283DE).

²¹ See section 1 *supra*.

There precisely is the rub. Laws are too simple and general given "the dissimilarities of men and events" and the fact that "it is impossible for that which keeps simple through everything to be well for what are never simple" (294B and C); and yet it is impossible for a single mortal man to be everywhere at once and to decide all problems himself.²² As a consequence, the only feasible solution, even for a true statesman, is that he become a lawgiver, that he "provide his science as law" (297A).²³ At the most, his ruling "without laws" means that he, like the classical lawgivers, also controls the amendment process. Emendation, of course, denotes not merely rejecting old laws but composing new ones: in place of laws already written the statesman may substitute others (295C, 296A).

Later passages in the *Statesman* also point to the existence of a law code. Some do so in passing (305E, 310A); and others by indicating that *statesman*, *king*, and *legislator* are synonymous terms. Perhaps the clearest proof occurs in the account of the city's judges. In considering "the function of judges who judge rightly," the Stranger asked:

Well then, has it any power further than that of deciding about the mutual contracts, receiving all those that accord with the laws of the legislating king . . . being unwilling to decide the lawsuits against the arrangements of the legislator?

It is agreed that this is in fact their charge, and that consequently "the might of judges is not kingly, but is guardian of laws and servant of that [kingly function]" (305BC).

Though a statesman, then, would be no less a statesman for ruling without laws, he does rule with them. His city contains laws, perhaps even in writing (*γράμματα* at 293A and 296E). Plato's characters, to be sure, and perhaps Plato himself, deem laws to have serious drawbacks and their utilization to be less than ideal; but their preferences in no way negate the occurrence

²² Many other occupations, such as scientific gymnastics (294DE) encounter the same difficulty and handle it in an analogous fashion.

²³ Another way of phrasing this (*ibid.*) is that he "provide the might of his science as stronger than the laws." The two quotations have an identical purport, the one looking to future laws, the other to present laws that are being replaced. In either case the outcome is to be a scientifically grounded legal system.

of laws in the fictional cities they verbally construct. It is a pity, they seem to say, that even a city ruled by the most politically knowledgeable person one can imagine will have to endure a legal framework, but that is the way the world is. Far from eliminating laws from their best city, Plato's characters accept them, just as they accept birth and death among the citizenry.

4. The Bureaucratic Apparatus

Human temporal limitations require that the statesman, in whom complete authority is nominally invested, be assisted by a complex administrative structure that includes such major technical experts as orators, generals, judges, and educators,²⁴ as well as more routine public officials like clerks, heralds, soothsayers, and priests.²⁵ As a result the statesman need play only the role of *chief* policy maker. His science tells whether or not to employ the other sciences: it decides what is the right or wrong time for action, at least "for the most important matters in the city . . . and the other sciences do what has been ordained" (305D). Thus, the statesman decides when and how rhetoric should be applied, and whether and when war is to be waged by the generals; and he also "arrays and supervises" (308D) the educational process.

Conversely, orators, generals, and educators are seen as skill groups that are, or ought to be, instrumental and subsidiary to the statesman. Oratory, unlike modern public relations, is considered incapable of determining whether or not, and for what ends, to employ its science of suasion (304CD). Similarly, generalship concerns itself with how, not with whether, war is to be waged (*ὡς πολεμητέον*, not *εἴτε πολεμητέον*, 304E); and education is not allowed to teach just anything at all, but is

²⁴ There are also some other unspecified officials and boards in the city; see 311A.

²⁵ Other persons in the city—slaves, workers, dealers in services, and primary producers (287C ff.)—also aid the statesman, at least indirectly. Their endeavors may be considered political in that "without them neither a city nor statesmanship would ever grow, and yet I suppose we shall place none of them as the task of the kingly science" (287D). Though their work is a conditioning cause of the political community, persons in these occupations are rather far removed from the usual connotations of *political* and will not be further discussed here.

watched to ensure that it "completes and finishes some suitable character for its blending [i. e. for the statesman to blend in his cloth-of-state], and only in those matters does it exhort instruction" (308DE). Indeed, only the judges are permitted—or at least not explicitly denied—the freedom to act without the express command of the statesman. To be sure, they decide cases in accordance "with the laws of the legislating king"; they act as "guardians of laws and servants of that kingly science"; and they do not allow their judgments to be swayed by bribery or by private considerations (305BC). Nonetheless, they still act *sua sponte*: unlike generals and orators, they do not refer each case to the statesman for his opinion. Reasons for the difference are not hard to find. In particular, if the statesman decided about judicial cases, the judges would have nothing to do at all.

The statesman is also aided by lesser governmental employees like clerks and priests. Some are secular. They are part of the

heraldic race, who become wise about writing after much service, and other deucedly clever persons accomplishing various and sundry tasks in connection with offices. What too shall we call them? What you just said. They are not officers in the cities but servants.

They are, that is to say, civil servants. Other government employees perform sacred functions, like the soothsayers, who "are supposed to be the interpreters of the gods to men," and the priests, whose tasks are regulated by custom law. These men have a political aura not only because they are highly thought of in a community but because, in Egypt and in many Greek cities as well, kingship and religious authority often coincide (290C-E).²⁶

A catalogue of the domains assigned by Plato's characters to governmental officials should look familiar to modern readers. The most important activities are military preparedness, education, propaganda (oratory), and judicial decision-making. Ancillary to these endeavors are diplomacy (a function of heralds), record-keeping and other clerical chores, chaplaincy, and religious ceremonials. We might today emphasize diplomacy somewhat more and religion somewhat less, and we might wonder

²⁶ Reference is made (290E) to the second Athenian archon, who was styled *king* but whose function was largely ceremonial.

about the lack of overt references to tax collectors and welfare officials; but in the main the dialogue's list of topics to be handled by a bureaucracy is sensible, perceptive of Greek practice, and of enduring correctness.

5. The Reactions of the Public

After a more or less violent transition, a statesman has imposed on a city a lasting system of laws and a comprehensive bureaucratic structure. The effect of his actions on that city's public is not only massive but intimate. For one thing, there is the testing of "men in play,"²⁷ and "after the test it will further hand them over to those able to instruct and to serve toward this very goal, but still it arrays and supervises . . ." (308D). For another, the capable and incapable are separated, the latter being subjected to such penalties as exile, disgrace, execution, and slavery (308E-309A), while the former have their opinions made more homogeneous through diffuse techniques like laws (310A), education, and rhetoric, as well as by specific restrictions on acceptable marriage partners.²⁸

Will the statesman succeed and the people accept him and his aims? An unqualified affirmative answer seems unlikely. He tries (*πειράται*) to bind and weave the population together (309B), but his attempt is bound to fail at least in part. Indeed, the relative inapplicability of laws to human circumstances indicates eloquently that the inhabitants are only partly controlled by nature and nurture; for were the statesman truly able to standardize men into a few types, general laws could not be criticized as rough-cut treatments too simple to fit situational and behavioral complexities. Other political characteristics carry the same implication. Thus, the stress on the judiciary shows that there will be lawsuits (305C); and that in turn presupposes independent or illicit activities by individuals.

²⁷ It is not clear from the passage whether the testing applies solely to children, or to all males (and females?) both old and young.

²⁸ The logic behind the last point is that persons are temperamentally bold or moderate, and that marriages must be controlled to prevent that inbreeding by which the bold would become maniacal and the moderate weak (306A ff.). For the same sort of reason, in assigning offices in the city the statesman chooses as a single official a man who has both decorous and courageous characteristics, while to a board he appoints persons from both psychological groupings (311A).

Similarly, oratory connotes a need for continually persuading the population (304C-E).

The statesman himself, of course, is a *deus ex machina*, a device dragged in to make the system work. After all, where does he, or someone like him (295E), come from? Or how might one raise another to take his place? Furthermore, even that device may not suffice to make the system work. The statesman cannot frame wholly adequate laws, for men are always too various. He cannot foresee the acts of gods or of chance. He cannot do everything and watch everyone. Indeed, he may not even be able, during the time of transition and perhaps thereafter, to convince people that his science differs from the manner of a tyrant; and thus, rather than live under his rule, the people may choose to establish and endure one of the inferior forms of government.²⁹ For all his force and knowledge, even as underpinned by a legal code and bureaucratic structure, the statesman may be incapable of saving his city if the people react against him and refuse to accept what he represents. And that may well be precisely their reaction.³⁰

MORRIS DAVIS.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

²⁹ See section 1 *supra*.

³⁰ Socrates' bitter question in the *Ion* would be quite pertinent here, of course. Ion, a rhapsode, had claimed that he knew from Homer the science of generalship. Socrates thereupon asked him:

How then ever is it, by the gods, that you, who are the best of the Greeks both as general and as rhapsode, are a rhapsode travelling among the Greeks, but not a general? Or does it seem to you that there is much need among the Greeks for a rhapsode crowned with gold, but of a general none? (*Ion*, 541BC; cf. *Republic*, 598D ff.)

In the same way, how can one assert that a person is truly a scientific statesman if the people will not accept him? Do not the Greeks stand in need of a lawgiver as much as they do of a general? The dialogue provides no answers, and speculation seems pointless. Indeed, it is not even clear whether the position taken in the *Statesman* should be accounted pessimistic (because science does not always bring success) or optimistic (because failure is not a sure sign of ignorance). The responses of critics seem as much a function of their perspectives as of Plato's doctrines: see, for example, J. Gould, *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge, England, 1955), Part III; and G. Vlastos, "Socratic Knowledge and Platonic 'Pessimism,'" *Philosophical Review*, LXVI (1957), pp. 226-38.

INTERPOLATIONS IN THE *BACCHAE*.

The corrupt state of the end of Euripides' *Bacchae* has contributed to the disagreement concerning Euripides' attitude towards Dionysiac religion. The presence of two large lacunae makes it difficult to evaluate accurately the intended dramatic effect of the *exodos*. When the play ended, did the punishment of Pentheus and Agave, although harsh, still seem justified, or did the audience suddenly turn against Dionysus, repelled by his brutality and petty insistence on his divinity? The difficulty has been alleviated to some extent by a partial restoration of the lacunae with the help of lines from the twelfth century cento *Christus Patiens*. But while scholarly attention has been concentrated on the lacunae, it has not been noticed that the end of the play also contains interpolations which further complicate the problem of interpretation. Because of the location of the interpolations it is necessary first to make some observations about the lacunae.

In the first place, Robert's views on the lacunae, although they have not been followed by the editors, are almost certainly correct.¹ Instead of a single large lacuna following 1329, there are two large lacunae, one following 1300 and containing the *compositio membrorum* speech of Agave, the other following 1329 and containing mainly the speech of Dionysus. This follows from the consideration that for dramatic reasons the *compositio membrorum* speech of Agave must precede the speech of Cadmus 1302-26. According to Apsines, Agave in her speech effectively aroused grief for Pentheus by handling and lamenting each piece of his body separately and pity for herself by self-accusations.² We may reasonably conjecture that in terms of emotional intensity this speech was the high point of the play. Such a speech fits only following line 1300. The preceding rapid dialogue between Agave and Cadmus (1263-1300) has led to Agave's return to sanity and the realization that Pentheus

¹ Carl Robert, "Die Schlusscene der Euripideischen Bakchen," *Hermes*, XXXIV (1899), pp. 645-9.

² *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Walz, IX, pp. 587, 590. Quoted by Murray and Dodds.

is dead and that she has killed him. Agave now commands the undivided attention of the audience. Lines 1298-1300 ask questions about Pentheus and lead up to a confrontation between Agave and Pentheus' body. When the confrontation takes place some appropriate reaction is expected from her. It is highly disturbing to delay at this point the *compositio membrorum* speech for another 28 lines while Cadmus digresses about his own troubles and diverts the audience's attention from Agave. Cadmus' speech appears rather to be a transitional passage designed to relieve the emotional tension of the preceding speech and prepare the audience for the universal announcement of Dionysus' divinity. It does so by redirecting the feeling of pity to Cadmus himself (1305-22) and generalizing the guilt and suffering to the whole family (1302-4, 1323-4). If the *compositio membrorum* speech were to follow Cadmus' speech, it would be necessary to direct the attention of the audience to Agave and Pentheus and build up the emotional tension all over again.

The first lacuna has no further bearing on the problem of the interpolations. The second lacuna begins following line 1329. The last line preceding the lacuna is spoken by Agave and seems to lead up to a brief lament of the sudden change in her fortunes which may have taken up one or two additional lines. These were probably followed by a short answer by Cadmus as ὁ πατήρ in 1329 implies. Cadmus' answer was soon followed by the epiphany and speech of Dionysus. The beginning of Dionysus' speech appears to be described by the last sentence of the first *hypothesis*: Διόνυσος δὲ ἐπιφανείς μὲν πᾶσι παρήγγειλεν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἃ συμβήσεται διεσάφησεν ἔργοις, ἵνα μὴ λόγοις ὑπὸ τινος τῶν ἐκτὸς ὡς ἄνθρωπος καταφρονηθῇ. "Dionysus appeared and exhorted everyone (to accept his divinity) and made it clear by deeds (the fate of Pentheus) to each one (present) what will happen to him (if he blasphemes Dionysus) so that no (uninitiated) outsider should despise him in words as human." Dionysus probably began with some form of the announcement "I am Dionysus, the son of Zeus," perhaps added a list of his benefits to mankind, and then proceeded to discuss the crime and punishment of Pentheus. The following lines may have occurred in this part of the speech:³

³ The following reconstruction of the lacuna apart from some changes

- C.P.*, 1664 ἐς δεσμά τ' ἦλθε καὶ (λόγους ἐμπαιγμάτων)
C.P., 1663 τοίγαρ τέθνηκεν ὦν ἐχρῆν ἦκισθ' ὕπο.
C.P., 1667 καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πέπονθεν οὗτος (οὐκ ἄκων)
 1664: λόγων ὑβρίσματα, Wecklein, 1667: ἐνδίκως, Kirchhoff.

The discussion of Pentheus may have ended with the lines preserved in the papyrus fragment *Antinoopolis Papyri*, 24, fr. (b) verso and supplemented by Dodds:

- 6 ὁ ταῦτ' ὅπως ἐκδιδαχ[θήτω βροτῶν·
 7 Διόνυσον] ὁ Ζεὺς ἐστὶν ὁ [σπείρας θεόν.

These lines may have been followed by an announcement that punishment awaits all blasphemers. A section discussing the crimes of Agave and her sisters and announcing their exile probably followed next. The following lines may have occurred here:

- C.P.*, 1756 δεῖ γάρ σε τὴν φονῶσαν ἐκλιπεῖν πόλιν
C.P., 1674 λιπεῖν πόλιν τήνδ', ἀνοσίτου μιάσματος
C.P., 1675 δίκην (τίνοντας) τῷδ' ὃν ἐκτειναν (φθόνων),
C.P., 1676 καὶ μηκέτ' (ιδεῖν) πατρίδ'· οὐ γὰρ εὐσεβὲς
C.P., 1677 μένειν φονευτὰς (ἐν τάφοις νεκρουμένων).
 1675: τινούσας, Kirchhoff, 1676: ἐσιδεῖν, Kirchhoff.

This section would then be followed by the accusation of the Thebans and the announcement of their expulsion and slavery. The following lines may have occurred here:

- C.P.*, 1360 οὐκ εὐπρεπεῖς ἔθεντο πολλοί μοι λόγους,
C.P., 1361 ψευδῶς τεκεῖν βάζοντες ἔκ τινος βροτῶν.
C.P., 1668 ἅ δ' αὖ παθεῖν δεῖ λαὸν οὐ κρύψω κακά.
C.P., 1669 λίπη πόλισμα, βαρβάροις εἰκων, (ἄκων)
C.P., 1678 πόλεις δὲ πολλὰς εἰσαφίκωνται, ζυγὸν
C.P., 1679 δούλειον (ἀνέλκοντες) οἱ δυσδαίμονες:
C.P., 1672 αἰχμαῖς ἄλωτους, πόλλ' ἀναπλάντας κακά

The last part of the speech consisted of prophecies addressed to Cadmus. The following line probably served as an introduction:

in order is basically that of Murray and Dodds. Any argument involving this passage ultimately depends on the correctness of Murray's ascription of these lines to the *Bacchae*.

C. P., 1689 οὗτος δ' ἂ μέλλει πῆματ' ἐκπλήσειν φράσω·

An announcement of exile must have followed (cf. 1354-5), These lines were soon followed by 1330 in the text. The prophecy to Cadmus then goes on to describe how Cadmus and Harmonia will be transformed into snakes, lead a barbarian army against Greece, suffer defeat, and finally be transported by Ares to the land of the blessed.

Two events in the prophecies, the expulsion and enslavement of the Thebans and the return of Cadmus as the leader of a barbarian army, are difficult to explain. The expulsion of the Thebans is usually connected with the statement in Herodotus, V, 61, 2: ἐπὶ τούτου δὴ τοῦ Λαοδάμαντος τοῦ Ἑτεοκλέος μοναρχέοντος ἐξανίσταται Καδμείοι ὑπ' Ἀργείων καὶ τρέπονται ἐς τοὺς Ἑγχελέας. The same event is mentioned by Pausanias (IX, 8, 6): ἡνίκα ὑπὸ Ἀργείων μάχῃ πρὸς Γλίσαντι ἐκρατήθησαν, τότε ὁμοῦ Λαοδάμαντι τῷ Ἑτεοκλέους ὑπεξίασιν οἱ πολλοί· τούτων οὖν μοῖρα τὴν μὲν ἐς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς πορείαν ἀπώκνησε, τραπόμενοι δὲ ἐς Θεσσαλοὺς καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὀμόλῃν. There are, however, two serious discrepancies between the account of Herodotus and Pausanias and the prophecy. In the first place, Argives cannot be properly called barbarians. Secondly, Herodotus and Pausanias speak of expulsion and emigration, but definitely not of slavery. There is, however, a historical event which corresponds much more closely to the prophecy. This is the capture of Thebes and enslavement of the Thebans by Alexander in 335. The Macedonians can be properly called barbarians (e.g. Herodotus, V, 22, 2; Thucydides, IV, 124, 1) and on this occasion the Thebans were indeed enslaved (Arrian, *Anab.*, I, 9, 9; Diodorus, XVII, 13, 3). The prophecy is also likely to have contained a reference to the spectacular destruction of Thebes, but if so, these lines were not used by the compiler of *Christus Patiens*.

The prophecy that Cadmus will lead an army of barbarians against Greece (1333-8, 1355-60) is equally puzzling. The prophecy suggests the invasions of Xerxes. The oracle (1333, 1355) can be connected with the oracle which Herodotus reports as known to Mardonius (IX, 42, 3): ἔστι λόγιον ὡς χρεὼν ἐστι Πέρσας ἀπικομένους ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαρπάσαι τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖσι, μετὰ δὲ τὴν διαρπαγὴν ἀπολέσθαι πάντας. Herodotus, however, goes on to explain (IX, 43, 1): τούτου δ' ἐγωγε τὸν χρησμόν, τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυριοὺς τε καὶ τὸν Ἑγχελέων

στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. The oracle therefore need not be referred to the Persians. The sacking of the temple (1336-7), although reminiscent of the events of 480, does not fit them accurately since according to Herodotus, VIII, 37-8 the Persians did not succeed in sacking the temple. Similarly the attempted sack of the temple was not a significant turning point (1336-8) in the Persian War. There is, however, again a historical event which corresponds much more closely to the prophecy. This is the invasion of Greece by the Galatians under Brennus in 279. The oracle (1333), if we take it to be the same as that of Herodotus, is far more applicable to the Galatians than to the Persians. The Galatians were a mixed (1356) army which included conquered Illyrian tribes to whom the oracle was properly applicable (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 101). The mention of the ox cart (1333) and the presence of Cadmus' wife (1334) can be taken as referring to the Galatian habit of traveling with a wagon train which carried their families and possessions. A wagon train accompanied the expedition of Brennus (*C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 101, 103). As for the sacking of the temple (1336-7), according to sources uninfluenced by Delphic propaganda the Galatians either sacked or at least started to sack the temple.⁴ For the Galatian invasion, moreover, the sack of the temple was the turning point (1336-8). Immediately thereafter the Galatians began to retreat and the retreat turned into a rout with heavy losses (Pausanias, X, 23). The only part of the prophecy which does not fit the events of 279 is the sacking of many cities (1335-6). The Galatians were notoriously unsuccessful when it came to capturing walled towns. These lines may have arisen simply from a desire to emphasize the serious nature of the invasion.

The occurrence of two such historical references within a few lines of each other clearly suggests the work of an interpolator. The interpolation was probably made some time between 279 and 262 at Athens. The two historical events would be well known to most Athenians at this time, the invasion of 279 because it was recent history, the destruction of Thebes because it may well have figured in the anti-Macedonian propaganda

⁴ Salomon Reinach, "L'attaque de Delphes par les Gaulois," *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1904, pp. 158-64.

before and during the Chremonidean War. The enslavement of the Thebans could be quoted as excellent proof that the Macedonians were yet another hostile nation of barbarians bent on enslaving the Greeks. That such a sentiment was current at this time is demonstrated by the decree of Chremonides (*S. I. G.*³, 434/5). The decree compares the Macedonians with the Persians in their desire to enslave the Greek cities (*καταδουλοῦσθαι τὰς πόλεις*, line 11) and destroy the Greek way of life (lines 13-16). Such sentiments are less likely to have been voiced after the surrender of Athens in 262. There are two possible reasons which may have led the interpolator to apply Herodotus' oracle to the Galatians. One is the general practice of comparing the Persian and the Galatian invasions (*C. A. H.*, VII, p. 102). This apparently began immediately after the Galatian invasion. An inscription of 278 mentions the Galatian shields which were hung up on one side of the temple at Delphi to balance the Persian shields from Marathon on the other side.⁵ A second reason may have been the presence of Illyrians in the Galatian army to whom, as the interpolator knew, the oracle was properly applicable. The connection between Cadmus and Illyria is also first attested in the third century. Apollonius Rhodius mentions a mound (*τύμβος*) of Cadmus and Harmonia, Phylarchus a memorial (*μνημεῖον*) of Cadmus and Harmonia, and Callimachus a stone (*λᾶας*) of Harmonia, all of them situated in Illyria.⁶ The idea of Cadmus leading the invasion of the Galatians may again have been suggested to the interpolator by the presence in the Galatian army of Illyrians with whom Cadmus was now connected. The interpolator's idea of Cadmus' travels in the ox wagon as a leader of a barbarian army apparently failed to influence later tradition. The only possible influence is found in the *Etymologicum Magnum* under Βουθόη: *εἴρηται ὅτι Κάδμος ἐπὶ βοῶν ζεύγους ἐκ Θηβῶν ταχέως εἰς Ἰλλυρικοὺς παραγενόμενος ἔκτισε*

³ *S. I. G.*³, 398, lines 9-10. Pausanias, X, 19, 4.

⁶ Apollonius Rhodius, IV, 516-17; Phylarchus quoted by Athenaeus, XI, 462 b; Callimachus quoted by Strabo, I, C, 46. It has been conjectured (O. Crusius, "Kadmos," no. 50 in Roscher's *Lexikon*, II [1890], col. 850) that the source of this information is an early epic dealing with the Argonauts. It is more likely, however, that the information represents a local cult tradition (see Dodds' note on 1330) which was first picked up in literary sources in the third century.

πόλιν· καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βοῶν καὶ τοῦ θοῶς φυγεῖν, Βουθόην αὐτὴν ὠνόμασεν. The unknown punster may have been familiar with the ending of the *Bacchae*.

The interpolator himself apparently was an educated man who knew his Herodotus and the latest views on Cadmus and Illyria. He could also write good Euripidean trimeters. In making the interpolations he seems to have had two things in mind: one, to demonstrate the prophetic powers of his poet by introducing in the text references to two prominent historical events known to the audience; two, to increase the pathos of the ending by multiplying the number of exiles and making Cadmus more pathetic. The changes introduced by the interpolator are at least the following:

1. Addition of the passage prophesying the exile and enslavement of the Thebans. This is now represented by *C.P.*, 1360, 1361, 1668, 1669, 1678, 1679, 1672. The original impetus for the interpolation may have come from a reference in the immediately preceding lines to the blasphemies of Agave and her sisters (cf. 26-7). The interpolator then attributed the same behavior to the Thebans and imposed an identical punishment.
2. Addition of *C.P.*, 1689, which introduces the prophecies concerning Cadmus, and lines 1333-9, which prophesy Cadmus' return as the leader of a barbarian army. Lines 1333-9 in addition to the problems of the prophecy itself also introduce a logical inconsistency. The immediately preceding lines (1330-2) have announced Cadmus' metamorphosis into a snake. Next he is seen driving an ox cart. We are led to ask with Dodds, "Was Cadmus already a snake when he drove the ox-wagon?" The metamorphosis into a snake was probably the only reference to the fate of Cadmus in the original speech. Euripides seems to have liked the idea and had already used it in an earlier play (probably the lost *Cadmus*) as fr. 930 N² implies:

οἷμοι, δράκων μοι γίγνεται τὸ γ' ἡμῶν·
τέκνον, περιπλάκηθι τῷ λοιπῷ πατρί.

According to Philostratus, *Imagines*, I, 18 the metamorphosis took place in Thebes. That Euripides also followed this tradition and did not make Cadmus first go into exile is strongly implied by the end of the play. Agave separated from Cadmus goes into exile, but Cadmus himself stays behind. Cadmus'

line, *νῦν δ' ἐκ δόμων ἄτιμος ἐκβεβλήσομαι* (1313), does not in its context imply exile, but means simply that Cadmus will lose his respected position in the city which depended on the power of his grandson and will be thrown out of the palace by the new ruler.

3. Change of speaker in lines 1344, 1346, 1348. Since with the interpolated prophecy Cadmus now appears to be punished, he has reason to beg for mercy and complain of Dionysus' harshness. The change was probably motivated by a desire to heighten the pathos by making an obviously innocent man suffer. Elmsley's change of speaker in these lines from Cadmus back to Agave is almost certainly correct and has been followed by most editors.

4. Addition of lines 1354-62. These lines are a paraphrase of the prophecy in the speech of Dionysus and were probably added to produce another pathetic scene in which Cadmus could theatrically lament his misfortunes. In 1353 we should restore *ἐγώ*.

These changes in so far as they affect the fate of Cadmus have far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of the play. Having aged Cadmus go into exile and then return as the leader of a barbarian army seems like a gratuitous act of brutality on the part of Dionysus. Cadmus, after all, along with Tiresias was the first of Thebans to accept the divinity of Dionysus (178 ff.). This cruelty to Cadmus provides a strong argument for the view which sees Dionysus as a Nietzschean nature god who, when offended, deals out punishments with indiscriminate brutality and is above such merely human trifles as guilt or innocence. Those who will wish to use this argument in the future, however, would do well to consider that the fate of Cadmus as it appears at the end of the play is in all probability not the creation of Euripides, but that of a sincere admirer of his who wanted to improve upon the most tragic of all poets by making the most tragic of plays still more tragic.

VALDIS LEJNIEKS.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

REVIEWS.

- A. HOEKSTRA. *Homeric Modifications of Formulaic Prototypes. Studies in the Development of Greek Epic Diction.* Amsterdam, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1965. Pp. 172. \$6.30. (*Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, LXXI, no. 1.*)

Here is the most ambitious and valuable study of Homeric formulas to appear since Milman Parry's epoch-making publications of some thirty-five years ago. It is not, however, an easy book to read. Most of Hoekstra's exposition proceeds slowly, amassing large amounts of evidence, some of which is admittedly vague (see, e.g., pp. 28-9, 69-70, 89-90, 134-6), and the reader constantly faces the problem of estimating just how convincing Hoekstra's inferences from a necessarily limited body of data really are. Nevertheless it is a book that will give us a good deal to think about, especially in the United States, because it argues well against some major points of Parry's doctrine that have become widely accepted in this country without ever having been adequately criticized.

Hoekstra's purpose is to give a "historical style-morphology" of the Homeric diction, although he disavows any attempt to produce a systematic treatise, calling his chapters a "collection of essays" (p. 5). But the book does have a unifying argument, which is of the highest importance for present-day Homeric studies. It is that the evolution of the epic diction was *not* the long slow process envisioned by Parry, but was instead a rapid process carried out by the later Ionian singers, with most of the variety and flexibility achieved in the last two generations before Homer. Unfortunately, this provocative thesis is never given one central, elaborated statement in the book, but is scattered through various chapters (cf. pp. 15-16, 28, 48-9, 136-7, 140, and 147). One wonders why the author did not use his first and last chapters to introduce clearly and then recapitulate his central argument. (The first chapter is an essay on quite another topic.) Perhaps he feels he is letting the evidence speak for itself; but it does not speak as decisively as one might wish.

The bulk of Hoekstra's investigation is organized largely under linguistic headings, after an introductory chapter on the nature of the formula (discussed below). Chapter II is on modification based on quantitative metathesis, III on initial digamma, IV on nu-movable, and V on modifications due to such phenomena as conjugation, declension, and splitting of formulas. There is an interesting appendix on "The testimony of *νῶν*, *νός*, etc." and a sixth chapter on "The Limitations of the Method." His main argument is based on the following reasoning. The traditional formulaic structure of the epic hexameter must have undergone a certain amount of modifica-

tion and "decomposition" under the pressure of new linguistic developments in Ionia—loss of digamma, introduction of nu-movable, and quantitative metathesis. The availability of nu-movable for making position and obviating hiatus, and the disappearance of digamma, would have had a considerable loosening effect on the diction, allowing new combinations of words and permutations of formulas. A highly advanced stage of this decomposition is found in the early post-Homeric period, i.e., Hesiod and the Homeric hymns (cf. pp. 75-87), where we can see, in many cases, just how modification of the original prototypes took place. By the same method, then, we can find in Homer numerous instances of phrases that depend on these relatively late linguistic changes, and whose ancient prototypes can be reasonably reconstructed from what survives of them elsewhere in the text. An illustration of this method is Hoekstra's treatment (p. 59) of the verse

οἴκαδ' εἰς ἑλθέμεναι καὶ νόστιμον ἦμαρ ἰδέσθαι (3x).

ἦμαρ ἰδέσθαι is possible only after digamma has vanished. Therefore the verse involves a relatively late transposition of νόστιμον ἦμαρ from the end of the line, where its traditional use is in expressions like ἀφείλετο (ἀπώλετο, ὤλετο, ὤλεσε) νόστιμον ἦμαρ, to an earlier position, perhaps following the pattern of ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ ἀπούρας (3x). The change would be aided by the fixed use of ἰδέσθαι at the verse-end (38x, digamma neglected twice).

Now this kind of analysis is hardly new. We have seen it in the studies of Parry, Chantraine, and Severyns, and we all assume that some such development of the formulaic language took place before Homer's time. But Hoekstra has put together for the first time an extensive body of evidence to show that the epic language, far from having been transmitted, orally, in what Chantraine has called "le cadre presque immuable des vieilles formules," actually underwent more modification of its formulaic structure than has been generally realized. By combining this evidence with the assumption of a late date for the loss of digamma, following Risch,¹ and for the widespread use of nu-movable to make position and avoid hiatus, he comes to the conclusion that the epic diction we find in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* has been subjected to a drastic modification in the one or two generations before Homer (pp. 45, 51 with note 1, 147). This would mean ca. 750, since he places Homer around 700, as he says in a rather roundabout way on p. 31. The weak point in Hoekstra's argument, to this reviewer, is his insistence on so late a date, since "late" according to Risch's relative chronology can be defined no more precisely than post-900.

Hoekstra's most specific argument for a late date is his inference from the treatment of εἰ and οἱ that the initial digamma vanished in the very generation before Homer. Noting the irregularity, in the speech repeated at *Il.* XXIV, 146-58 and 175-87, of ὅς ᾄξει (154) having the same metrical value as ὅς σ' ᾄξει (183), he says "It is hardly conceivable that such a vaguely outlined, incidental and easily

¹ "Die Gliederung der griechischen Dialekte in neuer Sicht," *Mus. Helv.*, XII (1955), pp. 61-76, especially p. 68.

variable expression as $\delta\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\upsilon$ could survive the loss of the sound for a considerable time" (pp. 43-4). But there is, in this case, one might answer, a very strong motive for the preservation of the original spondaic scansion. The phrase $\delta\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\upsilon$ was embedded in a thirteen-line speech that was repeated almost immediately in identical language, allowing for a change of pronouns. To re-cast this phrase because it no longer seemed to scan correctly would have meant the disruption of the whole line and most likely of the adjoining verses, and the unravelling of the carefully built symmetry of the two speeches. From the singer's point of view it was far preferable to tolerate what appeared to be an irregular lengthening. If, then, the survival of the digamma's force in this passage can be so explained, there is really no evidence for dating the loss of the sound to a period as late as the second half of the eighth century. Another argument for a late date is that although the disappearance of digamma caused extensive modification of the diction (pp. 51-2), yet an extremely small number of phrases based on a vanished digamma had time to develop into commonly repeated formulas, the only two "substantial and fully developed combinations" being $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\delta\upsilon$ $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\omicron\rho\alpha$ $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu$ (11x) and $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$ (11x) (p. 69). This argument is slightly weakened, I think, by the existence of other repeated expressions that neglect digamma, as noted by Hoekstra himself, e. g., $\delta\phi\rho'$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omega$ (9x), $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\mu\upsilon\upsilon$ $\phi\omega\eta\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma'$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\alpha$ $\pi\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$ $\pi\rho\sigma\eta\acute{\gamma}\delta\alpha$ (10x), $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\pi\omicron\delta\alpha\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\iota\kappa\alpha\varsigma$ $\beta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ (5x) (p. 70). Moreover, since the commonly repeated expressions normally represent the most basic ideas in epic life, we should not expect many of them to be coined when the epic diction is in its latest, most developed phase. The underlying problem here is that there is no way to estimate the rate at which new fixed expressions were added. Thus while Hoekstra is right in associating the loss of digamma with growing modification and flexibility, it is hard to see how he can accurately date the phenomenon by appealing to the small amount of innovation among the commonly repeated formulas. Four or five generations may be as likely a date as one or two generations.

There is still less to be learned from quantitative metathesis. Hoekstra considers it slightly later than the loss of digamma, with some overlap likely. Little modification came about as a result of metathesis, with the interesting exception of some formulaic modifications in the description of ships (pp. 124-30). He notes that while the proportion of newer to older forms of $\nu\eta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ is higher in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad* for $\nu\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$: $\nu\eta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ and $\nu\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$: $\nu\acute{\eta}\alpha\varsigma$, as would be expected, yet in other cases it is the *Iliad* that has the higher percentage of later forms ($\nu\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu$: $\nu\eta\acute{\omicron}\nu$, $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota$: $\nu\acute{\eta}\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota$). Since these late forms are concentrated chiefly in Books XI, XII, XIII, XV, and XVI, it seems likely, as he says, that parts of the narrative of the battle near the ships were composed or remodelled at a relatively late period, by Homer or his immediate predecessors.

The third sound-change from which Hoekstra argues is the introduction of nu-movable. He demonstrates clearly that it was a great factor in allowing and encouraging formulaic modification in what he calls the late pre-Homeric and early post-Homeric periods; but it is impossible even to attempt to date the entry of the sound into Ionic,

and we must assume a relatively early date (pp. 74-5, 89-90). While Hoekstra emphasizes that it is not the introduction of the sound itself but the extensive spreading of nu-movable that he considers "late" (p. 108), it is hard to know how much time really separated these two developments. Many of the modifications that point to the spreading of nu-movable can have occurred at any time after its introduction, and so it is impossible, again, to demonstrate that the widespread modification traced by Hoekstra is really confined to the brief period just before Homer.

In short, then, Hoekstra's arguments from linguistic innovations and their role in hastening decomposition of the formulaic language are not going to convince a sceptical reader that the numerous modifications found in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were the work of Homer and the one or two generations that preceded him. It does, however, seem to follow from his extensive evidence that much of the innovation and flexibility was achieved at a *relatively* late period, perhaps 850-700. In his detailed study of the processes of modification, then, the author has performed a great service.

Hoekstra's first chapter, "The Formula and its Use as a Criterion of Stylistic Development," is in many ways the most stimulating part of the book. Here the author puts forward the best arguments I have seen for a major re-evaluation, and partial rejection, of what may be called the Parry school of Homeric criticism. He calls into question both the tendency to expand the definition of "formula" and "formulaic" and the necessity of explaining formulaic qualities of diction solely in terms of composition by the oral improvising technique. To some this will appear as a hopelessly reactionary position, but I do think Hoekstra has put his finger on some very important problems. Parry's view of Homeric composition has been successively attacked as heresy and embraced as dogma, with rarely an unbiased critical examination. Hoekstra goes right to the heart of the matter: there is a *non sequitur* between Parry's first published work, the two French theses of 1928, and the next two articles of 1930 and 1932. The first proved *not* that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as we have them are pure oral compositions, but only that certain formula systems must have been devised over many generations of oral composition. The second group of writings (and subsequent writings by Parry, A. B. Lord, and J. A. Notopoulos) assume as *proven* that the Homeric poems are wholly oral in style and composition, and then go on to draw parallels to the improvising style of modern oral traditions. There is a certain leap of faith here, and Hoekstra is correct to emphasize that the problem of Homeric composition is far from solved. While the Parry-Lord view is appealing, and teaches us to recognize many features characteristic of oral style in the poems, we should nevertheless remember that it is really still a hypothesis. I stress this because it is already customary, in much of the best writing on Homer appearing in English today, to refer to Milman Parry's "proof" that the Homeric epics are oral compositions.²

² See, e.g., C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1958), pp. 4-5; D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 222-3; G. S. Kirk, *The Songs*

Hoekstra's view (pp. 18-20) is that if the Homeric poems were not composed with the aid of writing (a possibility he does not exclude), they could not be the products of a pure improvisation that makes no use of "recitation"—that is, of the opportunity to work on certain passages so as to perfect their expression and to be able to re-use these and other sections in verbatim form when needed. He thus questions the equation *oral composition* = *improvisation*, which is Lord's and Notopoulos' position (p. 18). Citing several lengthy repetitions in Homer (e. g. *Il.*, IX, 122-56 repeated in 264-98; *Od.*, XIV, 258-72 in XVII, 427-41; IV, 333-50 in XVII, 124-41), he claims that such exact reproduction would be impossible if the poet were always improvising and did not rely on memorization and recitation. The problem, I think, is that Hoekstra interprets Lord's idea of recitation much too broadly. What Lord specifically meant by the term is public performance from a fixed memorized text. Such recitation and creative oral composition do represent, among the Yugoslav singers, mutually exclusive methods. But Lord does not exclude the possibility of an oral poet rendering the same sequence of ideas in exactly the same formulas (see *The Singer of Tales*, pp. 58-60, for such "runs" of formulas). A certain amount of verbatim repetition is surely within the powers of a talented oral singer, and so the Homeric repetitions cited by Hoekstra need not be an embarrassment to Lord's theory. This is especially so since a strict form like the Greek hexameter would probably have supported exact repetition more strongly than a looser form like the Yugoslav decasyllabic verse, and this would account for the fact that the Homeric "runs" tend to be longer than their Slavic counterparts. As for the actual method of Homer's composition, Hoekstra offers a most reasonable explanation: "The creation of the poems was not a single feat of improvising but was the result of elaborate and well-studied composition, complete with rehearsal and reassertion of the 'thematic unity'—and, perhaps, with the insertion of certain passages [i. e., interpolation]" (p. 20). In view of the elaborateness and impressive length and coherence of the poems, this seems to me the most reasonable hypothesis if one wishes to preserve the idea of epics composed without writing. There is of course another alternative, that the poems are *written* in a style whose history up to that time had been *oral*. Far from having been eliminated by Parry, this is still a very real possibility, and I am tempted to think of it as offering fewer difficulties.³

But it is in his criticism of the extended definition of the formula and the formulaic that Hoekstra raises the most fundamental issue of all,⁴ since the whole concept of an oral poetry depends on identi-

of *Homer* (Cambridge, 1962), p. 59. For a healthy expression of dissent, however, see M. W. M. Pope, "The Parry-Lord Theory of Homeric Composition," *Acta Classica*, VI (1963), pp. 1-21.

³ See now Adam Parry, "Have We Homer's Iliad?" *Yale Classical Studies*, XX (1966), pp. 175-216.

⁴ This issue is currently a subject of debate in Homeric criticism. For a view akin to Hoekstra's, see J. B. Hainsworth, "Structure and Content in Epic Formulae: the Question of the Unique Expression," *C. Q.*, XIV (1964), pp. 155-64. For a different view see J. A. Russo, "The Structural Formula in Homeric Verse," *Yale Classical Studies*, XX (1966), pp. 217-40.

fying its language as formulaic in a way that other poetic language is not. While I agree with Hoekstra that we should not call everything in Homer formulaic because this ignores the existence of unique expressions (p. 15 and note 4), I should add that it also ignores the distinction between the stricter verbatim formula and the formulaic pattern or "structural" formula. Hoekstra belongs to the sceptical school that does not accept the latter, which may be defined as a word group that serves the same rhythmical function and a similar semantic function by using the same parts of speech in the same part of the verse, and allowing free substitution for any of its members. (Examples would be, ending the verse, ἄλγε' ἔθηκε, ἄλγε' ἔδωκε, κῦδος ἔδωκε, κῦδος ὀπάξει, γῆρας ὀπάξει, etc.; beginning the verse, οὐλομένην, ἄζόμενοι, ἐρχόμενον, etc.) Hoekstra dismisses them as "too vague" and, since they can be found in Callimachus, "inherent in the hexameter itself, whether formulaic or non-formulaic, whether oral or written" (p. 12). As for the idea that single words in fixed positions can be formulaic, he cites O'Neill's demonstration that their fixity continues through the Hellenistic hexameter as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole notion (pp. 14-15). But is Hoekstra not overlooking here the simple fact of chronology? The pattern and single word formulas may be in a sense "inherent in the hexameter itself," but the hexameter was oral before it was written. The fact that Hellenistic poets follow the same patterns of word localization as Homer does not show that such localization has nothing to do with the formulaic quality of Homeric hexameter, but simply that the early hexameter set the norms for the later. Of course, calling single words formulaic does present a problem, and we should be careful which single words we choose, since there is a level at which, even for the oral poet, the use of some single words may be too banal or too non-localized to be considered distinctive of oral style or in any way noteworthy. Thus Hoekstra is probably right to criticize the singling out of τὴν μὲν or οὐνεκα as "formulae" (p. 15). But I would agree with Lord against Hoekstra that Ἀτρεΐδης at the beginning of the line is formulaic (*ibid.*), as uncontestably so as is Ἀχιλλεύς at the end of the line. And I cannot imagine anyone denying that the characteristic use of the middle-passive participle (or the patronymic) of the form -οο- to open the verse represents a formulaic single word usage, created originally to serve the needs of an oral improvising style.

Let me re-emphasize that Hoekstra's book, my criticisms notwithstanding, is the most important recent study of the whole problem of formulaic language and formular evolution. The first chapter alone is certain to make a considerable impression on current Homeric controversy, and should provoke a wide range of reactions. I have tried to cover the most important issues in the book, but there are many interesting points that cannot be gone into here. I should mention in passing the persuasive argument, based on good evidence of relatively late replacement of third person plural verb forms with those of the first person singular, that the pre-Homeric epic was more concerned with narrative passages, "Mythenerzählung," and family histories, and less with personal statement and dialogue, than the Homeric poems we know (pp. 51-3); and the

conclusion, from an examination of the formula language describing Mycenaean customs and objects, that there is extremely little direct formula continuity from Mycenaean times into post-migration Ionic (pp. 140-5).⁵

We are grateful to the author for taking the extra pains to write the book in English, and its occasional lapses of idiom offer no serious problems (although the reader should perhaps be forewarned of "reserves" for "reservations" on p. 83, "emission" for "omission" on p. 54, and "departed" for "departed from" on p. 116, which may be a misprint). Misprints seem relatively few for so technical a work, and the only important ones I noticed are: p. 31, for E1 read E; p. 61, n. 4, the missing reference is to *REG*; p. 139, the reference to Page should read *H. H. I.* 286 (not 228).

JOSEPH A. RUSSO.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY. *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*. Volume I (Books I-II). Volume II (Books III-IV). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. xii + 422. \$9.50. Pp. viii + 248. \$7.50. (*Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries*, 3 and 4.)

Shackleton Bailey has produced two volumes of exceptional merit. Students of Cicero and Rome can look forward eagerly to the succeeding volumes which will continue and conclude the corpus of Ciceronian letters to Atticus. And yet while this is unquestionably a most outstanding and welcome contribution, it also leaves a keen disappointment. The paradox is evident. Scholars will rightly applaud what the author has done and, for the same reasons, will lament what he has left undone. A commentary on Cicero's correspondence enters upon an almost limitless storehouse of information, problems, and controversy. Wherever Shackleton Bailey lights he is incisive and stimulating; but the gaps are large and many are inexplicable.

First, as to the merits. The translations are easily the best and most lively available in English. Cicero was at ease and largely without pretension when writing to his closest friend and confidant. Shackleton Bailey, with a spirited style of his own, admirably captures the flow, sparkle, and wit of these letters. There are countless nice touches like "he is marvellously hipped" (*est miro quodam modo adfectus*; I, p. 109), "little Miss Curio" (*filiole Curionis*; I, p. 143), or "I have given you a fine writeup" (*valde te venditavi*; I, p. 161).

⁵ In this he agrees with G. S. Kirk, "Objective Dating Criteria in Homer," *Mus. Helv.*, XVII (1960), pp. 198 ff. and *The Songs of Homer*, pp. 113-25. For a different view see Page, *op. cit.*, chapter IV, "Mycenaean Relics in the Iliad," *passim*.

A lengthy introduction on Atticus and Cicero is perhaps the highlight of the two volumes. Nowhere is there a more lucid and penetrating exposition of the relations between these two men, informed by a thorough control of the vast but elusive evidence contained in the letters. Shackleton Bailey displays deep sensitivity and acumen in his characterization of Atticus. That cultivated gentleman of many gifts and interests had a special talent for winning the affection and respect of men with every variety of background and politics. He would have smiled upon and approved Shackleton Bailey's capsule analysis in I, pp. 56-8. It is not blind to his faults, but most perceptive on his qualities.

A second introductory piece, "*Fata Epistularum*," is equally sane and lucid. But the conclusion remains dubious. There is no definitive way to determine the date of publication for Cicero's correspondence. Nor has any one clearly defined at what point an ancient text can be said to have been "published." Shackleton Bailey's conclusion borders curiously on the self-contradictory. He accepts the arguments of R. S. Stewart (*T. A. P. A.*, 1962) that "the collection existed in the form in which we now have it" by the time Asconius was writing, ca. 55 A.D. (I, p. 68). Yet he opts for a date of publication "about half-way through Nero's reign" (I, p. 73). Seneca is a *terminus ante quem* (*Ep.*, 97, 5), but Asconius' silence hardly counts as evidence if it is admitted that the collection existed in his day. Wherein lies the difference between the "collection" and "publication"?

The third section of the introduction, on the manuscripts, is comprehensive and useful. Four brief appendices concern themselves with some detailed and disputed points.

The commentary itself forms the largest single part of Shackleton Bailey's enterprise. Naturally it warrants more extensive treatment than space will here allow. The prospective reader will anticipate with enthusiasm what Shackleton Bailey chooses to include, but must be cautioned as to what he chooses to omit. Each will decide for himself whether the inclusions outweigh the omissions. With voluminous material at his disposal, the commentator on Cicero must be ruthlessly selective. Shackleton Bailey has pursued primarily two lines of inquiry, syntactical and textual on the one hand, prosopographical on the other. With the former he is at his best. Few are superior to him in command of Ciceronian Latin. There are many new readings, sound and provocative emendations, excellent grammatical notes. Textual critics will render final judgments on these matters (if one can imagine arrival at a consensus).

The prosopographical notes are in quite a different category. Shackleton Bailey has been conscientious. With few exceptions, all the names mentioned in the correspondence are duly recorded and identified in the commentary. But the prosopography is unimaginative and colorless. The author obviously has a keen interest in these personages, but the results give the appearance of mechanical drudgery. Offices and careers can identify an individual in only the most superficial sense. For example, from Shackleton Bailey's brief sketch (I, p. 310) one would get little impression of the mercurial C. Scribonius Curio, trib. 50, flighty and unstable, but obviously of

great attractiveness, appeal, and ability. Similarly for Q. Hortensius; a dry entry in the commentary (I, pp. 302-3) does not suggest the pomposity and pretentiousness of that aristocrat whose ornate, florid oratory was matched only by the conspicuous luxury of his estates. M. Terentius Varro is duly given his tribunate, praetorship, and vigintivirate; even his military service under Pompey (I, p. 392). Few would imagine from this that he was the extraordinary polymath with encyclopedic knowledge and omnivorous scholarly interests. His services for Pompey were in more important areas than the military; Varro produced a handbook on senatorial procedure for the bewildered consul of 70 who was seeing the inside of the Curia for the first time. The subtle and clever financier, L. Cornelius Balbus, a protégé and adviser of dynasts, hardly emerges from the bare catalogue of his career (I, p. 358). Nor does T. Annius Milo (II, p. 175), the roughneck who employed high office to flex his muscles and indulge his brutality.

One might argue, perhaps, that notes with limited space cannot afford characterizations in depth. But there is an even more important failing in Shackleton Bailey's approach. The aim of prosopography is not accuracy alone but the development of a framework from which to formulate historical judgments. The author's prosopography here seems almost to be done for its own sake. There are countless important historical problems arising out of material in Cicero's correspondence as all classical scholars are abundantly aware. Yet this commentary, with no prior warning in preface or introduction, chooses to ignore most of them. Some of the key questions of late Republican history are not even touched upon. The issue of land settlement and the political maneuvers over agricultural rewards for returning veterans, mentioned frequently by Cicero (e. g. I, pp. 174, 180, 196, 204, 236), receive little treatment. There is a brief note on the *ager Campanus* and a reference to the Rullan law (I, p. 381); one would have expected some discussion of the relationship between the Caesarian and the Rullan legislation. Pompey is a central figure for Cicero and for Rome in the late 60's and 50's. Yet his motives and actions do not receive much analysis in the commentary. What were the implications of Pompey's silence on Cicero's "Nones" (I, p. 140)? What were the political repercussions of his divorce of Mucia (I, p. 132)? His relations with Cicero shifted frequently (cf. I, pp. 140, 158, 176, 182), and the shifts are generally symptomatic of the political climate. One looks in vain in the commentary for an examination of this matter. The letters contained in these two volumes coincide roughly with the period of the "first triumvirate," and provide much of our contemporary evidence for it. Shackleton Bailey rightly points to *Ad Att.*, II, 3 as suggesting that the triumvirate had not yet come into shape by Dec., 60 (I, p. 358). *Ad Att.*, II, 4 (I, p. 208), however, shows that Crassus had been drawn in and the coalition formed by April, 59. It is interesting, though not commented upon, that the triumvirs were still seeking to win Cicero in April (I, p. 210). And where does Clodius fit into this picture? Why did he rouse opposition even from former friends like Curio (I, pp. 224, 226) and his own brother-in-law Metellus Celer (I, p. 194)? The whole issue of Clodius'

relations to the dynasts and the question of how far he was acting on their advice and urging sadly want discussion in this commentary. That Shackleton Bailey accepts the traditional view on this, however, is indicated by his curious remark that if Cicero accepted a *legatio libera* his protection would lie in Clodius' "sense of moral obligation to observe the bargain between Cicero and the dynasts" (I, p. 387). Other central questions on the triumviral pact are ignored. Why the gross unpopularity of the men in 59, attested over and again by Cicero (e.g. I, pp. 248, 250, 254, 256)? Why was Curio lionized (I, p. 244)? What meaning did the coalition have if Crassus had not buried the hatchet with Pompey (I, p. 256)? How real were the fissures and where did they lie (II, p. 20)? Some of the remarks of the commentator are strange and unsubstantiated: "(the triumvirs) had a special grudge against the knights" (I, p. 390); "Crassus was unlikely to take any such action (on Cicero's behalf) independently of Caesar" (I, p. 397). The *obiter dicta* lack documentation and the major questions are not confronted directly.

The struggle over Cicero's recall from exile, the gradual breakdown of law and order, and the disintegration of traditional institutions after the orator's return are amply documented in the correspondence. It is disappointing to find no analysis of these developments in the notes. How does one explain the election of tribunes favorable to Cicero in 58 (II, p. 28)? What were the attitudes of Caesar and Pompey and how may they be accounted for (II, p. 40)? How important was the rabid welcome which the returning exile received (II, p. 64)? There are no comments on the political contest revolving around the restoration of Cicero's house (II, pp. 70, 72) and the violence in which it issued (II, p. 76); nor on Cicero's maneuvers *vis-à-vis* Pompey and the optimates (cf. II, pp. 66, 90). The failure to mention Clodius' corn law in relation to the grain shortage of 57 (II, p. 167) is difficult to understand. Stranger still is Shackleton Bailey's silence on Cicero's tortuous situation after Luca (cf. II, pp. 120, 122, 126, 128), on the growing anarchy in electoral processes and legal institutions (cf. II, pp. 120, 130, 132), and the increasing talk about dictatorship (cf. II, pp. 66, 130, 132).

Politics, obviously, get short shrift. Other matters contained in or referred to by the letters barely receive any mention at all in the notes. At several points Cicero refers to life in Italian municipalities or the attitudes of Roman citizens dwelling in the towns (e.g. I, pp. 212, 230, 232, 234). These seem to have aroused little interest for Shackleton Bailey. Allusions to events abroad, the Gallic problems, provincial matters, Caesar's campaigns in Gaul and Britain, all these are also passed by, presumably without regret, by the commentator (cf. I, pp. 132, 178, 188; II, pp. 112, 130). Items on what we may call private life or social history are similarly ignored or rapidly skimmed over (cf. II, pp. 84, 86, 90, 98, 118).

The nature of a commentary perhaps renders much of this inevitable. Since selectivity is unavoidable, it is a commentator's prerogative to dwell on and expound matters of interest to him and to touch only lightly on others. But it is one thing to avoid lengthy exposition and another blithely to ignore problems and questions growing directly out of the letters and calling for at least some

remark. Surely something could have been said about the Eumolpidai (I, p. 114), or about Laelius and Furius (I, p. 252), or even Servilius Ahala (I, p. 252). It is difficult to justify the lack of even the briefest identification in these instances. Legal and constitutional matters receive a little more attention, but often only enough to invite confusion, as on Clodius' two bills regarding Cicero in 58 (II, pp. 140-1; 152). The legal questions of Cicero's recall gain no elucidation in the pages of the commentary. The failings of Sestius' bill (II, p. 46) are not considered; nor is any explanation offered for Cicero's objections to the tribunician measure in late 58 (II, pp. 50, 52, 54). These issues are hardly self-explanatory. Similarly, for the pontiffs' decision on Cicero's house; why should it have lent itself to two contradictory interpretations (II, p. 70)? The complicated electoral pact between consuls and candidates in 54 (II, pp. 122, 124) is no less complicated in Shackleton Bailey's commentary (II, pp. 213-16). Several other questions receive no answers or are not even asked. Was Cicero really indifferent to the death of Diodotus, his old teacher and friend (I, p. 254)? Who were Cicero's enemies in Athens (II, p. 10)? What was the law which Visellius drafted for Fadius (II, p. 54)? Did Hortensius urge Cicero's voluntary exile merely out of envy and spite (II, pp. 16, 18)? Why did Atticus in 58 help the consuls-designate to get their provincial *ornatio* in advance and risk alienating the tribunes (II, p. 56)? Was Pompey really urging the measure of Messius from behind the scenes (II, p. 66)? Why should Clodius be using the house of P. Sulla, a former client of Cicero's, as a base of operations (II, p. 78)? Why did Metellus Nepos, apparently reconciled with Cicero, filibuster in the senate on Clodius' behalf (II, p. 78)? What about the question of Caesar's Gallie command in 55 (II, p. 92)?

Nor are all the instances where Shackleton Bailey does comment on historical matters above reproach. Sallust does not say that Catiline's candidature in 66 was refused because of an impending prosecution (I, p. 291). There is no persuasive evidence that Cicero is referring to Crassus as a perpetrator of the Rullan bill (I, p. 309). It seems strange to suggest that Cicero was deliberately playing down the importance of his own testimony at Clodius' trial (I, p. 314). He would hardly have any reason for doing so to Atticus and the remainder of that letter proves just the reverse (I, pp. 150, 152). Cicero's declining of Caesar's offers in 59 is surely not in the same category as Domitius' threat to supersede Caesar in 56 (II, p. 189). Calvus was not Cato's prosecutor in 54 (II, p. 208; see Gruen, *H. S. C. P.*, 1966).

A commentary cannot answer every question. The many gaps and voids could be forgiven if Shackleton Bailey had provided bibliographical references to guide the curious reader toward further information. There is as yet no comprehensive bibliography, and, to judge from the notes in these first two volumes, prospects do not appear bright. Citations of modern works outside of Ciceronian editors and Pauly-Wissowa are far too few and often out-dated. It will be useful to fill in a few gaps. On the candidature of Catiline in 66 (I, p. 291), cf. Mello, *P. P.*, 1963 and Sumner, *Phoenix*, 1965. Mention might have been made of H. Hill, *The*

Roman Middle Class on the *tribuni aerarii* (I, p. 315). Cicero's testimony at Clodius' trial (I, p. 320) has now been treated by Baldson, *Historia*, 1966. Several modern references on Clodius' activity in 59 and 58 are collected by Gruen, *Phoenix*, 1966. For the *leges Aelia et Fufia* (I, p. 324; II, p. 177), see Weinstock, *J. R. S.*, 1937; Baldson, *ibid.*, 1957; Taylor, *ibid.*, 1962; Sumner, *A. J. P.*, 1963; Astin, *Latomus*, 1964. On Bibulus (I, p. 329), cf. Collins, *C. J.*, 1955. On the candidature of Favonius in 60 (I, p. 350), see now Taylor, *Studies Ullman*, 1964. Groh, *Studi Bonfante*, III (1930), treats Clodius' *transitio ad plebem* in some detail. The formation of the first triumvirate (I, p. 358) is discussed by Bersanetti, *Riv. Indo-Greco-Ital. di Filol.*, 1927; Sanders, *Mem. Amer. Acad. Rome*, 1932; and Garzetti, *Athenaeum*, 1944. Sanford, *T. A. P. A.*, 1939, and Badian, *Philologus*, 1959, have fuller accounts of the career of Gabinius (I, p. 361). The commentary gives a good bibliography on the Vettius affair (I, p. 399), but missed Carcopino, *Scritti Nogara*, 1937, and Rossi, *Annali Triestini*, 1951; and see now Seager, *Latomus*, 1965. The appendix on Caesar's legislation in 59 (I, pp. 406-8) fails to mention Marsh, *C. J.*, 1927, and Gelzer, *Hermes*, 1928; since its publication one might note also Linderski, *Historia*, 1965. What is often known as the "1st Catilinarian Conspiracy" Shackleton Bailey refers to interestingly, but without elucidation, as the "Pisonian conspiracy" (II, p. 140). Much has been written on it; nothing is cited in the note; see De Benedetti, *Historia*, 1929; Jones, *C. J.*, 1939; Frisch, *Class. et Med.*, 1947; Brunt, *C. R.*, 1957; Stevens, *Latomus*, 1963; and Seager, *Historia*, 1964. On "Clodius" as a plebeian form of the name (II, p. 154), cf. Allen, *C. J.*, 1937. The whole question of *interdictio* and the loss of citizenship (II, p. 160) has recently been treated again by Crifò, *Ricerche sull' exilium nel periodo repubblicano*, and Kunkel, *Abh. Bay. Akad. Wiss. Münch.*, 1962. For the *lex Licinia de sodaliciis* (II, p. 211), see Kroll, *Rh. Mus.*, 1937; Linderski, *P. P.*, 1961; *Hermes*, 1961; and Taylor, *Athenaeum*, 1964. The trials of Gabinius in 54 (II, p. 219) are extensively treated by Ciaceri, *Processi politici e relazioni internazionale*.

It is clear that much is missing in this work. On these grounds it cannot rank with the excellent and full commentaries of Gomme on Thucydides, Walbank on Polybius, or Ogilvie on Livy. But those scholars did not produce new texts or translations together with their commentaries. Shackleton Bailey assumed a much more formidable task and those parts of it which he chose to discharge are discharged admirably and impressively. Criticism of his volumes is criticism not of errors, for they are few, but of omissions. The excellence of his achievement only increases the regret that he limited his objectives.

ERICH S. GRUEN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
BERKELEY.

ROGER A. PACK. *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt*. Second Revised and Enlarged Edition. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1965. Pp. x + 165. \$8.50.

It would certainly be quite pretentious for me to introduce Professor Pack's inventory of the Greek and Latin literary papyri to the world of philologists. For almost from the time of its first publication fifteen years ago, it unquestionably earned a distinguished position among the books indispensable for the classical scholar of today. It has become a norm to use Pack's inventory number in any reference to a literary papyrus, indeed often to use it for brevity's sake as the sole reference. Many a study of texts involving papyri has started with this book—as I can testify from experience. The great value and resulting popularity of Pack's book are largely due to its pragmatically defined scope, its convenient arrangement which permits the easy and assured location of a given text, as well as the wealth and accuracy of its information. With his second edition Pack brings his inventory up to date by incorporating the new material published in the thirteen-year period that has elapsed since the first edition and by re-distributing the entries whose authorship has been established or changed.

In scope and outlay the second edition differs but little from the first (cf. Introduction). The type of texts inventoried remains the same, namely, literary texts in the broadest sense of the term (excluding only private letters, documents, magical texts, and horoscopes) written on papyrus, parchment, potsherds (ostraca), and even some graffiti "of historical importance." Most of them come from Egypt; but despite its title the inventory includes also similar texts found elsewhere, e. g. in Palestine and Mesopotamia, with the notable exception of the Herculanean papyri. All Biblical and Christian texts are excluded from the main inventory, but a concession has been made to the demands of the critics of the first edition with a listing of the major patristic fragments in an Appendix.

The system of classification—one of the most important and distinct features of the work—naturally remains unchanged, but the author has modified and improved his system of reference to and description of the listed texts partly as the result of relevant suggestions from his critics. Thus he adds, whenever possible, information as to the present location of the papyri; lists photographic reproductions other than those given by the editors; and omits the now-obsolete references to the older catalogues (e. g. those of Oldfather, Reggers, and Giabbani). Citations occurring in individual papyri now precede the bibliographical notes within each entry. One small but commendable improvement is the use of the upper case for the names of the authors of identified texts—an improvement which indeed not only helps the eye in locating them easily and quickly but also permits a rapid estimate of the extent to which a given author is represented in the papyrological findings.

The inventory is preceded by a Bibliography with abbreviations of the major works and a Key to the Locations of the Papyri. It is followed by an Appendix of the major patristic fragments; the inevitable Supplement, listing items and/or references collected too late to be included in the main inventory; a most valuable Conspectus

of Texts Identified or Reattributed after their first edition—another new feature, I may mention; and finally a Concordance of the numbers of the first edition with those of the second or of "Pack" with "Pack 2," as the author proposes.

The book is lithoprinted from a typescript meticulously neat and free of typographical errors.¹ This process has its limitations, but limitations which are indeed more than offset by the low price at which the book sells. In comparison with the first edition the letters are smaller and the spaces larger—an arrangement which lends considerable improvement to the appearance of the book.

There is certainly little wanting in Pack's book, but nonetheless a few general remarks in this direction can be made. For instance, I feel that there should be included some type of acknowledgment—or even list—of the reviews of the first edition, and, one may add, of the excellent and up-to-date lists of newly-discovered material, bibliographies, and other pertinent information published regularly in the periodicals of papyrology. Moreover, a clear distinction among the terms *glossary*, *lexicon*, *onomasticon*, *scholia*, *commentary*, *vocabulary*, and *paraphrase* is desperately needed, especially for the papyri listed as "Homeric," where similar texts are indiscriminately indicated as lexica, glossaries, paraphrases, or "scholia minora." It is true that Pack usually borrows these titles from the editors of the respective papyri, who as a rule make little or no effort to distinguish among the various categories. However, the establishment of and adherence to a rigorous terminology are essential virtues of the bibliographer. I propose that the term *lexicon* be used for alphabetically-arranged dictionaries (e.g. nos. 1216, 1217). *Glossary* should indicate dictionaries restricted to one author or even to one work in which the glosses explained or otherwise dealt with are listed in the order in which they occur in the text (e.g. nos. 1163, 1179, 1191); while the distinct type of glossaries in which text and explanation run opposite one another in two parallel columns (e.g. nos. 1158, 1162, 2922, 2946) could be termed *paraphrases*. For continuous translations of a text (e.g. no. 1176), the term *translation* is sufficient. The term *scholia* should be reserved for marginal notes (cf. no. 186), while papyri containing exclusively scholia should be termed *commentaries*. *Onomasticon* would be appropriate for lists of words without explanation (cf. nos. 2129, 2137). Finally, the above term *glossary* could also be used in the rare case of miscellaneous glosses without any apparent arrangement (e.g. no. 2131).

I am not at all certain that still-unpublished papyri (e.g. nos. 258, 445, 1177, 1222, 1264, 1828) should be included in the main inventory; but since this method has been adopted, some eye-catching distinction (e.g. an asterisk at the end of the inventory number) ought to be made and their index given at the end. Moreover, although the general need for indexes is reduced, thanks to the system of classification, I feel that there is still much wanting in this direction.² To the indexes already suggested by others, I would add one more: an index to all fragments found outside Egypt.

¹ I found but one error "wnile" for "while" on p. 1.

² Pack has recently published "A Concordance to Literary Papyri: Basic Publications and Pack [2]," *Bull. Amer. Soc. Papyrologists*, III (1966), pp. 95-118, where he also lists a few *corrigenda*.

Finally, I would also wholeheartedly repeat a wish already expressed by F. R. Walton (*C. J.*, XLIX [1953-54], p. 335) that some indication of the size of the papyri be given. It is sufficient, in my opinion, to indicate the number of leaves or fragments preserved for the more extensive papyri or of columns and lines if only one fragment exists. This is a vital element for a quick appraisal by the uninitiated of the extent of our discoveries.

In a work of such scope as well as complexity inherent to papyrology, it is inevitable that some errors and omissions occur. It is to Pack's credit that no serious errors or omissions have been noticed and that the number of minor ones is remarkably small. I shall point out a few which I happened to have personally discovered. Calderini's article, "Commenti 'minori' al testo di Omero" (*Aegyptus*, II [1921], pp. 303-26), deserves in my opinion a place in the general Bibliography as much as Ludwig's *P. C.* Snell's latest edition of Bacchylides (1961) is not listed nor is his last edition of Pindar (i.e., the 1955 edition, since presumably the 1964 edition appeared too late to be included). Had Pack consulted these, he would have saved himself at least one error by eliminating no. 1384 (Pindar), which is identical with no. 185 (Bacchylides). Note also that Snell (following Lobel) attributes nos. 184 and 185 not only to the same scribe but also to the same roll. He also includes nos. 180, 181, and 183 in his last Bacchylides edition. Also missing is J. M. Edmonds' *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, vols. I-III B (1957-61), where many fragments from papyri have been re-edited as well as translated. On the other hand, I see no reason why, e.g., the first edition of Ziebarth's book, *Aus der antiken Schule*, should be listed in the Bibliography and referred to *ad loc.*

In the Key to the Locations of the Papyri, attention should be given to the fact that some Florentine papyri (indicated as *P. S. I.*) are now in the Cairo Museum; e.g. no. 2125 (the lexicon of Diogenianus) is *P. Cairo*, no. 49498.

In the inventory proper, the following remarks may be of some significance. A reference to Wilcken (*U. P. Z.*, I, 111-12) for nos. 31, 401, 1319, 1435 would be useful. The *editio princeps* of no. 164 (*P. Berol.*, 163) was made by F. Blass (*Hermes*, XV [1880], pp. 366-82). The text was identified and re-edited by Th. Bergk (*Rhein. Mus.*, XXXVI [1881], pp. 87-115). There is one more edition of this papyrus before the one mentioned in Pack, namely, that of H. Landwehr (*De papyro Berolinensi No. 163* [Berlin, 1883]). Most of the papyri of Hesiod's preserved works have been studied (no. 499 also re-edited) by N. Livadaras (*Ἱστορία τῆς παραδόσεως τοῦ κειμένου τοῦ Ἡσιόδου* [Athens, 1963]).² First mention of no. 1111 was made by F. Blass (*Zeitschr. Aeg. Spr.*, XIX [1881], p. 23); *editio princeps* by H. Landwehr (*Philologus*, XLIV [1885], pp. 585-91). In no. 1217 discard citation to Homer, *Il.*, XX, 357 (cf. my article, mentioned in the Supplement). A question mark belongs to the citation from *Od.*, XII, 330, not to that of *Il.*, XXI, 259. The attribution of no. 1216 to Apion has been rejected by K. Latte (*Hesychii Alex. Lexicon* [Hauniae, 1953], p. ix, n. 1). Add to the references A. Ludwig (*Philologus*, LXXIV [1917], pp. 205-47 and

² Cf. also *Athena*, LXVI (1962), pp. 425-7.

LXXV [1918], pp. 95-127), who also re-edited the papyrus. No. 1852 was first published by L. Stern (*Zeitschr. Aeg. Spr.*, XIX [1881], pp. 70-7 and Taf. V). For Pack 2121, K. Latte (*Hesych.*, p. xlii) has suggested Didymus or Theon as the possible author. Personally I would prefer Theon (cf. my article in *Χάρης Κωνστ. Βουρβέρη* [Athens, 1964], pp. 327-35). The new fragments are in Edmonds, *op. cit.*, except for that of Alexis. To the bibliography W. Crönert, *Lit. Zentralbl.*, LXXIII (1922), p. 424 should be added. J. A. W., 216.8 could be omitted, since it is merely a summary of Jacoby's article. In 2120 mention ought to be made of the fact that two more of the lexicographer's references are wrong: to Herodotus, Book II (instead of I, 32, as cited in Pack) and to Aristotle, *De natura animalium* (instead of *Hist. anim.*, as in Pack). Again in 2127 there is one such faulty reference, namely, to Aristotle's *De part. anim.*, Book VIII (instead of *Hist. anim.*, as in Pack). Pack omits the reference to Perigenes detected by Crönert (*Lit. Zentralbl.*, LXXIII [1922], p. 425) and accepted by Schmidt. Reference to Crönert is here essential. Under the heading Glossaries cross reference ought to be made to the Greek paraphrases of Latin texts such as 2922, 2923 (Cicero, *In Catilinam*), 2936, 2939, 2940, 2946, 2948, 2950, 2951 (Virgil, *Aeneid*), as is made to the Homeric paraphrases on the one hand and to the (marginal) glosses of the papyrus of Gaius (2953) on the other. In the section Mathematics and Metrology, a cross reference to 354 (metrological tables and problems by Dioscorus) should be added. No. 2943 consists not of 140 leaves but only of 8, which are part of the 140-page palimpsest MS. I might also mention that I have found no traces of the papyri of the University of Athens published by M. G. Tsoukalas (*Ἀνέκδοτοι φιλολογικοί καὶ ἰδιωτικοὶ πάπυροι* [Athens, 1962]—prescriptions and moral precepts on papyri dating from the third century B. C.); nor was I able to locate the small fragment (from a tragedy?) published by F. Blass (*Zeitschr. Aeg. Spr.*, XIX [1881], pp. 23-4).

By virtue of analogy to nos. 17 and 62 of the Appendix, the fragment of a "canon" attributed to St. Andrew of Crete by its editor (cf. P. Sanz, *Jahrbuch der oesterreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft*, IV [1955], pp. 1-11) ought to be listed among the other patristic fragments. This hymn is actually the work of John the Monk, i. e. presumably St. John of Damascus (cf. my article in *T. A. P. A.*, XCIII [1962], pp. 247-52).

Finally, in the Conspectus of Texts Identified or Reattributed, two more items ought to be included: no. 130 (*P. Lit. Lond.*, 54) and no. 164 (*P. Berol.*, 163; cf. above).

The above remarks should by no means serve to de-emphasize the importance of Pack's book nor to minimize the magnitude and the success of the task he undertook. I firmly believe that the new inventory will be—as the former also was—of great value for the scholars whose studies are in some degree connected with literary papyri. And one would only wish that Professor Pack keeps the world of classicists informed of the latest developments in this field with frequent supplements to his last inventory.

MARK NAOUMIDES.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

IIRO KAJANTO. *The Latin Cognomina*. Helsinki, Keskuskirjapaino, 1965. Pp. 418. FM 20.90. (*Societas Scientiarum Fennica. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, XXXVI, 2.)

It is a pleasure to welcome the new work of an author whose earlier studies have dealt with the Greek epitaphs of Rome and with the personal names found in the early Christian inscriptions of Rome and Carthage. The author says (p. 11): "It is my purpose in the present work to publish all Latin cognomina in so far as I have been able to find them, and to elucidate the principles of Latin cognomen-formation." The most important part of the book are the lists of names (pp. 137-366), where the reader will find 5783 different cognomina (author's count, p. 27; twenty-five additional cognomina are listed on p. 418). The prior part of the book consists of four chapters: the first (pp. 11-30) deals mainly, in a somewhat elementary but sensible way, with the textual criticism of inscriptions and with the Latin cognomen in general; the second chapter (pp. 31-99) discusses the various categories into which the author has divided the cognomina, and deals largely with the historical development and the statistics of these categories; the third chapter (pp. 100-30) is devoted to the suffixes whereby cognomina are formed; and the brief fourth chapter (pp. 131-5) sets forth certain conclusions about the chronological and social distribution of cognomina in general. The end of the book consists of a bibliography (pp. 367-72) and various indexes (pp. 373-417). The author is most modest about his achievement, and reminds the reader of human frailty (p. 12): we affirm that he is accurate, that his collections are comprehensive, and that his conclusions commend themselves by their caution. His book will prove the foundation of future work, and we shall mention details only to point out certain problems, and to help those who will consult the book.

The collection of material is the book's chief contribution. The author deals with "Latin" cognomina, i. e. those formed from Latin word-stems; most of these cognomina are found only in inscriptions. Kajanto has excerpted the *C. I. L.* carefully; one could add e. g. *Guttur* (*C. I. L.*, XII, 3206), a name which means the same as *gutturusus*, "suffering from goitre." Kajanto has, of course, utilised also the various supplements to the *C. I. L.* He cites the supplements only for inscriptions which have not been received into *C. I. L.* Yet these supplements also serve to correct *C. I. L.* For example, on p. 304 Kajanto cites *C. I. L.*, XII, 4152 for *Mater[n]illa*, listed as a derivative of *Maternus*, but *I. L. G. Narb.*, 532 states that the reading *Materilla* is certain. Kajanto states modestly (p. 12) that he has largely depended upon the indexes of publications; he does not state that he has often studied an inscription in detail, and that he has read through certain epigraphic collections which do not have an index (e. g. the two volumes of *I. L. Alg.*), with the same accuracy and completeness. By ignoring a single rather large collection of inscriptions, Kajanto has missed four cognomina: *Λουκιδία* (*Spoimenik of the Serbian Academy of Sciences*, XCVIII [1941/48], p. 32, no. 78 and p. 66, no. 138), *Politianus* (*ibid.*, p. 253, no. 494), *Ιουστικος* (*ibid.*, p. 202, no. 402), and *Marininus* (*ibid.*, p. 85, no.

180). Of Greek inscriptions, Kajanto seems to have utilised only those collected in *I. G.*, XIV and in *I. G. R.* This procedure may have caused the neglect of but few cognomina not known otherwise, but it certainly vitiates the analysis of frequencies. To take a rare cognomen: Kajanto cites only a single instance (*C. I. L.*, X, 6309) for the name *Treballa*; it is useful to know that a certain *Καικιλία Τρεβούλλα* has eternised herself thrice on Memnon's Colossus (A. Bernand-E. Bernand, *Les inscriptions grecques et latines du Colosse de Memnon* [Paris, 1960], nos. 92-4). The same reservation applies to Kajanto's use of papyri, which, if I remember rightly, are cited only once, namely for the singular *Αλακερ* (p. 259). As for cognomina found in literature, Kajanto states (p. 12) that he has excerpted names occurring in poetry only if they are likely to refer to actual persons, and that he has often omitted sporadic examples occurring in literary documents. Luckily, he does list names which occur only in literature. Thus he cites *Advolans* (p. 357) and *Iuuatus* (p. 352) from Martial, and *Armillatus* (p. 346) from Juvenal; but, having three "historical" instances of the name *Gillo* (p. 344), he does not cite its occurrence in Juvenal, 1, 40. Kajanto does not utilise author's names consistently. He cannot fully establish the name *Firmicus* from epigraphical evidence (p. 258), but does not refer to the name of the amateur in astrology and convert to Christianity. He gives *Florens* as "another cognomen of Tertullian" (p. 233), but under *Firmianus* (p. 258) does not state that it was a name borne by Lactantius. At the end of the last century, we may remember, a controversy raged over Lactantius' birthplace. Local patriots and antiquaries had him born in Picene Firmum; Kajanto lists *Firmanus* as the ethnic of Firmum (p. 187), and *Firmianus* as a derivative of *Firmus*, a view which S. Brandt had proved in 1890.

Kajanto, following certain of his predecessors, gives very fully the Republican evidence; he states (on the basis of *R.-E.* and of Broughton's lists) which families used the cognomen concerned, and in which years bearers of the cognomen are attested. For the Imperial period, Kajanto gives merely the number of senators bearing the cognomen (after *P. I. R.*), and separately the number of its occurrences among freeborn men, among freeborn women, among servile and libertine men, among servile and libertine women, and among Christians; except that, when a cognomen occurs just a few times, Kajanto refers to the individual instances. I cannot guess how many cognomina still await listing, but feel that they are relatively few, and I agree with the author (p. 12) that they will not invalidate his conclusions. In many cases the reading is doubtful; in other cases the omitted name can be explained as barbarian; but it is disconcerting to be told (p. 244): "*Bassus* and derivatives have been excluded, because the word is not Latin."

The disposition of the material is generally appropriate. Kajanto recognises the difficulty of establishing categories (pp. 71, 81, 82); he has classified the cognomina by meaning. Inevitably "meaning" will now and then conflict with derivation; for example, *Augustalis* is listed under "priests" (p. 318), *Augustus* and the other names derived from it under "emperor" (p. 316). Some names are am-

biguous; thus *Fides* appears both as an "abstract" (p. 254) and as a "musical instrument" (p. 343). Occasionally variant orthography causes ambiguity: *Mesor* can stand for *Mensor* as well as for *Messor* (p. 361). Orthography can mislead more grievously: Kajanto derives *Catullus* and its congeners from *Cato* and lists them under "intellect, prudent" (p. 250), whereas he lists *Catulus* and its derivatives under "fauna" (p. 326), a distinction for which the orthographic variation is, I think, insufficient evidence. Another example of arbitrary classification is *Niuentius*, which is made to refer to human complexion (p. 228), whereas all the other names derived from *nix* are grouped (on p. 339) as "cognomina obtained from inanimate nature." A good example of overlapping categories are the names derived from the stem *silua*: some appear under the "dedicatory" theophoric cognomina (pp. 213-14), another as a "metonymical" cognomen (p. 216), and still others under the heading "woodlander" (p. 310). Another overlapping can be discerned between the generic names of the geographical cognomina (pp. 208-9), by which Kajanto means derivations from names (or parts of names) attached to more than one place, e. g. *Castrensis*, and the cognomina relating to geographical origin (pp. 308-12), e. g. *Montanus*. I suspect that the overlapping is due to the fact that we draw distinctions that the ancients did not make. Every classification has its disadvantages. On the whole I feel that the classification adopted by Kajanto, the classification according to meaning, is the most useful. Chapter 15, which is entitled "Formal Groups" and lists cognomina which are participles and nomina agentis and a few others (pp. 349-66), breaks the classification adopted for the other lists, and does so quite needlessly; for most of the names concerned would readily find a place elsewhere.

Naturally, everything turns on the interpretation of the individual cognomina. As for the function of the names, one must admit that Kajanto never defines a "cognomen." Indeed, such a definition is not necessary for the period of the tria nomina with which most of his book deals, but it is necessary when one deals with the Republican period. Consequently, the section which discusses the cognomina derived from praenomina (pp. 39-43; lists on pp. 172-9) suffers from what one may call obscurity. Also the author does not notice the use of gentilicia as cognomina (e. g. *Valerius*). As for the meaning of the individual cognomina, much could here be said. I give only a few examples which need no fuller demonstration. Sometimes the meaning should be taken more precisely; for example, Kajanto lists *Dentatus* under the heading "tooth, having teeth" and *Oculatus* under "having eyes" (p. 224), whereas the names mean "showing big teeth" and "having large eyes." *Bubulcus* appears under "tenders of animals" (p. 323), but the original meaning, at least, is "ox-drover" (βούρης) in the sense of *arator*. As ever, orthography misleads. *Abitus* (p. 349) cannot be from *abire*, which is intransitive and for which *Aditus*, if from the transitive *adire* and not from *addere*, and the similar *Conuenta* from *conuenire* are no parallels, while *Obitus* (p. 353) is ambiguous and *Reditus* (p. 355) stands, I believe, for *Redditus*. One must interpret suffixes strictly, whenever possible. *Antiatinus*, called the adjective of

Antium (p. 181), is in fact the adjective derived from the ethnic and personal name *Antias*; *Italicianus* and *Italicilla* are derived from *Italicus* rather than from the town *Italica* (p. 180). Kajanto utilises a theory of "haplogy" by which he is willing to derive "shortened" forms from longer forms, so that e.g. "haplogy" would appear in *Frontacianus*, *Frontasia*, *Frontillus*, *Frontinus*, and *Frontius*, while there would be none in *Frontonianus*, *Frontonilla*, and *Frontonius* (p. 236; other examples on pp. 123, 248, 250, 263, 268, 307, 329, 341, 347, 355, 418). Modern philology assumes simple and extended stems, and nobody should nowadays call (to mention an analogical case) εὐσχήμωσ a "shortened" form of εὐσχημόνως. Occasionally Kajanto is too ready to disregard the original and concrete meaning of words; thus he thinks that *Celsus* can refer also to a trait of character (p. 230; *I. L. G. Narb.*, 301 proves exactly the opposite). At times an explanation is far-fetched. For example, p. 74 states that *Decimanus* is an "obvious geographical cognomen" referring to the Colonia Narbonensis; this view is unlikely because, unlike the official names of Arelate and Arausio, the name of Narbo did not contain the legionary numeral of the veteran colonists (the *decumani Narbonenses* of, e.g., *C. I. L.*, XIII, 4344 do not prove the point), and because, of the thirteen occurrences of the name (p. 202), none appears in Narbo itself. Kajanto's assumptions of metonymical names need careful revision; here I shall merely point out three simple errors. Kajanto implies (p. 188) that the *Aemilii Bucae* were called after the Samnite city Buca; in fact they were so called because people considered them "puff-cheeks" (*buccae*). *Spartarius* and *Rosarius* are not metonymical names (p. 336), but mean, respectively, "dealer in esparto grass" and "dealer in roses." Let me add that most names are of course explained (or classified) correctly, and that the text gives many useful observations, though it cannot do justice to the wealth of material, and does not resume the results of previous investigations. The bibliography omits certain important works (e.g. A. Zimmermann's article on personal names ending in -o, published in the *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie*, 1904); it should have mentioned V. De-Vit, *Totius latinitatis onomasticon* (Prati, 1859-1887), whose four published volumes cover the letters A-O. Since relevant articles are difficult to find in *L'année philologique*, some classicists may be glad to learn that every issue of the *Bibliographie linguistique* has a full section on "Onomastique."

As for Kajanto's statistics, his counts of frequency appear trustworthy, as do the tables which record the distribution of each class of cognomina among the five groups of Republicans, senators, free-born, servile, and Christians (each group being separated again by sex); I have noticed wrong arithmetic only on p. 69 and in table 21 on p. 95. Kajanto interprets his statistics reasonably, largely by comparing the frequency of a particular class of cognomina in a particular group with the general frequency of cognomina in the group. Kajanto often indicates which volumes of *C. I. L.* contain frequent instances of a particular name; these indications are useful since the volumes largely coincide with natural groupings, but statistics based upon *C. I. L.*, III (of which there are two examples

on p. 247) are meaningless. I must, however, take exception to Kajanto's statistics of cognomina derived from gentilicia, of which he lists 1176 (on pp. 139-71; author's count, p. 31): it is not only possible, but likely, that some 250 of these cognomina are derived, not from gentilicia, but from other cognomina; Kajanto recognises the possibility in almost every individual case, but his statistics disregard the alternatives. Kajanto states the rule (p. 83; cf. p. 90): "The lower the frequency of a cognomen, the more likely is the appropriate use"; by the latter term he means that the name was intended to carry its inherent meaning. I should say that in such a case some meaning rather than none was intended, but not necessarily the correct one. This is of importance in the interpretation of "occupational" names (e.g. *Faber*, *Coronarius*), which are an old problem. The study of statistics also helps us to interpret Christian names. For example, the names *Agnus* and *Columba* do not occur more frequently among Christians than previously, which argues against a Christian symbolism of these names (pp. 87-8). The names *Ciuita*, *Corona*, and *Coronius* are used by Christians only in Africa (p. 346), which throws a peculiar sidelight on Tertullian's *de corona militis*.

Our age prefers the inductive method of investigation, which requires the collection, ordering, and interpretation of individual data. Kajanto has collected most cognomina and has classified most of them correctly. For the interpretation of the names much remains to be done; we still have to examine the chronology of all individual cognomina in the way in which L. R. Dean, *A Study of the Cognomina of Soldiers in the Roman Legions* (Princeton, 1916), has dealt successfully with a limited group. However, in the investigation of personal names, easily the most numerous type of evidence which the Romans have bequeathed us, Kajanto has already done more than his share.

HANS PETERSEN.

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE.

Euripides, *Orestes*, erklärt von WERNER BIEHL. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1965. Pp. xiv + 218. (*Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft, 46.*)

In the main body of his commentary (which is supplemented by a metrical analysis of lyrical passages, a table of deviations from Murray's 1939 Oxford text, and an index of Greek words and concepts here treated) Biehl provides much material normally expected in such a work: grammatical and linguistic notes, discussions of *Realien*, and such inevitable tidbits as the anecdote about Hegelochos, who "saw a weasel." More important, he succeeds, as a scholar of Euripidean drama must, in integrating the three interdependent types of study, *Textkritik*, *Strukturforschung* (with special emphasis on the interplay of content and stage effects), and *Interpretation*. The result is highly satisfactory.

The textual problems were treated earlier and at greater length in Biehl's dissertation, *Textprobleme in Euripides' Orestes, Interpolationen u. a.* (Göttingen, 1955). Although the earlier conclusions are often restated along with important evidence, the absence of discussion sometimes leaves bad lacunas in the commentary, as on lines 907-13. A few particulars: in line 159 Biehl could make a stronger case for *χάριν*, not *χαράν*. Not only is *χαράν* unsuitable, but *χάρις*, recurring throughout the play (104, 186, 239, 244, 453, 829), is closely related to the *Philia* theme; in 159 and 186 there is 'grace in sleep,' but later there is none in humans. Line 530: Biehl makes a good defense of Herrmann's δ' οὖν. Line 556: his reading, *μᾶλλον γ' ἀμῦναι*, is a considerable improvement over Verrall's *μᾶλλον με φῦναι*, which Murray accepted. Line 823: Biehl reads τὸ δ' αὖ with the MSS generally, but I am still attracted by Bothe's τὸ δ' εὖ *κακουργεῖν* ("to do bad deeds with good intent were a complex irreverence"—just what the play demonstrates). Line 946: Biehl's arguments for the singular *πετρούμενος* seem inadequate. On interpolations Biehl's judgment is usually convincing; yet we may wish to retain lines 626 and 663. In the former case, even if we agree with Page, *Actors' Interpolations*, p. 104, that the repetition 536-7 = 625-6 is suspect—although it is fully in Tyndareus' character to make his meaning crystal clear on both occasions—we may still prefer to reject 536 and not, as Biehl thinks, 626. Not that Biehl goes overboard where interpolations are concerned: he makes a fine case for retaining line 695, among others. Note also that he differs with Murray in assigning lines 1284-5 to Electra, not the chorus, and with good reason.

Biehl's comments on structural devices and techniques are always helpful, especially in his introductions to the different scenes. He takes special note of Euripides' preparation techniques, the relation between scenes, and the build-up to the *mechanema* and the final resolution. Thus he shows how the Electra-Helen scene anticipates the Orestes-Menelaus one; how metaphors of "fire" and "siege" appear early but take on physical reality later (notice Vergil's great debt to Euripides in the use of this technique); how gradually but effectively the *soteria* motif emerges in the second part. Biehl is also attentive to dramatic changes within a scene, as when Orestes becomes gradually aware that Menelaus will not help him (cf. at line 411) or reacts in an increasingly disturbed manner to Tyndareus (544 ff.; I would add that the repetition of *ὄρᾳς* in lines 588 and 591 shows his growing desperation in the face of Tyndareus' silence).

Just as Biehl's comments on textual and structural problems show critical acumen, his interpretations are solidly rooted in scholarship. His grammatical distinctions are helpful, as in line 45, between *ἀπὸ* and *ὑπὸ ζύγου*, and especially his discussions of various particles (see for example the remarks on *ἀρ'* in 163, *καὶ νῦν* in 294, *μὲν οὖν* in 691). He often catches nuances of tone, especially sarcasm (cf. on lines 419 and 571, although he misses a splendid instance in 949, where the assembly or *ἐκκλητοί* are decidedly not the 'chosen people'). He is alert to alliteration, hyperbaton, and enjambement,

but presumably chose to leave most sound effects to the teacher to comment on. I found his discussion of how the Phrygian mishandles Greek especially illuminating. He comments on some significant metaphors, like *δχῆσω* in 802 and *ἀνταναλώσω* in 1165, but could do more with others, like *ἀμιλλᾶται* in 456 (to which compare 38). His sometimes cryptic citation of important leitmotifs, usually in quotation marks, borders a little on the comic (we might be scanning the margins of a Wagnerian libretto), but is nonetheless very useful; the most interesting of these leitmotifs are "Entlastung," comprising a whole tangle of ethical and metaphysical questions about human responsibility, guilt, and judgment, "Freundschaft," "Parergon" (a category useful to the study of Thucydides' history; cf. at lines 562, 610, and especially 1369 ff.), and "Galene."

Biehl's broader interpretations, scattered throughout the commentary, are decisive and interesting. He unhesitatingly condemns Helen in her scene with Electra of unfeelingness, and he pinpoints Menelaus' progressive wavering, his gradual abandonment of any thought of helping Orestes (see especially Biehl's remarks on 488 and 711-15). He also follows the change in Orestes' attitude as Orestes becomes more and more certain that his mother's fault outweighed his own, and indeed, that he is hardly guilty at all (see 595, and compare the way in which Electra plays down the guilt of the house in 988-91). All this falls under "Entlastung." Biehl also notes, as signs of Orestes' changing disposition, the emphasis on "calculation" in his second approach to Menelaus (cf. the difference between Hecuba's first and second supplications in *Hecuba*) and his violent oscillations of mood, from abject humility towards Menelaus to exaggerated self-esteem in the scene with the Phrygian. Brief, but very much to the point, are Biehl's scattered references to Thucydides (cf. at lines 296, 659, 695, 819). These show considerable insight into the Thucydidean nature of this play, both in its presentation of *Machtpolitik* and, more important, of the thoroughly irrational nature of human deeds governed by blind fear or hope. Desperation breeds wild and meaningless action, which becomes self-generating as the play nears its end. Given such a situation, the parallel drawn by Biehl between the Phrygian's escape and that of Helen (at 1377) seemed particularly suggestive. Both are out of the realm of the serious. Or are they?

A few points of disagreement. Lines 202-3: this is more than a case of asyndeton; Euripides is pursuing a favorite motif, of "death-in-life." Line 245: Biehl misses the implicit irony in *τὸ πιστὸν τόδε λόγον*—Electra's hopes have no chance of realization. Line 268: Biehl's discussion of the bow seems insufficient; it may be "Ersatz-handlung" (another leitmotif), but there are other and perhaps better possibilities; see Nathan Greenberg's excellent discussion in *H. S. C. P.*, LXVI, pp. 164-7. In line 287 the contrast lies, I think, not within Apollo's command, between the murder and its consequences, but rather between Apollo's promise of help and his failure to follow it up with action (cf. Biehl's remarks on 426, where Apollo's hesitation resembles that of Menelaus). Line 596: I translate, not "What could I do (but refer blame to the god?)" but rather, "How could I have acted otherwise?" Line 632: Menelaus'

pacing around may be a metaphor, but it is also, and more simply, a visible dramatization of his state of mind. Lines 807-43: Biehl should have added that ἀπερά is 'inverted' as well as ἄλβος (and especially in this play; see, however, Biehl's remarks on 810 and 824). Line 1108: whether Helen is 'all ready to seal up' (Biehl's translation), or 'all sealed away,' or (taking the verb as middle, as Liddell and Scott do) busy sealing away (or conceivably, unsealing!) various things in the house, Pylades sarcastically plays on the sexual metaphor of 'sealing' in the following line: Helen is no virgin, but a bride of death. This sarcasm is very effective, considering Helen's past. Line 1272: the word ἐχθροῖσιν is not, I suggest, used by Electra of Orestes and Pylades as the 'countryman' would see them; rather, they themselves are the 'sword-bearing beasts' (cf. lines 1459, 1555), and the enemies must be theirs.

Three very important points of interpretation are broached by Biehl but deserve more extensive discussion, even in a commentary that remains modestly brief. First, the religious aspect of the play, and especially Apollo's ambiguous absence, needs further treatment, or our interpretation will be lop-sided. Second, Biehl could have done more with the irony of repeated action, as the murder of Clytemnestra is reenacted, but without any possible divine sanction, in the attempted murder of her sister, Helen (see the excellent and, I think, fully satisfactory interpretation of the play by Greenberg in his *H. S. C. P.* article, cited above. Biehl does show, at 1441, that the killing of Helen falls into the sequence of evil deeds committed by Pelops' house). Third, Biehl misses several opportunities to draw connections between the actual insanity of Orestes and the other insanity, not so much of the polis (Biehl connects the variable behavior of the populace at 700 with the phases of Orestes' sickness), as of the conspirators. The situation is extraordinarily similar to that of the Harmodius-Aristogeiton story as Thucydides analyzes it in VI, 54-9; for a brilliant discussion of this episode, and one most relevant to *Orestes*, see the recent (1966) volume on Thucydides by Hans-Peter Stahl in the *Zetemata* series. As Biehl says, at 824: what the chorus—and we—see as paranoia appears as "salvation" when seen from the viewpoint of *Philia*. Euripides' play is about individuals; it is, no less for that, about Athenian history and the plague of war.

Biehl's commentary remains a valuable possession. It is straightforward, unpretentious, and a considerable help to the student or teacher reading *Orestes*. Hard work went into it; so did the kind of sophistication in handling problems of myth, psychology, and intellectual history that we have come to associate with the names of (*inter alios*) Pohlenz, Lesky, and Diller. Let us hope that the attention of scholars will now be drawn further to *Orestes* and to other late plays of Euripides (not so much *Bacchae*, which has had its share and more; but the main thing is to get away from *Alcestis*, *Medea*, and *Hippolytus*).

Out of the waves I see—a fine scholar ship.

KENNETH J. RECKFORD.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

REINHARD HERBIG. *Götter und Dämonen der Etrusker*. Herausgegeben und bearbeitet von ERIKA SIMON. Mainz, Philipp von Zabern, 1965. Pp. vii + 51; 10 text figs.; frontispiece; end-piece; 50 pls. DM. 29.80.

This uncommonly attractive book is a new edition of Herbig's publication of 1948. The text has been left almost unaltered but all but a few of the pieces in the original illustrations reappear in handsome new photographs, and fourteen new plates have been added. The notes on the plates are largely the work of Dr. Simon; they are full, scholarly, and lively, with many ingenious conjectures. I particularly like her identification of the winged figure on the Ficoroni Cista as the seer Mopsus rather than one of the Boreads (fig. 5 on p. 15, notes on p. 36).

The text itself is Herbig's view of the gods and supernatural beings of the Etruscans. He was not trying to provide a catalogue of all the Etruscan divinities whose names we know nor an illustration of all those whose shapes we know, but using the available archaeological material to illuminate the nature of the Etruscan pantheon and pandemonium.

His first point is that the names of a great many Etruscan gods are Etruscanized Latin or Greek names: Apulu, Aritimi, Menerva, Maris. And many of the gods who have purely Etruscan names can be recognized in art by their Greek attributes. Thus Tinia with his eagle and thunderbolt is evidently the equivalent of Zeus. And Turan, whose name seems to have the same root as the pre-Greek word *tyrannos*, "lord," is identified by her attributes and associates on mirrors with Aphrodite.

These identifications are not so very ancient, however. Though Herbig does think that "Turan" should properly be translated "The Mistress," and though he sees this great goddess in a number of early sixth century figures, the stone statue from the Polledrara tomb at Vulci (pl. 14, 2; 15) and the stone busts of women from Chiusi (pl. 14, 1), as well as the later bronze winged lady from Perugia (pl. 16, 1) and the winged goddess in a cult scene on a late sixth century mirror from Palestrina (pl. 1), he does not point out that we could not possibly recognize the Greek Aprodite in any of these forms. The first "Aphrodite-Turan" he illustrates is the lady of an amber group in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, representing Aphrodite and Adonis (pl. 19). If the earlier stone figures really represent divinities rather than the dead or mourning women, they are almost the only images of gods from Etruria before the third quarter of the sixth century. A late seventh century bronze winged lady from Cortona, a decorative figure broken from some vessel, is the only exception I can think of. This may well be Turan but her sickle wings and plaid skirt make her look uncommonly like Artemis Orthia.

With this exception, the earliest figures of recognizable divinities date from the third quarter of the sixth century and later. Herbig illustrates two late archaic votive bronze figures of Minerva in the likeness of Athena Promachos (pl. 17); he might have added contemporary bronze figures of Hercules, Mercury, Jupiter, and Juno

Sospita. The latest of these figures still belongs to the early fifth century. It is a curious fact that until the Hellenistic period, among votive bronzes as opposed to decorative figures such as the beautiful Dionysus from the Ficoroni Cista (pl. 20, 1), recognizable images of divinities are common in Etruria proper only for about fifty years. Before that, all bronze ex-votos represented worshippers, three subjects reappearing in many different styles: the warrior, the civilian, the lady.

Because this had been so in Etruria in the archaic period, I am inclined to think that the votive bronzes of the classical period also represent worshippers, not gods. The figure on pl. 16, 2, which Herbig identifies tentatively as Turan, may represent an Etruscan lady praying; there are many bronzes of this general type from the classical period. And the curious "Mars of Todi" (pl. 13) may be a dedicant in armor.

However, all classical votive figures do not represent mortals; I do admit that there are two fine votive figures of Hercules from the classical period (Giglioli, pl. 260, 1 and 3), and that the handsome ephebe dedicated to Aritimi (pl. 22) must be a divinity because he is nude while the so-called "Strozzi Jupiter" in Florence (Giglioli, pl. 220, 6) must indeed represent Jupiter, to judge from the drapery of his cloak.

But we know the Hellenized Etruscan gods best from mythological scenes on mirrors and wall paintings of the classical period, and how far these scenes represent divinities actually worshipped in Etruria is sometimes not easy to tell.

Herbig points out that the mythological scenes on mirrors are of more than one kind; some are purely Greek, some have Greek protagonists in unfamiliar groupings, the most interesting have Greek and Etruscan elements together. As an example of the last, two mirrors show the birth of Athena (Menerva) from the head of Zeus (Tinia); in both cases, Tinia is assisted by two birth goddesses, Thanr and Ethausca on a mirror from Palestrina in the British Museum (pl. 3), Thanr and Thalna on a mirror from Arezzo (Giglioli, pl. 298, 3). Thalna turns up on other mirrors (for example, pl. 6); Thanr(a) also appears on the Magliano plaque and in two other inscriptions (M. Pallottino, *Testimonia Linguae Etruscae* [Florence, 1954], nos. 359, 621, 733) which suggests strongly that she was a divinity with a cult, rather than a mere attendant figure in mythological scenes.

Except for three names, the "Dämonen" of the second part of the book are all merely such attendant figures. Even Aita and Phersiphnae (Hades and Persephone, see pl. 37) are not known to have been worshipped in Etruria. Charun (pls. 36, 39), Tuchulcha (pl. 41), Vanth (pl. 38), and the other nameless demons of the underworld must have been creatures of Etruscan belief, just as the gorgon must once have been in Greece, but were never subjects of worship.

Culsu, however, whose name is written on a sarcophagus from Chiusi in Palermo beside the figure of a Fury with a lighted torch striding through an arched doorway (Giglioli, pl. 412, 2) is mentioned with the divinities Catha and Hermu (Hermes) on the Pulena

scroll (pl. 30, 2; *C. I. E.*, 5430); Geryon, who appears as a three-headed warrior standing in front of Aita and Phersiphnai in the Tomba del Orco (pl. 37), is said to have had an oracle near Padua (Suetonius, *Tib.*, 14, 14, cf. J. Bayet, *Hercle* [Paris, 1926], p. 98 and n. 3); and to judge by a late archaic votive bronze of a three-headed warrior in Lyons, he must have been worshipped in Etruria as early as the sixth century B. C., as he was in Cyprus. Incidentally, he is the only underworld divinity in Etruria whose existence is verified before the fourth century (see F. de Ruyt, *Charun, Demon etrusque de la Mort* [Brussels, 1934], pp. 180 f.).

The most important Etruscan attendant being, the Lasa, whose name appears eleven times on Etruscan mirrors and once on a gold ring (R. Enking, *R. M.*, LVII [1942], pp. 1-15), was also no mere attendant, for her name appears on the liver of Piacenza as well. Incidentally, the Lasas,—they are a plurality of divinities,—are another group who do not appear in Etruria till the fourth century B. C. Herbig's account of these winged companions of Turan and of young lovers is most persuasive. Generally nude or lightly clad, adorned with jewels and pretty slippers, carrying the toilet articles necessary to a lady's happiness, they play a part not unlike that of the Greek Erotes; they are also associated with several other major divinities, Tinia, Maris, and Menerva, as well as Turan. Sometimes they appear as protectresses of great families; the Lasa, indeed, seems to be a goddess in her own right, protecting the life of man, and continuing her protection even in the grave (pl. 45, 2), a sort of Lar Familiaris perhaps; the words are closely related.

At least once the Lasa appears as the announcer of destiny (fig. 10 on p. 29); and apparently she was identified at last with the Roman Fortuna Primigenia, as the Volsinian Nortia was. Herbig assumes that other winged figures on certain mirrors are Lasas, though they are differently named: the foreboding Zirna on a mirror showing Turan and Atuni (Aphrodite and Adonis, fig. 9, p. 26), the Fate Athrpa (Atropos) between the doomed lovers Aphrodite-Adonis and Atalanta-Meleager (pl. 7). If this Athrpa is a Lasa, the Lasa is not only an announcer, but a dealer of destiny.

On the single occasion that she appears as the announcer of destiny (fig. 10), the Lasa seems to be usurping one of the duties of the Vanth. It is this winged lady of the Underworld who turns up with a scroll in the cortège of Hades and Persephone as they go out to meet a new subject, on three Etruscan Red-Figure vases (J. D. Beazley, *Etruscan Vase Painting* [Oxford, 1947], 169, 1; 170, 4-5; de Ruyt, 159 f.); presumably the severely beautiful winged lady who sits at the feet of a young man as he reclines on his sarcophagus, from Chiusi, is also a Vanth, and she also carries a scroll (pl. 28, 1). Perhaps Vanths and Lasas are more interchangeable than we think. Herbig calls the reclining winged lady on the lid of a sarcophagus from Vulci (pl. 45, 2) a Lasa, but perhaps she is a Vanth? Does one's Lasa in this world become one's Vanth in the next?

Scrolls or tablets are often carried by underworld demons (fig. 8, p. 24, pl. 44, 2). Herbig says of these that they contain the record of the acts of the dead man in this world, and are used to determine his destiny in the next, but naturally enough it is not virtuous or

wicked acts that such scrolls as we can read record but the name, family, rank and offices of the dead man (cf. fig. 8 and pl. 30, 2).

It is not possible for the people of one age and civilization to understand the religious beliefs and myths of another given only the names of some gods and supernatural beings and the forms these were given in the art of certain periods. But Herbig does persuade us that, while the great gods of the Etruscan pantheon were not so strange as their names suggest, the supernatural beings that surround them and the Etruscan universe were quite unlike anything imagined either in Greece or at Rome.

EMELINE RICHARDSON.

DURHAM, N. C.

EINO MIKKOLA. Die Abstraktion im Lateinischen. Eine semantisch-morphologische Untersuchung auf begriffsanalytischer und literaturgeschichtlicher Grundlage. Erster Teil: Die hypostatische Abstraktivität im vorklassischen Gebrauchslatein. Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1964. Pp. 231. (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Ser. B, 133.)

By means of abstraction man organizes and, according to nominalist doctrine, to a great extent creates his world. If, then, a large part of his world lacks objective reality and finds its embodiment in language, the study of abstract words is important to the philosopher as well as to the philologist. In the book under review and its sequel Eino Mikkola, a nominalist, presents a study of abstraction in the non-literary documents of Latin (*Gebrauchssprache*).

The book has the subtlety and complexity that the subject demands. The nice discrimination and patient toil that have been devoted to this study are remarkable.

All of these qualities are foreshadowed in the frontispiece, a circle of numerous sectors which represents the entire field of abstraction, verbal and non-verbal. One half of the circumference is labeled *Struktureles*, the other half *Intensionales Abstrahieren*. The latter has two main classes, *Rationalia* and *Irrationalia*. (Under *Irrationalia* are such classes as *Divinalia*, *Sakralia*, the Thing in Itself, the Ideas.) *Struktureles Abstrahieren* likewise has two main classes, *Klassifikativa* and *Hypostativa*.

After sketching the philosophical background of his subject, defining his principal terms, and discussing various ways of attacking his problem, Mikkola presents a semantic study of abstraction in pre-classical, non-literary Latin. He is chiefly concerned with the *Hypostativa*, for this class comprises the words of the highest degree of abstraction, the *Abstrakta*, and those of the next highest, the *Abstraktiva*. The *Abstrakta* have three classes, of which only the first two consist of words which are *always* abstract: (1) Pure *Abstrakta*, such as *audacia*; (2) *Konversa*, which consist of paradigmatic forms of conjugations¹ (gerunds, supines, and infinitives);

¹ Pp. 163-4. The author says, declensions or conjugations; but this is a slip. Cases are not relevant to the abstractness of words.

(3) Konversiva, namely, substantival participles and adjectives, used abstractly (*dictum, bonum*). The Abstraktiva, in turn, have four classes.

The author groups his documents under five heads: sacral, legal, grammatical, oratorical, and inscriptional. (Among the inscriptions he includes only those which do not fall under any of the other heads. These, he finds, offer little occasion for the use of highly abstract words.) He gives the percentages of the Hypostativa and usually also of the Abstrakta to the total number of words in the individual documents and in the writings of each type as a whole. He usually reports also on the *Abstrakta-Frequenz*, the percentage of *different* Abstrakta in a total number of words. Throughout the book the standard deviations are noted.

Mikkola finds that the percentage of Hypostativa varies but little among the types of documents, exclusive of the inscriptions. He establishes 10.8 as the percentage in the total of the documents with this exception (p. 22, Tab. 1). There is much greater variation in the percentages of the Abstrakta. These are 7.8% in the oratorical and 4.4% in the legal documents (p. 26, Fig. 1a). As the author points out, the frequent use of highly abstract words enables an orator to lift the minds of his hearers into exalted realms and gives him an opportunity, if he so desires, to use lofty language without examining its validity or giving his listeners time to reflect. In legal writings, on the other hand, words must have clear, concrete meanings (pp. 26-7).

With his semantic analysis of abstract words Mikkola presents an equally careful and detailed analysis of their forms (pp. 163-71) and then considers his two sets of results in their relations to each other (pp. 171-2). He finds that of the 1155 semantic Abstrakta all but 315 belong to the morphological class *Sprachliche Abstrakta*, words derived from nouns or verbs by means of suffixes (*-ia, -es, -tas*, etc.).

One of the correspondences between semantic and morphological classes is baffling. The Resultativa,² a sub-class of the Abstraktiva, are for the most part in the morphological class Konversiva, while the semantic class Konversiva is a sub-class of the Abstrakta. A source of the difficulty is the lack of a demarcation between the Resultativa and the semantic Konversiva. On p. 164 *votum* and *dictum* are classed as semantic Konversiva; on p. 195 as Resultativa. Should not all abstract nouns which were originally past participles be classed exclusively with the Konversiva, which already include all adjectives used substantivally and abstractly? Then the Resultativa would become a small class consisting of nouns like *dos* and *stipendium*, which would be distributed as at present among various morphological classes.

In an appendix the author presents an outline of abstraction, verbal and non-verbal, and twenty-eight ingeniously constructed tables. The first of these shows how each of the six main morphological classes of the Hypostativa is distributed among the semantic classes and among the five types of writings. In the other tables every indi-

² Resultativa are words which designate the results of actions (*votum, dos*).

vidual Hypostativum is listed alphabetically in its morphological class, with an indication of its semantic class and of its frequency in each of the types of writings. If the word designates a quality, if it is derived from a verb, or if it is derived from a noun, this too is indicated. (It must be due to a misprint that on p. 194 *vectigal* is followed by *E*, the mark of an abstract word designating a quality [*Eigenschaft*].)

Part II of this work will, it is hoped, answer the question whether through the centuries there is a trend, in the types of writings studied, toward either an increase or a decrease in the percentage of abstract words.

The book contains a great deal beside the study of abstraction: sketches of the historical settings of the documents with mention of opposing views; rewarding morphological studies; interesting linguistic references to works of literature and especially to Plautus; and much beside.

Of Mikkola's many observations on words, a few shall be cited. He connects the change in gender of *finis* from masculine to feminine with a change from a concrete to an increasingly abstract meaning (pp. 41-2). The long *a* of *frustra*, he thinks, may be due to the analogy of *extra* and *supra* (p. 96). He gives accounts of the various meanings of *res* (pp. 71-2), *familia* (pp. 87, n. 2; 110, n. 4; 112, n. 2), *auctoritas* (pp. 94-5), and other words. He supplements Walde-Hofmann in some fifteen instances. For example, he finds *actio* used as a legal term in the Lex Acilia (Walde. "*Seit Rhet. Her.*" p. 101, n. 1); *sententia* as a technical juristic term in the S. C. de Bacchanalibus (Walde: "*Seit Cic.*" p. 126, n. 1). *Vindemia* occurs in the Lex Agraria (Walde: "*Seit Colum. und Plin.*" p. 116, n. 10). *Luctus* is used by Cato (Walde: "*Seit Cic.*" p. 148, n. 2).

The author's etymologies are carefully worked out. He thinks that *necessus* (*necessum*, *necesse*) was derived from the verb *cedo* and that, like *fas* and *nefas*, it is a substantive (pp. 126-8). He favors Walde's view that the root of *lis* is **stel*—and that this word is related to *locus* (pp. 99; 100, n. 1). Following Fliuck-Linkomies, he derives *vindeus* from **vino-dic-s*, "he who shows the vine-branch" (by holding it in his hand). He argues convincingly that *vinum* may well at one time have meant "vine-branch" as well as "wine" (pp. 74-6).

Mikkola includes in his study a number of documents in the Italic dialects. He uses the Tabulae Iguvinae to supplement the scanty remains of early sacral Latin (pp. 48-59). Buck's interpretation of *castrous* in the Tabula Bantina as *caput* is opposed on the ground that, according to Vetter, the competence of the people's court at Bantia did not extend to capital cases. Mikkola favors Walde's view that the word is equivalent to *castrum* (p. 146, n. 1).

The author offers some generalizations concerning Roman law. He thinks that the part played in legal processes by formal words and actions is a relic of magical practices, preserved because of Roman conservatism (pp. 88-9). He admires the Romans for their ability to legislate with abstract justice and then to apply their laws in the courts in ways which usually led to equitable decisions (pp. 100-1). He states that logical exactness in the use of abstract words may be one of the reasons for the brilliance of Roman jurisprudence

(p. 107). However, he contradicts himself when he says, still in the context of Roman law, that the Romans were not good at abstract thinking (p. 70).

The book closes with six concise indexes and a bibliography. The index of words contains entries from thirty-six languages, linguistic stages, and dialects (Italic).

There are occasional minor misprints and a few that are troublesome. On p. 80, line 3, read *Verkäufer* in place of *Käufer*. The order and the numbering of the notes on p. 83 are incorrect. On p. 92 the date of Lucius Papirius is incorrectly given. On p. 157 the reference to note 1 should be at the end of the first paragraph.

The full importance of this book cannot be judged until the conclusions of the complete work have been used in further studies. One would like to know how literary Latin compares with non-literary Latin, and how Latin compares with other languages in the use of abstract words. Mikkola has laid a sound foundation for such comparisons and has made a significant contribution to philology.

ALICE F. BRAUNLICH.

GOUCHER COLLEGE.

Apicius. *L'art culinaire: De Re Coquinaria*. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par JACQUES ANDRÉ. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1965. Pp. 317. Fr. 30. (*Études et Commentaires*, LVIII.)

Since André has announced the establishment of text, translation, and commentary to Apicius, he deserves to be assessed separately for each, for this author is so mutilated, so esoteric, and so post-classical that one might make a major contribution by succeeding in only one of his objectives.

Many have tried to describe and interpret the 477 recipes which comprise this cookbook, but the author of *Lexique des termes de botanique en latin* has brought to his task a unique knowledge of foodstuffs and their utilization in the ancient world. After the text and translation of each recipe, André has given a summary of the older commentaries and of related evidence in Latin and in Greek, to which he adds his own scientific knowledge in drawing new conclusions about the meaning of difficult passages. It is unfortunate that he has not known the unpublished commentaries left by Dr. M. B. Wilson in the archives of the New York Academy of Medicine, for she was a physician and dietitian who had gathered from the ancient writers at least as many pertinent references and at times excelled him in the fullness of her commentary, but her naiveté about the history of the text destroyed the validity of her work. André has, however, known and paid special attention to the unpublished because incomplete edition of Brandt in the archives of *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* at Munich, to which he here supplies the first sufficient commentary. In his careful consideration of the meanings of Apicius and the possibilities of emendation according to sense, Brandt was the most important editor of the cookbook since Humel-

berg in the 16th century, and André's detailed evaluation of his text is in itself an important contribution to Apician studies.

In offering a new translation of Apicius, André must be compared with the best of all previous translators, Flower and Rosenbaum in English, and the earlier French Guégan. As he points out in his introduction, the work of Guégan, although good, was based upon the unreliable Schuch text, and must therefore now be considered outmoded. Comparison with Flower and Rosenbaum is more difficult, for André does not approach his work with anything like their mastery of the technical difficulties of *textkritik* and its implications for translation, but he is equally well informed about gastronomy in the ancient world and its practical applications as tested in the modern kitchen. No translations of comparable importance exist for other languages.

It is in establishment of a text that André shows weakness and indifference to method. The corpus of Roman cookery attributed to a generic Apicius is comprised of two documents, Ten Books, which in the Italian Renaissance acquired the title *De Re Coquinaria*, and the brief *Apici Excerpta a Vinidario Viro Industri*, related and similar but having a very different MS tradition. André has kept the two separate in his new edition, but he does not display much knowledge about the MSS of either. The Excerpts are usually dated as late 5th or early 6th century from the historic Goth Vinidarius and are preserved in a single ancient MS (Paris 10318), from the 7th or 8th centuries, and its solitary copy, Leiden Burm. Q 13, which André has not noted. The Ten Books, however, have a total of eighteen extant MSS from which André has selected in a rather disturbing way. The only witnesses for establishment of a text are two 9th century codices, E (New York Academy of Medicine 1, formerly Cheltenham 275) and V (Vat. Urb. lat. 1146); from one or both of these comes every known exemplar. It is notable that André does not record the fact that the Cheltenham MS was sold in the 1920's and is now in New York.

In his preface André accepts the definitive study of Vollmer about the primacy of E and V, but he then proceeds to select six from the sixteen extant humanistic copies for listing in his sigla, and from these to choose three for complete collation in his *apparatus criticus*. Although my detailed study of the stemma and *fortuna* of Apicius was not available to him, the earlier work of Giarratano, Vollmer, and Campana would not have led him to the three MSS each of which he has chosen "parce qu'il . . . m'a été fort utile pour combler certaines lacunes." His selection for his sigla of less than half of the extant humanistic copies leaves the reader unaware of the existence of several codices of more importance for emendation than any he has selected, such as L, B, and D. To raise the worthless T, C, and P to equal status with E and V has damaged the value of what would otherwise have been an important edition of the text.

I must add, however, that André perhaps records in his text more correct readings than any previous editor. The definitive edition of Apicius to date remains the Giarratano and Vollmer 1922 Teubner, which was based upon Vollmer's study of the primacy of E and V and which preserves a perfect collation of E and V in its *apparatus*

criticus to the exclusion of all humanistic copies except for occasional emendations. André has obviously not approached the technical excellence of their work, but he has intended something else equally important. Giarratano and Vollmer were reactionary even for their own day in normalizing all forms and orthographies in the late Latin Ten Books to fit classical standards. André, influenced by Brandt, Svennung, and perhaps even some of my own studies of Apician syntax, has attempted to render a text of late Latin, a far more difficult task and one which he has done quite well. In his introduction he thanks the eminent Prof. Ernout for advice, and I think that one can see the guidance of such a scholar in some of his late Latinisms, which are sounder than some of those in the unpublished edition of Brandt. He is not entirely consistent in his restoration of MS forms, but this is a minor weakness. In his editing of the Excerpts, which are later and in a less classical orthography, I feel that he has presented too vulgar a version of the text, but this is in part a matter of editorial taste. In sum, I would say that while its method and *apparatus criticus* are suspect, this is in other ways a very useful and scholarly edition.

I must also mention the addenda which André has included. He has separately indexed and glossed men and places mentioned in Apicius, weights and measures, plants, utensils, and foods; and in his index to plants he has supplied all identifiable botanical names. This is in itself a unique and valuable contribution to Apician studies, for no other indices exist except my own earlier grammatical analyses and the projected index to my forthcoming Teubner edition, which will be devoted to parallel evidence for late Latin forms. André has also included a collection, not available elsewhere, of twenty-seven *testimonia* about Apicius from later classical authors, both Latin and Greek. Although it is improbable that either the Ten Books or the Excerpts were compiled by an historic Apicius, these *testimonia* have their own interest and uses.

In his presentation of a new numbering system for Apicius' recipes, André has eliminated the earlier system of Schuch, upon which his is modelled, but he has retained the system of Giarratano and Vollmer as well, the latter being the most commonly-used system of reference in standard lexica and reference books. There remain, however, some occasions upon which the Schuch system would have been advantageous, and I at least, in my forthcoming study of stemma and *fortuna*, shall change my numbering of certain recipes to the system of André instead of Schuch.

Although André has not established a text upon acceptable methodology, he has prepared an exhaustive and scholarly study of the meanings of Apicius as they can be adduced from ancient gastronomy and modern scientific knowledge, and he has used his great learning to present the best commentary yet produced, the best translation into French, which is comparable with the best in English, and a version of the text which offers important emendations from meaning and restorations of late Latin forms. His book will, in spite of its very real weaknesses, undoubtedly take its place among the most important works upon Apicius to appear in this century.

MARY ELLA MILHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK.

ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, S.J. *Platon, Oeuvres complètes, XIV: Lexique de la langue philosophique et religieuse de Platon. 1^{re} Partie: A-Λ; 2^e Partie: M-Ω.* Paris, Société d'Éditions "Les Belles Lettres," 1964. Pp. xv + 316; 317-577. (*Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.*)

These volumes have been composed as a selective lexicon to Plato's usage, not one intended to replace "entièrement" (p. v) Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*: "ont été retenus les mots d'une plus grande portée philosophique ou religieuse, et, pour ces mots, à l'intérieur des principaux sens, les cas les plus significatifs" (p. v). The two volumes are clearly and handsomely set. Entries are unusually well-spaced and clearly subdivided, with useful cross-references to synonyms, antonyms, and related terms. For each word, examples are (as a rule) listed in the chronological order of the dialogues, and by page sequence within each dialogue. Main variants are noted, and Des Places has even entered some of his own collations for the *Timaeus* and *Ep. VII*. These volumes thus effectively incorporate extensive research and a deep knowledge of Plato. For all their merits, however, they also suffer from a fundamental weakness: it is that Des Places does not spell out in any more detail than that just quoted above the criteria that guide his selection of entries. Since the lexicon is designedly incomplete, this leaves far too much scope for unclarity and disagreement as to its omissions. It is unfortunate that the principles behind the selections—the assumptions as to what counts as "philosophical" and the corresponding choice of "les cas les plus significatifs"—have not been more clearly defined. As the following cases may illustrate, the operative criteria would appear somewhat restrictive.

Under his entry for *δεικνύναι*, Des Places lists some seven "abstract" uses of the term (e.g. *Phr.*, 270E3 *τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει . . . τῆς φύσεως*). He does not cite at all the cases where it strictly denotes concrete physical ostension. He omits Plato's own explanation of the term at *Crat.*, 430E6-7: *τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι*. He omits any reference to *Tim.*, 49E, where the term is forcefully conjoined with the "deictic" pronouns: *δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι*. His selective entry also omits the occurrence of *δεικνύναι* at *Politicus*, 286A2, a context bearing once again on ostensive explanation or definition (cf. *ibid.*, 277C-278E). Because of these and other omissions, the lexicon provides the reader no indication at all concerning one recurrent and significant part in Plato's philosophical analysis of concepts relating to the immediate phenomenal world. Yet there are assuredly issues of considerable "portée philosophique" implicated in these texts; for the question of whether any term can be ostensively defined (i.e., explained sufficiently just by presenting the physical item to someone's senses [*Polit.*, 286A1-4, cf. *Ep. VII*, 343C1-7]) is closely bound up with the ontological question of whether anything is "just what we see" (*ὅπερ ὁρῶμεν*, *Parm.*, 130D3-4, cf. *Tim.*, 51C). Plato himself moves thus from the logical or

semantic question directly to the metaphysical question at *Tim.*, 49-51. Furthermore, Des Places also omits any entries for the demonstrative pronouns οὗτος and ὅδε (cf. *Tim.*, 49D-50B) or for οὗτω (cf. *Tht.*, 183A-B), and considers only uses of ἐκείνος "appliqué au monde des Idées" (but cf. *Crat.*, 439D9, *Tht.*, 157B, 202A). There is no entry for τοιοῦτος, either, and as a result the reader consulting this lexicon will find no guidance to Plato's explicit terminological contrast (at *Tim.*, 49D-50B) between τοῦτο, τόδε, and τοιοῦτον. Yet that contrast is in all probability the source of Aristotle's terminological contrast between particular and universal as τόδε and τοιόνδε (*Met.*, Z, 13, etc.), and the fact that a Platonic passage influenced Aristotle's analyses is assuredly testimony to its "philosophical" importance. Throughout this group of related cases, then, Des Places' selection of significant instances would appear to reflect unstated and unduly restrictive assumptions as to the philosophical elements in Plato's writing.

Soph., 262D yields another example. Plato, in his analysis of λόγος there, contrasts mere naming with asserting that something is the case: οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει. The passage has attracted careful scrutiny in recent studies, but here it is not listed in the entry for ὀνομάζειν, nor under that for περαίνειν. Again, there is no entry for παγίως, though the word occurs in several related and important statements on the impossibility of reaching a determinate, stable conception about any items in flux (*Rep.*, V, 479C4, *Tht.*, 157A4; cf. *Tim.*, 49D2). And there is no entry for ἀναμάρτητος, the distinguishing feature of ἐπιστήμη at *Rep.*, V, 477E6 (cf. *Tht.*, 146A, 200E). Very broadly speaking, the lexicon is weighted toward the religious and moral aspects of Plato's thought, at the cost of his rather more technical epistemological, logical, and semantic concerns. Des Places appears to regard as cases "d'une plus grande portée philosophique" primarily those which are directly concerned with the ontology of Forms or immediately involve serious moral and political issues. These are certainly important topics—in a sense, no doubt, they are the *most* important—but it is arbitrary nonetheless to slight the others. At the least, if the lexicon excludes certain sorts of items on principle, its principles should be well stated and its limits of selectiveness made clear.

The entries under the key terms εἶδος and ἰδέα are extensive, and improve upon Ast's in some respects. They distinguish more fully and clearly the cases where εἶδος refers to the Forms of Plato's metaphysics (sense 6 "Idée") and distinguish (under sense 4) cases in which εἶδος signifies any class or group as opposed to one or more others, from cases like *Meno*, 72C6, where it means a single "character" or "property" (sense 5). However, these entries also raise familiar questions on the evolution of Plato's philosophical terminology. The fifth sense under εἶδος is "caractère (général)," while the sixth is "Idée." Presumably (Des Places does not make this clear) the crux of the distinction is that cases of the former lack metaphysical force or any commitment to the "separate" existence of the Forms. However, *Gorg.*, 503E2, *Meno*, 72C6, *Euthyphro*, 6D11 and *H. M.*, 289D4 are suggested under both senses, avoiding

any clear commitment on these cases. On the other hand, the occurrences of *εἶδος* in *Crat.*, 389-390 are entered freely under sense 6. Des Places is apparently confident that the metaphysical theory is already (fully?) present there. (For careful defense of a contrary view, see now J. V. Luce, "The Theory of Ideas in the *Cratylus*," *Phronesis*, X [1965], pp. 21-36.) Clearly, very difficult problems in the analysis and assessment of texts underlie the very cataloguing of cases for such crucial terms as these. The extent and character of Plato's philosophical commitments are not encapsulated in his terms, but are a function of much larger literary contexts, perhaps even of whole dialogues. The lexicon would be a much more useful research tool if it contained more indications of the controversy at least around such "technical" terms. (Cf. the entries under *μερέχειν* b and *εἶναι* 3.) Further, Des Places' procedure of adopting one- or two-word "definitions" as labels for each of the senses that he distinguishes under these terms does not suffice to convey a usefully clear idea as to how he understands these senses to differ.

The lexicon is particularly strong in the areas of Plato's moral vocabulary and religious terminology. However, I missed an entry for Plato's use of the verb *ἀγαπᾶν* to express an attitude of philosophic resignation, one of contenting oneself with less than the ideal: see *Rep.*, V, 472B-473B, *Tim.*, 29C8 (with Taylor *ad loc.*), *Tim.*, 50B5, *Critias*, 107C-D, and even dialectical contexts like *Thet.*, 164C7-9, 207A3-7. and *Soph.*, 241C7-8. That sense of the term is clearly important for Plato's attitude toward mortal human nature and its limitations. Again, the entry under *τόπος* ought surely to include *Thet.*, 177A5 *ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος* (cf. 176A7-8). Des Places enters *Polit.*, 273D7 under *τόπος*—noting the variant—although elsewhere (pp. 52 and 61) he prefers *πόντος*, for which he here includes no separate entry. (He has argued for *πόντος* in *Polit.*, 273D from the affinity with *Rep.*, X, 611E4-5: see *Arch. de Philos.*, XIX [1956], pp. 120-2.) And there is no entry for Plato's remarkable designation of the Forms as an *ἀνπνος φύσις* at *Tim.*, 52B7, though the phrase is clearly related to familiar Academic speculation on the unceasing noetic activity of the gods.

The difficulties of designing a Plato lexicon are legion. Des Places describes them well on pp. v-vii, and clearly speaks from deep personal experience when he remarks that "Platon se prête moins que tout autre auteur au morcellement" (p. vi). His own achievement at the task is most distinguished, and forms an appropriate conclusion to the invaluable Budé series. Though I do believe one must feel reservations about a lexicon so selective in an area where completeness is all, these volumes will usefully serve generations of Plato studies, "en attendant un *Lexicon Platonium* complet" (p. v).

EDWARD N. LEE.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

MARIO BONARIA. *Romani Mimi*. Rome, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1965.
Pp. 307. Lire 5000. (*Poetarum Latinorum Reliquiae, Aetas Rei Publicae*, VI, 2.)

Aside from Bonaria's own work of 1955 *ad usum academicum*, this is the first edition of the fragments of the Roman mime to appear since the third edition of Ribbeck's *Scaenicae Romanorum poesis fragmenta*, the second volume of which was published in 1898. It is a notable, and expansive, achievement, considering that, in Bonaria's numbering, only 241 remnants survive, many of them consisting of one word. An introduction deals with the history of the mime in the Latin west and with work on the text since 1505 when Petrus Crinitus published at Florence the famous prologue of Laberius along with three other fragments. The fragments themselves follow, divided into three categories, *fragmenta certa*, *fragmenta dubia*, and *fragmenta spuria*, and embellished by detailed source citations and superabundant *apparatus*. These in turn are accompanied by elaborate explanatory notes and a translation into Italian. Two appendices are devoted to *glossae mimicae* and *fasti mimici et pantomimici*. Detailed and careful indices complete the volume.

Bonaria discusses on pages 20-4 of the introduction and then again at appropriate places in the notes his divergences from the edition of Ribbeck. The order is much altered, beginning with Bonaria's fragment 1. There are many orthographical and textual changes, incorporating the advances of the last sixty years, especially in linguistic matters. The famous lines in the *Satyricon* (55, 6), which Trimalchio quotes as if they were the product of Publilius Syrus, assigned to Publilius by Ribbeck in his first edition but bracketed in his third, are here relegated to the *fragmenta spuria* (Bonaria's frs. 223-38). Bonaria reasons (p. 142) that, aside from a few of Virgil, Petronius never cites verses of other authors.

Introduction and notes together are generous and informative. Further discussion of fragments 87 and 176 might be in order. Bonaria usually offers ample documentation on the meaning of the titles of the mimes whence the fragments come. This is not done in the case of *Cretensis*, *Imago*, *Natal*, and *Paupertas* of Laberius.

For detailed treatment of certain topics one must occasionally go elsewhere. For information on Publilius Syrus, for instance, we can now turn to O. Skutsch in *R.-E.*, XXIII, cols. 1920-8. Discussion of the actual ways and means of a mimic performance is limited to a few sentences (the reader could be referred to W. Beare, *The Roman Stage*, ch. 18). On the later history of the mime Bonaria is perhaps over brief. Use could have been made of the well-documented history of the mime during the middle ages in A. Nicoll, *Masks, Mimes and Miracles* (New York, 1931), especially chapter 3, "The Fate of the Mimes in the Dark Ages." It is not strictly accurate to assume from the words of Isidore of Seville (*Etym.*, XVIII, 48-9), as does Bonaria on p. 17, that the mime and acting in general were dead in Spain in the early seventh century. Isidore uses present as well as past tenses in his discussions *de histrionibus* and *de mimis* (see Nicoll, *op. cit.*, p. 146).

Bonaria embraces the usual notion that the reason so few lines of *mimi* survive is that they were only partially written down. Though no documentation is offered for this theory, it is plausible in itself. But the matter of survival is a complicated question, not given to easy answers, especially when many authors, Cornelius Gallus, for example, respected by their contemporaries and of importance historically, have been preserved in an even more shattered form than Laberius and Publilius, the most important Roman mimeographers. Laberius probably died in early 43, yet already within a few years of his death Horace can juxtapose him and Lucilius in one of his more brisk literary characterizations (*Sat.*, I, 10, 5-6). Whatever we may think of the validity of the judgment, the fact remains that Horace probably read Laberius (he might have admired his mimes as *pulchra poemata*, Horace states, had he fulfilled certain stylistic considerations). The same must be said for those others, especially Gellius and Macrobius, who, during subsequent centuries, quote him for reasons beyond mere interest in grammar and lexicography.

Bonaria seems to concur (p. 8) with the opinion of Reich (*Der Mimus*, p. 574) that the prevalence of erotic elements in the fragments of Laberius is due essentially to the fact that the lexicographers singled out esoteric obscenities for mention. Yet the abundant *testimonia* from ancient sources scarcely suggest decency as a prime characteristic of the mime. We may note the definition of Diomedes (*G. L.*, I, 491): *mimus est sermonis cuius libet [imitatio et] motus sine reverentia, vel factorum et [dictorum] turpium cum lascivia imitatio*. In the case of Laberius himself, it is his *maledicentia et adrogantia* that Gellius singles out for special comment (*N. A.*, XVII, 14, 2).

It is one of the curious facts of Roman literary history that, as comic theatre declines in importance and the writing of tragedy is more and more cut off from the actual stage, the mime grows in fashion. Bonaria offers no reason for this, but perhaps the appearance of such a richly documented edition will be cause enough for a re-examination of this and other important questions concerning Roman drama.¹

MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

FRANZ LENZINGER. Zur griechischen Anthologie. Zürich, Schmidberger & Müller, 1965. Pp. 67. (Diss.)

This doctoral dissertation from the University of Bern has three parts. The first (pp. 2-30) attempts to exhibit the composition of the Greek Anthology more clearly than has been done previously. The second (pp. 31-55) investigates the relation of Codd. Palatinus

¹ *Errata*: p. 5, the reference to the Skutsch article should read XXIII. 1920-28; p. 8, numbering of the notes is awry (for 8 read 1, for 1 read 2, etc.); p. 19, n. 2, and p. 20, n. 3, for *dhe* read *the* throughout the citations; p. 47, the citations for the mime *Colphinus* should be on p. 48; p. 106, for Wölffini read Wölffin; p. 108, the note on verse 28 should be placed with the mime *Caeculi*, not *Cancer*.

23 and Marcianus 481. The third (pp. 56-61), an excursus, suggests Semitic origin for certain formulae in the earliest and later sepulchral and dedicatory Greek epigrams. There then follows a summary (pp. 62-3), comparative tables indicating the generally accepted sources for corresponding books and types of epigrams in Agathias, Cephalas, the Palatine, and Planudes. Finally come the bibliography (pp. 65-6) and *vita* (p. 67).

A few years ago Gow (*The Greek Anthology*, p. 9) called the collection "that bewildering book." All the greater credit is therefore due Lenzinger for his orderly presentation and excellent tables. In his first part he discusses the books individually and the blocks of epigrams *seriatim*. The summaries of others' opinions are to the main point and his own contributions, when they differ from others', are stated concisely (e. g., p. 15, where he disagrees with Gow's suggestion that Meleager repeated epigrams; and pp. 26-7, where he opposes Beckby's opinion that Cephalas compiled *A. P.*, XV). At times, however, less brevity would have been advantageous. He uses *kunstvoll* (p. 15) to describe Meleager's method of arranging epigrams. Although the elements comprising his conception of that quality are implicit in his analyses of the books, a direct presentation with examples would have been helpful and have revealed definitely any additions he offers to those noted by Wifstrand (*Studien zur griechischen Anthologie*, pp. 28 f.). Further, while he finds unnecessary (p. 10, *nicht notwendig*) Beckby's suggestion that an edition of Herodotus is a source for *A. P.*, VI, no other source is offered (pp. 6, 8) to indicate whence Cephalas may have found *A. P.*, VI, 6-8, 341, 343.

Lenzinger has not discovered any new important problem but to prior opinions he adds corroborative matter of varying strength. One instance: he denies that *A. P.*, IV is Cephalan and to Beckby's argument adds that the chronology seen in the order of the prologues (Meleager's first, then Agathias', then Philip's) is not preserved in the excerpts Cephalas made. Another instance: following Boas and against Sakolowski, he assigns to Cephalas the mixing which has resulted in *A. P.*, V, 2-103, since otherwise, he says, *A. P.*, XV would be the only Cephalan book lacking a rather large block of epigrams from Meleager, Philip, and Agathias and since *A. P.*, V, 2-13 reveal thematic arrangement. A third instance: arguing with those who consider that *A. P.*, XII was collected by Cephalas, he suggests that Strato cannot be the collector. He thinks that its thirty non-pederastic poems are more than Strato would have placed in a book otherwise containing that type of epigram. Also, he cites the thematic order in the epigrams not written by Strato, which cannot be reconciled with the lack of order among those Strato did write, unless the collector be not Strato. A fourth instance: he agrees with Wolters that *A. P.*, XIII is non-Cephalan and with Beckby that its 4, 9, 10, and 14 were unsuitable for Cephalas' collection because they are incomplete. To this Lenzinger adds (p. 27) that Cephalas would have put here, rather than in other books, the epigrams which are not in the elegiac distich or would have included in his other books the twenty-seven complete poems.

As Lenzinger says (p. 1), the reconstruction of Cephalas' collection has always been a central problem in research on the Greek An-

thology. In attempting this it is necessary to be aware of what can be inferred regarding his methods. Lenzinger suggests that Cephalas revealed a forgetfulness of what epigrams he had already excerpted when he searched his sources a second time (p. 8), a progressing haste and carelessness (pp. 11, 15), and an abandoning of thematic order because it was too time-consuming and difficult (pp. 5, 7, 11).

The second part of this work is a demonstration, based in the main on many variant readings (including those of the Corrector), that Planudes' two sources, reflected in the two parts of Cod. Marc. 481, Pl^a and Pl^b, are indeed different and that neither descends from Cod. Pal. 23. Thus Lenzinger agrees with Basson, Gow (whom he omits), and Waltz and opposes Preisendanz and Pfeiffer in regard to Pl^a, Beckby in regard to Pl^b, and Wifstrand (whom he omits) in regard to Pl^a and Pl^b. Further, for him neither Pl^a nor Pl^b depends from Cephalas directly.

Friedländer (*Epigrammata*, p. 7) commences his discussion of the hexametric epigram by saying that the Greeks may, when they took over the Phoenician version of the alphabet, also at that time have taken over the simple prose formulae found on Greek tombstones and ex-votos. In his excursus Lenzinger cites early Greek and early Semitic inscriptions to support this thesis and accounts (p. 60) for the absence of Semitic parallels to the Greek inscriptions in which the tomb or ex-voto speaks by noting that personification of an inanimate object is not a Semitic concept. Since the earliest hexametric as well as prose inscriptions come from areas which had been colonized by the Phoenicians, Lenzinger, while acknowledging that the Greeks added manifold variations to the themes of the epigram, sees (p. 61) the Semitic influence extending to a later time (he does not offer a date) than Friedländer suggested. An advance would be gained if some scholar heeds and accomplishes the concluding remark of this dissertation: that an investigation of the influence of the Hellenistic epigram on the Semitic would be a worthy undertaking.

In the summary there is stated Cephalas' principle of compilation: excerpts from his sources (with those from Philip usually preceding those from Meleager) are followed by a short supplement. Then Lenzinger takes up the scholion (Cod. Pal., p. 81) which states in part that Cephalas' collection contained erotic, dedicatory, sepulchral, and epideictic epigrams. While these correspond to *A. P.*, V-VII and IX, because *A. P.*, X-XII show a similar system of composition Lenzinger accepts them as Cephalan also. He does not, however, think the scholion erroneous but, rather, argues tellingly that to his original collection Cephalas added further books, which in modern editions are later parts of *A. P.*, V-VII and IX and the whole of X-XII.

Lenzinger's contribution is twofold. He has presented succinctly results of prior investigation and added corroborative matter toward determining the evolution of the Greek Anthology and understanding the origin of Greek epigram.

Four misprints: p. 22, read Bd. III and Δὸς; p. 24, read Sakowski; p. 65, read The Greek Anthology.

BAYLY TURLINGTON.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH,
SEWANEE, TENN.

T. A. DOREY, ed. *Latin Historians*. New York, Basic Books, 1966.
Pp. xiii + 194. \$4.95.

In essays ranging between 15 and 38 pages E. Badian (early historians), F. W. Walbank (Polybius), T. A. Dorey (Caesar), G. M. Paul (Sallust), P. G. Walsh (Livy), E. A. Thompson (Ammianus Marcellinus), and J. Campbell (Bede) discuss the life, works, and literary style of their respective historians. Both the dust jacket of the volume and the title of the series in which it appears (*Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence*) promise consideration of the influence of these authors "on scholars and statesmen in other ages," but this promise is only spasmodically fulfilled; manuscript traditions are intentionally omitted.

To assemble so stellar a cast of authors the editor must have had winning ways indeed; and teachers will be grateful for the resulting collection of straightforward essays, useful to those beginning students who know Greek and Latin. Where so much was possible, it is to be regretted that the general plan of the book was not more carefully meditated so as to make the volume a really distinguished introduction to the whole sweep of Latin historiography. The work, that is to say, has two essays which might have been spared, and lacks at least one it should have. Thus, why should the Greek Polybius be included? Dorey's mediaeval interests, again, probably dictated the inclusion of Bede; but Campbell's essay, judicious as it is, shows on every page how far Bede was removed in spirit from the other historians here considered. In place of these two essays one might have hoped for a survey of those minor Latin historians such as Florus, Eutropius, Orosius, *et al.*, who really did have considerable later influence; Tacitus, it should be noted, will be given an entire volume in this series. Such general, introductory essays, moreover, should properly be accompanied by careful bibliographical information in the notes, a requirement which is poorly satisfied in the editor's own essay and in Thompson's brief and incomplete survey of Ammianus Marcellinus.

Apart from the clear and useful accounts of Polybius and Livy,¹ two essays deserve special comment. Badian has done a workmanlike job, sober in conjecture, on the early Latin historians, who have been poorly treated in English to this point. Alföldi's *Early Rome and the Latins* came out too late for him to consider; I should like to have seen his comments on the remarkable picture drawn there of Fabius Pictor as the root of all evil in the annalistic tradition. The essay on Sallust by Paul is a gem in its interweaving of the author's life and works; Paul's judgments are provocative of thought. Both of these essays are also admirably footnoted. Proofreading has been good; there is an index of proper names, but no general bibliography.

CHESTER G. STARR.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

¹ With regard to Walbank's comments (p. 44) on Panaetius, see now Hermann Strasburger, "Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman Empire," *J. R. S.*, LV (1965), pp. 40-53. A useful survey of recent studies on Ammianus is by C. di Spigno in *Helikon*, III (1963), pp. 524-34.

BRUNO GRENZHEUSER. *Kaiser und Senat in der Zeit von Nero bis Nerva*. Münster, 1964. Pp. xii + 271. (Diss.)

This published dissertation is, just as the title implies, a study of the relationship between Roman emperors and the Senate from A.D. 54 to 98, although background material is also given on the period beginning in 31 B.C. (23 pages). In view of the relative importance of the emperors, the work centers on them rather than the Senate. In general, nothing new appears; Grenzheuser chooses sensibly between previous interpretations. An immense amount of material, primary and secondary sources (see the 14-page bibliography for the latter), has been distilled into 155 pages, which are quite well documented in 59 pages of footnotes. There is an over-long addendum of 43 pages; the text should have been rewritten at the places in question. With regard to primary sources it is noteworthy that much attention has been paid to numismatic evidence.

Every historian who reads this work no doubt has a special interest which he would like to see pursued at greater length, but a good balance between various fields of interest seems to have been struck. Nevertheless, the reviewer feels that the reader will gain more from the text, if not the footnotes, of Mason Hammond's two comparable monographs, *The Augustan Principate* and *The Antonine Monarchy*. In the discussion of the imperial period before A.D. 54, Grenzheuser might have mentioned A. H. M. Jones' "Imperial and Senatorial Jurisdiction in the Early Principate" (*Historia*, III [1955], pp. 464-88) and "The Imperium of Augustus" (*J. R. S.*, XLI [1951], pp. 112-19), although he does cite the reprinted version of these articles, *Studies in Roman Government and Law* (Oxford, 1960) in his bibliography. Grenzheuser favors the rehabilitation of Domitian; K. H. Water's article on this subject (*Phoenix*, XVIII [1964], pp. 49-77) appeared too late to be listed.

Since the main value of Grenzheuser's book is use as a work of reference, one misses both an index of topics and proper names and an index of primary sources discussed.

MICHAEL WOLOCH.

McGILL UNIVERSITY.

GERHARD PFOHL. *Griechische Inschriften als Zeugnisse des privaten und öffentlichen Lebens*. Munich, Ernst Heimeran Verlag, 1966. Pp. 252; 8 illus. (*Tusculum-Bücherei*.)

One hundred and sixty-four interesting documents in Greek with German translations, commentary, and essential bibliography have been collected in one small volume which illustrates the range and type of epigraphical evidence. The little book satisfies no particular need, but the editor has presented the inscriptions with admirable accuracy and concision. The texts are well printed with correct accentuation and brackets.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

LOUIS ROBERT. Noms indigènes dans l'Asie-Mineure gréco-romaine. Première partie. Paris, Adrien Maisonneuve, 1963. Pp. 659; 13 illus. (*Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie d'Istanbul*, XIII.)

NEZİH FIRATLI. Les stèles funéraires de Byzance gréco-romaine avec l'édition et l'index commenté des épitaphes par LOUIS ROBERT. Paris, Adrien Maisonneuve, 1964. Pp. 193; 75 pls. (*Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie d'Istanbul*, XV.)

When great scholars like W. Dittenberger and M. N. Tod make a selection of inscriptions, they perforce contribute something to our understanding of many documents, but the majority of selections remain mere works of popularization, of value to students if well done but without advancing the knowledge of experts. The real progress comes in the competent publication of new inscriptions and in the presentation of new information about old inscriptions. Louis Robert, for his vast knowledge, critical sense, and industry, is a master of epigraphy unequalled today anywhere. New works by him constitute events of great importance to the whole profession.

His discussion of Greek, Latin, and Thracian names on pp. 131-89 in the excellent publication of the funerary steles of Byzantium contributes observations not only on types of names but on cults and institutions with emphasis on the essentially Greek (not Thracian) character of Byzantium. The goddess Phosphoros (Hecate) at Byzantium calls forth exciting glimpses into the influence of Byzantium in Thrace and in the larger Greek world itself.

The *Noms indigènes* places the onomastics of Asia Minor on a new basis. It will be absolutely indispensable to archaeologists digging in Turkey, but it is full of interest for epigraphists everywhere. Many families of hitherto unrecognized Greek names are separated from the native material. Infrequent variants and hypocoristics based on unfamiliar but thoroughly Greek roots will be seen more easily as a result of this organization of the material.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

E. MARY SMALLWOOD. Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian. Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. xii + 208. \$8.00.

The value of a collection of documents to illustrate such and such a period of the Roman Empire depends partly on the balance and coverage of the documents selected and partly on the care with which the documents are edited. There are also other considerations, but these are paramount.

In the reviewer's opinion the range and balance of the documents selected by Miss Smallwood are remarkably good. For the historian

it is a convenient volume; for the teacher it is a splendidly representative collection. There is not only a comparative table for the 520 fascinating documents but even indexes and consular fasti. The editor is to be congratulated on her discrimination.

In the presentation of the documents, however, she has been careless. If the reader consults No. 442, the correspondence of Hadrian and Plotina on the Epicurean School at Athens, he may feel that the normalizing <n> (so edited) for *im* before *pe<re>greinum* was just unnecessary, but he will certainly deplore the omission of the sigma in the word *βουλευσόμενον* (line 29). The sigma was first omitted in the last Corpus, but it appears in Wilhelm's basic edition and photograph, which should have been studied carefully. Here too false accents in lines 16-17, 27, 28, and 33 are discouraging in a classroom.

If the reader consults No. 493, he will find asterisks in the text. Since the asterisks are not explained at the end of the inscription, he may consult the table of abbreviations and symbols on pp. x-xii, but the asterisks are not explained there either.

It is good to have the Julius Quadratus Bassus inscription. But in editing it as No. 214 why retain Premierstein's impossible restoration of line 14, [πρεσβευτήν Κρή]της καὶ Κυρήνης, where one expects the quaestorship? A. Stein rightly restored ταμίαν. Premierstein's restoration was predicated on a false identification, rejected also by Syme. For Premierstein the quaestorship had to be that of Bithynia.

These are mere samples of errors. In fact false accents are particularly common, doubly surprising in view of the reputation that the Cambridge University Press had for readers with a knowledge of Greek. Recent editions of old texts have been examined with care, but the student interested in No. 441 would do well to consult Texts A and B of the *horothesia* dossier at Istros in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, VI (1965), pp. 143-56.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notices are not returnable.)

Acheson (G. J.). The Caesarian Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Translated from the Latin and Prefaced by an Account of the Men and Events Concerned. Johannesburg, *Witwatersrand Univ. Press*, 1965. Pp. 155. \$4.05.

Adrados (Francisco Rodriguez). Ilustración y política en la Grecia clásica. Madrid, *Ediciones de la "Revista de Occidente,"* 1966. Pp. 588. (*Biblioteca de Política y Sociología*.)

Anassagora, Testimonianze e frammenti. Introduzione, traduzione e commento a cura di Diego Lanza. Firenze, "*La Nuova Italia*" Editrice, 1966. Pp. xxx + 261. L. 3700. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori*, LII.)

Antisthenis Fragmenta collegit Fernanda Decleva Caizzi. Milano-Varese, *Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino*, 1966. Pp. 145. (*Testi e Documenti per lo Studio dell'Antichità*, XIII.)

Aristotle, *Poetics*, Translated with Introduction and Notes by Gerald F. Else. Ann Arbor, *Univ. of Michigan Press*, 1967. Pp. 124.

Buchheit (Vinzenz). *Tyrannii Rufini Librorum Adamantii Origenis Adversus Haereticos Interpretatio*. Eingeleitet, herausgegeben und kritisch kommentiert. München, *Wilhelm Fink Verlag*, 1966. Pp. lii + 156.

Clarke (Howard W.). *The Art of the Odyssey*. Englewood Cliffs, *Prentice-Hall, Inc.*, 1967. Pp. 120. \$3.95.

Connor (W. Robert). *Greek Orations: Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides and Letter of Philip*. Edited with an Introduction. Ann Arbor, *Univ. of Michigan Press*, 1966. Pp. vi + 223. \$5.95.

Corlu (André). *Recherches sur les mots relatifs à l'idée de prière d'Homère aux tragiques*. Paris, *Librairie C. Klincksieck*, 1966. Pp. 355. (*Études et Commentaires*, LXIV.)

Daris (Sergio), ed. *Papiri Milanesi (P. Med.)*, I, nos. 13-87. Milano, *Società Editrice Vita e Pensiero*, 1966. Pp. xi + 180. (*Pubblicazioni dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Contributi—Serie Terza.*)

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WHOLE No. 352

HORACE, *CARMINA*, II, 16.

In analyzing the structure of Odes, II, 16,¹ Latte and Barwick saw a composition of five pairs of stanzas. In Latte's outline,² stanzas 1 and 2 are an introduction, 5/6 and 7/8 are linked as pairs opposed to each other, with the framing pairs of 3/4 and 9/10 corresponding to each other. Barwick³ thought the antithesis of 5/6 and 7/8, observed by Latte, present as well between 3/4 and 5/6 on the one hand and 7/8 and 9/10 on the other, 3/4 and 5/6 containing the negative statement of how one does not

¹Much of the recent literature on the poem has been devoted to restoring the sixth stanza to its rightful place in the text. I presume that the work of Latte, Barwick, and Pöschl (cited in the notes immediately following) has been convincing and that lines 21-24 are now secure, so the whole poem can be subjected to a close examination that includes the abused stanza and does not have as its purpose the defense of it. These earlier studies, however, in demonstrating the integral part played by the sixth stanza, have given careful attention to many elements of the poem, and the present investigation must gratefully acknowledge its debt to them, especially to the thoughtful article of Pöschl.

The importance of certain passages in Lucretius as "sources" of some elements of the poem has long been noted and receives fullest treatment in Pöschl's article. Büchner (*op. cit.*, note 5 below) has shown allusions found in extant fragments of Epicurus. The present study does not discover in the ode a "meaning" different from what its students have always found but attempts to understand the way in which it manipulates and dramatizes this material—much of it historically the matter of Epicurean expression—by complex interrelationship within the distinct setting of the poem.

²K. Latte, "Eine Ode des Horaz (II, 16)," *Philologus*, XC (1935), pp. 294-304; pp. 300 f.

³K. Barwick, "Drei Oden des Horaz," *Rh. Mus.*, XCIII (1950), pp. 249-67; pp. 254 f.

obtain inner peace, 7/8 and 9/10 advancing positive advice, general in 7/8 and specific in 9/10. Agreeing with Latte that stanzas 1/2 were introductory, he saw in 3-6 and 7-10 the principal blocks of the poem, 7 beginning with an adversative asyndeton, but all other pair-groups connected by a transition.

Pöschl⁴ sees a "concrete-symbolic" beginning, followed by a general but vigorously pictured formulation of the happy life, which composes the reader's mind, followed by a second passage on Anxiety which mounts the theme from the beginning to a climax in the sixth strophe. He identifies a sharp break at 7, and sees vivid contrast between 6 and 7, followed in 7/8 by praise of the wise man who looks to the present and does not fear death, and in 9/10 by the employment of this wisdom in the cases of Grosphus and Horace himself. Büchner⁵ athetizes the sixth stanza, and analyzes the remaining nine as three blocks of three stanzas each.

Collinge⁶ accepts the division of five pairs of stanzas, setting 3/4 as antistrophe to the strophe of 1/2, 9/10 as antistrophe to the strophe of 7/8. Stanzas 5 and 6 he explains as "a central section which stands apart from the general scheme" and as an "interlude, a stationary two-stanza section of very general reflexion, placed in a pivotal position. . . ." He characterizes its content as aphoristic and "quite extraneous to the poem's strict design," saying that its "subtraction would, formally speaking, make no difference."⁷ Further, he sees a division within each of the antistrophic sections (3/4 and 9/10).

Commager's impression is that the poem's structure is random and rather disorderly, a reflection perhaps the result of the

⁴ V. Pöschl, "Die Curastrophe der Otiumode des Horaz," *Hermes*, LXXXIV (1956), pp. 74-90; pp. 88 f.

⁵ K. Büchner, *Humanitas Romana* (Heidelberg, 1957), "Horaz über die Gelassenheit," pp. 176-202; pp. 185 ff.

⁶ N. E. Collinge, *The Structure of Horace's Odes* (London, 1961), pp. 73 f.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 101. Accepting this intriguing invitation, I have run off a copy of the poem with the fifth and sixth stanzas removed, and must respond that I find in the resultant text both an altered argument and, formally, a different poem. On the other hand, one might say that from the standpoint of logical assertion, the text would "make sense" (but not the same sense) with any stanza between the third and eighth excised. It is interesting that Collinge finds stanzas 5 and 6 aphoristic, but detects none of the aphoristic character of 4 and 7.

earlier persistence of others in the orientation to five pairs of two stanzas each. "The ode's general progress seems somewhat haphazard, as though Horace had assembled those topics in Lucretius for which he felt a particular affinity, and stripped them of their doctrinaire associations. Only with the last two stanzas does the poem take a decisively personal turn."⁸

The beginning of the Ode is dominated by the word *otium*, significantly emphasized by triple anaphora and by position as the first word of the poem and of lines 5 and 6. But the cadence of repetition must not mislead us; the seaman of the first stanza and the Thracians and Persians of lines 5-6 are not praying for the same thing. Nor should we at this point by anticipating a universal prayer for peace of mind grasp impatiently toward the poet's conclusion. Let us allow the poet his meditation on the turns of reference which the word can take. The opening scene is of a sailor earnestly hoping not for *ῥοιχία* but for a calm.⁹ The sympathetic reader can react too quickly to the suggestive wording and imagine a sailor in the midst of a storm. *Prensus* is a common expression for being "caught" in a storm,¹⁰ and *in patenti* makes a point of his helplessness far from any harbor. But as Pöschl has pointed out, the storm is only threatening.¹¹ *Simul* indicates that the wish for *otium* comes the moment there are warning signs of a storm. The sailor's immediate distress is that he has lost his bearing by the stars, *neque certa fulgent sidera nautis*, and he is too far at sea for any shoreline to furnish a landmark, *in patenti*. Although *prensus* forebodes the storm as much as does the black cloud, the sailor is "caught" not by the storm, at least not yet, but by his fear and in the moment of it.

Thracians and Medes also pray for *otium*, but *bello* starkly placed beside *otium* makes it clear that their wish is for peace in the general sense of *pax*.¹² That we have in *bello furiosa* and

⁸ S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (New Haven, 1962), p. 333.

⁹ Barwick, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

¹⁰ Ovid, *Met.*, XI, 663; Verg., *Geor.*, IV, 421, and Serv., *ad loc.*

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 87. The suggestion of *prensus*, *atra*, *in patenti Aegaeo* does serve to make the storm an imminent possibility, and the sailor's fear immediate and realistic.

¹² Where usage of a word in a particular sense is common enough for there to be several citations in Lewis and Short, no support for the usage is given in these notes.

pharetra decori equivalents for such epithets as ἀραιμανής, κλυτότοξος, ἀγκυλότοξος was noted by Latte¹³ and as long ago as Orelli (*ad. loc.*). Latte felt that the epithets fit in with the military stance of the lines and point up as well the natural association of these peoples with warfare in the Roman imagination. Does this not then imply some shift of attitude? The seaman is after all only sensible to be concerned at well-known signs of imminent danger. But Horace chooses for his warriors nationalities immediately and almost proverbially bellicose and applies to them terms which were not only the tags of this tradition but literally descriptive of a warlike nature—Thrace savage in battle, the Mede handsomely equipped for battle. For these to pray for peace is ironical in that their posture is at variance with their prayer, and what they are characteristically and pictorially prepared to do will bring the opposite of what they are said to want. This subtle turn of the poem's attitude is accompanied by an ambiguity in *bello*, "They pray for peace even in war" and "even those furious in war pray for peace."¹⁴

Lines 7-12 explain the motivation of sailor and soldier and show another shift in the reference of *otium*. The singular *venale* implies a single item not "for sale." If it is questionable whether *pax* can be bought, weather obviously cannot; *venale* prepares the way for a new understanding of *otium* applicable to its three instances above. Latte found the collocation *purpura venale* disturbing,¹⁵ and one will readily agree that *purpura* is unorthodox currency. Barwick countered that it is no more surprising than *gemmis venale*, and included *auro* to interpret all three as symbolizing riches in general.¹⁶ Unquestionably all three are symbolic of great wealth, but in this context they are directly related to the pursuits of sailor and soldiers. They are in fact the specific terms of the frustration of these activities, as the five-fold anaphora of negatives overpowers the *otium* of lines 1-6 (*non . . . neque . . . nec . . . non . . . neque*, running into the next stanza). For the sailor they represent characteristic material of overseas commerce, for the fierce fighter his most extravagant

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 295.

¹⁴ Cf. W. Wimmel, "Doppelsinnige Formulierung bei Horaz?," *Glotta*, XL (1962), p. 142.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 296, n. 3.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 251, n. 7.

dream of spoils. As merchandise and as spoils they are involved in the particular vocation of the merchant seaman and the soldier. Both entail going abroad from home and represent the object of their "going" and "getting."

As we see them, soldiers and sailor are engaged in serious business, and we see them not as individuals but only in their "business" capacity as occupied each in his vocation. The paradox observed above (the notoriously bellicose praying for *pax*) functions also in the verbal play of *otium* as the opposite of *negotium*, and here we find the single reference of *otium* to which the singular *venale* can be applied and for which sailor and soldiers, engaged in different occupations and caught in different situations, can pray. They pray for release from the burdens and dangers of their work, for the good life of "leisure." In this sense soldier and sailor are engaged in the opposite of what they want; they "work" in the hope of freeing themselves of the necessity for work. Jewels, purple, and gold are, then, both the immediate stuff of their traffic and the means by which they mistakenly hope to reach their ultimate goal, *otium*. That they symbolize also riches in general intimates the most bountiful success, but no matter how abundant their success, their purpose will be frustrated since they cannot buy with its fruits, their "pay," the thing which they are hopefully working to afford themselves. *Otium* cannot be bought, for any amount; the gods will not make the exchange, for even the most magnificent *votum*.¹⁷

The theme of frustration introduced at line 7 continues without interruption into the third stanza. As was observed earlier, the dominant note is struck by a flow of negatives, and the third stanza begins with the same subject matter with which the second closed, *gazae*. The symbol, with its connotations of oriental royal luxury, suggests the power of the Roman political equivalent, the consul. The consul's lictor stalks into the poem at line 10, trying to push aside an unruly mob to make way for the dignitary. The vignette only makes more acute our shock when we are confronted with *mentis*. As a symbolic depiction of power and high place, the brief scene of the lictor would have been of itself enough, but *mentis* requires a quick look backward and an

¹⁷ Cf. Barwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 251 f.

adjustment forward as we accommodate our perception to a double metaphor in which each part throws light on the other.¹⁸ The momentary dislocation and reorientation of our perception caused by this surprising "double-barrelled" metaphor accompanies with some flourish the final turn in the development of the reference of *otium* which emerges through the metaphorical expression of its opposite, *tumultus mentis*. It is only at this point that *otium* becomes "peace of mind."

Royal wealth and high place cannot command secure passage through the unruly mob of the mind, nor can there be any security in one's home, which is also beset. *Tumultus mentis* and *curas . . . volantis* are clearly not separate conceptions, but distinct metaphors for the same anxiety, the first in terms of public appearance, the second of the interior of an elegant house.¹⁹ The mob abroad is transformed into harpies at home,²⁰ a threatening and hovering presence as they fly about the ceilings. "Wealth cannot take worries away," but harpies are themselves notorious for "taking away" and befouling what they do not take. And they are no more obedient to the order to withdraw than was the mob outside, but lower constantly overhead.

Lines 7-12 make a direct counter-statement²¹ to the whole

¹⁸ Cf. M. Andrewes, "An Aspect of Horatian Imagery," *C. R.*, LXII (1948), pp. 111-12; Collinge, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 f.

¹⁹ C. W. Mendell, "Horace, *Odes* II, 18," *Y. Cl. S.*, XI (1950), pp. 281-92, has discussed the panelled ceiling as a symbol of luxury and the development of a literary tradition of disapproval associated with it.

²⁰ Wickham, *ad loc.*, "Cares are represented as a flock of ill-omened birds or harpies that fly round and round under the panelled roof of the rich man's hall." Latte, *op. cit.*, p. 296, saw in the metaphor a reference to bats. But how are bats like anxieties, except perhaps in the difficulty of getting them out of a house once they are inside? Cf. Verg., *Aen.*, III, 233 (of harpies), *turba sonans praedam pedibus circumvolat uncis*.

²¹ Although it is convenient to use the analogy of logic, we must of course not be misled by our own terms into a mistaken notion that our poet is "posing" a problem or "stating" a proposition. It would be more correct to say that the poem is "staging" the problem or "picturing" a series of thesis, antithesis, and resolution. It is significant to understand that the movement is dialectic in its pattern of direction, but matter and technique are obviously visual and dramatic rather than logical. The "counter-statement" ("But by the means which they employ they can never attain the end which they seek") is introduced by a sudden vision of "treasure" in terms of its varied colors, and effected by scenes acted out by lictors and the urban prole-

passage on the longing for *otium*: "But prayer is futile since, even if they are enormously successful, the means they will have gained can never achieve the purpose for which the means were sought." To the tension created by the confrontation of goal and means, impulse and frustration, the fourth stanza furnishes the resolution as it supplies the solution to the problem. The impersonal form of the opening verb, its pithy and almost formulaic beginning ("he lives well who . . ."), and the sententious tone give the stanza the ring of a proverb, with the proverb's presumption of universal application and of wisdom. In stanza four we are presented the aphoristic example of the man who has gained *otium* and are symbolically shown the means by which it is achieved.

The resolution is first positive and then negative, as were previously in turn the thesis and the antithesis movements. We have (chiastically) first the good life and its wealth, then peace of mind symbolized by the sound sleep which *curae*—here, specifically *timor* and *cupido*—do not take away. The aphorism begins with a verbal paradox, a union of opposite and mutually contradictory terms, for *bene vivere* is instinctively associated with prosperity and plenty, the opposite of *parvum*. There is a further ironic inversion within the context in that previously the poem has insisted that sailor and warrior are mistaken in thinking that the so-called "good life" is the way to inner security. But they were not mistaken; in the fourth stanza we see it is the way to peace of mind. They were only mistaken about what constitutes the good life.

The verbal and contextual irony of *vivitur parvo bene* deftly accomplishes these inversions, but otherwise the *sententia* is not very instructive. One man's notion of a little may be in another's perspective rather a lot. *Parvo* is only an introduction to the True Means to Inner Peace; for the perspective we must turn to the relative clause, *cui paternum splendet in mensa tenui salinum*. The heirloom salt-cellar gleaming on a scant table is the whole description of the good life on a little. Except for its relation to details of the complex of thesis and antithesis, and its resolution of that tension, it would, like *parvo*, furnish as solution something less than revelation. There is of course

tariat, and by harpies against the background of coffered ceilings. It is a statement only in that we have converted it into such by paraphrase.

much more to the good life, however it be conceived, than table silver. The salt-cellar is chosen to serve as the symbol with which to convey a perception of that which comprises the good life, just as the common understanding of the good life was conveyed by symbols (*gemmis, purpura, auro, gazae, lictor, laqueata tecta*).

Consider the symbol for its value outside the complex of the present text: salt is a basic necessity in the diet; a table without salt would imply a household worse than impoverished. The *salinum* is then the needed gloss on *parvo*: "He lives well on a little who enjoys at least the necessities and the most modest amenities of life, who is at least not destitute." We have our perspective, but nothing more. The tenor of this association of salt-cellar with style of life leaves us with our paradox on *bene*, and is almost tautological as to *parvo* ("not much, but not nothing").

Salt was also used as a sacrificial offering in the domestic devotions to the household gods. For the context of our poem this external value of *salinum* is important. The poem began with a prayer and the suggestion of a magnificent *votum* which would still not induce the gods to grant the prayer. Salt is, however, part of the offering traditionally acceptable to household gods. It is also significant that this ritual association of the salt-cellar involves household gods. The prayer of the soldier and sailor was the longing of those going abroad, the seaman literally en route. The good life on a little is lived at home; its prayers are addressed to the familiar and domestic gods. The whole stanza is an expansion of this image of the home, the place where one eats (*mensa*) and sleeps (*somnos*), where reverence of household gods is symbolized by an ancestral vessel.

Within the context of the poem, every element of the clause containing the symbolic salt-cellar, *cui . . . salinum*, participates in the counterpoint of symbols already in play in lines 1-12, and the vehicle gains from the interaction a unity and logic. The salt-cellar is presumably to be imagined as silver (*splendet*)²² and belongs therefore to the thematic pattern of the dazzle

²² Cf. Kiessling-Heinze, *ad loc.*, and Val. Max., IV, 4, 3 cited there. Wickham, *ad loc.*, quotes Pers., *Sat.*, 3, 25 as evidence for the silver salt-cellar "as a test of respectable competence." If we do not recognize the vessel as silver, the symbolic tenor of the *salinum* would be the opposite of its tenor as silver, and directly adversative to the shimmer-

of material wealth. The good life on a little is conveyed by the more modest but still precious metal and by the fact that there is only one decorous piece of it. It is the only splendor the poet chooses to put on the table, and its loneliness has meaning not in relation to the owner's total worth but in contrast to the accumulation of treasures earlier.

In its common meaning, "of inferior status," *tenuis* alludes to the rank of the table's owner, and as the opposite of *locuples* to his fortune: "The table of a man undistinguished and of small means." In this sense it brings about an inversion of the image of the consul and the extravagant mansion. The adjective is also regularly applied to food, in the sense of "modest fare," and this meaning is clearly seen in the word's grammatical agreement with *mensa*, as well as in the suggestion of the table in *vivere*. The *mensa tenuis* is, then, the opposite of the table implicit in the image of harpies, lines 11-12, the table of the man of wealth and rank. The meager table of a man not rich or important thereby becomes part of the symbolic drama which the harpy image informs. The counterpoise is so delicate and sure that we instinctively look for an element present in the earlier but missing in the subsequent appearance. Wealth and rank, the imposing table, are helpless to prevent its being ravaged by harpy-worries. Here we have the opposite of wealth and rank, the opposite sort of table; is it able to protect itself, to fend off the menacing worries? Since the earlier "good life" was a futile striving toward *otium*, and in fact inevitably insured its absence, does its opposite counterpart, this good life on a little, achieve *otium*?

The question is answered in the second half of the stanza, for in *levis somnos* we have another of Horace's universal symbols, peaceful sleep signifying the untroubled mind. The current of thought in lines 7-12 ran: "Riches and rank cannot achieve peace since they cannot dismiss the worries that steal peace." But here *curae* do not take away sound sleep, the peace of a mind at rest. Peace is attained and, beyond the reach of the *curae*, secure.

ing treasures of wealth ("He has no precious metals"). But *splendet* would still recall those treasures and insist upon the thematic system, "treasure," in which the non-treasure would participate ("But his treasure is the ancestral salt-cellar").

Timor and *cupido* are worries especially suitable to the idea of position and possessions, the compulsion to acquire more, and the fear of losing what one has. Furthermore within the poem's symbolic structure they are emotions dominant in the seaman and soldiers who long for *otium*, for *timor* recalls the fear of the sailor which was the opening note of the poem, and *cupido* was the motivation of both in their traffic. *Timor* and *cupido* are the *curae* of those who long for *otium* as they pursue their vocations, but in lines 15-16 these very *curae* are said to be those that take away *otium*, *levis somnos . . . aufert*. "What fear and greed impel us to seek, they themselves snatch away from us." *Sordidus* and *aufert* weave in again the harpy theme, making *timor* and *cupido*, so to speak, proper names of two of that predatory host in the image of lines 11-12, as the adjective suggests their filth and the verb their notorious rapaciousness. By associating in this way the prayer for *otium* with the symbol of that which takes it away, the poem develops the assertion that the wealth sought in lines 1-6 will not achieve *otium* but will actually insure its loss.

As the resolution of the conflict between desire and frustration, we are shown the household of the man living well on little. But the lesson the reader may extract derives its meaning from an opposition to that erroneous and frustrated "good life"; it comes in terms of what it is not. We explored the various suggestions in each of the specific terms of the symbol used to convey this life and reduced to distinct, if two-dimensional, paraphrases the many-sided reference which poetic handling set into simultaneous motion in *splendet, mensa, tenui, salinum*. It is still impossible to distinguish out of the complex interaction an answer more precise than "not much, but not nothing."

We must look to *paternum*, which holds a place of importance as the first word of the clause proper, balanced by *salinum* as the last. Is it merely decorative, or could the poet not resist indulging himself in a touch of sentiment? Viewed for its extrinsic value alone, the word might easily be so explained. Still, the poem has not to this point offered any non-functional detail, nor any relaxation of its taut and muscular control. What modification then of the essential intrinsic tenor of *salinum* does the application to it of *paternum* effect? As the sole article of valuable metal, *paternum* would explain the appearance of a

piece of silver on the table of a man whose means could perhaps not command it. *Salinum* is also an instrument of sacramental usage in the home; *paternum* adds a further dimension to the reverence of ancestral gods of the family in the use of an ancestral vessel. It emphasizes the contrast already observed between devotions to gods of the household and the prayers of those who are "going and getting." The *paternum salinum* is pointedly not the product of going or getting, yet it is the essence of the good life and of inner peace. A new meaning comes to the surface with relation to the longings of the seaman and soldiers. Their prayer for peace must be frustrated not because they seek the wrong means to peace, but because they are wrong in seeking any means at all, in thinking that there are means to peace beyond what they already have. Our problem with the vagueness and relativity of the "good life on a little" is also resolved. The good life is relative to what one has, not to any amount small or large; it is lived by those who live content on what they have. Presumably the good life on a lot should be just as good for those who accept their possessions as they are and refrain from "going and getting."

Stanzas 5-7 repeat the pattern of direction which gave shape to the first four: impulse, frustration, solution, each now occupying a single stanza. Not only is the structure parallel to that of the initial series (thesis, antithesis, resolution), but we find that this second "movement" is worked out with the same symbolic *personae*, deriving its meaning from its relation to the first as well as from its own denotation. The thesis movement, lines 17-20, is a further question based on the solution of a problem previously handled, an introduction to subsequent investigation that proceeds from the assumption that a basic point has been proved. "Now that we have established that peace is the result, not of acquisition of property, but of accommodation to what one has, let us ask why men seem bent on acquisition in spite of this demonstrable futility."

The "thesis" stanza is written in the form of three short questions which are to be taken together, their unity indicated by anaphorical repetition of interrogatives (*quid . . . quid . . . quis*) as the unity of the earlier "thesis" movement (lines 1-6) was shaped by repetition of the word *otium*. Taken together the questions constitute a statement. The first question recalls the

Thracian and Parthian soldiers, in *fortes* (*bello furiosa Thrace*) and *iaculamur* (*pharetra*). In *multa* it recalls the plurality of the catalogued things they seek, and as the correspondent opposite of *parvo* (*vivitur parvo bene cui . . .*) it restates the futility of their striving, as does *iaculamur* in the sense of the metaphoric use of *τοξέειν*, "to strive for."²³

The second question summons into the present context the mariner pictured in the act of travelling to other lands, and as *iaculamur* reflects the bow of the Parthian archer, the commercial overtone in *mutare* reflects the business of the merchant seaman. And travel and archery share the perspective of distance, the destination and the target. The two questions are then assembled by interweaving motifs of the previous argument, but iterate the question "why?" We have not changed the subject; we are considering it from a different approach, examining the compulsion to acquire from the standpoint of inner causation rather than from its effectiveness as the means to distant and deliberate goal. The earlier problem was put in terms of rank and property, of going and getting; the present is in terms of psychological compulsion toward them.

The answer to the third question, "What exile from his country has also fled himself?" is implicit in the question itself; no one has ever escaped himself. Further, *patriae* (line 19) recalls the *paternum* of line 13, which rounds off the stanza in its suggestive connotation from relation to the previous course of the poem. From this reflective suggestion emerges the "thesis" or "statement" of this series. The reason for our inability to accept life on the property we have is not related to the property, but to ourselves. As *otium* was indifferent to possessions, but consequent on accepting them as they are, here the acquisitive impulse is essentially indifferent to possessions and the result of our inability to accept ourselves as we are. Our going and getting is then the illusory outward expression of an inner compulsion;

²³ It is almost universally noted by commentators that *iaculamur* reflects the double reference of "shooting at" and "striving for" of *τοξέειν*. A significant observation, but we must also perceive that the verb symbolically includes the futility of "striving for" and the picture of one engaged in the futile striving (*pharetra*). Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 84, n. 1, rejects the association with *τοξέειν* and sees in *iaculamur* a figure drawn from hunting and developed in the pursuing *Cura* of the sixth stanza.

an attempt to get away from ourselves. The "getting away" is as doomed to failure as was the "going and getting." Exile is not a casually chosen term, or merely another Lucretian undertone; it represents failure at home.

Pöschl saw in the repetition of short questions a suggestion of hurrying, mounted in the next strophe to the "fierce inexorable pursuit of the demon *Cura*."²⁴ My own impression is that although the questions convey the atmosphere of haste, reinforced by *brevi . . . aevo* in the first of the series, they make in their staccato cadence a contrast to the sweep of one long sentence through the next stanza. The short questions build up a breathlessness, as though the speaker of the poem were walking and then running along beside the man who is going "to get," and then is going "to get away," and suggests his weak and ineffectual haste in contrast to the stately sweeping speed of *Cura*.

The sixth stanza brings the frustration of the impulse conveyed by stanza five; it is the counter-statement to the assertion that in our going and getting we are really trying to get away from ourselves: "But we can't get away." *Cura* is too fast for us. She is faster than the means of escape, the vehicles and symbols of speed, which are all faster than any human: warships, horses, deer, and wind. Ship and horse have a further value here as they pick up and continue to develop the symbolic drama of the poem. Pöschl has explored in detail their relationship to the previous course of the poem as well as their Lucretian unity.²⁵ He points out that in the image-structure *aeratas . . . navis* and *ocior Euro* are bound to the beginning of the Ode, the storm at sea. He sees the warship and cavalry troop as reflecting the sea and the warfare of lines 1-6, and also (presumably in the rank of their commander) the consul's lictor who is powerless against the turbulent riot of the mind.²⁶

To Pöschl's observations should be added that *turmas equitum* recalls the soldiers of the second stanza not only in the suggestion of warfare in general but also in the more specific asso-

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁵ In showing its integral relation to the rest of the poem, Pöschl understandably points continually to the stanza as the focus of his attention. We must understand his purpose of vindicating the stanza, however, and not grant it a more important place in the poem than that of the functioning part which Pöschl has shown it to be.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 84 f.

ciation of Parthian warfare with horse. Their army consisted almost entirely of cavalry, the nobility fighting as cataphracts and the great body of the army as mounted archers. Their characteristic stratagem was to pretend retreat and then "in flight" to take their pursuers at a disadvantage with a surprisingly skilful and accurate volley of archery.²⁷ The suggestion of this "Parthian shot," combined with that in *iaculamur* (line 17) and *pharetra* (line 6), is a further development of the paradox of the fifth stanza ("Those who are pursuing possessions are really running away, themselves pursued"): "just as those who pursue retreating Parthians are really being assaulted by the Parthians, who are actually on the offensive."

The paradox gets another turn in the ordering of the four symbols of speed.²⁸ The first two are military and, as Pöschl notes, recall not only the ship and the soldiers of the poem's beginning, but also the consul's lictor. But we must examine the function of this recall. The warship and cavalry, and the recalled image of the consul, share the idea of control. The consul suggests the high rank of the person who marshalls such forces, and the warship and cavalry are not only symbols of speed, but fast vehicles for escape. The ship's course is directed by a helmsman, the horse's by its rider; both are ultimately directed by the commander. They carry man and according to his orders. The deer and clouds, on the other hand, are entirely passive, as is explicit in the case of the latter, pictured as "driven." The deer's speed in flight is its principal defense. Its impulse is dictated by the source of the danger and its course in relation to the direction of external aggression. Likewise, but more so, clouds have in themselves no impulse at all; any momentum or direction they appear to have belongs to the wind which carries them along helpless.

The fifth stanza began with symbols of "going to get" paradoxically inverted into "haste to get away." The sixth dramatizes in the arrangement of its symbols of speed an ironic inversion of the very paradox of the fifth: "The apparent subject of direction is in reality its object." They are not racing to get

²⁷ Cf. W. W. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, IX, chap. 14, pp. 601 f.

²⁸ Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 86, saw a chiasmic arrangement, ". . . das ocior *Euro* in kunstvollem chiasmus sich auf die *aeratas navis*, das ocior *cervis* auf die *turmas equitum* bezieht."

away but driven from behind. "Those who are so busily in pursuit of things external and distant are actually the victims and play things of those very externals."

To the thesis of impulse to escape (stanza 5), and the antithesis of its frustration (stanza 6), the seventh stanza offers the resolution, and like stanza 4 of the previous sequence, is stated as a general truth embodied in an aphorism. The problem constructed by the opposition of the previous statement and counter-statement is that we cannot be happy with what we have because we are not content with ourselves as we are, yet we cannot escape ourselves, and therefore we cannot rid ourselves of that unhappiness. As the solution to the problem of the first three stanzas was the acceptance of what possessions one has, here it is the acceptance of the person one is. The "inner" quality of the solution is emphasized by the subject of the first clause, *animus*, and contrasted to the external aspect in the very idea of possessions, things outside oneself. But to say "we must accept ourselves as we are" answers the question by restating it, for the problem is our very inability to accept what we are. The answer lies in the tense of "what we have" and "what we are." It is our inner attitude toward the present, both elements of which are expressed in *ultra*: "Let the mind be loath to concern itself with what is outside and beyond itself," that is, with externals, and "Let the mind be happy for the moment and not worry about what is beyond the present moment." *Oderit curare quod ultra est* represents the triumph over the external, and since the "domestic" defeat of invading *curae* is the way to *otium*, it epitomizes the attainment of inner peace. In the clause itself, the *curae* who played such a rôle in lines 11-12 as the besetting and ravaging harpies and became the pursuing demon of the sixth stanza, are not warded off or eluded but stripped of animation and reduced to the lifeless remains of a mere complementary infinitive by the contempt of the man who scorns the concern for the extraneous that produces them.

No one requires an enjoiner to accept the present if it is expected to bring only happiness; but this "acceptance" implies also the unwelcome. The two are presented not as coming mixed but as being mixed, in the metaphor of a bitter cup.²⁹

²⁹ The metaphor so identified by Wickham and Kiessling-Heinze, *ad loc.*, and Pöschl, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Wickham paraphrased, ". . . when the

The connotations of the metaphor and its relation to the poem's context have not been examined closely enough, possibly because for us "accepting the bitter with the sweet" long ago wore out its vivid figurative character. Admixture of the sweet which makes the cup potable continues the running image of the table and in the complex mechanics of the poem implies a man who does not passively drink the bitter, nor reject it (to go in search of something else), but accepts the bitter as what it is, combines with it the sweet of laughter which he has at hand and can provide, and therefore himself determines the quality of the drink. He cannot direct without first accepting realistically the world and himself as they are, acknowledging both its good and the bad which will always be there, requiring the smile of irony. Herein is the answer to the problem of accepting ourselves; the poet invites us to count our blessings, here and now and within ourselves. We shall find within ourselves more of the sweet than the bitter, implied in "nothing is completely blessed" (as its opposite, "nothing is entirely bad" sees some good but more of the bad). The accounts show a profit gained, for like the *paternum salinum* it is ours already. If one recognize this, acceptance of ourselves is a good bargain, for after the reckoning of cost it still accrues to our advantage, and this is the final twist of the paradox, for the profit is not gained but already there in the refusal to gain.

The aphorism is, then, not simply pasted on by a sententious mentality for our dubious edification. That the means of accepting ourselves is an attitude toward ourselves is manifested even in the syntactical ambiguity of *lento risu*, which expresses both the means of sweetening and the manner which accompanies and illustrates the admixture. As the latter it catches the wise and happy man in the act of sweetening the bitter, for the platitude is not so much addressed by the poet to the reader as it is the wise man's gesture which embodies his attitude as he shrugs off the lesser bad and totals up the greater good. I should like to print it:

et amara lento
temperet risu, "Nihil est ab omni
parte beatum."

cup is bitter, sweeten it with the smile of patience." If *lento risu* is to be interpreted as the smile of long-suffering, the draught may yet seem none too palatable.

The irony of the smile is that of complacent security.

We have seen two sequences of thesis, antithesis, and resolution. In them the pattern of direction is the same, and on separate levels of reference their conclusion is the same, acceptance. But the second creates in relation to the first a revolving paradox on it, which casts reflections of it in various directions always counter to those of the first. Although the first series solves its own problem, the second takes a position counter to the first in its insistence that the way to peace of mind is not at all through such externals as property, but quite the opposite. The many-sided paradox that emerges from the confrontation of the two is the result of the conjunction of contradictory theses. Their relationship to the structure of the whole poem is then the same as the internal relationship of their own components.

The last three stanzas resolve the tense conflict between external and internal, apparent and actual, by the pragmatic method, observing the opposing claims as they are put to the test in the lives of specific persons. In stanza 8 the program of the resolution is announced. It begins with mythological *exempla* which seem to illustrate the platitude on which the preceding counter-thesis ended: that nothing is completely blessed. Achilles' life was glorious (*clarum*) but short (*cita mors*); Tithonus' was long (*longa senectus*) but miserably undistinguished (*minuit*). The advantage and attendant disadvantage of each are notable extremes in the span and quality of life, but they are more than just formal transitions, or mythological examples of the aphorism. They prepare the way for the pair of extremes in the last two stanzas, they restate the larger problem symbolically, and give initial shape to the solution.

It would be difficult to name a better example than Achilles of an aggressive man, the epitome of going and getting. Still, we recall that his going was not of his own choice, but dictated by an external force, and that his getting was dramatically frustrated when Briseis was taken away. In him is incarnate the image of the commander of ships and horses, and the *Cura* associated with them was a besetting presence for him. Further, the *cura* of his celebrated anger at Troy was the result of a concern for externals, his prize which was taken away. An early death overtook him, its swiftness (*cita*) reminiscent of the emphasized fleetness of *cura* (stanza 6), and the verb *abstulit* a repetition

of that used of two of the *curae*, *Timor* and *Cupido* (*aufert*, line 16). Death then is metaphorically linked to *Cura*, and his external success (his rank and reputation, expressed in *clarum*) was as defenseless in warding off the harpy-pursuer Death as were position and property (stanza 3) in warding off the *curae* there. The looming imminence of death, always ready to make off with that treasured possession, life, is a basic element to the solution of our problem: the conflicting attitudes toward *otium*, as represented by the thesis and antithesis movements, are not to be tested in suspension, but as framed in the limiting dimension of time.

Tithonus, on the other hand, is the passive and pursued man of the antithetical position in the second series. Pursued by Aurora, he was carried off by her and the span and quality of his life shaped by her decision. Whether or not he accepted his life or her arrangements is not even relevant; the direction of his life was entirely determined by another.

Gathering together the planes of suggestion in the combination of the Achilles and Tithonus *exempla*, we have a preliminary statement of the limitations to be assumed in examining the contrary claims of appearance against reality, external against internal. As we test the operation of the antithetical theses, we proceed from agreement that man directs the quality of his life by his deliberate response to the alternatives he is offered. Since lack of self-direction through the controlling response forces direction from without, and since death is always hovering overhead to seize and make off with life itself (we recall *brevi aevo* of line 17), these responses are of urgent immediacy.

This urgency is then deftly focused in the material moment of the poem and the present company, the spokesman of the Ode (it will be convenient to call him Horace) and Grosphus: perhaps this very hour will offer to one what it will have denied the other, a restatement of man's inability to direct the terms of what he will be offered, and likewise a reminder of the ever impending necessity for an immediate controlling response. As the specific advantage and disadvantage of Achilles and Tithonus was put in terms of length of life, use of so small a unit of time, *hora*, urges anew the insistence of the present and repeats the important limitation of time expressed in the metaphor of the harpy-cura-death; life can be lived only now and our control of

its quality asserted only in the present. "Quality" is suggested in the ambiguity of *negarit*: future perfect (as interpreted above), and perfect subjunctive. In the latter, it implies "the kind of thing" offered to one but denied the other.

The eighth stanza is, then, an introduction to the test of contrary theses. It sets the terms of the contest, opposite extremes in the quality of life, and recognizes the conditional limitations which circumscribe man's direction of his life. Presumption of these limitations is evident in the cases to be inspected, for each case portrays the quality of a man's life in the terms offered by his own lot; each represents that lot at the present moment. The statement of the two stanzas points the realization of each man's advantage, Grosphus' in material wealth, Horace's in inner resources. As we pursue the contrast within the limitation already set (advantages have attendant disadvantages), we see that Horace's disadvantage (*parva rura*) is more than offset by his advantage, which links him to the proverb of the seventh stanza, just as his enumeration of inner "wealth" shows him the representative of the counter-thesis of stanzas 5-7. Grosphus is pictured amid symbols of material wealth, not going or getting, but literally surrounded by his property. He is the champion of the initial thesis of stanzas 1-4. As no attendant disadvantage is mentioned we assume from the contrast with the opposite description of Horace's life that it is paucity of inner resources.³⁰

The distribution seems to be the "fair balancing of fortune,"

³⁰ Without evidence on Grosphus and his relationship with Horace, it is impossible to draw any conclusions as to the attitude of the poet toward him. There seems no reason to question the identification with the Grosphus recommended in *Epist.*, I, 12, 21-4, if he is indeed recommended in that puzzling poem. The *Epistle*, however, was written at a different time and for a different artistic purpose, and we cannot assume that Horace's perspective need be the same in both poems. His attitude in the ode could be interpreted as gentle remonstrance to a man too decent to be allowed by a friend to drift into excessive affection for his property. Or it could be humorous teasing of a well-fixed friend by one who makes rather a bravura point of his "poverty." Or it could be impatience with a man who had made some fatuous remark like, "Leisured class, indeed! Wealth like mine is a heavy burden and I must work very hard." All of this is obviously rootless conjecture, which is precisely the point. Since we have no evidence and can do no more than speculate on the poet's attitude toward Grosphus, we must concern ourselves only with the perspective and attitude of the poem.

the "broad equality of men's lots" which Wickham noted (*ad loc.*), but when they are examined in their specific components it becomes clear that any "fairness" or "equality" is only on the surface. The terms in which each case is described are animated by their own antecedent performance within the poem, and in their reappearance they become symbols drawing with them their own history. The description of Grosphus' property reintroduces symbols of the futility of the quest for *otium* (lines 7-12). *Centum* recalls the plurality of many treasures, and the *multa* of line 18; *Siculae* points to a remote and foreign place, as does *Afro* the distant source of a valuable commodity, the object of getting and going afar. It is, of course, the purple which in line 7 could not buy *otium*. More interesting, however, are two actual word-repetitions.³¹ *Circum* at the end of line 33 repeats and recalls the *circum* at the end of line 11, where it was used of worries flying like harpies around the halls of the wealthy. The racehorse suggests the wealth of the man who can afford to keep them, but it is also the symbol which triggers the image of the fast horses of stanza 6 (*turmas equitum*), horses which were not fast enough to outrun the emphasized swiftness of *Cura*. Each element of the description of Grosphus' affluence summons forward an antecedent counterpart which together ironically reshape themselves into description of the wealth that cannot buy peace and cannot drive *Cura* away.

Horace's list of his own possessions also mentions a source, and the means of acquisition. *Parca non mendax* indicates that his "possessions" were a gift; they represent his lot in life. Although his muse is characterized as Greek, the substantive in the phrase is Latin, *Camenae*, and, like the salt-cellar, inherited. This is the opposite of going and getting. His lot is not a treacherous illusion as was that of Grosphus, which bestowed an apparent felicity but one actually teeming with anxiety. The first element, *parva rura*, seems to state the disadvantage which accompanies his advantage ("You have great estates; my country place is small, but I have inner wealth"). But again the repetition of a word makes the surface assertion ironic and the

³¹ For the use of word-repetition to invest the subsequent occurrence with the additional dimension of its own previous performance, and the possibilities for irony in this technique, see H. Womble, "Repetition and Irony: Horace, Odes 2.18," *T.A.P.A.*, XCII (1961), pp. 537-49.

"disadvantage" becomes the prayed-for *otium*. *Parva* repeats the *parvo* of *vivitur parvo bene*, and identifies the good life and *otium* with Horace's acceptance of the little which he has. As the supposedly "good life" of opulence (lines 7-12) is besieged by the anxiety which also lurks everywhere in the pastoral description of Grosphus' wealth (even to the idyllic location in Sicily), the truly good life produced by acceptance of one's property (stanza 4) reappears in Horace's acceptance of his small property for what it is. There are no qualifications, no comparisons with any other estate, only brief and simple acceptance.

His inner wealth, the breath of the Greek Muse, is, like his farm, meager, and here in the final stanza *tenuem* follows *parva*, as *tenui* in line 14 followed *parvo* in line 13, the repetition directing the identification of Horace's inner wealth with the good life and the achievement of *otium*, just as repetition of *parvo* linked to them his material possessions.³² It has often been observed by commentators that *tenuis*, as a translation of *λεπτός*, refers also to a style of poetry; more recently it has been shown that it implies the *γένος λεπτόν* of Callimachus, which eschewed the imposing dimensions of epic and tragedy.³³ The poet accepts the Muse's gift as it is, and *tenuem* suggests his disinclination to seek "greater" themes beyond his muse, both in the extrinsic

³² Commager, *op. cit.*, p. 334, sees the link as something less than firm: "Horace's tranquil withdrawal to his farm balances the picture of those forever in flight from themselves (19-20): his *parva rura* (37) recall the man 'living well on little' (*vivitur parvo bene*, 13); and perhaps in *spiritum tenuem* (38) it is legitimate to catch an echo of *mensa tenui* (14). The verbal associations are only tentative, but they are clear enough to show that Horace's reference to his poetry is not an afterthought but an integral part of the poem's progress." One will heartily agree that the last stanza is "an integral part of the poem's progress," and perhaps question whether in fact any Horatian stanza can today be seriously regarded an "afterthought."

³³ L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 119 ff.; H. J. Mette, "'genus tenue' und 'mensa tenuis' bei Horaz," *Mus. Helv.*, XVIII (1961), pp. 136-9; Commager, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 ff. Mette interprets the association of Horace's style of life with his style of poetry as an aesthetic perception of the mutual "rightness" of each for the other. Commager, in his interesting chap. VI, "The World of Art," elevates it into the embodiment of Horace's aesthetic self-consciousness, the form he assumed to express the quality of his peculiar artistic experience.

reference to the γένος λεπτόν and within the Ode by the coupling with its own earlier appearance as a component of the assertion that acceptance of what we have is the means to *otium*.

The last of the enumerated "advantages" of Horace's lot, *malignum spernere volgus*, is interpreted by Commager as an additional facet of Horace's literary self-awareness, the Alexandrian pride in the exclusiveness of its erudition.³⁴ He misses, however, the humor created by the poet at his own expense if we interpret it as his acceptance of the smallness of his audience along with that of his farm and his muse ("See how blessed I am with inner wealth! Fate has given me a small country place, but on the other hand the muse of a lesser genre and, thankfully, the capacity not to be disturbed by the meagerness of my reading public"). Isolated from the context of the poem, combined and compared with other passages, the three gifts which the poet acknowledges as possessions do good service in Commager's sensitive explication of the "world of art" of the whole collection. But within the inner complex of this ode, the three "possessions" do not align themselves into such a distinction of literary aspects of the poet's life as separate from his life in general.

Interpreted within the context of the poem, the third "possession" sets the seal of affirmation on the achievement of *otium*, a feat which in itself distinguishes the wise man who knows the means to peace from the misguided mob that pursues it by futile means and begrudges its attainment by others. The envy of the crowd is evidence of their failure to accept their own lots and consequently of their inevitable frustration in the quest for *otium*. The poet's scorn of them represents his acceptance of himself and his confidence in his own self-sufficiency. Their opinions and commotions are of no concern to him since they can contribute nothing to his self-ordered competence. To the composed security of the mind at peace with itself, they are alien and to be kept at a distance so as not to disturb that composure. His disdain is both the efficient cause of the distance and the

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 41, "Among the coterie audiences of the Alexandrian age, readers were often as learned as writers, and the neoteric ideal of the *doctus poeta* celebrated the same narrowness of appeal . . . Horace was equally quick to reject the *malignum vulgus* as an audience for his *tenuis spiritus*—let only a handful of learned friends approve his verse!"

acknowledgment of their externality. So the crowd is a menace to be regarded seriously and must be defensively kept "external," for if his distance from them is not resolutely maintained, they will produce in him the *cura* that will rob him of his peace of mind. In warding off the crowd he fends off the *curae* in ambush within it, as the treasures, the consular retainer, and the coffered ceilings of the third stanza could not.

The tension of counter claims which opposite and contradictory positions profess as each pretends to attainment of *otium* is resolved with its achievement in the last stanza. But neither competitor has won. The tenth stanza realizes *otium*, but in doing so it turns Horace's disadvantage, his insignificant financial worth as symbolized in his small farm, into an advantage by identifying his small homestead with the modest home of the fourth stanza and its achievement of *otium* and the good life. The poem rejects then the exclusive claims of both theses, and unites the material with the spiritual, possessions with inner resources, the external with the internal. Peace of mind is reached through conciliating synthesis of the two extremes, through acceptance and therefore contentment with one's present portion, both external and internal, through realization that although we cannot determine the character or dimensions of the portion fate allots, the nature of our acceptance of it determines the quality of our lives.

One will perhaps respond that this resolution is inevitable in such a conflict of theses, since the construction of antithetical extremes was obviously unrealistic and artificial; life cannot be lived (or serenity achieved) exclusively in terms of either the external or the internal. But any inevitability is the creation of the poem, and common sense and the realistic and practical perception of the obvious are not of themselves inevitable in poetry, or out of it.

Some final comment should be made about the structure of the poem, especially since the pattern of its ordering seen by this study is at variance with previous analyses. N. E. Collinge has said, "Horace has driven critics to probe and analyze and regroup the stanzas of this ode *ad nauseam*,"³⁵ the remark prefacing his own dissection. Let me preface the outline of its composition here offered with the preliminary statement of my

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

persuasion that analysis of a poem's structure cannot be conducted apart from close examination of the poem. The conclusions of structural study are convincing or not, as the explication of the whole poem is or is not successful. To analyze only the ordering of constituent overt statements made by a poem must imply that other non-assertive content and relationships are somehow additional aspects which can be isolated from the "blocks of sense,"³⁶ and what intends to be exploration of the composition of the poem often proves to be an abbreviated paraphrase of the "statement" thereby extracted from the poem.

Hence the labelling terms employed in the present structural synopsis are general designations indicating direction and relationship, and words actually present and operative in the poem are avoided. It is difficult, if not impossible, for such operative terms to plot the inversions, irony, paradoxes which they themselves cause to happen in the poem. Further, the most important of the actual words of the poem are not static; they refuse to stand still, so to speak, to have their picture taken, but insist upon breaking rank to consort with each other. To use these active terms to describe their own course would, if accurate as to their complex interplay, result in such complicated configurations that the outline would merely restate abstractly all the problems of understanding the poem's mode of direction. Such considerations stated, the following outline of the ode's structure is offered as it stands forth in the present interpretation.³⁷

I Thesis: External	{	Problem	{ thesis, 1-6: Impulse "toward"
			antithesis, 7-12: Its frustration in futility of the means employed
		Solution	resolution, 13-16: Acceptance

³⁶ Collinge's term, *op. cit.*, p. 56. It is nevertheless everywhere evident in his discerning judgments throughout the book that he does not equate the poem with a paraphrase of it, or its structure with an outline of the interrelationships in such a paraphrase. The problem in examination of a poem's "argumentative structure" as distinguished from its "poetic structure" is succinctly put by Kenneth Quinn, *Latin Explorations* (London, 1963), p. 12, n. 1.

³⁷ Designations appropriate to choral poetry (strophe, antistrophe, epode, triad) are not used because for me the metrical associations of the terms render them more distracting than helpful. Those who find useful the analogy, to Horatian patterning, of choral argument and metrical direction can easily make the obvious substitutions of terminology.

II	{	Problem	{ thesis, 17-20: Impulse "away from"
Counter- Thesis: Internal			antithesis, 21-24: Its frustration in futi- ty of the means em- ployed
		Solution	resolution, 25-28: Acceptance
III			29-32: Introduction and pre- liminary limitations
Synthesis:			33-36: The position of I re- jected
Theses tested			37-40: The reconciled posi- tions of I and II suc- cessful

In proposing a more complex interrelationship in which the inner articulation of the major divisions is ordered according to the same pattern as that of the major divisions in their relation to each other on the scale of the whole poem, the present analysis recognizes in either the smaller or larger scale most of the divisions seen both by Büchner (three groups of three stanzas) and by those who find five groups of two stanzas. The single exception is the break seen by the proponents of the latter system at the end of the second stanza. The present analysis indicates a counter-movement initiated at line 7 and continued through line 12, the break punctuated by the name of the ode's addressee and the union of lines 7 and 8 with the following stanza directed by the chain of negatives. Although this interpretation regards lines 7-12 as embodying also a unity of denotative content, if not of overt statement, it may be difficult for some to accept a change of direction in mid-stanza, even mid-sentence. Rather than attempting to evade the problem by tinkering with the punctuation and putting a semi-colon after *auro* in line 8, the present analysis submits that the course of the poem, though not of the sentence, has a break at the mention of Grosphus' name and after the break takes a course counter to the direction of its movement through line 6.

HILBURN WOMBLE.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

INTEGRATION AND THE UNDESCENDED SOUL IN PLOTINUS.

"Since I should be bold enough to speak more clearly what seems to me to be true contrary to the opinions of others, even our human soul has not entirely sunk, but there is some aspect of it for ever in the intelligible world" (*Enn.*, IV, 8, 8, 1-3).

Plotinus speaks in this tone nowhere else in the *Enneads*. The tone betokens the extreme importance he attaches to the doctrine, here for the first time expounded,¹ that something of the soul remains above in the intelligible world. *Ennead* IV, 8 is number six in Porphyry's chronological list.

"If we are told that the soul of man is tripartite and that since it is composite it will be dissolved,² we shall say that when pure souls are released they will put away everything that has been fastened to them at birth, but that the others will live with this longer."³

This text, one of the very few in the *Enneads* to refer clearly to the famous Platonic doctrine of the tripartite soul, is from *Ennead*, IV, 7, 14, 8 ff. *Ennead* IV, 7 is number two in Porphyry's chronological list. Plotinus is apparently explaining the simplicity of the soul in the terms of the tenth book of Plato's *Republic* where Plato compares the highest element of the soul to the sea-god Glaucus who needs to have his barnacles and seaweed stripped off in order to appear in his pristine splendour and simplicity. Similarly the highest part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν) must divest itself of the two lower elements it has taken on at birth. Plotinus refers to this passage of the *Republic* again in I, 1, 12, the last but one of the treatises, but this time, although considering once again the problem of whether the soul is composite, he makes no mention whatever of tripartition.

The series of problems we wish to consider arises from Plotinus' apparent unwillingness to take very much notice of

¹ Cf. II, 9, 2, 4; III, 8, 5, 10; IV, 8, 4, 3; 3, 12, 5; V, 1, 10.

² The text is corrupt at this point but the basic sense is clear and the reference to tripartition certain. See Henry and Schwyzler's *apparatus criticus*.

³ Reading πλείον for πλείστον with Harder.

the tripartition of the soul.⁴ They are as follows: What is the relation of the Plotinian "soul above" to the λογιστικόν part of the soul in Plato? If Plotinus tacitly dropped tripartition was it because his own doubts of its adequacy are in fact confirmed by a hesitancy (if not a series of contradictions) he could observe in the text of Plato himself?⁵ And if Plotinus changed the Platonic doctrines, even unwittingly, why did he do so? Above all why is he so comparatively strident in IV, 8 when introducing his novel opinion "contrary to the opinions of others" that the whole soul does not descend?

Whatever his views on the subject of the tripartition in the *Laws*,⁶ Plato nowhere repudiates the doctrine which he expounds at length especially in the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*. Interpreters have long disputed how Plato reconciled this theory with the earlier view of the *Phaedo* that the soul is pre-eminently simple (78C).⁷ Taylor had long ago indicated the area in which a solution to this could be found.⁸ Discussing the comparison of the souls of both men and Gods to a charioteer and two horses, and with particular reference to the word συμφύτω in the phrase εοικέτω δὴ συμφύτω δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνίοχου (*Phaedr.*, 246C), he observes that "Συμφύτω here should mean, as the word regularly does in Plato, literally *concretæ*, 'grown together into

⁴ Apart from IV, 7, 14, 8 ff., tripartition (or at least the three elements τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμικόν, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) occurs at I, 2, 1, 18-20—a passage which seems to be merely a repetition of school doctrine (cf. Albinus, *Didasc.*, 29). We find tripartition again (also in a discussion of ethics) at III, 6, 2, 26-32, while the discussion in III, 6, 2 itself is referred to at III, 6, 4, 4. Tripartition is mentioned, though not employed, at VI, 1, 12, 6, while the distinction between τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν and τὸ θυμικόν is criticized at IV, 4, 28, 63 ff.

Dr. H. Blumenthal, who has discussed these passages in detail in an unpublished Cambridge dissertation on Plotinus' psychology, rightly concludes that Plotinus rejects tripartition as a basis for serious psychology.

⁵ On the general subject of Plotinus' attitude towards such "contradictions" see J. M. Rist, *Eros and Psyche* (Toronto, 1964).

⁶ Cf. D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *J.H.S.*, LXXVII (1957), p. 112.

⁷ Cf. especially W. K. C. Guthrie, "Plato's Views on the Immortality of the Soul," *Entretiens Hardt*, III (1955), pp. 4-22.

⁸ *Plato: The Man and His Work* (Paperback edition, London, 1960), p. 307.

one.' It is inserted in order to insist on the *unity* of the individual mind (does Taylor mean 'soul'?). We are to think of the driver and his horses as a single organism." Plato continues by remarking that the horses and the charioteer of the souls of the Gods are wholly good, that is, that goodness is the unity and bond of the soul.⁹

If the idea that goodness is the unifying bond of the soul is developed and if its full implications are brought out, it will be found to conflict with the tripartition theory as Plato normally expounds it. The classic text for Plato's opinions of the ultimate simplicity of the soul is *Republic*, 612A, the passage about Glauco. When the sea-god (the soul) is cleaned up, we shall see whether its essential nature is simple or manifold (*εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής*). There is no doubt as to Plato's view here: the soul is essentially simple and appears manifold only because of being involved in the cycle of births and deaths.¹⁰ The essential soul, that is, is obscured by the lower elements derived from the body. This view, it should be added, is the foundation of the doctrine of the *Timaeus* that the highest element, the immortal λογιστικόν, now called νοῦς, is situated in the head while the merely mortal parts are in the chest and abdomen (69 E ff.), and ultimately also for the tendency of the Academy (doubtless represented by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1102a28 ff.) that in the soul can be distinguished two elements, a rational and an irrational.

According to the doctrine of the tripartite soul it is the highest element, called both τὸ λογιστόν and νοῦς which is immortal, which is the pure gold buried in the dross of the bodily aspects of soul, which is pre-eminently simple. Presumably therefore νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικόν cannot sin and is the good of the soul. It is because of the unsullied intellect that Plato can echo the Socratic view and say in the *Timaeus* "No one is willingly bad" (*Tim.*, 86D).¹¹ Yet all this does not fully accord with what we have seen in the *Phaedrus* myth; there it turned out to be not the charioteer (τὸ λογιστικόν) who was the unifying factor of goodness, but that there is a goodness permeating both the charioteer and his

⁹ Cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14; Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

¹⁰ Cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹¹ Cf. *Prot.*, 358C, etc.

horses yet in some way transcendent over both of them. In other words the problem is as follows: Does Plato hold that "pure and essential soul" is τὸ λογιστικόν, one of the "parts" of the tripartite soul? Or is tripartition itself an arrangement which is transcended by the true soul (or self)?

There are other considerations which complicate the problem further. We know from the myth of Er that there are utterly corrupted souls; we know from the *Laws* that certain criminals are past all reform (854E); in the *Gorgias* when the naked souls are judged in the underworld, if they have been involved in heinous crimes during their life on earth, these crimes leave their scars which, presumably, cannot be obliterated (524E). These souls too are often incurable; punishment in the underworld is inflicted as a warning to others (525C).

There is a difference then between the naked soul, that is, the soul free from the body, and the essential soul, which is τὸ λογιστικόν or νοῦς. Although all evil is in some sense involuntary, yet some souls are incurable! If evil is ultimately involuntary there must be a part of the soul which is free of it, and this presumably would be the god-like λογιστικόν; if souls are incurable, however, this godlike element can become so marked by evil that its essential character is changed. Presumably in the case of the incurable sinner Plato would have to say that τὸ λογιστικόν is damaged and has sinned. There is an underlying lack of clarity here. Plato does not commit himself finally as to whether the essential aspect of the soul can sin.

We must now return to the other problem: what is this essential aspect of the soul? According to the theory of tripartition all cognitive aspects of the soul are classed under τὸ λογιστικόν, but in the *Republic* itself there is a discussion of modes of knowing which might make us wonder about how seriously Plato would take such a classification. In the divided line section of book six Plato distinguishes, among other things, between διάνοια and νόησις.¹² Νόησις operates with Forms alone; διάνοια is compelled to use verbal or sensible examples. Clearly error cannot arise at the level of νόησις; it can however arise at the level of διάνοια. Within the division τὸ λογιστικόν, therefore, we can

¹² See now D. Gallop, "Image and Reality in Plato's *Republic*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XLVII (1965), pp. 119-24.

distinguish a more and a less perfect faculty. If this is so, then the notion of a tripartite division of the soul is at the least misleading, for the really important division of the soul must surely be between the pure and the corruptible, the infallible and the fallible. Perhaps one should determine, as Plato did not, that νοῦς and τὸ λογιστικόν should not be identified—as they seem to be in the theory of tripartition where the λογιστικόν of the *Republic* is apparently to be identified with the νοῦς of the *Timaeus*. What would happen if a later thinker developed a theory along these lines?

Plato is not a mystic if a mystic is someone who either desires union with God, or who identifies himself with God, or who identifies himself with the external world, or who attempts to isolate the pure soul from all things.¹³ But in a number of important respects his philosophical predicament can be compared with that of the mystic. One of these respects affects our present problem. If a man sins, according to the myth of Er and other Platonic writings, he may be reincarnated at a lower level: a bad man will be reincarnated as a woman, a woman as a beast, Thersites as an ape. But how, we may ask, is it possible ever to reascend the scale? How can the soul in the beast return to being human? If it is in a beast it will presumably be beastly. A humane tiger is hard to conceive. And Plato himself admits that some souls are irredeemable. It almost seems as though the errors of one life will doom many men for eternity; their souls will be perpetually scarred. It would seem as though if a soul is ever to reascend in the hierarchy of life it must possess an unsullied phase or part. Such a part would certainly be θεῖον, and godly in its intuitive possession of knowledge. It would not have to be identified with the reasoning element in man, since it would exclude any faculty liable to error. It would have to be a second self, lying behind the empirical ego of, perhaps, three parts. Plato, who certainly holds at times that there is an essential, pure and sinless soul, never takes this further step of dissociating it from the tripartite soul of normal life, though his use of the word γένος (class) instead of μέρος (part) for the phases of the soul in the *Timaeus* (e. g. at 69D)

¹³ For these varieties see R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane* (Oxford, 1957).

may be a move in this direction. It seems likely, however, that it was his own theory of tripartition which prevented him from taking the further step.

Plotinus' doctrine that part of the soul remains above was recognized as novel and widely believed to be unplatonic. It is a "new theory" according to Proclus,¹⁴ and Proclus, Damascius, and Hermias all recognize it as peculiar to Plotinus.¹⁵ Hermias argues against it on the grounds that the Ideal State of the *Republic* would last forever if the souls of the Guardians did not descend. We must assume from this, he believes, that the doctrine is unplatonic and that in Plato's view the charioteer, the highest aspect of soul according to the *Phaedrus*, is subject to evil (*κακύνεσθαι*). This probably is the position of the *Phaedrus*, though Plato leaves the matter there somewhat ambiguous, as our earlier discussion has led us to expect. In human souls, Plato thinks, the evil horse will weigh the charioteer down (*ρέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων*) unless he trains him well. But it is not certain how the metaphor of weighing down should be cashed. Obviously it means that humans sin; but it is not certain that it means that the charioteer actually consents to sin, as the adversaries of Plotinus must have taken it. Indeed such a view would flatly oppose the dictum that "no one is bad willingly." Again Plato's problem: Is sin a deliberately and fully recognized act of the will or is it an obscuration of a higher self? The former interpretation is in opposition to that of Plotinus and is best summed up by Iamblichus: *εἰ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀμαρτάνει, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχὴ*;¹⁶ For Iamblichus a deliberate choice, a deliberate act of the will, is involved.

We noticed at the beginning of this discussion the striking way in which Plotinus introduces his novel doctrine of the soul above "contrary to the opinions of others." We have now examined something of the situation which underlies that doctrine as it is revealed in the writings of Plato. And we have seen how Hermias appeals to the *Phaedrus* against Plotinus' view. If we now turn to *Ennead*, II, 9, 2, we see what is unmistakably the language of the *Phaedrus* being used by Plotinus to reject the normal interpretation of the *Phaedrus* if not the

¹⁴ In *Tim.*, III, 323, 5 (Diehl).

¹⁵ Cf. Henry and Schwyzer's references to IV, 8, 8.

¹⁶ *Apud* Proclum, In *Tim.*, III, 334, 7.

Phaedrus itself. Plotinus has distinguished three aspects of the soul—though these aspects are not necessarily to be taken as Platonic parts. He calls them the upper, the middle, and the lower. When the lower is dragged down it sometimes drags the middle down with it, but, continues Plotinus solemnly, “It is not in the nature of things for the whole soul to be dragged down.” This is certainly the *language* of the *Phaedrus*, but the doctrine is different. For Plato the charioteer of the human soul can be dragged down (though we observed that that phrase is ambiguous); for Plotinus the upper phase cannot be dragged down.

What are the three phases of the soul in II, 9, 2? They do not appear to correspond to the Platonic parts. Leaving the “upper soul” aside for a moment we can identify the middle phase with what Plotinus calls τὸ λογιστικόν at III, 6, 2, 22. This λογιστικόν is not what Plato calls νοῦς; nor is it the Plotinian νοῦς; it is from νοῦς (παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, III, 6, 2, 31). The sharp distinction, therefore, between νοῦς and τὸ λογιστικόν in Plotinus must be recognized. It is drawn clearly again in V, 3, 3, 23 ff., parts of which deserve quotation at some length: “We shall not say that νοῦς is part of the soul (understood as τὸ λογιστικόν plus the lower phases), but we will speak of ‘our νοῦς’ . . . It is ours and not ours . . . For we are not νοῦς, therefore we operate according to νοῦς (κατ’ ἐκείνο) by our primary λογιστικόν . . . We ourselves are discursive reasoners and we think our thoughts in our understanding (διάνοια).”

The μέσον of II, 9, 2, therefore, is τὸ λογιστικόν, διάνοια; perhaps it is the second type of knowing faculty recognized by Plato in the Divided Line. And the lower element of II, 9, 2 is therefore all the rest of the soul’s phases, sensation, the faculty of desire, of reproduction, of nourishment. There is no need to assume that the lower element consists of any clearly defined number of parts or faculties. Plotinus is capable of using Platonic, Aristotelian, or any other distinctions here as he sees fit. If there were a tripartite division of the soul in Plotinus, therefore, with τὸ λογιστικόν at the top, it would be *below* the level of the upper soul which is eternally in contact with νοῦς in contemplation. Later philosophers of Neoplatonic inclination, such as Avicenna, make such a doctrine explicit.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cf. Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

We can now understand why IV, 7, 14, 11 (a part of one of the very earliest of Plotinus' writings, as we saw) is one of the very few specific references to the Platonic tripartition of the soul in the *Enneads*. In that section Plotinus has to allude to the doctrine of the *Republic* that the sea-god Glaucus, representing τὸ λογιστικόν, is the pure upper soul. But this view turns out to be inconvenient for Plotinus' philosophy as a whole, where he wishes to use τὸ λογιστικόν in a different way and with different ends in view. To speak of the upper, the middle, and the lower soul, as in II, 9, 2, is more satisfactory, because these phrases may be used to refer to indefinite numbers of parts or faculties. The lower soul may include, for example, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμοειδές, or again the totality of the faculties of the non-rational soul of Aristotle.

In an analysis of the phases of the soul, such as we find in *Ennead*, V, 3, 3, little is made of the importance of the distinction between the upper soul and the rest, but in II, 9, 2, IV, 8, 8, and elsewhere this distinction is all important. This is the essence of Plotinus' "novel theory" and he must have had a very good reason for introducing it. In fact although the reason is apparent to the reader of the *Enneads* Plotinus nowhere makes it explicit. It is a doctrine which must originate in Plotinus' confidence, based on personal mystical experience, that a return to the sources of the soul, to Νοῦς and to One, is possible for every soul. For such a return to excellence is possible in Plotinus, as in Plato, by the soul's own efforts. The soul needs no further help from the One, or from Gods or saviours (III, 2, 8-9) to enable it to return, for it has been generated from eternity with the necessary powers within itself. Yet although Plato, like Plotinus, thinks that man can be "saved" by his own efforts, he fails to make clear on what psychological theory such a doctrine is based. In Plotinus, however, the psychological theory is made explicit: it is the theory of the undescended part of the soul. If man can identify his empirical self, his ego, which, according to V, 3, 3, is fundamentally his λογιστικόν, but which Plotinus more usually thinks of as the combination of the λογιστικόν and the lower phases—if he can identify this ego with his upper soul, then his newly integrated personality will enjoy the contemplation of the Νοῦς and the possibility of the return to the One which the upper soul always enjoys.

For in Plotinus' view it is a psychological fact that there are many phases of our psychological make-up which continue to function without our being aware of them (IV, 8, 8, 7). It is only when the particular phase is brought into union with the "whole soul" that we become aware of its operations.

When speaking in the tenth book of the *Republic* of the uncovering of Glaucus, the revealing of the pure soul, Plato has in mind a doctrine of what we might call two selves, an empirical and an eternal self, but he has not succeeded, as we have seen, in integrating this view with his whole psychological outlook, or at least in explaining that outlook unambiguously. Plotinus, on the other hand, is in no doubt here and we shall speak from now on therefore of his "empirical self" (to be identified with the everyday conscious personality) and of his "second self," his "soul above." In V, 3, 3, as we have seen, Plotinus holds that the "we" in us is normally to be thought of as the rational-discursive element, but he makes it clear that we can identify this element either with the Intelligible World, presumably through identity with the "soul above," or with any of the lower phases or images of soul, beginning with the power of sense-perception. Naturally our happiness will depend on the identifications we make. Just as union with the One, the power which is creative of finite being, is the highest joy, so union with the non-being of matter is the ultimate misery.

Before considering this union or integration we should look briefly at a few more texts in which the two selves are discussed and where Plotinus points out that the guide to the importance of an activity is by no means merely our consciousness of it. In V, 3, 9 he refers to our "second self" as a "first soul," but his normal mode of reference is to an "inner" and an "outer" man. Throughout sections IV, 3, 30-2 the theme is discussed. The doctrine of IV, 8 that the upper soul functions continually in the intelligible world, though we are not always aware of it, occurs again in IV, 3, 30: "Thinking is different from awareness of thinking, for we think (*νοοῦμεν*) continually but are not continually aware of thinking." And indeed in section 31 Plotinus speaks of "each soul," as though we were dealing not merely with phases of a soul, but with two entities different in kind but which are able to harmonize with one another. And

in chapter 32 we find the lower soul distinguished by name. Finally this section distinguishes two Herculeses—a favourite *topos* of Plotinus: "That Hercules would speak of his feats, but the other man is he who considers all these as petty, who is translated to a holier place, who has become a member of the Intelligible World and got beyond Hercules by strength in the contests of the wise." This "Hercules beyond" is the soul integrated with its higher self.¹⁸

If Plotinus tends towards speaking of two souls in some treatises, elsewhere he prefers the terminology of the inner and outer man. If Socrates joins in childish activities he does so in the "outer Socrates," we read at III, 2, 15, 58. And discussing the place of friendship in the life of the wise man, Plotinus tells us that sometimes friendship is natural to the inner man (ὁ ἐνδον ἄνθρωπος, I, 1, 10, 15). That there is a second self, an inner man, a soul above, being clear, and the need for its existence in Plotinus' scheme being demonstrated, it remains for us to consider the relation of the two selves (bearing in mind Plato's views on the subject) and in particular to examine this relation in the case of the best soul, the soul of the philosopher. For it is both our duty and our advantage to raise our souls to this level. A brief look at parts of *Ennead*, I, 4, *On Happiness*, is therefore required.

In Plotinus' system as a whole the Intelligible World is the world of reality, of true being, while matter is non-being, nothingness, privation of being. In the sphere of morals it follows that the assimilation of the self to the Intelligible World is marked by virtue ("Without true virtue 'God' on the lips is a mere word," II, 9, 15, 39-40), while a perverse longing for assimilation with matter, that is, in fact, with non-being, leads to vice.¹⁹ For our present purposes we are only concerned with virtue; and the philosopher who possesses true virtue can be seen in I, 4 as the happy man who has integrated his empirical self with the higher soul. All men are potentially or actually happy (I, 4, 4, 9 ff.). This means, for Plotinus, that all men possess the second self, but while in the majority this second

¹⁸ Cf. I, 1, 12, 31 ff.; IV, 3, 27, 23.

¹⁹ Cf. J. M. Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil," *Phronesis*, VI (1961), pp. 154-66.

self is only part (*μέρος*) of their total psychological make-up, in the case of the philosopher the ego has become identified with or perhaps integrated with the higher soul. It has become the higher self in actuality (*ἐνεργεία ἐπὶ τοῦτο*), says Plotinus. What exactly does he mean by this? What kind of integration does he refer to? The answer is given in the following sentence. When this integration is achieved the lower elements become as garments lying about the upper soul; they are now recognized as wholly inessential and really are inessential. They can no longer be called parts of the soul (*μέρη*), since they clothe the true self without any act of will on its part. They are the pure accidents of earthly life.

Integration then seems to change the status of the empirical self—or, more accurately, it enables a man to see the correct status of that self in the ordinary life of everyday humanity and to form in himself a new “self,” a self realized by identification with the upper soul. Such identification is the felt realization of immortality, of the goodness of Providence, of the existence in eternal reality of the world of Forms. Presumably man can still lose this new-found integration during human life, for in Plotinus’ view the Stoics were wrong to suppose that the sage could not sin, but obviously the fully integrated self is unlikely to degenerate and will reach heaven (if we may use the word metaphorically to show the emotional force of the theory) if he dies in this holy state.

One possible misconception should be cleared up. When the human ego is reformed and integration with the second self takes place, Plotinus does not teach that the goal of mysticism has been attained. The emergence of the true personality of man is not, as in certain Indian systems, an isolation of the immortal soul apart from all things. It is, as we have seen, the felt realization of immortality and a partaking in the Intelligible World. These two, however, are inextricably bound up together, and since the soul is then in contact with the intelligible world it will enjoy non-discursive knowledge and understanding of the nature of all things. Such understanding will involve an understanding of the utter dependence of all things on the One as first cause. Hence integration of the personality will mean not the isolation of the soul as a monad, but the

placing of the soul on the upward path to union with the One. Integration is an earlier step, and in Plotinus' world each upward step leads to another until the goal of union with the One is reached. "Anyone not of the strength to lay hold of the first Soul, that possessing pure intellect, must grasp that which has to do with our ordinary thinking and thence ascend: if even this proves too hard, let him turn to account the sensitive phase which carries the ideal forms of the less fine degree, that phase which, too, with its powers, is immaterial and lies just within the realm of Ideal-principles. One may even, if it seems necessary, begin as low as the reproductive Soul and its very production and thence make the ascent, mounting from these ultimate ideal principles to the ultimates in the highest sense, that is to the primals" (V, 3, 9, 30-5, trans. MacKenna-Page).

Full recognition of the second self then is not a static situation but an entry on the road to the One. Yet it is a vital step, perhaps indeed *the* vital step which the sage must take. It is such recognition which primarily distinguishes the wise man from the ordinary mass of humanity.

Now that we see what Plotinus means by his "upper soul" and how we are to understand identification with it we may add a few reflections on the idea of the naked soul. The theme is Platonic and by Plotinus' times had become traditional. Often in the traditional versions we hear of the stripping off of tunics which have accumulated around the soul, sometimes during its descent through the planetary spheres.²⁰ In Plotinus' treatise *On Happiness* (I, 4), as we have seen, we find the doctrine that when the ego is re-integrated with the upper soul all the lower parts become as it were garments draped about the self during earthly life, but irrelevant and recognized as irrelevant to its true nature. We can now see one reason why in a famous passage of I, 6, 7 Plotinus compares the ascent of the soul to the process of initiation into a mystery religion. The soul, he says, must divest itself of the clothing it has put on during its descent and must return to the Good its source, just as the initiates of the mysteries strip themselves naked before entering the holy of holies. Such ceremonial stripping is a widespread

²⁰ Cf. P. Wendland, "Das Gewand der Eitelkeit," *Hermes*, LI (1916), pp. 481-5.

custom, quite unrelated, of course, to the orgies of immoral cults; it signifies the casting off of the old man. But clothes cannot be cast off unless they are recognized as clothes; and the lower phases of the soul cannot cease to trouble the wise man until he realizes that they are lower. When the devotee of the mysteries is living in the outside world, his clothes are as it were the badge of life at a secular level; when he enters the sanctuary and divests himself of them he is "alone with the Alone" with his God. Similarly the soul of the mystic, once fully integrated and by itself or "naked," will progress to the One. His soul will not be scarred, like those of the evil-doers in the *Gorgias*, but pure and whole.

Finally let us summarize Plotinus' position, for the theories discussed in this paper are some of his most important contributions to ancient thought and deserve much wider recognition than they have been accorded hitherto. There is a second self in all men, above the empirical level, which functions regardless of the activities at that level. The second self is eternally in contact with the intelligible world. It is the aim of the philosopher to reorientate his empirical self in accordance with this second self. If he achieves this end he can recognize his immortality, understand the nature of his unintegrated empirical ego and proceed to the ultimate union with the One. It seems highly likely that Plato, with his problems about whether the soul is essentially simple or multiform, was groping towards a position of this sort. As so often Plotinus was the man able to read Plato's intentions behind the apparently conflicting statements in the dialogues. That Plotinus saw further than Plato in these matters is certain; that he saw further in the same direction is, to my mind, equally certain.

JOHN M. RIST.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, TORONTO.

CATULLUS 67: INTERPRETATION AND FORM.¹

The sixty-seventh poem of Catullus, a poem that has prompted scholars to enormous efforts in the attempt to unravel its "enigma," seems oddly out of place between the highly polished Callimachean *Lock of Berenice* and poem 68, which is probably the finest and certainly the most intricate of all Catullus' works. For poem 67 is a dramatic divertissement, highly colloquial in its phrasing, of clearly comic intent, in which Catullus frames a dialogue between a housedoor and an interlocutor (or possibly interlocutors) in order to lampoon a fellow townsman and spread scandalous gossip about him and his family. Except for its metre and relative length and its curious and elaborate form, it would seem to belong rather with the polymetric poems, especially the polymetric narratives such as 17 and 22, than here among the major efforts, for it is a slender joke, worked out neatly and easily, more savage than Catullus is wont to be in his long poems and less probing. But it is not without subtleties, and its dramatic form, which sets it off from everything else in the collection, may have been as much as anything what determined its place here. Poem 66 is a translation accompanied by a prefatory letter, poem 65; in 66 the voice is not the poet's own but that of the constellation of the *Lock of Berenice*. Poem 68 is a searching examination of the threads of connexion in the personal tragedy that has overwhelmed the poet; it too is accompanied by a prefatory letter. There the voice is constantly and insistently the poet's own, and he speaks with anguish and intensity. In 67 the principal voice is that of the housedoor, called upon to defend itself; the other voice, or voices, are secondary and lack clear personality. But in 66 the voice of the *Lock* had nothing but praise for the queen who had sacrificed

¹ There is an extensive literature on this poem but nothing I have found helpful, except for the commentaries in the editions of M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis (Turin, 1958) and W. Kroll (3rd ed., Stuttgart, 1959). Those interested in other interpretations may consult F. O. Copley, *Exclusus Amator: A Study in Latin Love Poetry* (Philological Monographs published by the American Philological Association, XVII), pp. 48-51, and the literature cited there. Two articles are perhaps worth special note: F. O. Copley in *T.A.P.A.*, LXXX (1949), pp. 245-53 and G. Perotta in *Athenaeum*, n. s. V (1927), pp. 160-90.

her hair for her husband and lamented only the fate of being separated from her, while in 67 the door heaps opprobrium on its former mistress, vilifies her, and publishes the guilty secrets of the house to the world. Thus 66 and 67 stand in sharp contrast to one another in their very conception, and this contrast extends to other particulars. The *Lock of Berenice* is written in court style, about the stately connubial loves of royalty, in phrases of dignity burdened with learning; but poem 67 is written in racy dialogue, with phrases sometimes descending to easy vulgarity and obscenity, about the seamy side of a disgusting provincial household. The relationship of 67 to 66 is easy to see as one of contrast; it is less easy to see a relation between 67 and 68. But 67 brings us back from the extravagant world of Alexandria to that of Verona, to the world we associate intimately with our poet, and 68 is a fusion of the two worlds, the world of Troy and heroic myth with the world in which he moved with Lesbia and Allius. And as in 67 the personification of the housedoor is the central poetic mechanism, in 68 the central figure is that of a house and the way this has dominated and shaped the lives and happiness of the lovers. The juxtaposition of the two poems is highly artificial, even contrived, but not meaningless; 67 is a preparation for 68 in a very real way. And if we are shocked by the brazen coarseness of 67 we may find the delicacy and pathos of 68 the more poignant.

The poem opens with a salutation to a housedoor. As usual, Catullus plunges directly into his matter without preliminaries but provides us with the necessary clues to understanding what he is about. The speaker must be a woman and the mistress of the house, or just conceivably someone in a wedding party speaking on behalf of a bride, for no one else would greet the door spontaneously as *dulci iucunda uiro*, as we find in the first line. The word *dulcis* is regularly used by Catullus in connection with conjugal love,—one need only cite in proof its use in the poems to either side of this, 66, 33 and 68, 106—and to try to see this as the comment of either the poet or some chance passerby familiar with the household is to fly in the face of the simple and straightforward. The usual assignment of these lines to a man derives from a will to see in this poem some relation to the *paraclausithyron*; Kroll has even the audacity to suggest that Catullus is the rejected lover wreaking vengeance on an innocent

woman who has rejected him in this outrageous fashion. But this is not a *paraclausithyron*, as the development shows: there is no serenade, no lament, no suggestion that it is late at night, no suggestion that the door is barred; most important of all, the people who are attacked in this poem no longer live in the building. We are dealing with something else again.

The woman greets the door as an object of the affectionate regard of her husband and also of a *parenti*; as the noun is unqualified, it is natural to take this as her father rather than his. The occasion on which a woman, addressing a housedoor, would link her husband and her father must be her wedding, the time when she was conducted from the house of her father to the house of the husband her father had chosen for her (cf. 62, 59-61). At a proper Roman wedding we know the bride was conducted through the streets by the wedding procession, and at her arrival at the house of her husband, her first act was to anoint the doorposts of the housedoor with wolf's fat or oil and to deck them with woolen fillets (Don., *ad Ter. Hec.*, 1, 2, 60; Isidore, *Orig.*, IX, 7, 12; Serv., *ad Aen.*, IV, 458; Plutarch, *Quaest. rom.*, 31). This amounts to a sacrifice and ought to have been accompanied by a prayer, or spoken formula of some sort, though none of our sources mentions this, possibly because it seemed obvious to them. The bride was then usually carried over the threshold (Plut., *Quaest. rom.*, 29; Plaut., *Cas.*, 4, 4, 1) and made a prayer to the gods of her husband's house (Arnobius, II, 6, 7). The following day she made due sacrifice to the Lares and Penates of her new home and was properly installed as its mistress (Macrobius, *Satur.*, I, 15, 22). Parts of this ceremony are reflected in the approach of Aurunculeia to the house of Manlius Torquatus in Catullus 61, 149 (156)-163 (170): the house wishes to serve its new mistress, and the procession, which seems to have been compressed to a minimum in this epithalamium, pauses to permit this ritual meeting of the house and the bride. The symbolism involved in the housedoor ceremony is perfectly clear: the bride, by anointing the doorposts, indicates her reverence for this domestic shrine and her willingness to serve it as a good housewife, for the fat had practical value as a lubricant as well as religious value, and the door by accepting the offering indicated the willingness of the house as a whole, but especially the door, to take her as its mistress and to protect her and her rights.

In Catullus 67 no mention is made of the offerings the bride brings, but her greeting is warm and her general benevolence is conveyed in the phrase *teque bona Iuppiter auctet ope* (2). This is a prayer formula made emphatic by the archaic *auctet* (cf. Plaut., *Amphit.*, prol. 4-7; *Capt.*, 4, 1, 1 [768]). But there is a small bone to pick with the door, for the house has not always had a good reputation. It served Balbus well in his day but served someone else ill after the old man was dead and the door was *facta marita*. There is nothing obscure here, though this personification of the door is a little startling at first. Balbus must have been single, or a widower; during his tenure the house must have been above reproach. After his death the house passed into the hands of another whom it served ill. Editors commonly change the *uoto* of the manuscripts in verse 5 to *nato* to make the second owner of the house a son of Balbus, but that is because they do not understand the poem; Catullus deliberately does not mention the names of the second owner and his wife, giving only the facts that will identify them, because to name them would be to call down an evil omen on the marriage of Caecilius. But the *uotum*, the solemn promise and compact between the door and its master and mistress, is in the very forefront of everyone's thoughts, because a new *uotum* is about to be concluded. Will the door return to its former *fides*, or will it keep its lately proven disreputable character? The idea that the door became a married woman when the new couple entered is bold and suggestive, but perhaps not so bold as it seems at first glance in view of Livy, XXVII, 31, 5. In view of its questionable loyalty the door is asked to offer explanation of its conduct; the V manuscript reading of verse 7: *dic age de uobis, quare mutata feraris* is commonly changed to *dic agedum nobis, quare mutata feraris*. The V reading needs no correction; it is perfectly clear, as Lenchantin saw; the sense is "explain about yourself and those who have lived here."

At this point the door speaks in its own defense. Its elaborate personification in the introductory address has made this easy, and the long tradition of epigrams in which gravestones speak is commonly brought up by critics and commentators at this point. In view of the personification of the Lock of Berenice in Callimachus and Catullus 66, the personification of the *Lar Familiaris* in Plautus' prologue to the *Aulularia*, and the speak-

ing *phaselus* of Catullus 4, there is no need to go into long dissertations on this device. As a shrine the housedoor may be presumed to have a *numen* and a personality, and Catullus has shown his fondness for this sort of invention, but to have the housedoor speak is surprising, as verses 43-44 show, because it is presumed to have neither ears nor tongue. That, in fact, it might have both may be a joke of the poet's. The consoles supporting the overlintel of an Ionic doorway are called by Vitruvius (IV, 6, 4) *parotides*, and any tenon or member fitting with a socket might be called a *ligula* (Vitruvius, VIII, 6, 8; Columella, VIII, 11, 4). But the element of surprise at the door's breaking into speech is calculated.

Indeed the door breaks into speech only because it is so unjustly maligned. Its speech, like that of the speaking object or animal in a fairy tale, comes at first stiffly and with difficulty, a staccato of c's and q's marking its first three couplets, verses 9-14; with practice it becomes more fluent. It is indeed a benign *numen*, well disposed toward its new master, Caecilius, and anxious to please him. Its evil reputation is due to no fault of its own; indeed it has never done any wrong. But that is the way of people; whenever something scandalous comes to light they cry out: O door, the fault is yours. The sense is clear here, but the reading of verse 12 is desperate; the V manuscript reading: *uerum istius populi ianua quite facit* is neither metrically correct nor comprehensible Latin. But the word *populi* must be right, as it is necessary for what then follows, and the easiest emendation of the first half of the line would be *uerum est ius populi* (Munro, Lenchantin)—"but that is the law of the people." The second half line should then quote the law, or some saw or aphorism, something to the effect that a door performs a legal function or establishes a right or boundary. Baehrens was on this track when he suggested *ianua cuncta facit*, but that is nonsense. Other suggestions that would make more sense: *ianua claustra facit* or *ianua saepta facit*, are hard to derive from the manuscript reading *quite*. I wonder whether what was written was not *ianua equile facit*: it is the door that makes a stable, a proverb related in its meaning to our saw about locking the barn door after the horse has been stolen. This would at least make good sense in the context, and the comic picture of a mob abusing a door for its derelictions in guarding a wife's chastity would come into focus.

But the speaker is not satisfied with the door's defense and asks for further evidence; the door must not merely assert its innocence, it must prove it beyond the shadow of a doubt (verses 15-16). The door replies that it cannot, because no one is interested enough to ask or investigate, and the speaker then promises that the present interest is genuine (verses 17-18). The speakers through here, it should be pointed out, may be various members of the company, not necessarily the bride or her spokesman. The plural *nos* in verse 18 is probably not editorial, but to be taken to include the whole wedding party.

After its teasing reluctance and seeming shyness in verse 17 the door's next speech, verses 19-28, is comically bawdy. It knows everything in great detail and relates it in the vulgarest way possible; the euphemisms, which hover between the poetic and the merely graphic, emphasize its arch pretensions to respectability and its appetite for juicy scandal. It is a beautifully drawn character from the lip-smacking *primum igitur* with which it begins to the high flown and rather inappropriate *zonam soluere uirgineam* with which it ends. In the ten lines between we learn only one salient fact, that the mistress the door is supposed to have betrayed was no virgin bride when she was delivered into the door's keeping. But it comes out in grisly detail.

First of all, the door says, as to her being a virgin who was delivered into my keeping, that is a lie. It was not her husband who was the first to violate her; he was quite impotent. There is no reason to assume that *uir prior* in verse 20 refers to an earlier husband, as some have (cf. e.g. Kroll, *ad loc.*). It would be easier to read *prius* here, but as Lenchantin (*ad loc.*, who compares Tib., I, 4, 32) and Copley (*T.A.P.A.*, LXXX [1949], p. 250) have pointed out, no real confusion is possible as the door's account continues. The elaborate description of the husband's impotence is pure nice Nelly-ism; the diminutive *sicula* seems to occur only here in literature, and its characterization as *languidior tenera . . . beta* is a wonderful malapropism, for while beets were famous for their blandness and softness, much as the turnip is today, this was as cooked food (cf. Martial, XIII, 13; Suetonius, *Augustus*, 87), and the mental image the line evokes is of a raw root. Furthermore it is hard to avoid seeing here a lunatic reference to *raphanidosis*, since the subject of adultery is on everyone's mind.

It was not her husband, but his father, who is reported to have violated his son's bed and dishonored the house, either because he was himself victim of a secret guilty passion for his daughter-in-law or because his son was impotent and someone must be found to loose the girdle of virginity (verses 23-8). Since the story was that the bride had come to the present house a virgin, it must be presumed that the house was acquired by her husband on the eve of his wedding, a natural enough sequence of events. The *domus* in line 24 cannot then be the present house, but must be presumed to be the house of her father or "house" in the sense of "family," and the *cubile* of line 23 is not a particular bed, but rather her embrace. The phrasing of lines 26-8 is particularly nasty, with its intricate play of sound in *iners sterili semine*, arch circumlocution in *neruosius illud*, and flight of rhetoric in *zonam soluere uirgineam* (cf. Catullus, 2, 13 and 61, 53). A word has been omitted in verse 27; V reads *et quaerendus unde foret neruosius illud*. Lachmann proposed to insert *is* after *quaerendus*; Lenchantin would insert *homo*; Kroll thought the simplest emendation would be *quaerendum erat*. Any of these is perfectly acceptable and preferable to the elaborate rewriting: *ut quaerendum unde unde foret neruosius illud* (*ut* first proposed by Bergk; *unde unde* first suggested by Statius) accepted by Ellis and Mynors. Kroll's is the most attractive.

At this point an interlocutor interrupts, verses 29-30, but the coarse jocosity of the language here makes it difficult to assign the couplet to the bride, or any woman. The speaker matches the tone taken by the door: you tell of a father of marvellous paternal piety, one who would piss in the lap of his own son. The verb *minxerit* here may seem to us more shocking than in fact it was, for Catullus uses *comminxit* in 78, 8 and *commictae* in 99, 10 and in neither place does he seem to have wanted a really violent effect. However Persius' use of *immeio* in this sense in 6, 73 is clearly taken from the gutter, and it is hard to find the image anything but revolting.

This is all the encouragement the door needs, and off it launches into further scandal about this woman. The rest of the poem has been variously divided by editors to give certain lines to an interlocutor, but it is best to take it as a single speech in which the door is carried away by the attention it is receiving

and the story it has to tell. It drops some of its elaborate coyness about the sordid details, but its manner remains arch and offensively smug.

That is not all the gossip about this girl Brixia reports knowing; it tells also of adulterous affairs she had with a certain Postumius and a certain Cornelius (verses 31-6), which fixes the girl's town or origin as Brixia but tells us little more. The names Postumius and Cornelius were probably far too common to be identifying, and whether these affairs occurred during the course of a long engagement or whether they took place in the course of visits to her home after her marriage is not indicated. But the door is anxious to demonstrate an intimate acquaintance with Brixia to prove its veracity and does so by describing its landmarks and identifying it as *Veronae amata mater meae* (verse 34) which fixes the scene of our poem as Verona but gives some difficulty, since such a relation between the two cities is unknown from other sources, though they are not far apart and both were cities of the Celtic Cenomani. Verona claims a very old history and a period of Etruscan occupation before the arrival of the Gauls; Brescia may have been a Ligurian foundation but enjoyed political ascendancy over its neighbors when it was made the capital of the Cenomani. It is probably to this period that Catullus is alluding here, though he must have known of Verona's Etruscan pretensions (cf. poem 31, 13), and in his day Verona had eclipsed Brixia because of its importance as a road center. The identification of Brixia by its landmarks, the slow-moving yellow river running through it and the height that dominates it, has given further difficulty. The name of the river is given by manuscript O as Melo, by G as Mello; the nearby river Mella seems intended (cf. Servius pl. *Georg.*, IV, 278), but it does not pass through Brixia, nor, Lenchantin points out, is it *fluvius* or *mollis*. Lenchantin's note *ad loc.* is highly sensible; he suggests that the present day Torrente Garza, running through Brescia, once carried the name Mella, though only a tributary of the mother stream. Kroll, who would take the description of the river as formulaic and conventional, does not seem to see that the door is using these details to reinforce its story. The name of the eminence dominating Brixia was given by manuscript V as *Chynea*; it is popular among editors to change this to *Cycnea* (or *Cycneae*, with the change of *specula* to *speculae*) in order to connect it with the story of Cygnus and

Phaethon, but we must doubt the wisdom of this, for nothing else we know links the Cynus story with Brixia. It is indeed generally set by Roman authors in the Po valley (Ovid, *Meta.*, II, 367-80), but the Po is a good many miles from Brescia, and Brescia is not at all what one thinks of, and Ovid thought of, as swan country. Cynus in Vergil and Ovid was a Ligurian prince, and there might have been some well known Ligurian name that suggested by the similarity of its sound the location of the Cynus story in the Ligurian part of the Po Valley, but the Greek name is not apt to have foisted itself on to local landmarks as a result of this. It therefore seems prudent to retain the manuscript reading Chynea until something better turns up; however the change from ablative to dative seems necessary with *supposita*. It is also perhaps worth pointing out that one of the four famous *cruces* in the *Aeneid* is the name of a Ligurian leader remarkably like Chynea in three of the best manuscripts in everything but its quantities (*Aeneid*, X, 186); the name was certainly not Cynus.

The door now turns sly: someone will ask, how can a door know such things when it cannot leave its master's threshold? It cannot go about listening to what people say, but fixed to its frame can only close and open the house (verses 37-40). The V manuscript reading of verse 37 *quid* is frequently changed to *qui* (= *quo*); it is not a desirable change.

I have often heard her talking stealthily alone with her maids about her misdeeds and naming those I have spoken of, inasmuch as she hoped I had neither tongue nor ear. And besides she added a certain individual whom I am unwilling to name lest he raise his red eyebrows. He is a tall man who got into a great lawsuit once over a supposititious child (verses 41-8). Here we come to the heart of the scandal. The picture of the wife alone and confiding to her maids is a nice one, and the change of *concilliis* (*concillis* O) to *ancillis* must be accepted. In verse 44 the V reading *sperent* is changed by Mynors to *speraret* to avoid the hiatus at the caesura that otherwise results, but hiatus is a not uncommon phenomenon in Catullus (cf. Kroll on 66, 48), and the present gives better sense. Presumably the couple are still somewhere in the neighborhood. I made a suggestion earlier that the mistress' hope of the door's having neither ears nor tongue is apt to have been a mild joke; if it was, then the joke probably continues in the next couplet, for the

lintel of a door is regularly called the *supercilium* (cf. Vitruvius, IV, 6, 4) and might well be painted red, especially for a wedding. Thus the brows raised might be either the unnamed lover's own, raised in anger, though this is not very well attested as an expression of anger in antiquity (cf. Kroll *ad loc.*), or the lintel of the door, which he would dismantle in his anger. Being a man remarkable for his height he might be imagined capable of this, but the joke, if it exists at all, is a rather feeble one. The lawsuit that will identify him beyond question for the reader was one over a supposititious child, either a case in which his wife was falsely pretended to have a child so as to secure an inheritance (cf. Horace, *Epod.*, 17, 49-52), or a case in which he was falsely sued for *stuprum*; Kroll thinks the former is more probable, and certainly it would be rather more scandalous and apt to excite greater public interest. Since Catullus clearly thinks this will identify him, we must agree with Kroll.

On this reading the poem makes good sense and is coherent, but one further point must be discussed; this is the form of the poem. The choice of a dramatic form in which the housedoor was the principal speaker gave Catullus the opportunity to attack, as it were from ambush, certain fellow townsmen of unsavory character. But he seems to know more than he ought to, or could, about them; the relationship of the woman and her future father-in-law, for example, is very hard to believe, and we must suspect the poet here of retailing vile gossip at best. And what sort of wedding poem for Caecilius and his bride is it that is occupied entirely with scandal about the former tenants of their house?

Here we are helped by our knowledge of the traditions of the Roman wedding. Part of every wedding was the singing of Fescennine verses, what in poem 61 Catullus calls *procax / Fescennina iocatio* (61, 119-20 [126-7]). There the Fescennine verses would seem to have been sung, or recited, in the course of the procession escorting the bride from her father's house to her husband's, and if we can judge from what follows in the hymn, they were occupied largely with teasing scandal about the bridegroom and a favorite slave and somewhat ribald advice to the bride. Horace, in speaking of the Fescennines (*Ep.*, II, 1, 139-55), says that they originated at harvest festivals and developed in license, publishing rustic scandals (*opprobria rustica*,

146) in alternation (*uersibus alternis*). For a long time their freedom was harmless and innocent, but eventually they turned cruel and slanderous, and a law was passed forbidding defamation of character in them. From what he says we might presume the beginning of Vergil's third eclogue to be a fair specimen of the stuff of a *Fescennina iocatio* of rustics recreated by a sophisticated poet for a sophisticated audience. Livy in his famous account of the introduction of drama to Rome (VII, 2) seems to think of the Fescennines as fundamentally dramatic, a lively impromptu exchange, and this would accord with what Horace says and Vergil presents. But it would mean that in Catullus 61 we are given only a sketch of the plot of the *iocatio*, that in the procession the *concupinus*, or someone taking the part of the *concupinus*, was introduced in a speaking role—in which case it is likely that the bridegroom had his part, and perhaps the bride, too, for she is addressed in this section, though hers may have been a silent part—or else that the *iocatio* was something quite different and is passed over in silence, which seems most unlikely. All our evidence suggests that the custom was that as soon as the bride had begun her journey someone in the wedding procession, acting as spokesman, began attacking various members of the wedding party, with what justice it does not greatly matter. The attacked must be presumed to have replied, and in some, perhaps most, cases it is logical to think both attack and reply, like the wedding hymn, had been prepared beforehand (cf. Catullus, 62, 1-19), though not necessarily composed and rehearsed.

Poem 67 then ought to be an extension of this form and tradition, a Fescennine playlet at the climactic moment of the wedding procession, in which the bridegroom, Caecilius, is indirectly attacked for bringing his bride to a house with a murky past and the house defends itself. That Catullus had other motives than festal ribaldry for revealing the secrets he pretends to be privy to goes without saying, but you will notice that he stays within the law Horace speaks of:

quin etiam lex
poenaeque lata, malo quae nollet carmine quemquam
describi . . .

The names are withheld.

L. RICHARDSON, JR.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

THE SAPPHIC "UMWERTUNG ALLER WERTE."

Ever since discussion of the Priamel (or climactic catalogue) began in the twenties, the basic works have listed Sappho 16 (L-P) as a model instance.¹

οἱ μὲν ἱππῶν στρότον οἱ δὲ πέσδων
οἱ δὲ νάνων φαῖς' ἐπ[ι] γᾶν μελαί[ν]αν
ἔμμεναι κάλλιστον, ἔγω δὲ κῆν' ὅτ-
τω τις ἔραται·

8 π[ά]γχυ δ' εὔμαρες σύνετον πόησαι
π[άν]τι τ[ο]ῦτ', ἃ γὰρ πόλυν περσκέθοισα
κάλλος [ἀνθ]ρώπων Ἑλένα [τὸ]ν ἄνδρα
τὸν [πανάρ]ιστον

καλλ[ιποι]σ' ἔβα ᾿ς Τροίαν πλεοί[σα
 κωιδ' ἐ πα]ιδος οὐδὲ φίλων το[κ]ήων
 πά[μυαν] ἐμνάσθη, ἀλλὰ παράγαγ' αὐταν
 12]σαν

16 σ' οὐ] παρείοσας·
 ..] με νῦν Ἀνακτορί[as ὁ] νέμναι-
] αμπτρον γὰρ [. . . κούφως τ[] οησ[.] ν

20 τὰ]ς κε βολλοίμαν ἑρατόν τε βᾶμα
κάμινυχα λάμπρον ἴδην προσώπω
ἢ τὰ Λύδων ἄρματα καὶ πανόπλους
πесδομ]άχοντας.²

¹ Cf. F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin, 1921), p. 99, and *Die archaische Mythenerzählung* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 78-82. R. Oehler, *Mythologische Exempla* (diss. Basel, 1925), pp. 49-50. W. Kröhling, *Das Priamel (Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung* (Greifswalder Beiträge, X [1935]), pp. 32-4. W. A. A. van Otterlo, *Mnem.*, VIII (1940), pp. 147-55. H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*² (München, 1960), pp. 90-4, and *Dichtung und Philosophie*² (München, 1962), pp. 211-13. U. Schmid, *Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen* (Wiesbaden, 1964), pp. 53-8.

² I give the text with those supplements accepted by Denys Page in his *Sappho and Alcaeus*² (Oxford, 1959), p. 52, differing from him only on the accent of *μελαινὰν*—for which see note 13 below. Internal evidence—and some external (see H. J. M. Milne, *Aegyptus*, XIII [1933], p. 177)—indicates that the poem is probably complete at v. 20.

The poem differs from other early (i.e. pre-Pindaric) Priameln in two respects. First: the catalogue, which seems to be completed in the first strophe with the climactic $\xi\gamma\omega$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, is *resumed* after an interval of three strophes. Second: the relationship between the catalogued values and the climactic one seems tenuous. "Fast scheinen beide Seiten überhaupt nicht miteinander vergleichbar zu sein."³ Indeed, Carl Theander, trying to answer the question "quid sibi vult apparatus ille bellicus," concluded that only some special circumstance in the life of Sappho could explain so arbitrary a conjunction. He therefore developed Edmonds' idea that Anactoria is $\sigma\upsilon$ $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha$ because she has married a Lydian soldier!⁴

The difficulty to which Theander addresses himself is not so much that military glitter is considered a $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ —Alcaeus, fr. 357 (L-P), shows how impressive to Lesbians was the flash of armor—but that all the $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ said to appeal to others are mere aspects of this single beauty.⁵ One expects a little more range in the choice, especially when Sappho's preference is so categorically distant from that of the horse- foot- and ship-fanciers. This is a real difficulty, to which I mean to return. But it is the lesser difficulty of the first strophe. The major inconcinnity does not arise from the choice of specific items in

³ Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

⁴ *Eranos*, XXXII (1934), p. 78. Other attempts at a biographical interpretation of the poem are: a) that of Dornseiff (*Mythenerzählung*, p. 79) and Kröhling (*op. cit.*, p. 33), who suppose that Anactoria was not very pretty, and Sappho is rationalizing her love for the ugly duckling with a poetic *de gustibus* . . . ; and b) that of R. Merkelbach (*Philol.*, CI [1957], pp. 16-19), who thinks the poem a *consolatio* for Sappho's *θλασος*, brokenhearted that Anactoria (Helen) could desert them and marry into the rude world of man. Against this last view, see H. Eisenberger, *Philol.*, CIII (1959), pp. 130-5.

⁵ Dornseiff (*Mythenerzählung*, pp. 79-80) notes that horses and ships occur in a list of visual splendors at Pindar, *Isthm.*, 5, 4-6; that, in similar lists, we get horses and ships at Pindar, fr. 221 (Snell); horses at *Hymn to Apollo*, 263-6; and ships at *Hymn to Apollo*, 155. But the lists are either more varied than Sappho's (e.g. *Hymn to Apollo*, 154-5; Pindar, fr. 221), or more specifically connected with the poet's subject matter (contests at *Isthm.*, 5, horse-country at *Hymn to Apollo*, 264-5). At Alcman, 1, 92-5, the ships and horses are examples, not of visual splendor, but of steering and control (for their regular connection in this regard, cf. Soph., fr. 785 N³, $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\upsilon\chi\alpha\lambda\iota\omega\upsilon\chi\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$ $\omicron\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omega\nu$ θ' $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$).

the catalogue, but from the fact that *no* specific item is put over against them in the climactic position, which contains an abstract proposition: *κῆν' ὅττω τις ἔραται* (*ἔμμεναι τὸ κάλλιστον*). The proposition and the specific items exist on such different planes as to make their comparison seem almost clumsy.

It is clear, then, that the exceptions to normal Priamel-form are connected. We expect a specific good to be placed against the splendor of cavalry, infantry, and navy, but we get, instead, a proposition that does not seem to fit here; and it is *because* of this that the catalogue is resumed in vv. 17-20: the sight of Anactoria's *βάμα* and *ἀμάρνχμα* is the specific thing Sappho calls *τὸ κάλλιστον*. This is the natural climax to the Priamel, which was "short-circuited" by the general proposition in vv. 3-4. The normal way of arguing from a catalogue of Sappho's sort can be seen in the equally famous Priamel of Tyrtaeus, fr. 9 (D^s).⁶ The Spartan poet contrasts other *ἀρεταί* with a climactic *θεοῦρις ἀλκή* (v. 9). Then he gives the reason for his preference in a *γάρ* clause: *θεοῦρις ἀλκή* is the *arete* most useful in war (vv. 10 ff.), and that *should* be one's standard for judging *aretai* because strength in war protects the community as well as the individual (vv. 15 ff.). The *γάρ* clause gives us the measure by which we are to arrange the hierarchy of *aretai*. It establishes a *tertium comparationis* for the poet's opening comparisons. *Arete* is a category, not a norm; it applies equally to all the items in the catalogue. But *arete-in-war* gives a measure for deciding which achievements are higher, which lower.

Comparison with Tyrtaeus shows us what Sappho is doing, how she rearranges the elements in this kind of argument. The general principle Tyrtaeus put in his *γάρ* clause she moves up, unexpectedly, into the climax-position *within* the catalogue. That leaves her, still, with the job of applying the principle to her own case. The substantiating argument for her principle (vv. 5-11—note the *γάρ* in v. 6) resembles Tyrtaeus, vv. 15 ff., where he demonstrates that *arete-in-war should* be the measuring-rod for all man's achievements.

It might be objected that Sappho's opening sentence already supplies a *tertium comparationis*: she is testing things against the standard of *τὸ κάλλιστον*. But *καλόν*, especially as applied to

⁶ I draw here on U. Schmid's excellent analysis of this poem (*op. cit.*, pp. 1-6).

the disparate things Sappho lists, has an unspecified range—noble, beautiful, excellent, good, etc.⁷ One is forced to ask: *καλόν* in what sense? Sappho answers that question in vv. 3-4, which specify *τὸ κάλλιστον*, indeed *define* it, so that the first standard is displaced by this more specific one. The formulation *κῆν' ὅττω τις ἔραται* stands to *κάλλιστον* in the same relation as Tyrtaeus' *arete*-in-war to his *arete*. But here is the key paradox of the whole poem: Sappho supplies a measuring rod that will not measure. She gives us a principle that precludes differentiation on any scale of objective merit. Those who say ships are *τὸ κάλλιστον* are obviously admiring *κῆνα τῶν ἔρανται*—and that is all that matters. After establishing a pattern that calls for disjunction, for the rejecting of other things in favor of some highest good (*οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . . ἔγω δέ*), Sappho does *not* reject. She enunciates a principle that makes it impossible to reject what went before: the *οἱ μὲν* and *οἱ δέ* have expressed what is *κάλλιστον* to them, and that is precisely what *τὸ κάλλιστον* means.

Unfortunately, the expectation of rejection that Sappho creates (only to disappoint it) has been so strong that most interpreters follow the trail of this expectation rather than the quick sidestepping maneuver in Sappho's words. They think that *ἔγω δέ* *does* signal a rejection of what went before.⁸ They do not remark on the odd fact that this personal preference should be stated in such impersonal terms. What starts as if it were to be

⁷ Thus W. Schadewaldt (*Sappho, Welt und Dichtung* [Potsdam, 1950], p. 125): "'Das Schönste,' sagt sie einfach und umfasst damit zugleich auch das Höchste, Beste, Wirklichste auf Erden"—and he goes on to give it the sense "best mode of fighting" in vv. 1-3 (here U. Schmid follows him, *op. cit.*, p. 57). In the Priamel known as the Delian inscription (Arist., *Ἰ. N.*, 1099a24-31 = Theognis, 255-6) *τὸ κάλλιστον* is *τὸ δικαίωτατον*.

⁸ See, for instance, B. Snell, *Entdeckung des Geistes*² (Hamburg, 1948), pp. 61-2: "Dass ein Mensch sein eigenes Meinen dem der übrigen Menschen gegenüberstellt, geschieht in einem Gedicht Sapphos . . . bedient sich Sappho der 'Präambel' . . . dazu, um ihr eigenes Urteil gegen das zu setzen, was andere für schön halten." Or E. Voegelin, *The World of the Polis* (Louisiana State, 1957), p. 201: "she enumerates a number of predilections in order to pool them in what might be called a conventional range of preferences; and over against this whole conventional range, she defines: 'The most beautiful is what one loves' . . . The problem of subjectivity arises when the unquestioned values of archaic society are challenged by the new authority of the differentiating

her own creed (ἐγὼ δέ) becomes a matter easily demonstrable to anyone (πάντι). Yet critics are so struck by the contrast of οἱ μὲν and οἱ δέ with ἐγὼ δέ that they do not see how a second, sudden contrast—of ἐγὼ with ὅττω and τις and παντι—erases the polarity so boldly established at the outset. Her *personal* statement is all cast in terms of indefinite pronouns. Indeed, her formulation is carefully made, to be of widest inclusiveness: I say the κάλλιστον is *whatever* (the neuter, the indefinite relative) *whoever* (again, indefinite) *desires ever* (subjunctive in a conditional relative clause). Strange to say, men gloss this determinedly inclusive sentence as if it were an exclusive, private one: "A taluni piacciono spettacoli di parata, a *me* l'oggetto del mio amore" (Castiglioni); "Sappho sagt, welcher Wert der höhere vor anderen ist,—der, den ihre Seele liebend umfasst" (Snell); "She claims to go *her own way* to *her own ends* . . . She is concerned only with what is κάλλιστον, and she has no doubts what it is *for her*" (Bowra); "Sie traute sich zu, dass sie es besser wusste, und spricht also einmal ihr Wörtlein mit, sagt, dass das Schönste *für sie* das ist, wo die Liebe hingeht" (Schadewaldt).⁹

Some try to evade the problem of Sappho's inclusive formulation in vv. 3-4 by saying that the whole point of the sentence is in that verb ἔπαυε—that what Sappho is exalting over the admiration of military spectacle is, emphatically, ἔπος—*love*, a love between *persons*, a spiritual response to another spirit, not an impression given off by glittering surfaces.¹⁰ But there are several things that tell against this view:

1) If Sappho meant precisely to pit the love of a *person* soul." Or U. Schmid, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5: "Auch ihr Höchstwert unterscheidet sich wesentlich von den Werten 'der andern' . . . Dieses Anderssein deutlich zu machen, ist das primäre Anliegen dieses Priameltyps." Or M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*² (Oxford, 1961), pp. 182-3: "she chooses her examples from the sphere of τὸ κάλλιστον and inside it she makes a sharp contrast . . . and in so doing puts the masculine ideal of military splendour in what she believes to be its right place." Or G. L. Koniaris, *Hermes*, XCV (1967), p. 259.

⁹ *Atene e Roma*, XVII (1914), p. 237; *Entdeckung*, p. 62; *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 181-2; *Sappho, Welt u. Dicht.*, p. 127. Italics in the passages cited are all mine.

¹⁰ Bowra, *op. cit.*, p. 181: "This is a poem of love, not of qualities incidental or subsidiary to it, but of love itself." Voegelin, *op. cit.*, p. 201: "Eros is the passion that authenticates the 'really' beautiful

against the admiration of *things*, she would hardly have used the neuter *κῆν' ὄττω*.

2) For Sappho, as for Theognis, the personal relationship of homosexual love was probably best expressed by *φιλότας* (see fr. 1, 19 and 23; 30, 4; 71, 3), not *ἔρος*.¹¹ Eros is usually the personified *passion* in Sappho—fr. 47, 1; 54; 73a, 4; 130, 1; 159; 194 (cf. Page, *op. cit.*, p. 10). Thus fr. 16's *ἔρασθαι* is a yearning for something—cf. *ἔρος τῶελίω* at fr. 58, 26 and the Delian inscription's *τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν*—and in vv. 17-18 the poet supplies a *thing* as the object of her choice: she wants the sight (*ἴδην*)¹² of a *βᾶμα* and an *ἀμάρνυμα*. And notice that the *βᾶμα* is *ἔρατον*: *this* is the thing she desires (*ἔραται*).

3) Sappho does not draw the comparison between the surface glitter of other things and the "inner reality" of Anactoria. Far from it. She singles out the motion and sparkle of Anactoria—points in which her beauty most resembles that of the military items listed (cf. Page, *op. cit.*, p. 57). The pleasure Sappho speaks of is entirely visual.¹³

against the mere subjectivity of conventional preferences." Schmid, *op. cit.*, p. 54: "Sapphos Höchswert dagegen wird von der Liebe bestimmt, einem tiefinnerlichen, menschlichen Wert also, der, wie sie nachher selbst ausführt, den Menschen in seiner ganzen Existenz ergreift und sich darin grundlegend von der oberflächlichen Beispielwerten unterscheidet." Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-3: "Über das Äusserlich-Glänzende stellt Sappho das Innerlich-Empfundene . . . der (Wert), den ihre Seele liebend umfasst . . . Dieser Gegensatz von dem allgemein anerkannten Pompösen und dem wesentlichen Schlichten ist ebenfalls unhomerisch." H. Fränkel, *Dicht. u. Phil.*, p. 211: "Sappho findet die höchste Schönheit nicht in der imposanten Entfaltung prangender Macht, sondern im intimen Reiz eines geliebten Menschen," and *Wege u. Formen*, p. 91: "Kontrast . . . zwischen glänzenden, weltberühmten Dingen, und der stilleren, vielleicht, für den flüchtigen Beschauer unscheinbaren Schönheit des geliebten Gegenstandes."

¹¹ Theognis does not use the word *ἔρος* in "Book I," and the verbs *ἔρασθαι* and *ἐρᾶν* are not used there of sexual love (vv. 256, 654, 696, 886, 1160, 1191). Cf. Solon, 12, 1; 13, 1 (D³) on *παιδοφιλία*, and R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* (Leipzig, 1882), II, pp. 393-5.

¹² See the passages on visual splendor cited in note 5 above: *ἀνδρας εἰσορόων καλλιζώνους τε γυναῖκας* . . . *Hymn Apollo*, 154, *ἔνθα τις ἀνθρώπων βουλῆσεται εἰσοράσθαι / ἄρματα κτλ.*, *ibid.*, 264-5, and the role of *Θεᾶ* (= *θεᾶσθαι*) in the opening to *Isthm.*, 5.

¹³ The appearance of the ships is emphasized by *μεγαλῶν* in v. 2. The

If there is any doubt about the nature of Sappho's principle that τὸ κάλλιστον is whatever one yearns for, it should be resolved by the "proof" she supplies from myth. We are shown the power of desire by its influence on Helen, "who surpassed all in beauty." U. Schmid (*op. cit.*, p. 55) draws attention to the "Wortspiel zwischen πόλυ περσκέθουσα κάλλος ἀνθρώπων Ἑλένα und dem ἔμμεναι κάλλιστον der wertenden Aussage." But this echo seems, to many, an unfortunate one. Page, for instance, writes (*op. cit.*, p. 53): "It seems then inelegant to begin this parable, the point of which is that Helen found τὸ κάλλιστον in her lover, by stating that she herself surpassed all mortals in this very quality." Schmid and Schadewaldt (*op. cit.*, pp. 127-8) argue that her beauty makes Helen an expert on the subject of τὸ κάλλος. But the principle of vv. 3-4 is that the one *drawn* to an object of desire can certify its beauty, not the one who *possesses* beauty.

In terms of Sappho's carefully marked argument at this point, the κάλλος of v. 7 is not within the sphere of the κάλλιστον defined in vv. 3-4. It is decidedly outside it. Sappho gives the epic estimate of Helen, "most beautiful of women," just as she gives a heroic description of Menelaus as ἄνηρ πανάριστος. These are the agreed estimates of society; but Sappho's prin-

adjective can be accented μέλαιναν, to go with γᾶν, and so most editors mark it, relying on the parallel in fr. 1, 10 (περὶ γᾶς μελαίνας) and 20, 6 (γᾶς μελαίνας). But:

1) In fr. 1, the χρύσιον ἄρμα is the center of attention in the middle strophes—to which the dark earth serves as background. In fr. 16, the point is the visual impression made by the ships; to give the epithet to a subordinate idea, while the last word in the list remains unembellished, is feeble. In the resumed list, the final item is alone given a decorative adjective (παρόπλοισ). It is interesting to note that some would like to take the χρύσιον of fr. 1 with δόμον not ἄρμα—but see Wilamowitz, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin, 1913), p. 45, and Page, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Taking χρύσιον with δόμον would shift one's focus from the center of Sappho's imaginative picture to a subsidiary aspect of it.

2) The words ἐπὶ γᾶν must mean "across the whole world," since to specify "on black soil" in closest conjunction with *ships* is to court absurdity. And with that sense ἐπὶ should take the dative.

3) "Black ships" is not only a Homeric phrase, and so heroically impressive. Black is an emotive concept as well, suggesting danger—and Sappho's myth shows that this note is appropriate here. Of Alcaeus' black ships buffeted by storm in fr. 34a, 12 and 326, 4, and the κελαιναὶ νᾶες of Soph., *Antig.*, 954.

ciple overturns all such estimates. By "objective" standards, Helen was perfectly matched—best of women to the best of men. But these and all other social norms are broken when Helen sees *κῆνο τὸ ἔραται*. She breaks all ties with her society's past and future (vv. 10-11).¹⁴ Thus *κάλλος* (which is circumscribed in meaning, "physical beauty") is a term of social convention, and has nothing to do with the egocentric *κάλλιστον* which has been defined in vv. 3-4. Of the *κάλλιστον* only the individual drawn to it can testify. Fränkel was right when he discerned a "homo-mensura" relativism in Sappho's standard: "ist halb schon die These des Sophisten Protagoras vorweggenommen. . ."¹⁵ Rather, Sappho goes *beyond* Protagoras in her vision of a beautiful and destructive anarchy.

Sappho's poem, so far as we have considered it, contains nothing but an "Entwertung." On the logical level, it makes every man's response to beauty so private and absolute as to be uncommunicable and unpredictable. The *οἱ μὲν* and *οἱ δέ* are all alike in choosing their *κάλλιστον*, but this only makes them all divided in the separateness of their goals. This logical level of the poem is very important. Sappho is careful to establish her *argument* as such. The *γάρ* in v. 6 does not suffice. She must preface it with a resolutely programmatic claim: *πάγχυ δ' εὔμαρες σύνετον πόησαι πάντι τοῦτο*.¹⁶ But if logic destroys all objective values for Sappho, as for Nietzsche, this is only that she may create a newly evaluated world by sheer personal assertion and creativity.

There is a pattern in her poem, an element of control giving predictability. It lies in the arbitrary but insistent choice of items that can serve as objects of man's *ἔρος*. These are all visual beauties, all of them connected with war. Furthermore,

¹⁴ It is significant that the closest parallel to vv. 6-11 is the bawdy speech in Eurip., *Cyc.*, 179-86. (R. Hampe draws the comparison at length in *Mus. Helv.*, VIII [1951], pp. 144-6. He seems not to know that Schubart pointed out the similarity in *Hermes*, LXXIII [1938], p. 305.)

¹⁵ *Wege u. Formen*, p. 91; *Dicht. u. Phil.*, p. 212.

¹⁶ Page (*op. cit.*, p. 56) finds this "a phrase which rings dull," and Fränkel (*Wege u. Formen*, p. 93) calls them "nüchternen Einführungsworte." Diehl's 1936 edition remarks: "Pindarus exempla elegantius subiungere solet." The lost segment of the poem also advanced itself in a *γάρ* relationship (see v. 13).

the myth deals with a *κάλλος* that leads to war. Sappho wants her flash and movement of beauty to be full of danger. She does not contrast woman's world with man's, as many think.¹⁷ Her lists, it is true, set these over against each other; but she singles out points of resemblance—the moving and sparkle of Anactoria, the massing and articulation of war's largest instruments. And the myth merges these two worlds of beauty and warfare. Helen's *κάλλος*, rejected in terms of the logic of τὸ *κάλλιστον*, makes its force felt, at this level, in a new way, by a true "Umwertung." Seen in the largest context of the poem, this *κάλλος* is not the conventional beauty that might keep Helen enshrined in a stable social situation. It is the errant beauty that caused war. Only because Helen was *πολύ περσκέθοισα κάλλος ἀνθρώπων* did so many men fight and die for her.¹⁸ Her beauty did not fix her in her place; it drew society after her in a human earthquake that turned into epic, into song. Helen's beauty stirs all the horsemen, infantry, ships, and chariots of Sappho's lists. It shines through them all, deeper than them all.

Sappho's world is an overripe, endangered one—Alcaeus' world of a falling warrior class, in love with the futile glitter of its ancient weaponry. Sappho takes that world and values it precisely for its imperiled atmosphere, as one might love the beauty of the fires that ravine Troy. For her, as for Rilke,

das Schöne ist nichts
als des Schrecklichen Anfang. . . .

Anactoria is, to her, menacingly desirable, "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners."

GARRY WILLS.

¹⁷ Wilamowitz, *Neue Jahrb. f. kl. Alt.*, XVII (1914), p. 227; K. F. W. Schmidt, *Gött. gel. Anz.*, 1916, p. 390; H. Eisenberger, *Philol.*, CIII (1959), p. 133; Bowra, *op. cit.*, p. 183; Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, p. 131-2.

¹⁸ So, rightly, Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9. Fränkel (*Wege u. Formen*, p. 93) strictly limits the myth's function to its logical level, as proof for the general maxim in vv. 3-4, not allowing for its emotional function in Sappho's arbitrary revaluation of things.

AN EPISODE IN THE LIFE OF AESCHINES.

Repeated scrutiny of an unpromising inscription will often prove fruitless, but will occasionally, as all epigraphers know, yield surprising results. Of such surprising results we offer an example that concerns the Attic orator Aeschines.

In 1888 Johannes Baunack saw at Epidaurus an unpublished marble tablet, broken at the left and bottom. After copying it carelessly he published it in 1895¹ with a brief comment, as follows:

. . . κτου Ἀθηναῖος [ἀ]νέθηκ[εν]

Von einer dritten Zeile nur wenige Zeichen: nach 3 oberen Zeichenresten El?N. Unklar, welcher Götternamen." Such an inscription, mutilated and commonplace, aroused no interest in any quarter.

Better results were obtained in 1902 by the second person who scrutinized the stone, with a view to publishing it in the Corpus. This was Maximilian Fränkel, who in *I.G.*, IV, 1214, offered the following reading and partial restoration:

.....Διογν]ήτου Ἀθηναῖος
Ἀσκληπιῶι ἀ]νέθηκεν.
]με τὸ θεῖον

When Hiller von Gärtringen in 1929 came to prepare the *editio minor* of *I.G.*, IV, in which our inscription appears as no. 255, the stone had been lost and no squeeze of it was in existence. Hiller left the patronymic in the first line unrestored, saying: "Fraenkelii supplementum Διογν]ήτου prorsus incertum est." This is right. But Hiller too readily accepted Fränkel's dating of the inscription to the third century, since the letter-forms resemble just about equally well those occurring in Epidaurian inscriptions of the fourth century. As we shall see, the inscription indubitably belongs to the fourth century.

Though the stone remained lost, a step towards the restoration of its wording was taken in a bold and brilliant conjecture by Rudolf Herzog, the classical scholar who excavated the Ascle-

¹ J. Baunack, "Zu den Inschriften aus Epidaurus," *Philol.*, LIV (1895), pp. 16-63, at 61.

pieion of Cos and whose medical training and interests led him to write a book on *Die Wunderheilungen von Epidauros* (Leipzig, 1931; *Philol. Suppl.* XXII, Heft 3). Searching in Greek literature for testimonia of the miraculous cures at Epidauros, Herzog noticed in the Palatine Anthology (VI, 330) an epigram recording such a cure at a sacred grove of Asclepius—the locale of the Asclepieion being left unmentioned. Could the reference be to Epidauros? Herzog thought so, and tried to make a case by ingenious *Kombinationsforschung*.²

Let us look at the Greek text of the epigram in the Anthology, where the four hexameters appear as the work of *Αἰσχίνου ῥήτορος*:

θνητῶν μὲν τέχναις ἀπορούμενος, εἰς δὲ τὸ θεῖον
ἐλπίδα πᾶσαν ἔχων, προλιπὼν εὐπαιδας Ἀθήνας
ἰάθην ἐλθὼν, Ἀσκληπιέ, πρὸς τὸ σὸν ἄλσος
ἔλκος ἔχων κεφαλῇς ἐνιαύσιον, ἐν τρισὶ μῆσιν.

Herzog took this dedicatory epigram to be a genuine dedication and not a piece of literary artistry about an imaginary cure. He observed that in the Palatine Anthology it occurs in a cluster of epigrams which do not derive from the Garland of Meleager or that of Philip; further that in the sylloge Euphemiana (no. 4) the same epigram reappears with the same ascription of authorship: *Αἰσχίνου ῥήτορος*.³ Surely if the authorship of this epigram had been in doubt, no one could have foisted it on such an unlikely person as Aeschines. It looks as if the anthologist got the epigram not from a book, such as one of the Garlands, but from a stone whereon the name of Aeschines was chiseled as dedicator.

At any rate the dedication was by an Athenian (line 2); and it appears likely that in the fourth century an Athenian in quest of a miraculous cure would resort to the nearest famous Asclepieion, the one at Epidauros. The Edelsteins in their book on Asclepius⁴ observe that Epidauros was probably the place of

² Herzog assigns a serial number to each cure, with the symbol W for Wunderheilung. The cure with which we are now concerned is W 75, discussed on pp. 39-41.

³ The Sylloge Euphemiana is a small collection of Greek epigrams dedicated to Euphemius. It is preserved in two MSS of Paris and one of Florence; cf. H. Stadtmueller, *Anthologia Graeca*, I (Leipzig, 1894), praef. xiii.

⁴ Emma J. and Ludwig Edelstein, *Asclepius* (Baltimore, 1945), II, p. 243.

the original divinization of Asclepius, that his worship with altar and sacred building began there in the late sixth century, and that his first temple there was built in the early fourth century (about the time of the birth of Aeschines). The lengthy stelai found by Kavvadias at the shrine, recording seventy miraculous cures, date from the century of Aeschines, when the medical reputation of Epidaurus was at its zenith.

Now the mutilated Epidaurian dedication found by Baunack shows the closing syllables of a hexameter: $\mu\epsilon \tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$, with doubt as to the letter mu. The first hexameter of Aeschines' epigram, quoted in the Anthology, closes with $\delta\grave{\epsilon} \tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$. Herzog concluded that the epigram attributed in the Anthology to Aeschines was the very one that had originally been cut on the stone of Epidaurus at the order of an Athenian (Aeschines) whose father's name ended in -etus. Herzog's audacious theory faced two difficulties. Two other Epidaurian inscriptions⁵ by grateful beneficiaries of Asclepius have hexameters ending with $\tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$; if this clausula was commonplace, its recurrence in an epigram of the Anthology was not worthy of remark, and was of scant help in an effort to identify the Athenian who used it in a dedicatory inscription of Epidaurus. Furthermore, Fraenkel in the first edition of *I.G.*, IV, followed unquestioningly by Hiller in the second edition, read the broken letters before $\tau\omicron \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ as $\mu\epsilon$, where Aeschines' epigram has $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$. To re-examine the stone was clearly imperative, but was also impossible, since it was known to be lost. All that Herzog could do was to surmise that possibly the stone at its broken lower edge showed only the single upper angle of Δ rather than the double upper angle of M ; in this case ΔE rather than ME would be the correct reading. With this he rested his case.

The lost stone has been rediscovered. The find was made in 1961 by Werner Peek in the course of his rearrangement of the epigraphical collection of the museum at Epidaurus.⁶ Studying it closely Peek has been able to reach a striking confirmation of Herzog's bold conjecture. The broken letter in the third line before E is not M , but Δ or conceivably Λ (a single, not a double,

⁵ *I.G.*, IV², 121, line 8; 128, line 3.

⁶ W. Peek, "Griechische Weihgedichte aus dem Asklepieion von Epidaurus," *Wiss. Z. Univ. Halle, gesellschafts- und sprachwiss. Reihe*, XI (1962), pp. 1001-14, at 1002 f., no. 2.

upper angle). Of the previous word, ΕΙΞ, the top of the Ι and the upper stroke of the Ξ are visible. Peek declares that the reading of the stone as *εἰς δὲ τὸ θεῖον* is guaranteed—exactly the last four words of the epigram given in the Anthology. The stone therefore, exactly as Herzog conjectured, had been the ultimate source of the anthologist.

We recall that the name of Aeschines' father was Atrometus. Now in the first line of the inscription the patronymic of the dedicator had been restored by Fränkel as Diognetus, . . . Διο-
γν]ήτρου; but Hiller, while unable to consult the stone, had rejected Fränkel's restoration as hazardous. Hiller observed that the majuscule copy of the inscription, as given by Fränkel, showed before the ΗΤΟΥ merely the lower end of a vertical stroke—possibly part of Μ, but not of Ν.

All of the pieces fall into place. The first line of the inscription was confidently and rightly restored by Peek as [Αἰσχίνης
'Ατρομ]ήτρου 'Αθηναῖος. That the dedicatee was Asclepius, as assumed by Fränkel and Hiller, was almost guaranteed by the provenience of the inscription, the Asclepieion of Epidaurus. That the heading was followed by a metrical epigram was already correctly deduced by Fränkel in 1902 from the clausula of a hexameter in the third line. Fränkel wrote: "Dedicationi sanati subscriptum erat carmen; hexametro eo, cuius clausula servata, dictum erat 'me aegrotum servavit vis divina.'" Fränkel's deduction has now been solidly confirmed; and by a stroke of good fortune we have, preserved intact in the Palatine Anthology, the hexameters composed for Asclepius by the grateful Aeschines. Raise a cheer for Kombinationsforschung, and for Kombinationsforscher Rudolf Herzog, who divined the truth of this whole matter.

But students of the Anthology and students of Aeschines have not learned of Herzog's brilliant contribution. Herzog published in 1931. In the same year Pierre Waltz brought out the third volume of the Budé edition of the Anthology, with the following astounding note on page 186 about the author of our epigram (VI, 330): "Eschine l'Orateur doit sans doute être identifié avec un des nombreux rhéteurs qui portèrent ce nom, peut-être avec Eschine de Milet, écrivain 'politique' contemporain de Sénèque le père." The source of this misguided identification is nothing less than Pauly-Wissowa, the article on Aeschines of

Miletus by Richard Reitzenstein (*R.-E.*, I, col. 1063, Aischines, no. 19). Reitzenstein in turn leaned upon Bergk, as cited by Stadtmueller in the critical apparatus of the Teubner edition of the Anthology (VI, 330): *epigramma ab oratore alienum ratus Aeschini rhetori Milesio vel Mitylenaeo tribuit Bergk*. But Bergk and Reitzenstein and Waltz were blindly disregarding the second line of the epigram, which unambiguously refers to Athens as the author's home.

The histories of Greek literature, no matter how recent or extensive, give no hint that the orator Aeschines was capable of writing poetry. Students of Greek oratory would perhaps be only marginally interested in poetry written by one of the orators, but in any case they have not learned of Herzog's find.

But Herzog's find adds two facts to our knowledge of the life of Aeschines: 1) this writer of good prose could also write passable poetry, of which we have a four-line sample; and 2) at some unknown time in his life Aeschines went to Epidaurus and received what he considered to be a miraculous cure of an ulcer on his head.

The affinity of Aeschines for poetry has been observed. S. Perlman⁷ has noticed that while "the Attic orators studied poetry as a special part of their rhetorical training," most of them avoided quoting it verbatim in their speeches; but Aeschines outquotes the others, using fifteen epigrams or passages from the standard poets. "The quotation of poetry to support an argument is central to his method," says Helen North,⁸ "as it never is with any other Attic orator. Perhaps Aeschines' experience on the stage fostered his taste for literary allusion . . . Aeschines glories in his familiarity with poetry."

We have also known from Aeschines' own testimony that he wrote poetry under the inspiration of Eros. In the speech *Against Timarchus* he anticipates the tactics of an adversary: "In an attempt to raise a laugh and start silly talk among you, he says he is going to exhibit all the erotic poems I have ever addressed to one person or another, and he promises to call witnesses to certain quarrels and pommelings in which I have

⁷ S. Perlman, "Quotations from Poetry in Attic Orators," *A.J.P.*, LXXXV (1964), pp. 155-72, at 158.

⁸ Helen North, "The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator," *Traditio*, VIII (1952), pp. 1-33, at 26 f.

been involved in consequence of this habit."⁹ Aeschines proceeds to acknowledge freely that he has composed erotic verses for boy-favorites, and merely complains that some of his verses are wilfully misinterpreted by his foes. One of the ancient biographies, the one attributed to Apollonius, refers to the erotic reputation of Aeschines: *Δέγεται δὲ ὁ Αἰσχίνης ἐρωτικὸς γεγονέναι*. Herzog shrewdly linked the erotic Aeschines with the epithet *εὐπαιδες* which he applied to Athens; the word, well-known to the actor Aeschines from its five occurrences in Euripides, is never used for a city except in the Epidaurian epigram. Pindar had other adjectives for Athens, but the pederast Aeschines called it the city of handsome boys.

The three orations of Aeschines and the ancient biographies make no mention of Epidaurus, of Asclepius or of any illness or ailment of the orator. Pseudo-Plutarch stated that he was active in the gymnasia when he was young and physically vigorous.¹⁰ The spurious epistles of Aeschines (1 and 9) say that he had asthma—not a likely ailment for a tragic actor and orator from the bema. There is no way to date Aeschines' successful visit to Epidaurus. The ulcer on his head persisted for a year, and was cured in three months in the sacred grove of Epidaurus. These statements we take to be true, without seeing any need to acknowledge that any miraculous power of Asclepius came into play. But Aeschines came to Epidaurus with faith and hope in Asclepius, and to the god he piously ascribed his cure.

Among the grateful beneficiaries of Asclepius at Epidaurus, so far as their identity is known to us, the most eminent personage is the Attic orator Aeschines.

CLARENCE A. FORBES.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

⁹ In *Timarch.*, 135, trans. by C. D. Adams (Loeb).

¹⁰ Ps.-Plut., *Vit. X Orat.*, 840 A.

IN DEFENSE OF DEMOSTHENES, XIX, 228.

In the preceding chapters Demosthenes has been calling attention to the different position in which the orators who accepted bribes from Philip found themselves, as compared with those who did not. The former act as though Philip were standing right there beside them, and they make the friends of Philip their friends, the enemies of Philip their enemies. With the latter, however, matters are very different. Never having betrayed the interests of Athens in the past and being quite incapable of doing so in the future, they not unnaturally expect to receive some recognition for their disinterestedness. Instead the Athenians have no more regard for them than for their rascally opponents, who are outright traitors.

"And now," Demosthenes continues (227), "are you willing to listen and learn why this is so? Then I will tell you, for no one ought to be angry with me for speaking the truth. I think it is because that man [i. e. Philip] shows great love for those who support him and equally strong hate for those who do not. But you, to begin with, never assume that anyone who benefits the state also benefits you as individuals, nor that anyone who harms the state necessarily harms you. 228. Then, too, there are other considerations which carry more weight with you individually, and by which you are frequently misled, such as pity, envy (*φθόνος*), anger, generosity to petitioners, and a host of others." Then follows a phrase that deserves to be examined with some care:¹

ἂν δ' ἄρ' ἅπαντά τις ἐκφύγῃ τᾶλλα, τοὺς γ' οὐδένα
βουλομένους εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ διαφεύξεται.

This may be translated: "And if one escapes all the rest still he will not escape those who are unwilling that there should be a person of this sort." The chapter ends: "Mistakes on each of these counts, creeping in little by little, bring overwhelming disaster to the state."

¹ The text followed here is the Budé text established by G. Mathieu (*Démosthène: Plaidoyers Politiques*, Vol. III [2nd ed., Paris, 1956]). There are slight differences in Blass' Teubner text and in other editions consulted, but they do not affect the present discussion.

The usual explanation of this passage, that τοιοῦτον refers to Demosthenes, is based on the comments of a Demosthenes scholiast, presumably Ulpian of Emesa, who writes:²

τούς γε οὐδένα βουλομένους] Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ φθονεῖν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι εἶναί τινα μέγαν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

One modern editor, I. Taylor, is not happy with Ulpian, remarking that if the entire phrase, ἀν . . . διαφεύξεται, were deleted the text would make perfectly good sense. He adds rather plaintively: "quid autem statuendum sit de huius loci; vel sententia, vel sinceritate; de auctoris mente, vel scripturae veritate, id iudicent alii."³ The first of Ulpian's alternatives, as Taylor presumably sees, is unsatisfactory because Demosthenes has just listed a number of reasons why the Athenians are often misled, and in that list φθόνος is included. What follows is presented as something quite distinct, a trap that may catch the orator who has avoided all the others, while Ulpian's phrase, διὰ τὸ φθονεῖν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀγαθοῖς, merely amplifies the φθόνος trap which has already been eluded. Can Demosthenes really have been so inept in such a celebrated speech? Also, this is no stenographic transcript of what was actually said, but a longer carefully written version brought out by Demosthenes himself for political reasons.⁴ What of Ulpian's other suggestion (διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι εἶναί τινα μέγαν ἐν τῇ πόλει)? Despite avoidance of the word, this is really a repetition of the φθόνος idea: the Athenians were jealous of any man who seemed noticeably better or more powerful than themselves. Also this sets us to thinking about Aristides (as no doubt Ulpian intended), but the famous story of his being ostracized because the Athenians were tired of hearing him called "the Just," cannot be traced back of Roman times, and must be regarded as apocryphal.⁵ Historically, the Athenians showed an attachment to strong men who dominated them, like Pericles,

² See *Oratores Attici, et quos sic vocant Sophistae Opera*, edited by William S. Dobson (16 volumes, London, 1828), Vol. X, p. 150.

³ Taylor's text and notes are reprinted in the *Oratores Attici* of Dobson. See Vol. VI, pp. 294-5, *ap. crit.*

⁴ See G. Mathieu, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20; A. and M. Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature grecque*, IV (A. Croiset, 3rd ed., Paris, 1947), pp. 525 f.

⁵ Cf. Plut., *Reg. et imp. apophth.*, 186; *Arist.*, 7, 2; Nepos, *Arist.*, 1.

and to pious men, like Nicias.⁶ Furthermore, in 346 B. C., when the speech *On the Embassy* was made, Demosthenes himself posed no threat, he was still in opposition. The case against Aeschines was difficult to present because earlier, as everyone knew, Aeschines had got off scot free by proving that Demosthenes' associate, Timarchus, was a damaged soul who had forfeited his rights as an Athenian. This was just not the year for Demosthenes to adopt a tone of moral superiority.⁷

Taylor, then, was right in showing distress over the most obvious interpretation of our passage, though his outcry fell on deaf ears.⁸ But need the most obvious interpretation be the correct one? There is one other possibility: τοιοῦτον may refer, not to the orator himself, but to Philip, the ἐκείνος of chapter 227. With this in mind we may translate the phrase once more: "And if one escapes all the rest, he will not escape those who are unwilling that anyone like Philip should exist." And now let us see how this version suits Demosthenes' argument.

The point has already been made that when Demosthenes

⁶ The Athenians were always quick to show their displeasure, but it was not jealousy of greatness. E.g. Pericles was fined, then promptly reappointed a general (Thucyd., II, 65). Rather it was the political leaders who feared the assembly. When Alcibiades returned to Athens, even though a victor, he did not dare land in the Piraeus until friends on the dock indicated that all was well (Xen., *Hell.*, I, 4, 18). Somewhat earlier Antiphon, relying on his skill as an orator, returned to stand trial. Despite what Thucydides spoke of as the best speech any man ever made who was on trial for his life, Antiphon was condemned to die (Thucyd., VIII, 68). Quite recently (361 B. C.) the same fate had overtaken the distinguished statesman Callistratus (see P. Cloché, *La politique étrangère d'Athènes* [Paris, 1934], pp. 133 f.).

⁷ Aeschines had already scored against Timarchus with a quotation from Euripides' *Phoenia*, to the effect that a man is known by the company he keeps (Aeschin., I, 152). Now, three years later, Demosthenes remembers this, and directs the same Euripidean barb against Aeschines (XIX, 245).

⁸ Voemel, to be sure, the Didot editor, carefully translates (*Demosthenis Opera* [Paris, 1843], p. 216): "... non tamen eos effugies, qui neminem talem esse velint"; but C. R. Kennedy, throwing discretion to the winds (*Orations of Demosthenes On the Crown and On the Embassy* [Bohn Library, London, 1875], p. 186), translates: "... indeed should one escape everything else there is no escaping persons who don't like one to be such." G. Mathieu, *op. cit.* has the same interpretation.

wished to address the Ecclesia to expose Aeschines' assurances about Philip's intentions, the Athenians shouted him down (XIX, 23; 45). Later Demosthenes asserts that those who intend to cheat the people have a pat phrase ready at hand, to describe those who disagree with them as: οἱ ταραττοντες τὴν πόλιν, οἱ διακωλύοντες Φίλιππον εὖ ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν (187). And this indicates that despite Philip's having behaved very differently after the peace had been signed than Aeschines had promised, still the Athenians have not given up hope, they refuse to recognize him for the man he is. Nor are they alone in this, as Demosthenes emphasizes with his moving figure of the νόσημα . . . νόσημα δεινὸν . . . which has taken hold of Greece (259). The orator continues: "The best known men in the cities, men who were thought fit to be put in charge of the government, these ill-starred persons voluntarily betrayed their liberties, introducing slavery to Philip under the specious names of hospitality, fraternity, friendship, and the like."⁹ Demosthenes goes on to document the spread of this dire malady. Included in his survey are: Thessaly, Elis, Arcadia, Argos, and Olynthus, while he warns the Athenians that they are not immune (260-7). It is noteworthy how often Demosthenes points up the contrast between Philip's public image and the real Philip. When the malady reaches Elis, for example, the inhabitants slaughter one another in order to obtain the rule, all in an effort to please Philip (260). The Arcadians who, as the only other autochthonous people, enjoy the same love of freedom as the Athenians have been quite captivated by Philip and erected a bronze statue in his honor (261). Thessaly (260) and Olynthus (263-7) illustrate the various stages by which Philip accomplishes his purpose of enslaving the Greeks.¹⁰

⁹ Here and elsewhere we are reminded of Thucydides' account of the revolution in Coreyra, and the way familiar words acquired entirely new meanings (III, 82, 4). Demosthenes evidently knew the major historians well (Herodotus was in his mind when he delivered the *Second Philippic*—especially his remarks about Alexander the Philhellene, VI, 11), and this probably accounts for the story that he had copied out Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* eight times (Lucian, *Adversus indoctum*, 4).

¹⁰ In the previous year (344 B.C.), when the *Second Philippic* was given, Demosthenes repeated some of these arguments, while expressing

One last example will serve to illustrate Philip's growing influence in Athens (225). Demosthenes tells us that Pythocles, son of Pythodorus, a man with whom he had once been on excellent terms, now goes out of his way to avoid being seen with him in public, preferring the company of Aeschines. The specific reason given by Demosthenes for this behavior is that Philip keeps close watch over those in his pay (226), but there is an implication that goes beyond this. Philip's cause is still respectable, a man might lose political influence if he were seen associating with a troublemaker like Demosthenes, whose anti-Macedonian party was in the minority. Just how respectable a figure Philip cut in Athens can also be seen by anyone who troubles to read the *Philippus* of Isocrates, who was not happy over the terms of peace but still had great hopes of Philip.

The present oration *On the Embassy* was unsuccessful, though Aeschines must have found the result unpleasantly close.¹¹ Certainly Demosthenes was not discouraged. In his last great speech as a member of the opposition, the *Third Philippic* (341 B. C.), he makes use of the same historical illustrations we have discussed above, while adding others provided by the events of the last two years. He still finds reason to complain over the way the Athenians were just as tolerant as ever of the friends of Philip in their midst (IX, 31; 39).

And now it is time to return to the passage with which we began:

ἀν δ' ἄρ' ἅπαντά τις ἐκφύγῃ τᾶλλα, τοὺς γ' οὐδένα
βουλομένους εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ διαφεύξεται.

It has been argued above that if *τοιοῦτον* is taken as referring, not as Ulpian wishes, to Demosthenes, but to Philip, the passage is in accord with the main theme of the speech. Ulpian's explanation is certainly the obvious one, but we need not be

the opinion that warnings about Philip would not carry much weight in the Peloponnese (VI, 20-6).

¹¹ According to Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit. X Or., Aeschin.*, 5), Aeschines escaped by a margin of 30 votes. G. Mathieu (*op. cit.*, p. 14, n. 3) believes the jury consisted of 501 (rather than 1501), and that therefore the vote was 266 or 265 for Aeschines and 236 against him. It is interesting to compare these figures with the vote of 280 against Socrates and 220 in his favor in 399 B. C. See A. E. Taylor, *Socrates* (Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, N. Y., 1956), p. 118, n. 1.

forced to accept the obvious with as subtle a mind as that of Athens' most brilliant orator at the height of his powers. Athenians liked to compare Demosthenes with Pericles,¹² let us not interpret him as though he were Thersites!

TRUEDELL S. BROWN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
LOS ANGELES.

WAS POLUS REFUTED?

Polus thinks that if one had to choose between *ἀδικεῖν* and *ἀδικεῖσθαι*—between wronging another and suffering wrong oneself—the former would be the better option. But he admits that it would be the “uglier” (*αἰσχυρόν*) (*Gorg.*, 474C). This admission (to which I shall refer as “*T*” hereafter), writes Professor E. R. Dodds, “proves fatal to his case, as Callicles will point out at 482D.”¹ Is this a correct diagnosis of Polus' defeat? “Because of just this concession,” says Callicles (*loc. cit.*), “he was tripped up in the argument and his mouth was stopped.” Is this really true? So all modern commentators seem to have thought: I have not seen one word to the contrary in the literature.² I believe that this opinion is mistaken. It is not Polus' profession of *T* that proves fatal to his case, but his failure to keep his wits about him in the ensuing argument.

¹² In fact one Athenian, Eunomus of Thria, is said to have made this comparison after having heard both men speak (Plut., *Dem.*, 6). This is not impossible, but if true Eunomus surely deserved a place alongside Isocrates in the *Macrobioi*!

¹ *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford, 1959), p. 249. I should like to take this opportunity to express my great debt to this book. I have found it the most valuable commentary on a Platonic dialogue to appear in English since F. M. Cornford's *Plato's Cosmology* (1937).

² While it is frequently stated or implied that Socrates here “established,” “proved,” etc. his own doctrine that to suffer wrong is better than to do it. For typical views see e.g. A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work* (4th ed., London, 1937), p. 114; P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), p. 140; J. Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (Paris, 1939), p. 72; P. Friedländer, *Plato, the Dialogues: First Period* (Eng. transl., New York, 1964), p. 257.

Had he brought a clearer head to this encounter, he could have stuck to *T* and passed unharmed through the elenchus, accepting its first three premises pretty much as they stand in the text, conceding the next two with reasonable qualifications, and rejecting its conclusion with logic entirely on his side. A brief review of the argument will, I trust, bear out this claim.

Here is a fairly literal translation of the essential lines in 474D 3-475B 1:

SOCRATES. In the case of all beautiful things—such as bodies, colors, figures, sounds, practices—don't you call them "beautiful" with an eye to something?

1 For example, beautiful bodies to begin with: don't you call them "beautiful" either on account of their usefulness for some particular purpose or because of a certain pleasure, if they delight their beholder in beholding them (*ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, εἴαν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας*);

2 So (*οὕτω*) too in the case of all such other things as shapes and colors? Don't you call them "beautiful" either because of a certain pleasure (*διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα*) or because of their usefulness or both? . . .

3 And likewise (*ὁσαύτως*) in the case of sounds and everything else which pertains to music? . . .

4 And further in the case of laws and practices: does not their beauty fall within the scope of usefulness or pleasure or of both? . . .

5 And is not the beauty of things we learn (*τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος*) the same? . . .

C So when one of two beautiful things is the more beautiful, it must be so by surpassing the other in one or the other or both of these two respects: pleasurable, usefulness, or both . . . And when one of two ugly things is the uglier, it must be so by surpassing the other in painfulness or in evil³ . . .

³ There is no sculduggery in the substitution of "evil" for "harmfulness" at this point, nor was there any when Polus was made to substitute "good" for "usefulness" a little earlier (475A 3) in lines I omitted from the citation. "Good"/"evil" can be used with this sense and, anyhow, the outcome is unaffected by the substitution. Socrates would have got the same result by adding just one more step in his final assault on Polus: Operating with the disjunction, "more painful or more harmful," as the definiens of "uglier," Socrates, having secured the admission that wrong-doing is the more painful, could have proceeded to argue that, if it is uglier, *it must be more harmful* and, therefore, more evil. That extra step would have given Polus no chance

There is no suggestion here that the conclusion (*C*) represents one of Polus' standing convictions. Socrates does not say or hint that he had found any such doctrine in Polus' book. Nor does he claim that *C* follows from anything Polus had said so far in this discussion. He mounts the above epagoge to win Polus' acceptance of *C* on the spot. Polus is, therefore, free to admit or reject it on its own merits or those of the argument by which Socrates purports to prove it. Let us examine the premises of this argument from Polus' point of view:

Premises 1, 2, and 3 would cause him no trouble whatever, provided that a certain qualification, made expressly in premise 1, is understood—as it should be from the wording of the text—to carry over into premises 2 and 3 as well. Bodies are said in premise 1 to be beautiful if (and only if) they are useful for their respective purpose or if they give *the viewer* a certain pleasure *in viewing them*. I have italicized the vital qualification which must also be understood to apply to the beauty of shapes and colors in premise 2 and then again (*mutatis mutandis*) to sounds and other elements of music in premise 3. A close reading of the text should convince anyone that this is indeed what is meant. It is only for stylistic reasons that the phrase, κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας, is not repeated in premise 2 nor reproduced in a suitable variant in premise 3: because the pace is very quick and Socrates clips his sentences, reducing verbal baggage to the absolute minimum. A second look at premise 2 will show that when he says καὶ ἄλλα πάντα οὕτω, he does expect the sense of the omitted phrase to be supplied from premise 1, thereby specifying as before the import of the qualifying pronoun in διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα: that "certain" pleasure is evidently, once again, that which the viewer derives in viewing the objects. The same thing, with a verb for hearing substituted for θεωρεῖσθαι, is meant to be understood in premise 3 to fill out the meaning of ὡσαύτως: the indicated parallelism would fail unless the pleasure to be had from beautiful sounds, melodies, etc. were felt by their hearer when he hears them.

Suppose now that, instead of going on to pile up more premises in the epagoge, Socrates were to draw his conclusion from 1, 2,

to squirm out of the conclusion. On his view, no less than that of Socrates, what is harmful is indeed evil.

and 3. To cover in just the same way moral, political, and intellectual, along with sensible, instances of beauty he would have needed only some such formula as this: the beautiful is that which is useful or else *that which delights those who see or hear or contemplate it*.⁴ Call this definition "*D*" for convenient reference. Polus could have accepted this with perfect security: the admission would have been as harmless to his case as that of the Socratic premises from which *D* is drawn. Nor could Socrates himself object to it, since it remains scrupulously faithful to his first three premises.⁵ The difference from *C* is nonetheless considerable: instead of "pleasure" without qualification in *C*, we have in *D* pleasure arising in sensuous apprehension or mental representation of an act or object. This would make all the difference to the outcome of the elenchus. The questioning that breaks Polus in the text begins as follows:

SOCRATES. First of all then let us consider if to do wrong is more painful than to be wronged, and who are the ones who suffer the greater pain: those who do wrong, or those who suffer it? (475B 8-C 3).

If he is to admit this line of questioning, Polus might as well give up at once. For when the question is so put it answers itself: if one man wrongs another with impunity,⁶ the victim naturally will feel the greater pain. And if *C* has been admitted as the operative definition of "beautiful" and "ugly," Polus would not object to the cast of Socrates' question. *C* would indeed empower one to settle which of the two happenings is the uglier by inquiring which of the two is the more painful, putting no strings on the further question, 'More painful *for whom?*'⁷

⁴ Good Greek for the italicized phrase would be $\delta \chi \alpha \lambda \rho \epsilon \iota \nu \pi \omicron \tau \epsilon \iota \tau \omicron \upsilon \varsigma \delta \rho \acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \alpha \varsigma \eta \acute{\alpha} \kappa \omicron \upsilon \omicron \nu \tau \alpha \varsigma \eta \theta \epsilon \omega \rho \acute{\omicron} \upsilon \nu \tau \alpha \varsigma$.

⁵ As should be clear even from the suggested phrasing of *D* in the preceding note: the verb $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho \acute{\omicron}$, used in its primary sense of *seeing* in premise 1, can also carry (and often does, not only in Plato and Aristotle, but also in the orators and Epicurus: examples in L. S. J., s. v.) the extended sense of *mental viewing, contemplating*, and I have put it to this use in the above formula for *D*.

⁶ That the wrong-doing which is in view here is entirely successful and meets with no punishment or rebuff is the presupposition of the whole discussion.

⁷ I use first-instance single quotes for imaginary quotations, reserving first-instance double quotes for verbatim citations from the translated text.

thus making it entirely legitimate for Socrates to slant it the way he does in the citation, asking if it is more painful "for those who do wrong or [for] those who suffer it?" If, on the other hand, *D* had been the agreed upon definition, the question Socrates would have had to ask would be, 'Which is the more painful to see or hear or contemplate?' hence 'Which is the more painful *for those who observe or contemplate* the two events?'"⁸ To that question the answer is, at best, indeterminate. Polus might have argued with some plausibility that most of us would find the former more painful than the latter and, on that ground, that it is "uglier," just as he had maintained at the start: except in rare, abnormally soft-hearted, souls he might have urged, resentment is more easily aroused than pity, more strongly felt and more disturbing to the one who feels it; hence most people would be more pained at the sight or thought of prospering villainy than that of suffering innocence. Whether or not he would be right on this last point is of no consequence in itself. This much at least is clear, and this is all that matters: if Polus had had the sense to opt for *D* instead of *C* a moment earlier, a line of argument would have been open to him which would have sufficed to save him from the abject capitulation to which he is forced by Socrates in the text.

What then of premises 4 and 5? It is here that the qualification expressed in premise 1 is, to all appearance, dropped.⁹ The

⁸ These would, of course, include the principals themselves, aggressor and victim, as well as their respective partisans. But what is being asked here is, in effect, 'How would *anyone* react?' and the response of those who are personally involved would count only so far as it reflects this *general* point of view. Though nothing, of course, is said to this effect, some such assumption is required already in premises 1, 2, and 3, else '*x* pleases the beholder or the hearer' would lose all plausibility as a sufficient condition of '*x* is beautiful.' Pleasure deriving from ego-involvement would be clearly irrelevant. If the sight of an arm-chair pleases me simply because it reminds me of grandpa (a sweet old man who left me a fortune) or the sound of a bell only because it portends my dinner, I would scarcely be tempted to think them beautiful on that account.

⁹ Taylor unaccountably fails to notice this very obvious fact. He misrepresents Socrates as arguing that "the same thing ['serviceable or immediately agreeable in contemplation or both'] holds good when we speak of 'fine' or 'noble' usages and callings in life, or of the 'beauty' of a science. We mean that the usage or business or science in question

question now becomes simply whether or not "usefulness or pleasure" is what accounts for the beauty of the items introduced in this lap of the argument: laws, practices, *μαθήματα*. Had Polus been on the *qui vive* he would have sensed the shift which this entailed and pulled his adversary up short over it, insisting that in the case of these more abstract objects, no less than that of bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds, the pleasure to the actual or ideal beholder is what accounts for beauty. This would have been a reasonable stand for him to take, and had he taken it he would have stymied Socrates, who would have had to look for some other way to discredit the view, as common now as it was then, which admits the "ugliness" of doing wrong but prefers it all the same to suffering wrong.

Did Plato, when he wrote the *Gorgias*, realize how hollow was the victory Socrates won in this debate? I do not think so. The mood of this dialogue is solemn, even tragic. Its hero is in dead earnest. He would have scorned an *ad hominem* triumph. Plato makes him sum up the outcome as a vindication of the truth—"So I spoke the truth that neither I nor you nor any other man would prefer to do wrong than to suffer it" (475E)—with Polus himself now forced to "witness" this truth and "vote" for it (476A). It would have been a mockery of Socrates to put such words into his mouth if Plato had not thought them warranted by the facts. So Plato himself misjudged the facts which he depicted. He thought Socrates' dialectic had refuted Polus' doctrine, when all it had done was to refute the man. Since, as should now be clear, a true estimate of the outcome depends entirely on seeing the implications of the difference between *C* and *D*—between "pleasant" and "pleasant to the beholder"—Plato could not have seen, or seen clearly, how the mere shift from the latter to the former would suffice to vitiate

either is highly beneficial or 'creates in the disinterested spectator a pleasing sentiment of approbation' or both . . ." (*loc. cit.* in note 2 above). The anachronistic reference to a "disinterested" spectator would have been misleading even in a paraphrase of premises 1, 2, and 3. It is perverse when read into premises 4 and 5 where nothing is said or implied about a spectator at all. On this reading of the five premises one would have at least expected Taylor to notice that *C* does *not* follow from them. But he continues in all innocence, "It follows that by calling anything 'ugly' or 'base,' we must mean that it is either disserviceable, or painful, or both."

a definition of beauty. He had come within sight of this when he wrote the *Hippias Major*. There he noted how absurd it would be to say that an action was beautiful merely because it was pleasant, citing eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse as examples, remarking about the latter that "all would contend with us that, while it is most pleasant, if we are to do it, we should not do it in anyone's sight, for it is ugliest to view ($\omega\varsigma$ αἰσχρότατον ὃν ὁρᾶσθαι)" (299A 5-6). He could have been led towards the essential point from just this example if he had analyzed the difference as that between what pleases the agent, on one hand, the spectator, on the other. But he did not. He analyzed it in terms of the difference between what pleases when perceived through sight and hearing (298A)¹⁰ and what gives pleasure to other parts of our sensorium. He evidently failed to see that if the pleasurable of an act is to be made the basis of its beauty then, in addition to other criteria which it must satisfy, it must involve the kind of pleasure that is felt by one who apprehends or represents it to himself, sensuously or imaginatively. For only this kind of pleasure is capable of that "disinterestedness" which, as Kant¹¹ and others have argued, is the true hallmark of aesthetic pleasure.

GREGORY VLASTOS.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

¹⁰ Though without implying that this gets to the bottom of the problem. The discussion is aporetic. For Plato only form (in his sense of the term) is beautiful; he thinks sight and hearing important only because he thinks of them as the media through which sensuous instantiation of form is perceived.

¹¹ *Critique of Judgment*, I (1), "Analytic of the Beautiful."

REVIEWS.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. *Hannibal's Legacy*. Vol. I: Rome and Her Neighbours before Hannibal's Entry; Vol. II: Rome and Her Neighbours after Hannibal's Exit. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xii + 543; x + 752; each with four maps and a chronological table. \$40.35.

The publication of this work is an important event, since it is one of the most significant studies of Roman history to appear in years, and also one of the most sumptuous. It is composed of two massive and handsomely printed volumes; misprints are rare; the appendices, even if not always obviously relevant, are invariably engrossing; the bibliographies are exhaustive and the glossaries, despite some elementary features, useful; the indexes are lavish; the maps and tables are clear, accurate, and easily consulted, since they are separate from the text and kept in pockets attached to the end-papers. Throughout, references are given impeccably, even the publishers of the learned journals that are cited in such profusion being regularly listed; and the use of those tantalizing and often enigmatic time-consumers, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*, and the like, is kept to an absolute minimum. Toynbee has taken enormous pains to suit his readers' convenience. He never hesitates to repeat himself if it will add to clarity and he often recapitulates arguments that have already been discussed in detail, even to the point of being prolix. All of this has no doubt contributed to the very stiff price at which the work sells, but the luxury of having the scholarly apparatus constantly and effortlessly at hand is a consummation devoutly to be thankful for.

The contents of the work are unfailingly engrossing. It is the product of a lifetime of research and reflection, having been begun in the days before World War I; and it can be confidently pronounced a masterpiece. It exhibits occasional overtones of its author's controversial views on the nature of history (as, for example, in the remarks about the "Hellenic World": I, pp. 351 f.); but there can be no controversy about its overall quality: this is a magnificent specimen of historical scholarship.

Seldom in accounts of the Roman Republic has the part played by Italians and Latins, as distinct from Romans, received its due. Yet down to the Social War they were the preponderant element in peninsular Italy. Toynbee has now earned the gratitude of all serious students of Roman history by putting an end to the rather distorted picture that has hitherto prevailed. By paying detailed attention to the Italians, he has produced a study that is penetrating, interesting, and valuable. *Hannibal's Legacy*, so far from being a re-examination of Rome's encounter with Hannibal, deals with the profound impact that that conflict made upon Italy, and above all Italian Italy. To that end it employs a panoramic canvas. Toynbee argues, and his view is not to be gainsaid, that before we can know how Italy was affected by the events of 218 to 202, it is imperative

to know what Italy was like before 218, and for that matter even before 264, since the Second Punic War after all was only a continuation of the earlier struggle. Accordingly he devotes his first volume to an account of Rome and her neighbours from the earliest days of the Republic, describing with meticulous care the methods by which Rome had fastened her hegemony upon the peninsula and the relationships that had been established between her and the various Italian states, tribal as well as urban. He obviously thinks that his range should not be restricted, and as a result his horizon is very wide indeed. He includes lengthy excursions on Etruscan origins and the Romano-Carthaginian Treaties, and much about continents and countries far away from Italy, such as China (I, p. 303). Of course, developments inside Italy could hardly remain unaffected by events outside Italy; but even had this not been the case, happenings in distant lands were almost inevitably bound to suggest to the encyclopaedic author of *A Study of History* instructive parallels and enlightening comparisons. Volume I is almost as much a history of the Hellenistic world as of the early Roman Republic. In the words of Polybius (III, 1, 4), "the entire subject on which we have set out to write is really a single action and a single spectacle."

The second volume describes the drastic changes which Hannibal's adventure brought about in the social and political behaviour, cultural development, spiritual outlook, economic condition and mutual relationships of the Roman state and its Latin and Italian associates. Together the two volumes provide a comprehensive account of the Roman Republic from its beginnings right down to the Social War. And it is an exceptionally well documented account. Everywhere Toynbee cites his evidence, punctiliously and accurately. Almost every page, with its wealth of footnotes, provides splendid proof of the author's erudition and industry, and (it might be added) of his fairness and courtesy: it is refreshing to read a work which seeks neither to vilify nor to display wit at the expense of those who hold other views.

The captious critic will be able, as always, to cite omissions from the bibliography and to accuse the author of overlooking this or that specialized work. Broughton's *Magistrates*, for example, which one would have thought invaluable, seems to have been used but little; and it is no doubt regrettable that Dittenberger is quoted in the second edition, that Mueller's antiquated pagination is used for Festus, and that more recent studies were not consulted concerning the Gracchan terminal stones (II, pp. 119, 209, 241). Unquestionably, however, this is a work that in general is well abreast of modern literature on the Roman Republic. It takes account of everything of real value that other scholars have had to say. Indeed, at times, it takes too much notice of their views and flogs horses that have long been dead (note the space devoted to refuting Rudolph's exploded theories: I, pp. 217-37). Toynbee has not missed much; and criticism of his work, if it is to be responsible, will have to be made on other grounds. There is, in fact, very little with which one can take serious issue and a great deal which evokes whole-hearted agreement; and the observations that follow are far from meaning that the present reviewer does not hold Toynbee's achievement in the highest esteem.

Some of Toynbee's generalizations seem overstated or, at the very least, more than a little audacious. Take, for instance, the explanation for Roman success inside Italy. Toynbee implies (I, pp. 105-15, 145) that it was chiefly due to Rome's championing of the city-state idea (about which, incidentally, he is wonderfully lucid and informative); by clinging to a benighted tribal system, her most stubborn and determined opponents were virtually the authors of their own defeat. That this was a factor in Rome's rise to power probably few will deny; but to make it almost the only factor is an oversimplification, and one that places too kindly an interpretation on Roman conduct. Nor is this an isolated example of Toynbee being over-tender towards Rome. His account of second century Italy, when (as he insists, at the risk perhaps of some exaggeration) a subsistence economy had to make way for cash-crop farming and nomadic pastoralism, could have been much more sharply critical of her.

The truth is that, for all his scrupulous care to bear non-Roman Italy constantly in mind, he nevertheless seems to see things too much from a Roman point of view. For him Rome is an extension of his favourite Hellenic civilization (II, pp. 403, 416), and his work reads like that of a Roman intent on being always conscious and never oblivious of his non-Roman neighbours. But one of those neighbours might well have depicted second century Italy somewhat differently and have had a good deal to say about Roman discrimination and about Roman monopolization of the fruits of imperialist victories.

In its bold and sweeping generalizations this work is typical of Toynbee, just as it is in its fondness for certain expressions, such as "the game of beggar-my-neighbour," "the Establishment," "the Lord's anointed." It also displays one of the mannerisms with which his writings on the philosophy of history have made us familiar: his penchant for seizing on something that in his view others have overlooked or insufficiently emphasized and then belaboring it *ad nauseam*. Besides irritating the reader, this habit does damage to a fine piece of scholarship. Consider, for instance, his insistence (I, p. 1) that the nomenclature usually employed to describe Rome's wars is misleading and should be abandoned. He renames the great struggles in which the Roman Republic was engaged with titles of his own choosing. Thus, except on rare occasions (as, for example, at II, p. 425), the Hannibalic War is regularly called the second bout of the Romano-Carthaginian Double War. This seems a harmless enough designation, although Toynbee's readers will find it cumbersome and some of them may wonder why the conflict of 146 is not the third bout. In other cases, however, the practice is likely to bewilder the reader and erect positive obstacles to his enlightenment. Exactly which was the fifth bout of the Great Romano-Samnite War (II, p. 5 and elsewhere)? Not the Social War, as one might be tempted to conjecture, but the Pyrrhic War, something that one is hardly likely to guess unless he knows that, for Toynbee, the Second Samnite War is really two bouts. Not that Toynbee does not have a name of his own for the Social War. It is the Second War of Secession (I, p. 91 and throughout), the Latin War having been the First. This nomenclature, too, is objectionable,

because of its implications. Toynbee is well aware, of course, that his "secessionists" in the two wars were anything but identical: he is, however, suggesting that their aims were the same, and some students of Roman history will disagree with him, perhaps vehemently. Is it not better to call these conflicts by their traditional names?

His attitude to chronology is very like his attitude to nomenclature. With praiseworthy determination to date, as well as to name, events in Roman history correctly, Toynbee lists every event before 300 with three different dates, the traditional Varronian one and two aberrations from it. Seeing that he includes a long and excellent note on early Roman chronology (I, pp. 557-62: something that has long been badly needed in English) it is surely hardly necessary for him to keep on driving the point home in this way; indeed it is little short of absurd to record 304 Varr. as "304 (304/3 or 303)" (II, p. 371).

No doubt dissent on such matters of judgment or opinion will be forthcoming from most of Toynbee's readers. What is more serious is that there will also be some dissent on questions of fact. The following list of lapses does not pretend to be complete: but it may give some idea of the kind of errors that occur.

Tarracina, rather than Terracina (I, p. 89 and throughout), was the correct spelling in antiquity. The Social War broke out in 91, not 90 (I, p. 143 and elsewhere). It is inaccurate to talk of a *TRIBUS praerogativa* (I, p. 309). Despite a brilliant commentary on the Italian roster for 225 (Polyb., II, 24 f.), Toynbee's exploitation of Roman census figures (I, pp. 438-505) is faulty, fascinating reading though it makes. Sabatia (II, p. 118), as the name of the town of the Sabatini (for whom see Livy, XXVI, 33 and 34) is a figment of Cluverius' imagination. *Rufri maceria* is the yard of a stone mason named Rufrius at Nola (Cato, *de Agric.*, 22, 4; 135, 2) and does not refer to Rufrium (II, pp. 335, 682), the town whose name is preserved by the church of S. Felice a Rufo alongside Presenzano. Cato should not be described as a "younger contemporary" of Scipio Africanus (II, p. 500), seeing that the latter was only one year older. There is one type of error that comes rather frequently and, it might be added, rather oddly in a work with such good maps: wrong compass points. The Maiella is NE, not NW of Samnium (I, p. 90); Rome was not on the right bank of the Tiber, nor Veii on the left (I, p. 115); Rhegium should not be placed in the "south-eastern extremity of the Italian Peninsula" (I, p. 289); the Sabine highlands "on the far side of Cures" lie NE, not NW of Rome (I, p. 381); Syracuse should not be described as on the west side of Sicily (II, p. 5); the Ager Taurasinus was NE of Beneventum, not NW (II, p. 119); and it was the SW, not the SE part of Lucania that Rome annexed (II, p. 120), as indeed Toynbee himself later points out (II, p. 229).

These points are obviously of varying degrees of importance, and they should not be overemphasized. They mar, but they do not disastrously impair the solid worth of a masterly synthesis. *Hannibal's Legacy* is packed with information and written with insight. It is hard to envisage a single reader who will not be greatly stimu-

lated or fail to come away from it much more learned than when he opened it.

E. T. SALMON.

McMASTER UNIVERSITY,
HAMILTON, ONTARIO.

JÜRGEN DEININGER. *Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit von Augustus bis zum Ende des dritten Jahrhunderts n. Chr.* München, C. H. Beck, 1965. Pp. xvi + 220. (*Vestigia, Beiträge zur alten Geschichte*, Band 6.)

Modern research on the assemblies of the Roman provinces dates from the publication of P. Guiraud's basic treatise *Les assemblées provinciales dans l'empire romain* (Paris, 1887), which itself superseded earlier studies by Marquardt and Duruy. With the exception of Kornemann's articles *concilium* (1900) and *κοινόν* (1924) in Pauly-Wissowa further general treatments of the subject have been precluded by the uneven nature of the literary evidence and by the difficulties in assembling the scattered epigraphical, numismatic, and archaeological evidence. The considerable number of later papers that have illuminated the field have rather concerned themselves with particular problems within individual assemblies, and a full-scale synthesis of intervening scholarship has long been needed. Deininger's welcome volume is expressly designed to fill this gap (p. 5). It may be said at once that it now replaces Guiraud as the definitive work on the provincial assemblies down to the accession of Diocletian.

Like his predecessor, Deininger begins by tracing the origins of the Roman institution to the Hellenistic *κοινόν*; but here an important distinction must be made. The original competence and organisation of the *κοινά* of Crete, Lycia, and Cyprus and of the various federations of the Greek world were essentially different from what they were under the Empire. The true antecedent of the Roman *commune* was rather the Ionian *κοινόν* whose distinctive features were the practice of the ruler cult and the representation of a defined range of provincial interests; any real legislative or administrative function was as conspicuously lacking then as later. So, too, in Republican times the *commune Siciliae* foreshadowed the later council in the way it erected statues to Roman officials or sent embassies to Rome to defend provincial interests. Similarly in the East the provincial council of Asia was honouring Roman officials with games and decrees as early as the beginning of the first century B. C.; the terms *κοινόν* and *Asiarch* are attested from ca. 50 B. C.

With this introduction Deininger turns to the beginning of the imperial assemblies under Augustus. On the initiative of the *κοινά* of Asia and Bithynia in 30 B. C. Octavian gave permission for the erection of two temples in Pergamum and Nicomedia—undoubtedly to Roma and Augustus; cf. Tac., *Ann.*, IV, 37. Thus the ruler cult was put in the hands of an assembly and the future pattern set. It may soon have been copied in Crete and Cyprus

and in Galatia and Macedonia, where recent research has tended to confirm an Augustan foundation (pp. 19-21). In the West Deininger's account gives the standard picture as far as Lugdunum and the *ara Ubiorum* near Cologne are concerned, though he rejects any Gallic prototype for the *concilium Galliarum*—this despite Caesar, *B. G.*, IV, 6, 5; V, 2, 4, etc. New here is the important archaeological evidence from Virunum, where excavations on the Magdalensberg may have unearthed the "Repräsentationshaus" of the council of Noricum (p. 25 with refs.). After Augustus' death, when the history of the *concilia* really begins, there are many gaps in our knowledge. On the request of the provincials of Hither Spain Tiberius gave permission to build a temple to Augustus at Tarraco . . . *datumque in omnes provincias exemplum* (*Ann.*, I, 78)—Tacitus' (inaccurate) meaning here is surely the example of a temple to *divus Augustus*, despite the improbability at this stage of a cult of Augustus without Roma (Deininger, p. 27, n. 2; cf. pp. 122 f.). On Deininger's view the example was not in any case followed in Lusitania, where evidence for a full-scale cult begins only under Vespasian. (For an earlier foundation under Tiberius or even Augustus see p. 29, n. 3 with refs.) The most significant post-Augustan stage of development, however, came under Vespasian. Deininger rightly accepts an early Flavian date for the provincial cult in Narbonensis (to his sources, p. 30, n. 2, add A. Aymard, *Bull. Soc. Archéol. du Midi de la France*, 3^{me} ser., V [1947], pp. 513-28) and Africa Proconsularis, where provincial priests date their year by a unique era beginning A. D. 70-72. Similar Vespasianic regulations seem to be echoed in Baetica by *C. I. L.*, II, 2221 and 2344 and by a new inscription from Corduba on which the author has himself contributed a subsequent paper: *Madriider Mitteilungen*, V (1964), pp. 167-79. Where exactly *C. I. L.*, II, 3271 now fits into this reconstruction the reviewer reserves for future discussion following H. G. Pflaum's revolutionary analysis in *Actes du Colloque International du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*, Madrid-Italica (Paris, 1965), pp. 91-100. Apart from these developments in long-standing provinces the councils whose origins can be dated are those of Cappadocia (Tiberius); Mauretania and Britain (Claudius); Lycia (incorporation of the Hellenistic *κοινόν*) and Armenia Minor (Vespasian); the *Agri Decumates* (Flavian); the three Dacias (? Trajan). Other councils probably date from the subsequent division of larger provinces into smaller. Thus contrary to Mommsen's thesis (*Röm. Staatsrecht*, III, pp. 743 f.) the establishment of provincial councils was the work not of Augustus but of his successors, particularly Vespasian, and in some provinces (Egypt, Cyrenaica) the institution seems to have been entirely absent.

Chapters II and III, which in effect constitute a corpus of present evidence, are the longest in the book and fundamental to the whole subject. Apart from Achaia and Galatia the *κοινά* of most eastern provinces conformed to a standard type. In Asia and Bithynia several centres existed for the cult, usually with more than one temple in each, but in general an annual meeting at a single centre was the norm, not always the residence of the Roman governor; cf. Beroia in Macedonia. At the head of the council was the high priest—Asia eventually had several corresponding to the proliferation of centres.

But what was his relationship to the Asiarch, Bithyniarch, Lysiarch, etc.? Deininger's sensible position on this vexed question (pp. 43-50) is that the two functions were in fact identical, the older office of Asiarch having been somewhat overshadowed during the first century A. D. when the head of the *κοινόν* was first made priest of the Imperial Cult. The assembly itself was made up of elected delegates representing the various cities; towns such as Smyrna apparently sent more than one. What the distinguishing characteristics of these assemblies were can be gathered from their activities. First and foremost a *κοινόν* worshipped the emperor through the observances of the imperial cult: which could include not only the upkeep of the provincial temple but even the publication of the Monumentum Ancyranum—essentially a cult act, Deininger stresses (p. 68). Its principal secular concerns were to honour benefactors such as Opramoas of Rhodiapolis in Lycia, to safeguard provincial interests by embassies to Rome, and above all to keep check on Roman governors by honorary decrees or at the opposite extreme by instituting proceedings. The cases Deininger cites (see further pp. 165 ff.) show that these were usually successful, though the accusers themselves were banished in the trial of Eprius Marcellus, governor of Lycia. *Ková* also issued coins, a sure sign of their autonomy, and gave games at which Christians were sometimes martyred: Polycarp at Smyrna, for instance.

Much the same pattern is observable in the West. The *concilium* best known, that of the Three Gauls, had its centre at the confluence of the Rhone and Saône, where stood the famous altar and in later times a provincial temple to Roma and Augustus. Recent excavations have confirmed that an amphitheatre for the festival games associated with the provincial cult already existed here under Tiberius (p. 100). As the names show, the high priest of the cult was always a Roman citizen (this holds good throughout the West), while below him served minor officials connected with the *arca*, etc. The council activities are the usual: the imperial cult; games, often a costly burden: cf. *C. I. L.*, II, 6278 with *Hesperia*, XXIV (1955), pp. 320-49. Deininger has some interesting remarks (p. 104) on the martyrdom of Christians under M. Aurelius and its connection with local Gallic rites; the representation of provincial interests, the most famous instance being the embassy of *primores Galliae* to Claudius: cf. Tac., *Ann.*, XI, 23; *C. I. L.*, XIII, 1668; honorary inscriptions, etc., the best example of which, *C. I. L.*, XIII, 3162, illustrates the relationship of the council to the Roman provincial administration (pp. 106 f.). In other provinces evidence is very scanty but there is enough to suggest a similar picture in the Alpine provinces, Sardinia, Britain, Germany, the three Dacias, the Danube provinces (Deininger argues convincingly, pp. 113-15, that the so-called *sacerdotes incerti* were municipal priests), etc. The councils of the African provinces seem also to have followed conventional lines with some irregularities in Proconsularis (p. 133). The most significant single piece of evidence, however, comes from Narbonensis, where the provisions of a *lex data*, *C. I. L.*, XII, 6038, throw invaluable light on both the cult and the assembly. (I miss a reference in Deininger's summary, pp. 108 f., to A. L. Abaecherli's epigraphical study, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIII [1932], pp. 256-68.) Particularly interest-

ing is the regulation concerning the honorific statue to be erected to the outgoing *flamen*, on which shall be inscribed his name, that of his father, his place of origin, and the year of his term. Whereas similar regulations appear to have been followed in Proconsularis and Baetica—an important point for chronological purposes—honorary inscriptions in the Three Gauls include the full *cursus* up to the priesthood but omit the year. This is also true of Hither Spain where numerous inscriptions show the kind of career that culminated in the provincial priesthood. Tiberius apparently followed Augustus' lead here; in this as in other respects the reign of Vespasian marked a new departure.

This systematic review of all the known evidence prepares the way for a comprehensive analysis of the councils' various facets: (i) "Aufbau"—their "province," composition and election of delegates, place and date of annual meeting, order of business, title and election of high priest, minor officials; (ii) "Tätigkeit"—self-administration, the ruler cult, representation of provincial interests, coin issues. The horizontal method necessarily results in overlapping from previous chapters and there is a good deal of repetition. Its justification is that it gives the best informed, if hardly new, account we have of the nature and role of a provincial assembly. Only two points can be raised briefly:

(i) Deininger is surely right as against Étienne that where the *cursus* of a provincial priest includes one or more *militiae equestres* these posts were held *before*, not after the flammate (p. 152; cf. pp. 102, 104). The point was originally made by Toutain (*Cultes païens*, I, p. 138) and has recently been underlined by Pflaum (*loc. cit.*, pp. 92 f.; cf. now H. G. Kolbe, *Carnuntum Jahrbuch* [1963/64], pp. 49 f.) that the inscription on a statue set up by a council (e. g. *P. H. C.*) to a past priest must have been engraved immediately or very soon after the end of his year. Hence, if the functions it lists include *militiae equestres* (*C. I. L.*, II, 4245, 4251, etc.), these must have come *before* the priest's term. A further consideration here is that according to the *Lex Narbonensis* a former high priest had the right to participate in the provincial assembly: *sententiae dicendae signandique ius esto* (line 15). Whatever the meaning of *signandi ius* (p. 109, n. 1 with literature), this provision, which would also have applied in Africa and Baetica, if not in Hither Spain, would be meaningless if a past priest often enough went off to hold military posts in Germany, Syria, Egypt, etc. (ii) Deininger suspends judgment on the difference between *flamen* and *sacerdos*. The reviewer holds that *sacerdos* was the title for a provincial priest in un-Romanised territories, whereas *flamen* was preferred in provinces with a pre-existing municipal cult. A *flamen* in the two Mauretaniae and the Alpine territories is explicable since these newer provinces adjoined Proconsularis and Narbonensis, where this term held the field. The more intriguing question is to elucidate the later change from *flamen* to *sacerdos* in Proconsularis (ca. A. D. 110) and Sardinia (before A. D. 250), a problem which the reviewer understands T. Kotula to have in hand.

The final chapter is devoted to the historical significance of the institution within the Roman empire. While the assemblies intrude relatively seldom upon the mainstream of historical events, they per-

formed a useful political function in galvanising local loyalties and fostering Romanisation, particularly in the West. Moreover, the provincial priesthood often opened up a senatorial career to the sons of former priests. But though the councils certainly embodied a representative system, it was not a system of representative government. Legislative and administrative power remained with the Roman authority and, contrary to Larsen's thesis (or at least Deininger's understanding of it), the councils never had the potential to develop into governing bodies (pp. 180 f.). Finally Deininger summarises the essential differences between these assemblies and the post-Diocletian provincial and diocesan gatherings. The study closes with a brief but useful "Zusammenfassung."

Maps and tables might have helped in places but in general the work is lucidly set out, the style clear and succinct, and the indices enable the reader to find his way about the enormous mass of material Deininger has digested. He has written a major volume, prepared with exemplary care and thoroughness, which incorporates the very latest findings at the time of publication (cf. "Nachträge," pp. 195 f.). He is to be congratulated on a valuable and timely contribution in an important field.

DUNCAN FISHWICK.

ST. FRANCIS XAVIER UNIVERSITY,
ANTIGONISH, N. S.

E. W. HANDLEY, editor. *The Dyskolos of Menander*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. x + 323. \$10.00.

In the seven years since the publication of the papyrus containing Menander's *Dyscolus* there have appeared no less than seventeen critical editions, many dozens of translations, and several hundred articles on all aspects of the play. But there is no doubt in the reviewer's mind that Handley's edition will be long in use for any study of the text and the technical problems raised by it. Not only does he give us the text with apparatus but also a commentary that is the fullest and most reliable yet to appear. Handley has clearly spent a great deal of time and care on it and has managed to sift and analyze the important ideas of previous scholars. In the process he has made his own examination and given his own explanation of some knotty problems. And the introductory essays on staging, scenery, setting, number of actors and their roles, costumes and masks may be highly recommended. Everywhere one finds a wealth of illustrative material and a fullness of explanation to satisfy the beginner and to delight the scholar. Indices of topics and Greek words complete it.

The Introduction (pp. 1-73) begins with a short discussion of Menander's life and works with emphasis on the *Dyscolus*. One greets with approval the observation: "The *Dyskolos* may be commended as an attractive, well-made play, essentially light-hearted, but with a blend of deeper human insight and sympathy. To claim that it is a great play by universal standards would be extravagant; nor, as a single relatively early work, should we expect it to show all of Menander's most admired qualities to their best advantage;

. . . .” Its importance, says Handley, lies in the fact that it is a virtually complete play by the acknowledged master of New Comedy.

Handley champions the idea that the *Dycolus* was acted out by three actors with the help of extras “to walk on for them at need in scenes where they were silent.” He then presents his own detailed arrangement of the parts played by the three actors in each of the five acts. There is no way, of course, to prove or disapprove this idea, but even if true it would only mean that this one play could have been acted out by three actors. It says nothing about the rest of New Comedy.

In his introduction to the text proper Handley repeats much of what can be found in the *editio princeps* of V. Martin: the state of the papyrus, the hand, the corrections, orthography, accents, use of the *paragraphus* and *dicolon*, mistakes, etc. He then warns the reader that although his critical apparatus consistently notes differences from the edition by Lloyd-Jones (OCT), it is otherwise “highly and personally selective, intended to illustrate some of the possibilities available, not to portray the present state of critical opinion.” It is not, therefore, van Groningen’s *Étude Critique* of 1960 brought up to date. We turn to the text itself.

Line 52: ἐρῶν ἀπῆλθες εὐθύς; asks Chaereas. Handley translates, “. . . you came away in love with her at first sight?” The emphasis appears wrong. Better would be, “. . . although in love with her you left immediately?” Chaereas is amazed that Sostratus did not stay to press his intentions upon her. At this point he does not know that Sostratus is serious about the girl.

Line 68: Handley’s emendation of ὥσαν to ὅσ’ ἄν is excellent, giving a needed object to διοικήσω.

Lines 92-3 are given to Sostratus and 93-4 to Chaereas, but I see no real reason why all of 87-94 cannot be spoken by Pyrrhias alone. Pyrrhias is excited and out of breath. He must warn his master of the danger, and, after a very short and understandable session of question and answer (81-6), he tries to blurt out the whole story almost in one breath. He manages, but with difficulty.

Line 114: Handley’s emendation of the papyrus reading ἐκάθαιρε-ταύτην το ταύτη μ’ ἐκάθαιρε is most attractive. He translates, “he set about me with it [i. e. the pole].” Pyrrhias says this of Cnemon in relating the story of their two-mile chase. The present reviewer has long suspected that a joke lies hidden in these words and that the stage is set for it back in the difficult passage of lines 100-102, where Pyrrhias explains how the old woman had pointed out Cnemon far off on a ridge περιφθειρόμενον ἀχράδας ἢ πολλὴν | κύφων’ ἐανῶ συλλέγονθ’. A curious note in Hesychius, s.v. περιφθείρεται, says that the word means τὰς φθείρας συλλέγει. V. Martin accordingly had translated Menander’s phrase as “ridding his pear trees of blight.” Handley punctuates differently and translates, “wandering round on the ridge there, the miserable old man, gathering himself wild-pears—or something ghastly.” But if the note in Hesychius can be referred to this passage, then Martin may be right in his approach. A species of jumping louse (called psylla by horticulturists) actually does attack pear trees, and Lucian (*Epistulae Saturnales*, 26) indicates that φθείρες (lice) attacked vegetable life in antiquity. Hence Cnemon might be poking around in his pear

trees to get rid of the lice. A hopeless procedure, but that is beside the point. It is in keeping with Cnemon's character to do just that. Later, when he sets off after Pyrrhias, he picks up a pole and "cleans" Pyrrhias' scalp with it. And "to clean" is the basic meaning of *καθαίρειν*. In other words, Cnemon is doing to Pyrrhias exactly what he had been doing to his pear trees up on the ridge. Human beings as well as pears are attacked by lice! One should not idly dismiss the note in Hesychius.

Lines 249-52. Gorgias is speaking:

δυσχρήστως γέ πως

ἔχει· ζυ]γομαχῶν τοῦτον οὐθ' ὄτ' τρὸς
ἀναγκάσαι τις εἰς τὸ βέλτι[ον φρονέ]ν
οὐτ' ἂν μεταπίσαι νοουθετῶν ο[ἱ] δ' ἂν φίλο]ς·

Here Handley's punctuation is excellent, for it makes ζυ]γομαχῶν parallel with νοουθετῶν. But one still feels that a verb ought to round it off at the end. His punctuation could be combined nicely with the restoration of ο[ἱ] δ' οὐδὲ εἰ]ς as given in OCT.

Line 606. Post's suggestion in *A. J. P.*, LXXXII (1961), p. 103, and *ibid.*, LXXXIV (1963), p. 47, for emending ἐπίστα[ται] to ἐπι<κ>τά[ται] ought to have been mentioned.

Lines 797-812. This passage is also preserved by Stobaeus (*Ecl.*, III, 16, 14), and it is extremely salutary to compare Stobaeus with the papyrus text. Handley has a fine note here in which he advises caution in the evaluation of passages quoted by the ancient anthologists. Lloyd-Jones in OCT took the view that the papyrus confirmed what Stobaeus has preserved, and that the variants in the papyrus only showed the corrupt state of its own text. But Handley shrewdly observes (p. 270): "Passages of ancient authors culled by anthologists are liable to suffer both casual alteration and wilful 'improvement' intended to make them read more plausibly in their new isolation: the flower in the vase looks different, and sometimes is different, from the flower on the plant." Anyone working with quotations from ancient authors by anthologists or others would be wise to compare the present passage in Menander with its quotation by Stobaeus and then reflect on Handley's remark.

Lines 813 ff. This is the passage in which Callippides acquiesces to his son Sostratus in the matter of betrothing his own daughter to Gorgias. The present reviewer has always felt that his acquiescence was too quick, too easy in the light of his previously emphatic refusal. And Gorgias acts somewhat similarly later on. Handley, however, does not feel this way about the passage, for he says, "Kallippides' generosity reasserts itself." True, but it is quite abrupt. Perhaps Menander could not, or felt that he ought not, devote more space or time to motivate this change of heart. One expects an argument.

Despite a few places in which one might disagree with Handley's conclusions, and there will always be such places in any book, this is a fine, scholarly edition with an excellent commentary. No student of Menander can afford not to own it.

ROBERT K. SHERK.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT BUFFALO.

ADELMO BARIGAZZI. La formazione spirituale di Menandro. Lezioni "Augusto Rostagni," Volume II. Torino, Bottega d'Erasmus, 1965. Pp. xvii + 247.

The main thesis of this well-written, leisurely, and discursive book is that "the key to unlock the secrets of Menander's thought and art is to be found in Peripatetic ethics." This idea will not appear so revolutionary perhaps to American, Irish, or English readers as to the Italian audience for whom the book was devised, but for all readers the long and careful discussion of Peripatetic ethics and the detailed comparison with passages of Menander will be useful.

The first chapter is a summary of Athenian history in the fourth century—the transition from the citizen of the *polis* to the citizen of the world, the growth of mercenary service, commerce, philosophy, etc. Menander and New Comedy represent the new spirit of the private citizen by expressing the sentiments which bind him to the rest of humanity.

The next chapter goes into greater detail on the history of Menander's life-time and the few external testimonies to his activity. Barigazzi is surely right in vindicating the tradition that Menander was a pupil of Theophrastus. Diogenes Laertius reports that Menander was nearly put to death because he was a friend of Demetrius of Phalerum. Barigazzi approves wholeheartedly of Demetrius and his methods of ruling Athens, which were undoubtedly inspired by Peripatetic philosophy, and believes that Menander also approved; clearly the relevant texts of Menander cannot settle this one way or another, since we do not generally know who is the speaker; and Menander may have been deeply influenced by Peripatetic philosophy without having any affection for the tyrant Demetrius. Barigazzi goes on to discuss Theophrastus, the book on marriage, *tyche*, the *megalopsychos*, the book on piety. Cnemon's attack on rich sacrifices (*Dysc.*, 449 ff.) is quoted as evidence of Menander's agreement with Theophrastus, but is it?

Barigazzi then discusses *humanitas* (in the sense of the Terence quotation *homo sum*, etc.) with its cognates *philanthropia*, *oikeiosis*, and the conception of civilised behaviour as distinctively Greek. Here again the close correspondence of verses in Menander with passages of Aristotle and Theophrastus is undoubted, and one would like to think that at the end of the *Perikeiromene* (429 f.), 'to accept satisfaction in your prosperity is evidence of your Greekness,' Menander is giving Pataecus his own views. But the Terence quotation with which the chapter starts, read in its context (*Heaut.*, 77), is put into Chremes' mouth to justify his meddling with Menedemus' affairs; and Syriacus' defence of justice (*Epitr.*, 56 ff.) is an adroit piece of rhetoric to convince Smicrines.

Theophrastus' *Characters* is compared with Aristotle's portraits in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, and then all possible cross-connections with Menander are traced. This amounts, in fact, to very little, particularly where a direct comparison can be made between a named character of Theophrastus and a named play of Menander. Nor has the conjecture that we have lost all the good characters of Theophrastus really much to commend it. Barigazzi sees a common ethical inspiration both in Menander and in Theo-

phrastus. Certainly also Theophrastus' method is to list the actions by which one may judge that a man is boorish or whatever, and such actions are the stuff of drama. Barigazzi does not consider whether Theophrastus may not have found such actions already described or represented in Middle Comedy. Their presence there would not necessarily imply the kind of detailed and consistent characterisation which he assumes Menander to have invented.

The next chapter gets rid of Menander's debt to Epicureans and Stoics. Chronologically this would in any case be confined to Menander's later plays. Temperamentally and intellectually it is difficult to imagine any sympathy between the intelligent Menander and Zeno. The possibility, in spite of the difference of deme and social station (which Barigazzi stresses), that Menander and Epicurus knew each other during their period of ephebe-training remains.

Barigazzi is concerned to play down tragedy as a source of Menander's ethics. His general position is certainly right: "it is impossible to trace the whole ethical world of Menander back to tragedy as if he could have ignored the great ferment of philosophical ideas in the Athens of his youth." But this position needs some qualification. Peripatetic ethics was to a large extent a codification of the ethics of tragedy and constantly used tragedy as a source of illustrations. Secondly, a classical tragedy was revived every year at the Dionysia, and so (apart from lectures and reading) classical tragedy on the stage was part of Menander's experience. Thirdly, Menander demonstrably used classical tragedy in several different ways (but this Barigazzi is perhaps reserving for his later book on Menander's art).

Barigazzi then develops in great detail Michael Tierney's brilliant discussion of the prologue of the *Perikeiromene* as an Aristotelian sermon. Here at least the position is clear. Agnoia, as prologue figure, is Menander's invention, and the whole systematisation of voluntary and involuntary acts and their subdivisions is known from Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetry*. The terminology can be traced right through the *Perikeiromene* and can be found also in other plays, notably the *Epitrepontes*. There follows a long and interesting discussion of the characters of Demeas and Moschion in the *Samia*. The great monologues of both are subtly evaluated with reference to Peripatetic ethics: a doubt remains, however, in my mind whether Demeas' expulsion of Chrysis is really an ethical necessity. Another key passage for philosophical interpretation is Onesimus' triumph over Smicrines at the end of the *Epitrepontes* (726 ff.). Barigazzi ingeniously argues that this is a consistent piece of Peripatetic philosophy, a serious and true assessment of Smicrines, and the moral of the whole play. (A final chapter discusses what we know of the theory of comedy in Aristotle and Theophrastus).

Barigazzi has provided a valuable documentation for Menander's knowledge of Peripatetic ethics. The audience also (here the restricted franchise should be remembered) must have recognised the formulation as Peripatetic. But how seriously should all this be taken (and how much did the seriousness of this or that passage vary with the actor who spoke it)? Certainly the prologue speech of the *Perikeiromene* and the reconciliation at the end are serious. But the slave Onesimus' triumph over the recurrent meddling of

Smicrines is surely comedy, and I still think that his philosophy is meant as a characteristic muddle (just as Syriseus mixes up Sophocles' *Tyro* and Euripides' *Antiope*, and Cnemon has a rather vague memory of Euripides' *Andromeda*).

Barigazzi's book was finished in 1957, and was held up for the publication of the *Dyscolus* and again until after the publication of the *Sicyonius*. He has not been able to take account of E. W. Handley's *Dyskolos* or his article on the *Sikyonios* (*B. I. C. S.*, 1965), or E. G. Turner's *Misoumenos*, or of Christina Dedoussi's *Samia*. He has included a number of allusions to the *Dyscolus*, but essentially his interpretation is based on the plays and fragments of the Teubner text. A generation which starts from the *Dyscolus* and *Sicyonius* may make itself a different Menander. A gifted Stanford student, who began Menander with the Oxford text of the *Dyscolus*, was fascinated with Gorgias' attack on Sostratus, which struck him as exactly like an enlisted man airing his grievances. The new Menander will not be less educated, but he may be less of an educationist.

T. B. L. WEBSTER.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

MARTIN MÜHMELT. Griechische Grammatik in der Vergilerklärung.

München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1965. Pp. ix + 168. DM. 25.
(*Zetemata*, Heft 37.)

In his review of the "Harvard Servius" (*J. R. S.*, XXXIX [1949], pp. 151-4), Eduard Fraenkel emphatically pointed out the need for a close and systematic study of the relationship of the Servian commentaries on Vergil to the scholia on Homer and other Greek poets. With this in view, Mühmelt has undertaken a preliminary study of this vast and intricate problem of ancient scholarship in the monograph which is reviewed here. He is to be congratulated on the overall clarity of his presentation and especially on the full bibliography and indices of passages and subject matter (some 25 pages), which should be most useful for future studies of this type.¹

Mühmelt limits himself to the exegetic scholia in Servius concerned with such subjects as geography, meaning of words, etymology, myth, and astronomy. A chapter entitled *Grammatische und stilistische Bemerkungen* is also included, together with a brief excursus, which points out the relationship between the *Italikusätze* and the *Etymologicum Magnum*. The work ends with a succinct and convincing evaluation of the whole.

Despite the fact that most of the Servian scholia discussed contain definitions of single words or names, nevertheless a wide range of material is covered. For the most part, Mühmelt's carefully

¹ Misprints: p. 21 (VII, 463) for *COSTIS AUTEM LATERIBUS*/, read *COSTIS/ autem lateribus*; p. 88 (VI, 287) for *Il. I. 392*, read *Il. I. 399*.

marshalled evidence as to Servius' dependency on his Greek predecessors is sufficiently convincing, although at times his meticulous attempts to trace the ultimate sources of the Latin commentaries seem both pointless and futile. One wonders what possible value there is in adducing as evidence of dependency such entries as the following (p. 36): *ad Aen.*, IV, 367 *CAUCASUS/ mons Scythiae inhospitalis*. Mühmelt compares this with schol. Theoc., VII, 76/7 f.: *Καύκαρος· ὄρος Σκυθίας*. For *inhospitalis*, we are referred to Horace, *C.*, I, 22, 7, etc. Mühmelt concludes that this and several other similarly brief statements in Servius derive from Theon, primarily from the use of the Scholia on Theocritus in the prolegomena to the *Eclogues*. This is possible, to be sure, wherever Servius shows a clear reliance upon the scholia on Theocritus, Lycophron, and Apollonius, which is not infrequently. But to use such brief remarks as this as evidence of dependency of any sort seems both unconvincing and useless. There is a surprising number of such vague comparisons scattered throughout the study. See also Mühmelt's remarks on *ad Aen.*, I, 223 (pp. 119-20), where an error in Servius is conjecturally attributed to confusion in the D-scholium on Homer, now fallen out of our text! Elsewhere, however, Mühmelt admits the possibility that Servius' information may have come from his own *Schulwissen* (pp. 27, 48).

Much, on the other hand, of what the author has to say about the relationship of Servius to the Aratus scholia and Eratosthenes (Ch. VI) is well-developed and, in general, quite clearly demonstrated. A good example of Mühmelt's approach can be found in his remarks on *ad Aen.*, I, 119 (pp. 18 f.), and especially on *ad Aen.*, II, 329 (p. 118), behind which Mühmelt points to a discussion of *ἐνάργεια* in the Homeric scholia carried over, but without the technical term, into Servius' comment on Vergil's adaptation of a metaphor. Eustathius also appears to have preserved the part of the original comment translated by Servius. See, too, the lengthy treatment of *ad Aen.*, IX, 712 (pp. 41-2), where the wealth of Greek comment clearly reveals the type of scholarship from which the Romans frequently drew their materials.

In a few cases, one might question the specific Greek source which Mühmelt has cited. In his discussion of *τὸ πρέπον* as a criterion of both Greek and Roman scholia (p. 122), he compares *ad Aen.*, I, 92 with the scholium on Pindar, *Ol.*, X, 55b. To be sure, the word *πρέπον* appears in both scholia, but the passages on which the scholia comment are sufficiently different to preclude any relationship between scholia, whether in form or in content. Better examples of "propriety" in the Homeric scholia can be found which would be more likely to have had some bearing on Servius' remarks on this topic.²

This leads to one criticism of Mühmelt's work which I believe has more serious implications for such a study. At one point (p. 16), he raises the valid question as to whether the Roman scholars considered the value of their comments for an understanding of Vergil's poetry. Part of the difficulty for the overall ques-

² Cf., e.g., K. Lehrs, *De Aristarchi Studiis Homericis* (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1882), pp. 333-5.

tion naturally arises from the fact that Mühlert has chosen to limit himself largely to definitions and comments on specific words. But on those relatively rare occasions when Servius' source is in fact drawn from scholia on lines appropriated by Vergil, Mühlert gives us no indication of this significant dual parallelism. In future work of this type, it would be of great value if some symbol were used to indicate such direct and convincing parallels.³ In this light, the value of some, at least, of Servius' comments might be found to be somewhat more relevant than Mühlert implies (p. 135), whereas, on the other hand, his conclusion that *vis-à-vis* the Greek, Roman scholarship is marked by a decline in creativity and a lapse into mere transcription of earlier materials (p. 136) would become still more decisive and meaningful.

Within the limits of his monograph, Mühlert's careful research readily demonstrates the general dependence of the Servian corpus upon the Greek commentaries both for form and content. His suggestion that Theon and the D-scholia on Homer were among the chief sources of the Roman scholars is at least plausible, and his concluding remark that what seems useful and astute in the comments on Vergil was in origin said by the Greeks appears entirely valid. The result of the research, as Mühlert points out, does indeed seem compromising for the Roman scholars. Still, the obvious parallels in both scholia serve often enough to complement and elucidate each other, and together they present us with a fuller understanding of the critical approach of antiquity to both Greek and Roman letters. Mühlert's work is, in short, a valuable and much-needed addition to Servian studies.

ROBIN R. SCHLUNK.

UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.

MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM. *The Poetry of the Aeneid. Four Studies in Imaginative Unity and Design.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xv + 238. \$5.25.

It is perhaps to be expected that classical scholars be testy, and, to be sure, many 'fights' of opposing camps have led to remarkable scholarly productions. The reviewer, however, detects with some regret a growing cleavage, particularly in this country, between two different kinds of scholarship on the *Aeneid* of Vergil. The fact that the two approaches are not necessarily diametrically opposed (except when pursued, as they seldom are, to an absurd extreme) and the fact that their goals are identical (i. e. to demonstrate the infinite variety and appeal of Vergil's poetry and at the same time

³I suspect that more such parallels exist, and cite for example IX, 474 = X, 448; XII, 225 = Δ, 95; and especially XII, 387 = Δ 184. Here, Servius' remark, which is virtually a translation of part of the Homeric scholium, has little significance until seen in the light of the lines which Vergil has imitated from the *Iliad* and the Greek commentary thereon.

reaffirm its essential unity) make the development of any bitter rupture the more regrettable.

We have on the one hand the factual approach which feels it must thoroughly document and demonstrate its points (if need be by charts, schemata, line-counts, etc.) at every step of its methodical, workmanlike way. Its chief fault, often pointed out by its critics, is that it gets so involved with externals that it sometimes loses contact with the poetry. On the other hand is the intuitive approach which feels it incumbent upon each age (indeed each individual) to express what Vergil means to it. In its subjective way it examines word and image searching for clues to the poem's inner meaning and plumbing the creative imagination of the poet. Its chief fault is that the creative imagination plumbed is often more that of the critic than that of the poet and it has a tendency to scorn any other examination (factual or intuitive) as inadequate.

It is the advocates of the latter approach who, in the opinion of the reviewer, have been the more militant. This is perhaps only natural, for the approach is certainly newer and moreover, since it lacks the kinds of demonstration available to the more pedestrian approach, the views stated carry authority only in proportion to the degree of force with which they are stated. Thus they tend to substitute defence of method or, more vehemently, criticism of other approaches which is often beside the point.

It is in the preface of the present work that the author sets himself down firmly in the camp of those who would utilize "the most recent developments in critical methodology." In his enthusiasm for the method, however, and in his shadowboxing with adversaries, named and unnamed, he becomes involved in several inconsistencies and non sequiturs. Granted "the importance of seeking for unity in dealing with a work of the creative imagination," why *must* it "begin with an examination of those subtle variations and repetitions of metaphor and image"? It certainly *may* begin there, but there is nothing illogical about its beginning (where incidentally Vergil began!) with the plan of the work and a consideration of how the poem is put together. Those many scholars who have painstakingly worked on the architecture of the poem have performed a service, even for Mr. Putnam, that ought to be acknowledged rather than scorned.

Scorn is one thing, and the author is certainly entitled to his view that his method transcends the superficiality of others, but misrepresentation is quite another. The reviewer knows of no scholar who, pointing to the relationship between books V-VIII or IX-XII, would deny "striking imaginative links" between these and other books as would be implied in paragraph three of page x. The second paragraph on this same page is a complete enigma. I have read it many times and fail to understand any relationship between its first two and last two sentences. Can the author be implying that those who draw analogies between various sections of the poem necessarily do so by way of emphasizing Vergil's relationship to Homer?

It is perhaps unfair of the reviewer to harp on the preface of a work in which there is so much that is commendable. The author's approach is not at all so arrogant as the initial pages of the preface

imply. Doing well to caution that "pattern is something which should be discovered as an end, not imposed as a means of critical evaluation," he seeks in detailed discussion of books II, V, VIII, and XII for salient images which stand out from the total design and reveal "a marvelous symbolic unity to the poem." Quick to acknowledge the exploratory nature of his work and the fact that "the appeal of a sensitive poet will vary from person to person," he proposes "by tentative example new methods for approaching" the *Aeneid*.

His treatments are extremely sensitive and it is clear that the author is dealing with a poetry that he loves. The only general criticism to be offered in such highly imaginative, and one must add highly stimulating, writing is that it is sometimes too highly imaginative. At such points, however, to criticise is simply to say, "I don't think so," or "It does not strike me that way at all," which will hardly pass muster as serious criticism.

A couple of matters, however, are a bit more tangible. In his discussion, following Knox, of the snake-imagery in book II Putnam is right to note the significance of the recurrent use of *lapsus*. There are many ways of expressing motion in Latin and Vergil's repeated use of this word and its cognates at this point in the narrative is striking and noteworthy. In the author's discussion (pp. 30 ff.) of the parallel imagery of II and VI, however, much is made of single repetitions of *cupido* (*tanta cupido* is more exactly repeated at VII, 263), *di quibus imperium* (also found at V, 235), and *nocte per umbram* (also found at IV, 184, cf. IX, 314 and Putnam, p. 51; *per umbram*: II, 732, 768, cf. Putnam, p. 44; VI, 257, 452). How many ways could one express in Latin 'desire,' 'gods whose rule,' and 'through the darkness at night'? Isolated repetitions of normal vocabulary after an interval of several books are not in themselves strikingly significant. In any event one must examine all uses of such common expressions and not just those one wishes to relate.

Again the author's most interesting discussion of book XII, wherein he sees a basically pessimistic ending to the poem and its central character in the end succumbing to a force and violence which he himself had previously found contemptible, is marred by a couple of premises regarding the book which are, in the reviewer's opinion, demonstrably inaccurate: "There are few hints in the action of book XII of any greatness of character of Aeneas and no mention whatever of the future brilliance of Rome, save in the idealistic utterances of Jupiter at the end. . . ." One wonders if Putnam is reading the same text! "Save . . . Jupiter" to begin with is a pretty big exception (is not the initial prophecy of Rome's future greatness in book I from his lips?), but apart from that book XII has its share of references to the Rome that is to be. The extended treaty-making scene is a case in point, providing as it does an august prototype for the *fetiales* and the *pater patratus*. A forward looking, nationalistic tone is established from the very beginning (166-9):

hinc pater Aeneas, Romanae stirpis origo,
sidereo flagrans clipeo et caelestibus armis

et iuxta Ascanius, magnae spes altera Romae,
procedunt castris . . .

These are the words of the poet and seem of unmistakable intent.

As for any greatness of character in Aeneas, it is difficult to miss the scene of the breaking of the truce, where Vergil has juxtaposed, surely for deliberate contrast, the reactions of Aeneas on the one hand and Turnus on the other. At the first bloodshed Aeneas rushes out unarmed, bare-headed, shouting in disbelief (313-15):

quo ruitis? quaeve ista repens discordia surgit?
o cohibete iras! ictum iam foedus et omnes
compositae leges, mihi ius concurrere soli . . .

Turnus, on the other hand, delighted at the reprieve, seeks only to make the most of the situation (325-8):

subita spe fervidus ardet;
poscit equos atque arma simul, saltuque superbus
emicat in currum et manibus molitur habenas.
multa virum volitans dat fortia corpora leto . . .

It is at this point, it seems to the reviewer, that the death of Turnus becomes inevitable. He has shown how incompatible his existence is with the terms of the truce upon which the future of the Trojans and Latins depends. A critic sensitive to Vergil's use of words cannot miss the adjective *superbus*. The term is applied to Turnus on only two other occasions: immediately before and immediately after the slaughter of Pallas (X, 445, 514).

There is no great, last-minute reversal in the character of Aeneas. His eventual dispatching of Turnus has indeed an immediate, even impulsive, cause in the desire to avenge the death of Pallas, but, whatever personal motives Aeneas may be responding to, they are entirely consistent with the higher mission enjoined as early as book VI: *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*. Turnus cannot, in the opinion of the reviewer, be included among the *subiecti* on the basis of his last-minute appeal in the face of death. The reliability of his word in this respect has been tested and found lacking in his gleeful joining in the breaking of the pact which he himself called for in line twelve.

ROBERT B. LLOYD.

RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN'S COLLEGE.

ULRICH FISCHER. *Der Telosgedanke in den Dramen des Aischylos:*

Ende, Ziel, Erfüllung, Machtvollkommenheit. Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965. Pp. 175. (*Spudasmata*, Band VI.)

Long before Greek philosophy assigned the connotation of moral perfection to *telos*, Greeks had used the word in a wide range of meanings—such as “end,” “rank,” “office,” “tax,” “rite,” and “sacrifice.” The latter meanings together with *telete* “mystery” and the cult epithet *teleios* show the importance of *telos* in religious

language. Fischer examines the use of *telos* in the "Motivtechnik" of Aeschylus, who employed the term with unusual variety. Concentrating on "Doppelsinn," "Hintergrundsbedeutung," "Wortwiederholungen," "Ringkomposition," and similar devices, this work gives only a subordinate, disorganized, and superficial treatment of certain basic lexicographical problems. Nevertheless, this book is important for two reasons. It adds to the understanding of Aeschylean theology and it shows once again that Aeschylus was an author whose skill was to gain through a variety of literary devices greater meaning from the language of his day. There are many fine interpretations of individual passages, some representing plausible solutions to controversial problems. Two passages of special interest are *Ag.*, 934, where Fischer assigns ritual significance to *telos*, and *Cho.*, 385, where a former view of Lesky that *τοκεῦσιν* refers to *τοκαῖς ἀρτης* is revived.

Although he notes at the outset the standard, if questionable, view of the etymologists that the many meanings of *telos* reflect a multiple origin (Pokorny gives *telos* "end" from IE *k^wel "turn," *telos* "rank" from IE *k^wel "group," and *telos* "tax" from IE *tel "lift"), Fischer is non-committal towards this explanation. His first order of business is to derive *telos* "munus" from Hes., *Erg.*, 669 (ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε) and Theognis, 660 (θεοὶ γὰρ τοι νημεσῶσ' οἷσιν ἔπεστι τέλος). His reasoning is that "die Vollmacht zum Handeln (Hes.) auch die Pflicht dazu bedinge (Theogn.)." Even if the Theognis passage does contain an example of *telos* "duty," a meaning otherwise found for the first time in Aeschylus, it is unwise to look for an "Angelpunkt" for lexical change in a single occurrence of a word. It may be that *telos* "duty" derives from a distinct IE root. If not, this reviewer has suggested that the source lies in the Homeric ἐν τελέεσσιν and related expressions ("The Homeric *Telos*," *Glotta*, 1965, p. 62). Having tacitly rejected the influence of an IE *k^wel "group," Fischer later (pp. 54 ff.) fails to make his position clear about IE *tel "lift" as a source for συντελής (*Ag.*, 532), τελέεσθω (*Cho.*, 310), and εὐτελής (*Sept.*, 491). Nevertheless, he relates these three words to *telein* "pay." He apparently (cf. pp. 8 and 54, n. 7) sees no inadequacy in Holwerda's solution to the etymology of *telos*, which is to ignore *tel "lift" altogether and derive all *telos* meanings from an alleged root-meaning "scale." In sum, neither this nor Holwerda's work ("Telos," *Mnemosyne*, 1963, pp. 347-63) fills the need for a systematic treatment—even an inconclusive one—of the etymology of the many meanings of *telos* in Aeschylus and other fifth-century authors.

Though disorganized, Fischer's survey of lexical material is generally accurate. The inaccuracies which do emerge are usually minor: The verb *telein* is always transitive in Homer, even at *Od.*, III, 119, where the object is κατὰ in the preceding line (cf. p. 133, n. 8), *telos* "rank" occurs also in Aesch., fr. 151, τέλος ἀθανάτων (cf. p. 117). The statement, "Einzelne Götter werden bei Aischylos nie *teleios* genannt, ausser den Erinyen . . ." (p. 110) is wrong. Zeus is, of course, called *teleios*, but so is Hera (*Eum.*, 214, fr. 383). The statement that except for Zeus single gods are not brought into association with the *telos*-concept should be further modified. In

addition to the one exception he cites there is also the speaker (Aphrodite?) of fr. 44. This error is made in support of an Aeschylean belief in an "Einheitlichkeit des für die Menschen spürbaren göttlichen Wirkens" (p. 111).

Fischer's work, however, is intended to be more than an analysis of lexical material. It aims to prove a thesis: that Aeschylus expressed his higher idea of Zeus' authority over the outcome of human affairs through a manifold use of *telos*. Fischer does not, however, propose a rigid scheme for the *telos*-motif, nor does he suggest that Aeschylus made a preliminary categorization of the meanings of *telos*.

In his attempt to prove the thesis, Fischer turns first to various technical uses of *telos*, such as *telos* "duty," *telos dikēs*, *dia telous*, and *telos* in the marriage rite. This is the crucial step: to show that Aeschylus gives religious connotations to non-religious expressions. Some of the author's arguments may be unconvincing, but his explication of *telos* "duty" or "authority" is impressive. He suggests that the Atreidae as *andrōn enteleōn* (*Ag.*, 105), the *telos* into which Apollo set Cassandra (*Ag.*, 1202), even the comic *telos* of the Nurse as *tropheus* and *gnapheus* (*Cho.*, 760), and the *telos* of the servants (*Ag.*, 908) all tie in with the fulfilment of the curse of the House. One act of this fulfilment is the *telos* ("end" and "sacrifice") of Agamemnon as *teleion* ("man in authority" and "sacrificial victim") to and through Zeus *Soter* and *Teleios* (*Ag.*, 1387, 973). Another and final act, however, is the *telos dikēs* awarded to Orestes. The result of this group of associations is to express the outcome of the trilogy and its intermediary stages as an obligation or duty. One may wish to draw added support for these conclusions from the lexical meanings of the noun *telos* in Aeschylus, which do fall into two broad categories: 1) Obligation (rank, rite, task) and 2) Outcome.

Fischer (p. 46) rightly compares the Aeschylean view to Solon's *telos* (fr. 1, 28) as a *tisis* owed to Justice by the unjust man. But he interprets the gradual process of fulfilling the retribution to justice through family curses, daimones, Erinyes, etc., under the overall view of Zeus as a departure from Solon, whose Zeus may bring the *telos* to the wrong-doer suddenly at any time. Fischer is misleading, however, in taking Solon's silence for an essential theological difference between the sage and the tragedian. As far as it goes Solon's view is very similar to that of Aeschylus.

Certainly Fischer's view representing an Aeschylean Zeus of greater moral force is contrary to that taken by H. Lloyd-Jones ("Zeus in Aeschylus," *J. H. S.*, 1956, pp. 55-67). The association of Zeus as *Teleios* and *Soter* (not only of the Dead, but in the end, of Orestes, *Eum.*, 759-60) supports Fischer's position well. V. Citti (*Il linguaggio religioso e liturgico nelle tragedie di Eschilo* [Bologna, 1962]), whose conclusions have not been incorporated by Fischer, has cited excellent internal and external evidence for the nature of the Aeschylean Zeus *Teleios*. The question remains, however, how far Aeschylus' high view of Zeus differs from the Zeus of epic and lyric tradition. One may not only wish to recall the moral ambiguity of the Aeschylean Zeus, e.g., in the *Prometheus*, but also to point out that there is a much greater emphasis upon the fulfilling power

of Zeus in Homer than Fischer indicates. On the relation of Zeus to the Homeric *telos*, the author is vague and even self-contradictory. On p. 102 he maintains that in spite of the greater frequency of Zeus' agency a qualitative difference exists between the agency of Zeus with the Homeric *telein* and that of other agents, human or divine. Yet on p. 103 he notes that *telein* is only infrequently used with an object referring to a conscious plan, such as the *boulē* of Zeus (Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή), "unter das die Mēnis-Handlung und damit die ganze Ilias gestellt ist." Can this be other than a qualitative difference? Of the 30 occurrences of divine agents of *telein* in Homer, Zeus is the agent in 17. Moreover, the plans which Zeus fulfils are always basic to the epic while the other six divine agents mentioned by name fulfil desires of only passing moment. Zeus is also the most frequent fulfiller of curses and prayers. The earliest divine epithet related to *telos* is *telesphoros*, given to Zeus in the Homeric *Hymn to Zeus*. Thus, the picture Fischer gives of Zeus *Teleios* in Aeschylus seems to have taken some form either in the epic tradition or under the influence of that tradition.

As for the Aeschylean *telos* itself, the author could go farther: the verb *telein* expresses outcomes basic to the plays. These outcomes include the deaths of Agamemnon, Aegisthus, and Clytemnestra, the salvation of Orestes, the honor to the Eumenides, the curse of Oedipus, the death of Polyneices, and even the taming of Zeus by the curse of Cronus. The effect of the tragedies is to show that the ultimate agents of these acts are *theoi teleioi*, whether chthonic or ethereal. Over all these forces, finally, stands Zeus, τελευτάτων κράτος (*Supp.*, 526). Τί δ' ἄνευ σέθεν θνατοῖσι τέλειόν ἐστιν; ask the Suppliant Maidens of Zeus. Such a doctrine seems to be expressed throughout the plays, and especially in the *Oresteia*, in the varied application of the Aeschylean *telos*.

These comments have attempted to indicate where this book stands on a fundamental problem of Aeschylean scholarship, the Aeschylean Zeus. They also point to some weaknesses of lexicographical procedure. Nevertheless, both the main thesis and the many thoughtful interpretations of difficult passages deserve attention by all Aeschylean scholars.

Z. PHILIP AMBROSE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.

DONALD R. DUDLEY, editor. *Lucretius*. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1965. Pp. ix + 166. \$4.95. (*Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence*.)

This is the second volume in the series edited by D. R. Dudley and T. A. Dorey of the University of Birmingham. Each volume is to present essays by scholars in classical and related fields, centering on one author or topic, the audience both the scholar and wider group of interested and literate readers. The *Lucretius* comprises an introduction, seven essays of which two are by "guests" from the fields of science and English literature respectively, an index of proper names, and a list of the principal passages discussed. The

essays range in length from 16 to 32 pages, each followed by reasonably brief footnotes.

The first chapter, "Pre-Socratics, Lucretius and Modern Science," by the zoologist, O. E. Lowenstein, starts with the striking contrast between Lucretius' faith in knowledge of the physical universe as the source of salvation from fear and the heightening of fear today rooted in that very knowledge. He proceeds to treat briefly ancient and modern concepts of the nature of matter and void, properties and accidents in relation to Locke's primary and secondary qualities, devotes somewhat more space to comparisons of cosmology, the origin of life, processes of natural selection, and the psycho-somatic problems. While the field is of course vast, he has selected fundamental points for emphasis and presented them clearly and vividly in his limited space. At the end he affirms his own preference for "the uncompromising acceptance of causality as expressed by Democritus . . . to the wooly and muddleheaded talk of some present-day philosophers and physicists alike, of indeterminism in physical nature and in Man with an alleged and far-fetched relevance to 'free will.'" Here, despite an appropriate quotation on mortality, Lucretius seems to be forgotten.

In the following essay, "Form and Purpose in the *De Rerum Natura*," Farrington immediately makes explicit the radically different orientation of Epicurus and Lucretius in their moral focus and insistence on free will. He vigorously protests the misconception that Lucretius' ultimate concern is physics. That the knowledge of nature, for all its wonders, is always a means rather than an end, that the poet is passionately concerned with the reader's conversion to the good life is worth reiterating, although one may feel the misconceptions are less widely shared today (even by Bailey) than Farrington suggests. He argues well for the central role of *amicitia* in the approach as in the fulfilment of *voluptas*. Granting the validity of much that he says in this context, one may still question his insistence that Lucretius' devotion to Memmius is "at the heart of the poem" and that Memmius is always to be identified as the immediate audience whenever the second person singular occurs, even in entire books where the name is never mentioned. Giancotti's thoughtful discussion is pertinent here: what we know of Memmius provides an excellent profile of the wider audience to whom the poem is addressed (*Il preludio di Lucrezio*, ch. II, especially pp. 124 ff.).

Farrington's article and the following by Wormell, "The Personal World of Lucretius," together constitute a stimulating introduction for student and layman as well as provide occasional challenge to the scholar. Wormell is at one with Farrington in the stress on the poet's purpose (as also in the view of Memmius). He surveys the prooemia of the six books, showing very effectively the power of Lucretius to transform the commonplaces of the tradition into a compelling affirmation of faith. His paragraphs on the poetic imagination and its relation to science, the "tension" between the two, and Lucretius' great achievement in their reconciliation are admirably presented.

The fourth and fifth essays on "Language" and "Imagery" are directed more exclusively to the student with the text at hand. Maguiness' selection of characteristic features of style properly

and inevitably goes over familiar ground: the devices to achieve clarity and emphasis, the *abundantia* and even tautology which he shows to be functional, deliberate, and effective rather than otiose. He well protests the common tendency to look on Lucretius' style "as a half-way stage between Ennius and Virgil," focusing rather on its power as the vehicle of the poet's thought and emotion. The specific points, well illustrated, provide a useful survey for the student. There is a brief appendix listing "probable or possible Lucretian creations," archaic pre-Lucretian words, and old forms.

Townend's discussion of imagery centers on the poet's power to develop even conventional and traditional motifs vividly and with the stamp of his own experience. He presents well instances of Lucretius' fresh observation of the external world, as well as "the visions of the mind" conveyed in striking metaphor, and concludes with reflections on symbolic images. Here he quotes C. D. Lewis to good effect, but perhaps for lack of space leaves us with an interesting and curiously unsatisfactory paragraph on the old issue of "the honeyed cup."

Dudley's essay, "The Satiric Element in Lucretius," concentrates chiefly on two passages, the great finales of books III and IV. The analysis is effective, although one is tempted to question the applicability of the term "satire" to the whole of either passage. It is worth noting that Murley ("Lucretius and the History of Satire," *T. A. P. A.*, LXX [1939], pp. 380 ff., apparently overlooked by Dudley, who comments on the lack of attention to the topic) employing more precise criteria and including only parts of these two passages, makes an estimate of six or seven hundred lines of satire in the poem as against about 450 for Dudley. Dudley's lively chapter, however, certainly confirms the claims of Lucretius to a place in the tradition.

Dudley makes the interesting suggestion that the treatment of passion in IV may have influenced Augustine's attitude to love and sex and thus contributed to the post-Augustinian thousand-year eclipse of the Catullan tradition; perhaps Yeats' "Crazy Jane" who inherited the old conflict is actually refuting Lucretius and Augustine. This suggests one of the incidental rewards of the volume whose contributors have read widely and imaginatively.

"Lucretius and the Scientific Poem in English" is contributed by T. J. B. Spencer, Professor of English at Birmingham. It contains much that is interesting and informative. Whereas scientific themes appear in English from Chaucer to the present, the direct influence of Lucretius is first marked in the 17th century, from which Dryden's tribute is quoted. In the 18th, after Newton seemed so clearly to have proved that the heavens declare the glory of God, many poets were inspired to develop the evidence. Thomson's *The Seasons* is a notable example where the anti-Lucretian conclusion is combined with the "Lucretian enthusiasm." There is also an illuminating discussion of Shelley whose science, Spencer points out, was "often up to date," and some of his apparently obscure and fanciful imagery is elucidated when this is realized. (This is an interesting kind of reply to Santayana who contrasts the dream world of Shelley with Lucretius' nature. Oddly enough, Santayana's brilliant essay is mentioned by none of the contributors.)

There are at least two aspects of Spencer's subject, as his title

indicates, and sometimes they need clarification. Thus Milton is dismissed for the "obseurantism" of his indifference to astronomy, with no reference to his imitations of Lucretius in other contexts. He proposes to confine himself to "the scientific poem," but theme and purpose are almost inextricably blended at times. Lucretius' eloquent challenge to the belief in an intelligent creator was often more compelling an "influence" than his account of atoms. There might well have been two essays here.

This is a rewarding and attractive volume, succeeding remarkably well in providing varied and stimulating fare to its varied audience. It should indeed contribute to the wider interest in Lucretius of which the editor expresses his hope in the preface. The topics selected are of central concern, the essays are for the most part a pleasure to read, marked often by grace and wit, and conveying the authors' sense of Lucretius' power and relevance.

MARGARET E. TAYLOR.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

G. E. R. LLOYD. *Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought.* Cambridge, University Press, 1966. Pp. v + 503. \$16.50.

Polarity and analogy receive separate and unequal treatment in this volume, polarity on pages 15-171, analogy on pages 172-420. They are united by a common introduction, conclusion, bibliography, index of passages, and general index. The two major divisions of the book are roughly parallel: the author first presents a large number of examples, ranging from prephilosophical thought (as exemplified both by early Greece and by primitive societies) through Presocratics, medical writers and historians, to Plato and Aristotle; after the examples comes an account of the ancient attempts at analysis of the respective forms of argumentation. The examples are drawn chiefly from cosmology and natural science; as a consequence, the Greek orators are not included in the study, and even the Sophists are largely ignored, except for Gorgias. Nevertheless the author believes that the material presented is sufficient to establish a pattern of increasing sophistication in the analysis and use of these modes of thought, the advance in each case culminating in Aristotle.

Polarity at the prephilosophical stage appears as a tendency to group things under pairs, or even paired columns, of opposites: left and right, female and male, night and day, and the like. Greek philosophers and scientists employed many such pairs: odd and even, hot and cold, wet and dry, for example, to which they added being and not-being, being and becoming, same and other, form and privation, and many more. Polarity was thus an important principle in Greek thought. Its chief weakness was that the theoretical schematisms derived from it were sometimes too rigidly imposed on phenomena, and the resultant alternatives were too narrowly conceived. Of special interest to Lloyd is the escape from a compulsory choice

between polar opposites through the discovery that pairs of opposites do not necessarily exhaust the possible alternatives. If the opposites are contraries rather than contradictories, both may be false; if subcontraries, both may be true. Lloyd is no doubt right when he gives to Plato and Aristotle the major credit for clarifying these relations; but he has unduly minimized evidence of earlier dissatisfaction with the rigidity of polar alternatives. Perhaps Anaximander's ἀπειρον is already an attempt to mediate between opposites (see p. 16 of Lloyd's book). Heraclitus, at any rate, quite deliberately rejected polar reasoning not only by combining opposites in a single predicate, but by pointing out that the same thing may have opposite predicates in different relations or at different times (for examples see pp. 97-8, 214, and 215, n. 3). Similarly, Protagoras protests against rigidly polarized predicates in *Protag.*, 334 A-C, a passage which is consistent, at least, with that philosopher's teaching. And surely the formula, "no more this than that," which is assigned with some plausibility to both Protagoras and Democritus, is a rejection of polarity. Another kind of protest is that of the physician who wrote *On Ancient Medicine*; he rejects a medical etiology based on the four canonical powers, hot and cold, wet and dry (which constitute a schema of opposites), because in his view the body is subject to an indefinitely large number of powers (cf. pp. 69-70). Thus the "oversimplification" of polar reasoning was not so common as Lloyd supposes (p. 434); and he overstates the case when he says that *Euthydemus*, 293 B 7 ff. "may be the first extant text in which it is implicitly recognized that the factors of *respect* and *time* must be taken into consideration in deciding whether two assertions in which contrary attributes are predicated of a single subject contradict one another" (p. 138; the italics are Lloyd's).

The account of analogy, despite its length, is less satisfactory than that of polarity. Part of the difficulty is that the author tries to do too much. He uses analogy in the broadest possible sense, including not merely arguments of the form, "as A is to B, so C is to D," but also metaphors, similes, and indeed comparisons of all types. As with polarity, he takes his examples chiefly from cosmology and natural science, thus giving in effect a virtual history of those subjects as well as of analogy. Not content with this, he sometimes offers reasons why some analogies were used rather than others. For example, the reason why the supreme deity in the Homeric poems is called a father and a king, but not ordinarily a craftsman, is that the craftsman had a low status in Homeric society (pp. 208-9). Unfortunately this explanation is considerably weakened by the author's subsequent observation that the contempt that Plato expresses for craftsmen does not prevent him from calling the creator of the universe a craftsman (p. 293). Such excursions as these distract the reader from the study of analogy as a form of argument.

A further difficulty is that the advance in the use of analogy is not clearcut. Lloyd can point to an increasing awareness of the difference between myth and rational account, and of the inability of analogy to define or prove; but philosophers and scientists did not for that reason abandon analogy or even take effective measures

to protect themselves against its ambiguities. Rather, they continued to find it an exceedingly useful device; witness Plato's later dialogues. Lloyd believes that Aristotle was less addicted to analogies than Plato, in cosmology at least, and this is a reasonable view; but the difference between the two men would not have been so great if he had taken into account the fragments of Aristotle's lost works, especially those assigned to the *De Philosophia*.

Still another difficulty arises precisely from the ambiguity inherent in analogical reasoning. How far are analogies to be pushed? Sometimes Lloyd pushes them too far. An example is his interpretation of Anaximander's use (frag. 1) of such words as *δίκη*, *τίσις*, *ἀδικία*. He observes that Anaximander is here describing the relation between cosmological factors in terms of social relations; more especially, he says that the image here is of "the rule of law which operates among equals"; for Justice is a "contract between equals" (p. 213). He then proceeds to the further point that in some Presocratic cosmologies a number of cosmological substances are imagined as being of equal rank or status, their relations being regulated by some sort of contract or treaty (pp. 216-19); and presently (p. 225) we find him referring to "the Empedoclean conception of a contract between equal cosmological factors." But on close inspection the evidence for this cosmological contract is nothing more than the use of such terms as *δίκη* and (in Empedocles, frag. 115) *ὅρκος*.

Often there is ambiguity also in the relationship of the things between which an analogy is drawn. Lloyd finds in Aristotle an awareness that when the similarity is not superficial, when, for example, the causes are the same or similar in both instances, the analogy acquires a certain strength (p. 371). But he seems not to appreciate the extent to which analogy is itself a means of arriving at a generalized conception in terms of which seemingly heterogeneous items acquire a generic unity. An example (not mentioned by Lloyd) is *Sophist*, 228 A, where Plato supports his analogy between *ills of body* and of *soul* by formulating a definition of *στράσις* sufficiently general to include both. Indeed, if Lloyd had explored more fully the complementary roles that Plato assigns in the *Phaedrus* to analogy and polarity in the construction of conceptual hierarchies, he might thereby have achieved a closer connection between his two major themes.

Limitations of space permit only a few references to matters of detail. P. 10, note 2: the chief obstacle to dating the *De corde* before Erasistratus is that it mentions the valves of the heart; see K. Abel in *Hermes*, LXXXVI (1958), pp. 201 f. P. 95, note 1: there is reason to believe that for the Pythagoreans the unit was not a number; cf. T. Heath, *History of Greek Mathematics*, I, p. 69. P. 121: the argument of Palamedes is not, strictly speaking, an instance of Aristotle's *τόπος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων*. P. 249, note 1, and p. 251: Aristotle does not say that Democritus' soul-atoms are self-moving. P. 274: a reference is needed to F. Solmsen, "Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXIV (1963), pp. 473-96.

PHILLIP DE LACY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

H. C. BALDRY. *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*. Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. viii + 223. \$7.50.

The title gives the "theme" of the book. The concern is with "the development of the notion itself and the changes of mental outlook which the development involved" (p. 2). Professor Baldry starts with Homer, and completes his survey with Cicero, whom he examines primarily as a product of late Hellenistic culture, and as a source for the doctrines of Greek thinkers of the Middle Stoa. The development described could be summarized in terms of four stages: 1) In Homer we find a "unified picture of man," based on the poet's appreciation of the common human lot (p. 11). Within this larger unity no distinctions of status are drawn between Greek and barbarian, or between men of different race or different color. But within each human society Homer assumes rigid distinctions, based on sex and hereditary class (pp. 12 ff.). 2) In the fifth century we find a "breakdown of the traditional respect for the aristocracy and rejection of the division of society . . . into a well-born upper class and a humble mass of common folk" (pp. 33 f.). At the same time, and partly as a result of the Persian wars, the antithesis between Greek and barbarian comes to be polarized (pp. 22 f., 33). 3) The philosophic enlightenment of the late fifth and fourth centuries supplants these older distinctions with a distinction of status between the wise and the unwise—in effect, between the community of *sophoi* and the rest of humanity (p. 55). In the early Stoics this becomes a gulf as unbridgeable as the old Homeric one of high and low birth (p. 115). 4) In the late third and second centuries we find for the first time the view that "not only the wise but all men, or at any rate all civilized men, are already fellow citizens of the world-city" (p. 167). Baldry sees the impact of Rome as the main factor in the development of this idea. An essential element at this stage is the assumption that there is a natural feeling or impulse of kinship or fellowship (*oikeiōsis*) among men—a doctrine for which Professor Baldry postulates a line of succession running from Panaetius to Cicero (pp. 178 ff.). Yet, even against this background, the old distinctions of male vs. female, free man vs. slave, persist unchallenged, both in theory and in practice. Moreover, this concept of the unity of mankind does not lead to organizational changes or to proposals for institutional reform (p. 203).

The telling of this story is smooth and engaging. Baldry is properly cautious and critical in using sources, without pressing criticism to the point of diminishing returns. There is one polemical chapter, against Tarn's thesis that Alexander was the founder and champion of the ideal of human brotherhood and unity (Ch. IV). Baldry voices scepticism here, and his counter-arguments appear fair, sensible, and convincing.

Two specific interpretations appear off the mark. Baldry takes note of the late fifth century medical writers' concept of a common biological "nature of man" (p. 49) subject to varying geographical and environmental influences. He finds in this view the potential of development away from "accepted discriminations and prejudices" (p. 52) toward an egalitarian view, but regards this potential as one which remains unrealized. A different view, the inegalitarianism

of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, came to reinforce the dominant attitude. But clearly this geo-biological conception of human nature is ambiguous. It could have led either to a tolerant relativism, or (with equal or greater plausibility) to theories of innate superiority for peoples of certain climates and geographic regions. This is exactly the development in Aristotle, as Baldry is aware (p. 99), and it does not involve a rejection of the medical view.

In the case of the Epicureans Baldry finds an "inconsistency" between their professed hedonistic egoism and their exaltation of the ideal of friendship and universal brotherhood. He finds this strange, and considers it as a discrepancy between their theory and their practice (p. 150). But we find the same pair of views in Bentham and Mill, which suggests that the polarity is built into the logic of a hedonistic ethical *theory*.

Overall, what one is inclined to question in this book is not so much specific interpretive theses but rather the presuppositions it involves and the conceptual framework it employs. The approach is openly historicist: concepts always *develop*, and they develop *gradually*, in rather *complex* sequences, but overall in *linear*, progressive, or cumulative fashion. There is almost a formula or mold at work here: "The idea of *F* already existed before *P*, but it is only with *P* that it receives conscious formulation." To speak of a formula is perhaps unfair; but remarks like the following occur abundantly and characteristically in the book: "the notion of the unity of mankind was an attitude of mind which existed in some sense from Homer onwards, but was given shape and content by different writers as time went on" (p. 122); "... his conception of it seems to have arisen as a natural development out of earlier Greek thought rather than as a result of sudden awareness of wider horizons . . ." (p. 140).

This linear or gradualist interpretation is not, contrary to Baldry's claim, a conclusion from facts. It is at best a working hypothesis, and at worst an unexamined assumption. Consider two cases. Baldry comments admiringly on Anaximander's map as involving "the idea of mankind as an aggregate, the notion of the human race as a single species" (p. 25). He sees in the map one of the first "theories of unity" (p. 24). Hesiod's remarkable anthropogony and anthropology receive, by comparison, only scant attention: they are treated briefly as a variant of the Homeric view (pp. 15 f.). Again, Baldry treats Eratosthenes as a major figure in the transition to what I described above as stage 4. He assigns to him a full section of chapter VI and comments: "Looking at the world of his day with the geographer's eye he argues that there are other civilized peoples besides those who can be labelled Greek" (p. 170). It is hard to see why this comment does not apply with equal force and perhaps even more significantly to Herodotus, who is given a smaller share in the development scheme (pp. 19 f., 21 ff.). One cannot help feeling that chronology and the assumption of gradualism have magnified the contributions of Anaximander and Eratosthenes and have correspondingly foreshortened those of Hesiod and Herodotus.

More seriously, the gradualist interpretation receives illegitimate support from the ambiguity of Baldry's key term, "the unity of

mankind." The term receives a historical commentary; it is nowhere given a philosophical analysis. One would want to distinguish at least six views which might be subsumed under this term. (a) Man is a single species distinct from Animal and God. (b) Men are naturally prone to agreement, consensus, sympathy, cooperation. (c) Mankind constitutes an organic system in which every man has his place or function, some being more centrally or characteristically *human* than others. (d) There is a single nature, form, or essence which constitutes the *telos* of all individual men. (e) All (biologically defined) men have equal, inalienable rights, all having the same dignity, none having greater claims to moral worth or respect than others. (f) The democratic ideal: men should strive for peace through convergence of individual preferences. The first two of these views are purely descriptive; the last four have normative force. So the two groups do not measure the same quantity. But Baldry often cites the currency of doctrines of type (a) or (b) as evidence of only partial advance. Curiously, he regards (c), the Platonic view, and (d), the Aristotelian view, as elements in a half-way stage—two versions of intellectualized defense for traditional inegalitarianism (pp. 72 f., 101). One would think they are the two strongest statements of the *unity* of mankind—allowing for the ambiguity of the term—received from antiquity. The doctrine of *oikeiōsis* (cf. [b] above) with which the narrative ends, appears pious and trivial in comparison.

ALEXANDER P. D. MOURELATOS.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
AT AUSTIN.

ALFRED ERNOUT. *Philologica*, III. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1965. Pp. 182. 18 Fr. (*Études et Commentaires*, LIX.)

Alfred Ernout's first volume of *Philologica* was published in 1946 and contained a selection of articles which had already appeared in journals (some of them difficult of access) together with one which had been delivered as an address. The second volume, which appeared in 1957, also contained one previously unpublished article together with a selection of articles which had already appeared in scattered journals. The first and second volumes were reviewed in *A. J. P.*, LXX (1949), pp. 443-5, and LXXX (1959), pp. 106-8.

The third volume differs from its two predecessors in the fact that approximately one half of it—to be exact, eight out of thirteen articles—consists of material not previously published. The first article, on Latin nouns of the type of *sēdēs*, is probably the most comprehensive treatment of this group that has yet appeared and includes slightly over fifty nouns, if we count different compounds of the same stem as separate items. Close attention is given to attestation, textual variants, semantic classes (animal names, military terms, technical terms, poetic words, etc.), and in conclusion the words of the type of *sēdēs* are shown to be an archaic and non-productive class, less closely related to the fifth declension than one might imagine, and subject to alteration under the influence of more

productive types.—The second article resembles the first in being a comprehensive listing of words of a certain class, in this case the ethnics of the type of *Arpinās*, *-ātis*, from both literary and epigraphical sources. Ernout dissents from the opinion of W. Schulze that these ethnics are a mark of Etruscan influence: not only is their distribution in Italy too wide to allow such a source to be plausible, but they are found also in Gaul and constitute another evidence of close Italic and Celtic kinship.

The third article, *Problèmes iguviens*, is not, like Ernout's *Le dialecte ombrien* (Paris, 1961), primarily etymological in character, but is concerned with the implications of a pair of tablets (VI and VII) containing the same instructions as the much earlier I but in a greatly amplified form and with the full text of the prayers, in addition to the fact of its being written in the Latin alphabet. Ernout does not raise the unanswerable question of when the Umbrian language became extinct, and he declines to admit positive evidence of influence of the *Acta fratrum arvalium* on the later Iguvine Tables, but he does believe in a considerable degree of Romanization, together with a general decline in the vitality of the Atiedian cult.—The next article briefly reviews a small group of divine names in *-ūna* (*-unna*), of which *Vacuna* and *Vesuna* are the most prominent. The principal sources of the names are epigraphical and the material is not rigidly limited to Latin, for **Decluna* (dat. *Declune*) in the Volscian inscription from Velletri is included, along with a few other dialect forms. The article concludes with a remark on the distribution of the suffix *-uno-* (*-unno-*) in the Italic dialects and Celtic, spreading possibly into Etruscan, and on its resemblance to the suffix *-ōna* *-ōna*. The article which immediately follows, entitled *Celtique "Epōna"*—latin "*Bellōna*," is so close in theme to the preceding that they could almost be looked upon as two parts of a single whole. Again we have an account of a group of divine names, mostly of rare attestation, and having their sources in Gaulish and Etruscan as well as in Latin territory.—The next article, making use of epigraphical attestations from Etruria and parts of Italy under Etruscan influence, argues, quite plausibly in this reviewer's opinion, that *Graius*, *Graecus*, *Graecia*, were brought into Latin by the Etruscans, whose use of the names for Greece and the Greeks in general rested on their contacts with the Epirote Greeks whose territory bordered on that of the Illyrians. The theory had been partly anticipated by J. Bérard, *R. Ph.*, XXXVI (1962), pp. 5 ff., from whom, however, Ernout differs in certain particulars.—The article on *homo*, *ner*, *vir* limits itself to Latin and the Italic dialects. Latin (apart from Sabine loans such as *Nero*, *Nerio*, *neriosus*) possessed only *homo* and *vir*, Oscan only the equivalents of *homo* and *ner*, at least as far as our scanty material permits us to know. Umbrian possessed all three, though *ner* and *vir* are limited to formulaic expressions. Latin, in terms like *duumvir*, reveals a usurpation by *vir* of meanings which in Oscan belong to *ner* as 'the one vested with authority,' but *homo* in turn assumed the meanings of *vir* and ultimately supplanted it.—The article *facere vitula* is an account of *facere* plus ablative in a ritual sense, with discussion of the text of Vergil, *Buc.*, III, 77 *cum faciam vitula pro frugibus, ipse venito*: since

vitulā has the support of Servius and Macrobius, Ernout does not favor changing it, but insists that *vitulam*, the reading of *Codex Romanus*, which alone among the *codices antiqui* contains the passage in question, should at least receive recognition in the apparatus critici.—The article on *-que* and *-ve* deals with certain expressions showing confusion of usage between *-que* and *et*, *-ve* and *aut*. Evidence in Petronius and in the Pompeian graffiti shows that *-que* and *-ve* had disappeared from spoken Latin, a fact corroborated by certain usages in Horace and Ovid. Pages 98-9 show a number of variant readings *-que/-ve* in the *Aeneid*, but with little discussion.—*Indusium*, *indusiarius*, *indusiatus* is actually a study of certain aspects of the vocabulary of Plautus, with particular attention to *Aul.*, 508-27 and *Epid.*, 221-34.—The next two articles have to a considerable extent the nature of reviews. A. I. Charsekin in *Zur Deutung etruskischer Sprachdenkmäler* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1962, a translation of the Russian original) affirms a close connection between Etruscan and Greek, while Georgiev, *Hethitisch und Etruskisch: Die hethitische Herkunft der etruskischen Sprache* (Sofia, 1962), adopts an altogether different position, which is clearly implied by the title of his work. Within Ernout's discussion of the phonological, morphological, and lexical features of the theories under review there is an interesting section (pp. 119-20) on the problem of the numerals on the dice from Tuscania. In conclusion Ernout argues that any claim of a solution to the Etruscan problem is excessive, the more so since the Etruscans themselves were probably the result of an ethnic mixture which is likely to have been reflected in a mixture of language.—The other review article deals with J. André's *Lexique de termes de botanique en latin* (Paris, 1956), which in general he praises highly, although in the important footnote on p. 147 he disagrees with André's thesis that Pliny did not know and use the work of Dioscorides and that the resemblances between them resulted from use of a common source or from their own independent observation of the same plants. Ernout's article is largely devoted to a classification of Latin plant names by morphological types and to a discussion of the problems that arise in connection with the preparation of a lexicon such as André's.—The last article is on the *Gynaecia* of Caelius Aurelianus and contains a page of introductory matter followed by sections on the constitution of the text, language and style, morphology, vocabulary, and syntax. It is in part a review of the edition of Aurelianus' *Gynaecia* by I. E. and M. F. Drabkin and, at the same time, of G. Bendz's *Emendationen zu Caelius Aurelianus*. In conclusion Ernout calls attention to the diverse influences—the Greek original, the Christian milieu, the schools of rhetoric, etc.—which have shaped the language of Aurelianus, and to its importance for students of the history of the Latin language.

Misprints are very infrequent. On page 8, thirtieth line, for *-oi* read *-oi*. On page 12, eighteenth line, in Luer., VI, 280, for *atque* read *et*. On the next to last line of page 19 the Vergilian reference given as *B. 84. 6* should be *B. 6. 84*. On page 21, thirteenth line, for *illis* read *illuc*. On page 59 in footnote 1 read *hic* for *hix* in the seventh line and *iustas* for *custas* in the twelfth.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Papiri della Università degli Studi di Milano (*P. Mil. Vogliano*),
Volume terzo. Milan, Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1965. Pp.
xvi + 227; 10 plates. Lire 15,500.

L'Istituto di Papirologia of Milan— I. Cazzaniga, M. Vandoni, and their associates—continue the publication of their papyrus collection with impressive assiduity and dispatch. Four years after the appearance of Volume II, the third volume carries the number of papyri published in this series to 203 Greek and 7 Demotic. Half of the 100 papyri of this volume, including most of the important pieces, were first published separately in various places. As in the preceding volume, the texts are published here with minimal commentary and, except for the Demotic, without translation; fuller commentaries are provided for the first two Demotic texts, and No. 123—an encomium in the Sophistic tradition, especially interesting because of its early date (third century B.C.)—is accompanied by a commentary of uncommon length (pp. 21-49; original publication in *Studi italiani di filologia classica*, XXIX [1957], pp. 133-71).

The volume opens with ten Homeric fragments (Nos. 111-120), eight from the *Iliad*, one each from a scholion and a lexicon. In the elegant first-century copy from which No. 114 survives the lines were numbered in the margin at least at every hundred if not more frequently. No. 121 (fourth century) preserves the ends of fifteen lines from Book III of Apollonius Rhodius, with a useful variant in line 1300 confirming a modern conjecture. No. 124 offers some improved readings in the second-century fragment of Achilles Tatius originally published by Vogliano in 1938.

With a half dozen exceptions the Greek documents (Nos. 127-203) all date from the second century. Nos. 129-154 (135-174 A.D.) are additional pieces, mostly leases and accounts, from the family archive providing Nos. 50-72 of Volume II. Interesting in No. 147 is the way in which fifths and tenths of measures of grain are expressed; naturally, $\epsilon' = 1/5$ and $\iota' = 1/10$, and with these elements the higher fractions of the series are written thus: $1/5 + 1/10 = 3/10$, $1/3 + 1/15 = 2/5$, $1/2 + 1/10 = 3/5$, $1/2 + 1/5 + 1/10 = 4/5$, $1/2 + 1/3 + 1/15 = 9/10$. No. 152 is a good example of the varied expenses involved in running a prosperous farm: a total of 257 drachmas was spent for labor of various kinds (carpenter, herdsman, wine-treader, etc.), for the purchase of fodder, sheep, a basket cover, yeast, palm fibre for plaiting into baskets, and for the rental of basket-plaiting equipment.

Nos. 155-183 are further documents from the family archive of Nos. 80-95 in Volume II. It is interesting to observe that members of the family repeatedly leased the same 25-aroura farm over a period of forty years, 110-150 A.D.

Among the remaining documents the following points seem noteworthy. No. 189 (208 A.D.) deserves more than its one-sentence introduction, if only to signalize the hitherto unattested presence of a *στόλαρχος διεραμάτων* in the administrative machinery of the grain collection. The ownership of one-sixteenth of a two-storey house, recorded in No. 192, speaks eloquently of crowded living conditions. Roomier accommodations, obviously, were the "two houses and two courtyards adjacent to each other" of No. 194a, but in these lived

"Herais, aged 40, and the children born of my husband from whom I am separated, namely, Kronion aged 21, Protas aged 19, Achillis aged 15; the wife of Kronion, Serapias, aged 18; and Herais' mother, Apias *alias* Didyme, aged 70."

Except for early-Roman No. 2, the seven Demotic documents date from the second century B. C. No. 1 is a lease of land providing for rotation of crops, No. 2 is a receipt for a payment of grain, and Nos. 5-7 are requests for oracular responses from the local crocodile god, Sobek. Nos. 3 and 4 record contracts of *hierodouleia*, an innovation (it seems) of Ptolemaic times whereby Egyptian men and women declared themselves and their descendants to be slaves of the god forever, promising to make a monthly contribution to the temple, in exchange for the god's protection against harm from natural and supernatural causes. In the present instances each of the dedicants is a young woman described as a "houseborn (slave), daughter of unknown father and So-and-so [name of mother]." Each makes the following declaration: "Before Sobek, lord of Tebtynis: 'I am your slave, together with my children and my children's children, from now on. I will give you 2 1/2 *kite* as my slave tribute every month. No ghost, ghostess, somnambulant, corpse, demon or malign influence [*variant*: ghost, ghostess, somnambulant, drowned maniac, demon, malign influence or pestilence] will be able to have me in its possession from now on. I will not be able to be a free person in your temple, never in perpetuity.'"

No volume of papyri fails to augment our vocabulary of ancient Greek. From the present volume the following words can now be added to *LSJ*: *εἰκόνη* (= *εἰκών*?), *ἐπισυναρμόζω*, *κατεικονίζω*, *κτάμιον* (which first appeared in Volume II, apparently a kind of pasture), *ὄνη* (fem. of *ὄνος*), *πρόλυμα*, *προθμάριος* (= *πορθ-*), *πτυχίδιον*, *πυροσπορεία*, *ὑδροδότης*.

My review of Volume II (*A. J. P.*, LXXXIV [1963], pp. 443-5) concluded with the hope that Volume I, of which most copies were destroyed in the war, would be reprinted. Readers and librarians should be pleased to know that that has been done, and Volume I is now available from the publishers of III.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE OF
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK.

TORE JANSON. *Latin Prose Prefaces. Studies in Literary Conventions.* Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964. Pp. 180. Kr. 25. (*Studia Latina Stockholmiensia*, XIII.)

Janson does not elevate "the preface" to the rank of a true literary genre. This is sensible, since prefaces drawn from all over the literary map and from different ages have in fact very little in common.

Hence the first of his two major sections unpretentiously traces recurrent motives and modes of expression in three recognized genres

down to the time of Trajan (prefaces to rhetorical treatises, to histories, and to agricultural handbooks). Then, still stopping with Trajan, when he faces a mass of disparate types of work, mostly didactic or scientific or technical, instead of trying to force a pattern upon their prefaces, Janson simply looks at some isolated phenomena in these prefaces (e.g. at the author's promise of brevity, his appeal to predecessors, his nocturnal studies—cf. *Lucr.*, I, 142 *noctes vigilare serenas*—or at his statement of his qualifications or lack of them).

The second section, continuing the method used in the last part of the first section, deals with clichés and turns of phrases to be found in prefaces written from the time of Trajan down to ca. A. D. 500 (e.g., someone's real or assumed request for the work and the consequent dedication, author's false modesty about his professional competence or style, help from God or even metaphors drawn from ships or from bees and flowers: a goodly mélange). At the end comes an Appendix on Gregory the Great and Gregory of Tours.

Admittedly this arrangement of material makes for a somewhat jerky continuity and at times, especially in the first section, this is made even jerkier by fairly lengthy discussions of what we know or may know or do not know, *pace* others, about individual writers. To the first complaint I would say: plain realism calls for and sanctions Janson's arrangement. A more apparently systematic procedure would have led to distortion and false accents. To the second, the discussions, I would say that honest scholarship demanded them; to have skirted real problems and doubts was the alternative (so pp. 77-83 on Seel's attempt to recover parts of Trogus' preface).

Janson's work itself is full of summaries, though he has compassionately tried to keep these limited. For a reviewer, then, to summarize summaries would be, at the least, unmerciful. Instead, I shall mention a few items.

Anent Sallust's *Historiae* (p. 69), since Büchner seems more or less to have accepted Bauhofer's proposals, see Herbert Bloch, "The Structure of Sallust's *Historiae*," *Didascalicae* (New York, 1961), pp. 61-76. On "the two letters to Caesar, now regarded as genuine by the majority of Sallustian scholars" (p. 69), hopefully now these bogus *suasoriae* have been shown up for what they are; see R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 318 ff. Syme also has much to say on Janson's "When did Livy write his preface" (pp. 73-4): "Livy and Augustus," *H. S. C. P.*, LXIV (1959), pp. 42-57.

Again and again throughout the book there are discussions which only indirectly bear on prefaces but which will much interest Latinists. One example: the remarks on that odd hodge-podge collection, Cato's *Agr.* (pp. 84-7). "In fact, there is no place at all for a farmer on the sort of holding that is described," and so it is hard to see how this absentee landlord is thus to be made *fortis* or *strenuus*. Or, "he departs from the idea of a farm of 100 *iugera* . . . and assumes instead exclusive cultivations of olives on 240 *iugera* and wine on 100 *iugera*." Finally, "the circle for whom Cato was writing and to which he himself belonged was thus in a situation as unlike as possible that of the resident farmer."

This book may be primarily thought of as a work of reference—the bibliography is vast, and at the end there are nine pages listing

major modern studies cited and an index of Greek and Latin authors mentioned—but it will best be used as such after it has been read through. And, despite its arrangement, it is readable, and clear.¹ Janson says of Quintilian: "We need read only a very few pages of this writer to notice that his is a very agreeable nature." I would say the same of Janson, and add that he abounds in modesty and humor.

J. P. ELDER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

PHILIP A. STADTER. *Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. viii + 159. \$4.00.

In this introduction and commentary to Plutarch's *Mulierum Virtutes* Stadter persuasively endorses the viewpoint of Flacelière (notices to the individual *Vitae* in the Budé edition, 1957—), Theander ("Plutarch und die Geschichte," *Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund* [1950-51], pp. 1-86), *et alii* who have rejected the single-intermediary-source as an explanation of Plutarch's method of composition and recognized in Plutarch an uncommonly well-read author who made his own syntheses of the sources at his disposal. For the *M. V.* Stadter finds (see his surveys, pp. 126-37) that he drew from, among others, Ephorus, Phylarchus, Polybius, Ctesias, Aristobulus, Aristotle, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Herodotus, and numerous local historians (Socrates of Argos, Charon of Lampsacus, Naxian and Argive writers, etc.), as well as *autopsia* and his own works. The unprinted Greek text on which Stadter's commentary is based is that of Nachstädt (Teubner, 1935).

The book is organized into four chapters followed by a selective bibliography and an index of proper nouns (including, however, an entry for inscriptions and for papyri). The first two are introductory. Stadter (Ch. I) discusses briefly matters appropriate to the study of the *M. V.* (its organization, authenticity, and date; Greek attitudes toward women from Homer through Plutarch; and other collections of women's achievements) and analyzes Plutarch's introduction to his collection of twenty-seven stories. Of these, nineteen are found also in Polyaeus' *Strategemata*, and Stadter next (Ch. II) demonstrates, by means of a careful examination of narrative and vocabulary, that with the exception of Polyaeus, VII, 45, 2 (Persian women) they are all derived from Plutarch's *M. V.*: the hypothesis of a common anthological source must be discarded.

The heart of the book is Ch. III, a commentary that deals separately with each of the stories in the *M. V.* and has as its major concern the investigation of Plutarch's sources. While literary and

¹ The English style is good, and even where it is a bit stiff, it is always understandable. On pp. 29 and 30, change "leisure time" to "leisure"; on p. 86 "them" should be "they"; on pp. 155 and 156 "loan" should be "borrow."

historical matters receive due attention, usually in conjunction with the source criticism, grammatical and textual problems are not treated. (An exception is textual comments, often in the footnotes, on a few proper nouns, most notably on pp. 78-9, where corroboration is given to Cobet's emendation identifying the heroines of *M. V.*, 12 [249D] as Ceians.)

Stadter's source criticism is in general as cogent as the evidence permits; and he refuses to identify sources on the basis of guesswork, as in the case of *M. V.*, 6 (Celtic women), 7 (Melian women), 10 (women of Salmantica), 11 (Milesian women), 19 (Aretaphila), 20 (Camma), 21 (Stratonice), and 23 (woman of Pergamum). This is not to say that he will convince all readers on all points. Necessarily speculative is his analysis (pp. 58-68) of *M. V.*, 8 (Tyrrhenian women). For the second part of the story (247 D-E, colonization by the Pelasgians [or Tyrrhenians] under Spartan auspices) he accepts Ephorus as Plutarch's source; for the first (247 A-C, down through the Tyrrhenians' escape from prison in Laconia by changing clothes with their wives) he rejects Herodotus, Ephorus, and Philochorus as immediate sources in favor of an unknown writer who modified Herodotus, IV, 145-8. Again, since Plutarch explicitly attributes (248D) his final version of the Bellerophon story in *M. V.*, 9 (Lycian women) to the fourth book of Nymphis' *On Heracleia*, it is questionable to deny (pp. 68-73) his direct use of Nymphis for at least this version. Also, the fact that Pausanias apparently used Plutarch's *Philopoemen* and *Epaminondas* (p. 37) and that Stadter must three times postulate a common source (pp. 36-7, 45, 85-7) to explain similarities between corresponding portions of Plutarch's *M. V.* and Pausanias indicates that the whole problem of Pausanias' relation to Plutarch needs special study. Nevertheless, even those who will disagree with Stadter on various points will find much of their basic research already done, thanks to the thoroughgoing manner in which he has assembled the pertinent *testimonia* and scholarship.

In view of Stadter's commentary (pp. 97-101 and 80-4, 118-20 respectively) two authors should receive additional entries in Helmbold and O'Neil's compilation, *Plutarch's Quotations* (*A. P. A. Monograph*, XIX [1959]): Charon of Lampsacus, *F. Gr. H.*, 262 F7 (*M. V.*, 255A); and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. Rom.*, V, 32-4 (*Publicola*, 18-19; *M. V.*, 250 B-E), V, 36, 2 (*M. V.*, 261 E), VII, 4 (*M. V.*, 261 E-F), VII, 9, 4 (*M. V.*, 261 F). Also (see Stadter, pp. 115-18, 66-7), two references to Herodotus should probably be deleted: IV, 160 (*M. V.*, 260 D ff.), VI, 138 (*M. V.*, 247 A).

Ch. IV is a series of comparisons and conclusions based on the commentary. An examination of the sources of the *M. V.* within the context of Plutarch's other works (especially the *Vitae* and the historical treatises *Quaestiones Graecae*, *Quaestiones Romanae*, and *De Herodoti Malignitate*) demonstrates that in carrying out his introductory resolve (*M. V.*, 243 D) to avoid, except under special circumstances, well-known stories Plutarch relied on his own extensive and thorough knowledge of Greek and Roman history and Greek historical literature (pp. 125-38). Remarks about Plutarch as a storyteller are followed by a résumé in which Stadter states a principle that should be taken to heart by all of Plutarch's source critics (pp. 139-40): "If Plutarch used more than one source for

a short anecdote in the *Mulierum Virtutes*, he undoubtedly did the same in the *Lives*, and the determination of the source of any particular statement in the *Lives* becomes more difficult than has sometimes been believed."

HUBERT MARTIN, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

T. A. DOREY and DONALD R. DUDLEY, editors. *Roman Drama*. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1965. Pp. x + 229. \$4.95.

This book is in the series, *Studies in Latin Literature and Its Influence*, in which *Cicero*, *Lucretius*, and *Latin Historians* have already appeared. Dudley says in the Introduction (p. ix): "In accordance with the plan of the series, contributions to the present volume deal not only with Roman drama, but also with its Greek background and its influence on later literature."

The writers and the subjects of the seven essays are as follows: T. B. L. Webster, "The Comedy of Menander" (pp. 1-20), devoted both to an analysis of the *Dyscolus* "to show the efficient mechanics of Menander's plot-construction" (p. 6) and to an extended discussion of the costumes and masks of New Comedy. W. R. Chalmers, "Plautus and his Audience" (pp. 21-50), on the alterations made in the Greek originals as concessions to popular taste; Chalmers comments on a large variety of topics, including addresses to the audience, Plautus' use of names, the settings of the plays, the prologues, references to Greek mythology and Greek institutions, and the nature of Plautus' humor. J. A. Hanson, "The Glorious Military" (pp. 51-85), and C. D. N. Costa, "The Amphitryo Theme" (pp. 87-122), on the later influence of two of Plautus' most popular comedies. Hanson traces the role of the *miles gloriosus* from Plautus and Terence through Elizabethan drama to Shaw (*Arms and the Man*) and Brecht (*Mother Courage, A Man's a Man*), and Costa carries the story of Amphitryo through Molière, Dryden, and von Kleist to Giraudoux (*Amphitryon 38*). G. L. Evans, "Shakespeare, Seneca, and the Kingdom of Violence" (pp. 123-59), and A. Steegman, "Seneca and Corneille" (pp. 161-92). The latter concludes (p. 191): "Between Garnier, an overfaithful and clumsy disciple, and Crébillon, who preserves only Seneca's exaggerations, Corneille represents the intelligent choice—Garnier, Corneille, Crébillon, three moments of Seneca's influence: the Renaissance, classicism and the baroque." Evans is less interested in the nature and details of Seneca's influence on Shakespeare (already well established by Cunliffe, Lucas, Eliot, and others) than in the reasons why Shakespeare looked to Seneca and in the manner in which his imagination breathed new life into the non-dramatic elements of the Roman dramatist;¹ he says (p. 157): "In the final analysis it is simply

¹ Evans states (p. 134): "There is much . . . that 'proves' that Seneca's plays were never subjected to the harsh demands of public theatrical performance."

the word 'humanity' which distinguishes Shakespeare's work from that of Seneca and Seneca's Elizabethan followers. . . . What one sees, in fact, is the growth of a complete dramatist out of the material of an incomplete dramatist." With the final essay, "Five Westminster Latin Plays," by T. L. Zinn (pp. 192-226), we return to Plautus and Terence and a delightful description of the Westminster productions of *Phormio* (1954), *Miles Gloriosus* (1956), *Mostellaria* (1958), *Adelphi* (1960), and *Heauton Timorumenos* (no date given; 1962?). Zinn, admittedly quite uninterested in Latin Plays when he accepted a position at Westminster in 1950, is enthusiastic about Latin Comedy as a vital and universal achievement, and concludes (p. 226) with "the sure knowledge that Latin is a living language."

The volume contains an index (pp. 227-9), and the illustrations include actors and scenes from *Titus Andronicus*, the *Mostellaria*, and *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum*.

The essays as a whole are well-written, scholarly, and up-to-date, but contain little that is new or striking. Those on Plautus' *Nachleben* are perhaps the most original, and this seems especially true of Hanson's study of the *Miles*. Terence is neglected; the late Professor Beare was to write on "The Reputation of Terence," but (p. x) "his sudden death means that this project—like so much else—must remain unfulfilled." The lack of an adequate treatment of Terence seems unfortunate, especially since Webster in the opening essay is unkind; e.g., p. 1: "Terence translated texts accurately but often flattened out the colour of the original"; p. 19: "Terence is at best like a Roman copy of a Greek statue; the outlines are well preserved but the bloom and life is largely lost." Webster also detracts from Plautus' fame by suggesting (p. 1) that "some of the elements which we regard as Plautine, particularly the expansion of the slave parts, may have been due to Greek actors during the century or so which separates Plautus from his originals." The estimate of Zinn seems preferable (p. 195):

After producing three plays by Terence and two by Plautus, I was struck most by the fact that though both playwrights drew upon similar originals, they were so very different from each other. Even if Latin plays are in some respects similar to each other, there could hardly be two more different comic writers than Plautus and Terence. This fact alone throws into high relief the extraordinary originality which Latin authors brought to their re-creation of Greek prototypes.²

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

² Zinn's experience with the production of both Plautus and Terence confirms my own views: see G. E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (Princeton, 1952), pp. 393-5.

ANTON WEISCHE. Studien zur politischen Sprache der römischen Republik. Münster, Westfalen, Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966. Pp. 111. DM. 18. (*Orbis Antiquus*, herausgegeben von Franz Beckmann und Max Wegner, Heft 24.)

When in 1963 J. Hellegouarc'h published his comprehensive study, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république*, Weische had already gone far with a similar investigation. From it he publishes here portions dealing with political terminology for which he has suggestive and often convincing new interpretations. In his discussion of the relation between Greek and Latin terminology, a subject that in general Hellegouarc'h avoids (see *A. J. P.*, LXXXVI [1965], pp. 328 f.), Weische provides an important supplement to the French scholar's valuable work. Weische considers particularly the language in Cicero's orations and in Sallust's monographs and *Historiae*, language influenced by the familiarity of both men with Greek texts. Under the title "Die moralische Kritik im Kampf der spätrepublikanischen Parteien," more than half the book deals with Greek and Roman propaganda for and against democracy. Important differences between Greek and Roman political thinking are revealed by the study of *furor*, *audacia* (pp. 23-33 and, for the influence of Thucydides on Sallust, 66-70) and *levitas*, *gravitas*, *constantia* (pp. 38-52). In the light of the investigations of Dumézil, Wagenvoort, and Hiltbrunner, the peculiarly Roman elevation of *gravitas* to a virtue is considered in some detail with the suggestion that *gravitas* corresponds to Isocrates' use of *σεμνότης*. But the influence of Isocrates is less convincing in the contrast in optimate propaganda between the *gravitas* attributed to *optimates* and Romans and the *levitas* assigned to *populares* and Greeks. Weische finds peculiarly Roman without Greek or German parallels the concept of *existimatio*, "public opinion," with *gratia*, "good repute," and *invidia*, "bad repute." The effort of the candidate was to increase his own *gratia* and at the same time the *invidia* of his rivals. These simple distinctions, in Weische's view, reflect a state which was neither democracy nor pure oligarchy, a state in which the voters, in choosing among candidates from the leading families, depended heavily on public opinion.

The contrast between the propaganda of *optimates* and that of *populares* is constantly emphasized. The language of the *optimates* is to be found in Cicero's orations and often also in Livy, that of the *populares* in the speeches from Sallust's historical writings (the letters to Caesar are not cited) and also at times in Caesar. The author really understands Roman politics, and every word of his discussion is worth reading and pondering.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

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